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Abstract

This thesis assesses India’s maritime strategy and critically examines its efficacy and sustainability
including India’s ambitions to be the “net security provider” for the region.” It seeks to answer the
question, whether or not the extant maritime strategy would help India maintain its balance of
power with respect to China, and recommends complementary actions and alternate strategic
options for India to fulfill its goals in the Indian Ocean.
The first part of the thesis examines the entire range of strategic maritime threats and challenges
posed to India by the evolving Indian Ocean security environment of the twenty-first century.
These include the non-traditional threats such as piracy, maritime terrorism and illegal fishing as
well as traditional threats posed by India’s hostile neighbours, China and Pakistan. Subsequently,
it looks at how India’s foreign policy has shaped its maritime doctrine and strategy, and examines
the stated objectives of India’s maritime strategy that broadly envisage shaping a favourable
environment in the India Ocean by emerging as the primary “net security provider” for the littoral
states. Next, the thesis explores how the changing world security order of the twenty-first century
facilitates maritime security cooperation, and proposes an innovative framework that helps to
empirically measure the degree of cooperation between India and regional states. Based on this
framework, the thesis then examines India’s bilateral maritime security cooperation initiatives with
various regional states and extra-regional powers, and critically analyses the extent and scope of
these relations supported by empirical evidence. This is followed by a comparative assessment of
India’s bilateral security ties vis-a-vis Chinese influence in the region. The thesis argues that
although India has successfully established durable bilateral security ties with most regional states,
India’s maritime strategy is unsustainable in the long term and challenged by rising Chinese
influence in the Indian Ocean. The study brings out the inherent risks in India’s maritime strategy
and proposes an alternate strategic option for India that leverages its geostrategic advantage in the
Indian Ocean. The thesis also explores India’s role in multilateral maritime security cooperation in
the Indian Ocean and identifies the risks in India’s insular approach to multilateral maritime
security cooperation in the region, arguing for involvement of China as well as other extra-regional
stakeholders in the maritime security of the region.
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The thesis posits that as Chinese maritime power follows its trade in the Indian Ocean region, the
threat of China altering the extant balance of power with India in its favour, looms large. What then
are the other strategic options for India? The thesis broadly recommends the following: India must
realise that national strategy is about leveraging own means rather than dependency on foreign
relations which could change over time. Hence, the current focus of India’s maritime strategy based
on building bilateral relations could be wasteful and unsustainable. The thesis identifies the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands as the weakest link in India’s maritime strategy. It argues that by
failing to develop the Andamans as a full-fledged operational command India has failed to leverage
their geostrategic potential, overlooking the mouth of the Strait of Malacca. The expansion of
China’s maritime power coupled with its rising economic and political influence in the Indian
Ocean region could lead to a permanent Chinese presence in the region that could effectively
neutralise India’s geographic advantage in the Indian Ocean. Thus, India must strengthen the
Andaman and Nicobar command and upgrade it to the level of other naval commands. Furthermore,
India should concurrently endeavor to strengthen maritime multilateralism in the Indian Ocean
region and work towards closer integration of the extant sub-regional institutions. India’s current
approach to take complete “ownership” of the various regional fora in its bid to emerge as the sole
“security provider” for the region could potentially stymie growth of maritime multilateralism in
the Indian Ocean region paving the way for a larger role by China. Finally, the thesis recommends
that India must work towards development of a pan-Indian Ocean information grid, as a regional
strategic project that could help to link together the various stakeholders in regional security and
help to strengthen India’s position in the region.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background
India faces a wide range of strategic maritime threats and challenges in the twenty-first century.
On one hand, India is exposed to several non-traditional threats such as piracy, transnational crimes
and terrorism. These threats are of an urgent nature and widely prevalent in the Indian Ocean
region. On the other hand, India also has to cope with long-term traditional strategic threats to its
territorial integrity from an emergent superpower, China, with growing influence in the Indian
Ocean region, and a hostile medium power, Pakistan. The “blurring of traditional and nontraditional lines”1 has given rise to India’s maritime strategy dilemma of having to cope with the
entire range of security threats with the available resources of a developing economy.
Consequently, India, with tacit support from the United States, has sought to leverage its maritime
power to create an overall secure and favourable environment for itself in the Indian Ocean region
by trying to take on the role of a “net security provider,” as specified in India’s current maritime
strategy,2 to tackle both the non-traditional threats and counter Chinese influence in the region.

Aim
This thesis seeks to assess India’s maritime strategy to critically examine its efficacy and
sustainability in the context of the prevailing maritime security of the Indian Ocean. This
examination includes an assessment of India’s ambitions to be the “net security provider” for the
region, and addresses the question of whether the extant maritime strategy can help India to
maintain its balance of power with respect to China. It also recommends complementary actions
and alternative strategic options that India could adopt to fulfil its policy goals in the Indian Ocean.

1

Government of India, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, Indian Navy Naval Strategic Publication 1.2,
Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence (Navy), New Delhi, October 2015, p. 3.
2 Ibid, p. 8.
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Literature Review
The rise of China, the future of India-China relations and the likelihood of a confrontation between
the two countries playing out in the Indian Ocean has been examined by various scholars. Some
salient works by leading analysts on this subject in recent years are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
In 2001, John W. Garver, in his comprehensively researched book, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian
Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, examined the relations between independent India and the
People’s Republic of China beginning from mid-twentieth century and analysed the five decades
of struggle between the two countries for “mutually acceptable accommodation.”3 In his analysis
Garver focused on the “interpretation of the broad pattern of interaction between the two great
states,” which he described as the world’s foremost ancient civilisations, stressing the deep and
enduring geopolitical rivalry between them. Based on this approach he also attempted to
prognosticate on the future state of India-China relations. Garver proposed two possible outcomes:
One, China could agree that South Asia is India's security zone and sphere of influence and desist
from actions there which are objectionable to New Delhi. Two, India could accommodate itself to a
seemingly inexorable growth of China's political-military role in South Asia.4

Garver concluded that, in the twenty-first century, given India’s earlier history of accepting
China’s subjugation of Tibet and its strategic partnership with Pakistan, New Delhi would tacitly
reconcile to China’s steadily expanding role in South Asia.5 By a logical extension this also implies
the Indian Ocean region, although Garver does not specifically state this. Perhaps, writing in 2001,
Garver failed to anticipate the rise of the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean, the inherent
vulnerabilities of China’s maritime trade through the region, and the strategic interests of the
United States in countering the rise of China. Consequently, Garver’s predictions for India-China
relations in the twenty-first century, so far, seem to be off the mark.

3

John W. Garver, Protracted Contest : Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, University of Washington Press, Seattle,
2001, pp. 3-5.
4 Ibid, pp. 368-385.
5 Ibid, p. 377.
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In 2011, in his definitive book, China and India: Great Power Rivals, Mohan Malik provided an
in-depth analysis of the bilateral relations between China and India. Malik aptly summed up SinoIndian bilateral relations as follows:
Just as the Indian sub-continental plate has a tendency to constantly rub and push against the Eurasian
tectonic plate and causes friction and volatility in the entire Himalayan mountain range, India’s
bilateral relationship with China also remain volatile and friction-and tension-ridden.6

Malik traced the divergent histories of both ancient civilisations and highlighted the brief intercivilisational interactions of the past. He also critically examined the similarities and differences
in the strategic cultures of both states. On this basis he posited that the “stage is set for more
competition than cooperation between Han and Hindu in the twenty-first century.” Malik further
stated that
…there is a fundamental clash of interests between China and India that is rooted in their strategic
cultures, history, geo-economics, and geo-politics. The biggest obstacle to Sino-Indian amity is that
both countries aspire to the same things at the same time on the same continental landmass and its
adjoining waters.7

He continued that China’s naval forays into the Indian Ocean have given a “maritime dimension
to the evolving U.S.-China-India strategic triangle.”8 Accordingly, the more India feels “encircled”
by China, the more it will move towards the United States and Japan:
As navies of two rising powers extend their reach and rub up against each other on the high seas, the
potential for confrontation – fueled by China’s historical nostalgia and an India buoyed by a sense of
historical revival – is likely to increase.9

Malik predicted that with both India and China focusing their naval strategies on each other in the
Indian Ocean, “the risk of miscalculation and escalation in the future remains high, unless managed
skillfully.” Although he also speculated that, in the long term, India and China could possibly even
come to terms in a cooperative burden-sharing arrangement that could improve stability and
security in the Indian Ocean. In this respect, he thinks that both sides do not consider Washington

6

Mohan Malik, China and India: Great Power Rivals, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 2011, p. 9.
Ibid.
8 Ibid, p. 357.
9 Ibid, p. 358.
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as an “honest broker” that could be trusted to mediate a deal between them. In the end, the author
prognosticates that Sino-Indian relations would be marked by geopolitical competition and
selective partnership on issues of mutual interest, with the threat of war looming large over the
long term.
Malik’s assessment of Sino-Indian relations remains relevant. Further, in line with his predictions
and evidenced by recent developments, jockeying for geopolitical influence by India and China in
the Indian Ocean region continues to rile Sino-Indian ties; if anything, the competition appears to
have become more pronounced in recent times.
In 2012, Raja Mohan, in his comprehensive book, Samudra Manthan, analysed the consequences
of the growth of India and China in the twenty-first century in the “world’s maritime spaces,” the
Indian and Pacific Oceans. He begins his analysis in the late twentieth century period, when the
two countries, driven by growing trade and seeking raw materials, turned their focus to naval
expansion.10 Mohan argued that an enduring security dilemma is manifest in Sino-Indian relations
based on the earlier history of conflict and the “unrelenting logic of geography.” He posited that,
as India and China expand their maritime footprint in the Indo-Pacific region, they are likely to
“step on each other’s toes and those of the Americans, the world’s dominant maritime power.”11
The book predicted that a closer maritime partnership between India and the United States is a
likely outcome of the growing Sino-Indian power struggle. He also believes that a strong IndoU.S. security relationship could invite Chinese countermeasures. The author suggested that SinoIndian contestation would also involve the Indian Ocean island countries, including Sri Lanka,
Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles and Madagascar, as both major powers seek to expand their
influence over the island states. He predicts that this could potentially lead to some island states
attempting to play one power against the other.12
In order to reduce the prospect of Sino-Indian rivalry from escalating in the maritime arena,
Samudra Manthan advocates development of mutual confidence-building measures and greater
maritime security cooperation, even suggesting that India be more accommodating of extraregional powers in the Indian Ocean. In the final analysis, however, Raja Mohan admits that the
10

C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C.,
October 2012, p. 2.
11 Ibid, p. 4.
12 Ibid, p.124.
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direction of Sino-Indian relations would be eventually shaped by the overall strategic environment
in the Indo-Pacific, where he believes the United States plays a crucial role. According to the
author:
Despite its relative decline, the United States is likely to still have a dominant say in ordering both the
oceans’ spaces as well as defining the overarching security framework for the Indo-Pacific. The nature
of the U.S. relationship with China and India and the unfolding dynamic between Beijing and New
Delhi are likely to be the principal determinants of the future security order in the Indo-Pacific region.
While many middle powers will have a bearing on the political evolution of the littoral, it is the United
States that has the biggest influence on the emerging Sino-Indian contestation in the Indo-Pacific.13

Raja Mohan concluded his arguments by putting forward three possible outcomes for the SinoIndian rivalry in the Indo-Pacific: cooperative security, a great power concert, and a balance of
power system. Although providing a critical analysis of all plausible scenarios that could unfold
in the twenty-first century between India and China, he seems to attach great importance to the
continued role of the United States in the region in support of India. However, it is viewed that a
likely scenario involving a Sino-American rapprochement in the future or a progressive
withdrawal of the United States from the region, with the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Navy
playing a more active role as security provider for the Indian Ocean, could potentially change the
outcome of the regional equation.
Another recent title published in 2014 dealing with India’s maritime power, India’s Ocean - The
Story of India’s Bid for Regional Leadership, by David Brewster, examined India’s “strategic
ambitions” as a rising world economic and military power and its network of security relations in
the Indian Ocean region. Brewster’s work sought to answer the question “whether India has the
wherewithal to become the leading power in the Indian Ocean.”14 Brewster argues that India sees
itself as destined to become not only a major regional power but also a global power:
Though few might publicly admit it, many in New Delhi believe that the Indian Ocean must be, and
must be seen to be, ‘India’s Ocean’. This involves several ideas – ﬁrst, domination of the Indian Ocean
is not merely a strategic choice but part of India’s ‘manifest destiny’; second, India must establish a
defence perimeter as deep into the Indian Ocean as possible to preclude the possibility of extra-

13
14

Mohan, Samudra Manthan, p. 234.
David Brewster, India’s Ocean - The story of India’s bid for regional leadership, Routledge, New York, 2014, p. 1.
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regional intervention in the subcontinent; and third, that the development of a sphere of inﬂuence in
the Indian Ocean is a necessary step towards India’s status as a global power. 15

Brewster noted that given the complicated relationship between India and China, the latter is
“firmly opposed to India’s aspirations” in the Indian Ocean region. He posited that in dealing with
China, India is faced with two strategic options: either to attempt to limit Chinese influence in the
Indian Ocean, or to try and engage China as a responsible stakeholder in the security of the region;
although he believes that China would be unlikely to be prepared to rely on India for protection of
its own security interests. In the final assessment Brewster argued that while India may acquire the
wherewithal to dominate the Indian Ocean in the coming years, it could be constrained by several
factors, including the role of the United States as the predominant military power in the region,
and India’s relations with middle powers such as Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Australia and South
Africa, which may not want to cede complete control to India.16 Further, according to Brewster,
China’s growing economic power and “inﬂuence will create important constraints on India’s
power and its ability to develop security relationships.”17
Although Brewster’s book provides a thorough assessment of the role of India in the Indian Ocean,
his assessment about the role of middle powers, particularly Australia, Indonesia and South Africa,
appears to be not only an overestimation of their maritime power and relative influence in the
region but also an exaggeration of their view of India’s growing maritime influence. Brewster cites
the example of Australia’s refusal to supply uranium to India as evidence of the former’s rebuttal
of India’s growing power. However, Australia has since agreed to supply uranium, with the then
Australian prime minister, Julia Gillard, admitting that the refusal to sell uranium to India had been
an "obstacle" to getting a larger slice of the benefits of the booming Indian economy.18 In any case
all three middle powers are seen to be aligned with the United States which is clearly in favour of
backing India’s efforts in the region.
One of the latest books dealing with Sino-Indian relations released in 2015, Meeting China
Halfway, by Lyle J. Goldstein,19 provides an interesting perspective on the U.S.-China rivalry,

Brewster, India’s Ocean - The story of India’s bid for regional leadership, p. 12.
Ibid, p. 203.
17 Ibid, p. 205.
18 “Australian Government Gives Green Signal to Supply of Uranium to India,” NDTV Online, 30 November 2015.
19 Lyle J. Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway, Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C., 2015, p. 1.
15
16
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which the author posits “continues to build a dangerous momentum in our own time.”20 According
to Goldstein, in five years China will surpass the size of the U.S. economy and some areas of
military capability such as anti-ship cruise missiles, yet the Americans continue to believe that
ideological differences preclude any rapprochement between the two powers. Goldstein believes
that the rise of China will force the United States and other world powers to make “strategic
readjustments and to reach political accommodations with China.” The book provides over one
hundred concrete proposals seeking to “reverse the escalation spiral” between the U.S. and China,
dealing with numerous global issues such as climate change, tensions in the Middle East and
relations with India, where the two countries could collaborate. Writing about the U.S.-ChinaIndia strategic triangle, the author states that China is concerned about U.S. assistance to build up
India’s naval capability, particularly the unprecedented sale of the state-of-the-art Boeing P-8I
maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircraft, which Beijing believes could be used to
monitor the PLA Navy in the Indian Ocean.21 Goldstein concludes that the Sino-Indian rivalry has
thus “become a major component of the spiraling China-U.S. rivalry.”22 He proposes a series of
options for the United States to play a positive role in facilitating a “constructive relationship
between New Delhi and Beijing.” Broadly, these proposals include the United States discouraging
India from providing assistance to Vietnam and for China to dispel rumours regarding a future
military base in Pakistan. Furthermore, he argues that both sides should exchange information
about their naval deployments in the Indo-Pacific region, and finally for India and China to agree
to an “East/West swap” of territory to settle the Himalayan border dispute.23
Goldstein’s book provides numerous “out of the box” ideas for the United States, China and India
to consider, such as the option to exchange information about naval deployments. However, his
proposal for a territory swap seems to be simplistic and even far-fetched. Given the extant trust
deficit between India and China, and between China and the United States, it would be extremely
difficult for the United States to convince India and China to agree on any such bold suggestion.
In any case, as the author points out, a territory swap was earlier proposed by the Chinese to India
but rejected outright.24
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Significance of the Research
A review of the extant literature dealing with Sino-Indian relations indicates that although various
plausible scenarios have been envisaged by many scholars, there is a general consensus that the
course of Sino-Indian relations in the twenty-first century will be shaped in the Indian Ocean
region. Yet, while many scholars have examined Sino-Indian relations from different perspectives,
few have focused on their maritime interactions, with the exception of Raja Mohan and Brewster.
Even fewer have concentrated on their naval interactions or the important relationship between
these interactions and maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean region in the twenty-first
century, an area where the Indian Navy is playing a crucial role. This thesis seeks to fill in those
gaps.
This research assumes significance because, firstly, it provides a nuanced view of the scope and
extent of India’s maritime reach and influence in the Indian Ocean, a crucial factor in how SinoIndian competition evolves. Secondly, it provides a viewpoint that runs contrary to the longstanding view held in India, and articulated in the official maritime strategy and other government
documents and policy announcements, that by developing a “favourable environment” alone, India
could seek to maintain its “balance of power” with China. The thesis examines the twenty-first
century security environment in the Indian Ocean and extent of the Indian Navy’s capability and
influence in the region. It argues that India’s maritime strategy to become the “net security
provider” is unsustainable with several inherent risks, and proposes an alternate strategic option,
one that leverages India’s inherent geostrategic advantage over China in the Indian Ocean, to
maintain an overall balance of power with China.

Objectives of the Research
This thesis examines the evolving maritime environment of the Indian Ocean, expansion of
Chinese maritime power in the region and its implications for India. It analyses India’s foreign
policy and maritime strategy to maintain a favourable balance of power with respect to China and
also to tackle the prevalent regional non-traditional maritime threats and challenges. It discusses
India’s bilateral relations with various regional and extra-regional states including the United
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States, Japan and Russia. The thesis also examines the various multilateral security initiatives in
the Indian Ocean region and the role played by India within these fora. It identifies the inherent
risks in India’s insular approach to multilateral maritime security cooperation in the region and
argues for the involvement of China and other extra-regional stakeholders in the regional maritime
security. Finally, the thesis recommends specific actions by India that could complement its
maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean.

Research Questions
This thesis seeks to address the following research questions:

Q1: What are the strategic maritime threats and challenges faced by India from the evolving
security environment of the twenty-first century in the Indian Ocean region?
Q2: How has India’s foreign policy shaped its twenty-first century maritime doctrine and strategy
for the Indian Ocean? What is the basis for India’s ambitions to emerge as the “net security
provider” for the Indian Ocean region, enunciated in the latest maritime strategy titled Ensuring
Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy of 2015?
Q3: What is the role of maritime security cooperation in the developing twenty-first century
security order in the Indian Ocean region? How can maritime security cooperation be assessed
analytically?
Q4: What is the efficacy of India’s bilateral maritime security cooperation initiatives with the
Indian Ocean regional states? Can India’s security ties undermine Chinese economic and political
influence in the region in the long term? What are other complementary actions and strategic
options that could be followed?
Q5: What is the context of India’s relations with extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean?
Q6: What has been India’s role in multilateral maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean
region? How can India strengthen multilateral maritime security cooperation in the region? What
are the prospects for maritime cooperation between Indian and China in the Indian Ocean region?
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Hypotheses
The key hypotheses of the thesis are as follows:

H1: The twenty-first century security environment in the Indian Ocean region presents several
complex challenges to India.
H2: India by virtue of its geographic location and extant naval power enjoys relative superiority
over China in the Indian Ocean. However, India’s relations with China and Pakistan will remain
adversarial and China will seek to enhance its influence in the Indian Ocean in pursuit of its
national interests.
H3: India, with tacit support from the United States, is asserting its leadership in the Indian Ocean
region with a national vision to emerge as the region’s “net security provider.”
H4: India has established close bilateral security relations with most Indian Ocean states.
H5: India has adopted a hedging strategy with other extra-regional powers such as the United
States, Japan and Russia in order to balance China.
H6: India alone cannot meet all the future maritime security challenges of the Indian Ocean region
and therefore needs to involve China along with other stakeholders, including the shipping
industry, in regional multilateral initiatives to offset costs and augment regional maritime
capabilities, while maintaining close security ties with other strategic partners.

Research Methodology
This research is based upon empirical analysis and has involved extensive library study, field work
and interactions with senior government officials and naval officers, particularly from the Indian
Ocean region. The primary sources include various reports issued by the Government of India
including the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of External Affairs. Reference was also made
to journal articles and commentaries published by various leading think tanks. Details pertaining
to military budgets, naval acquisitions and combined exercises were obtained from IHS Jane’s
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publications such as the Jane’s Fighting Ships, Jane’s Defence Weekly and Jane’s Navy
International. The author’s firsthand experience and impressions, as an Indian naval officer, of
participating in several multinational and bilateral naval exercises with various regional navies,
and official/professional interactions with many other navies have also been selectively included
in making assessments.

Chapter Structure
This study is divided into nine chapters, including this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 provides an
overview of the maritime environment in the Indian Ocean and the backdrop for a study of India’s
maritime strategy. It examines the geophysical attributes of the region, strategic resources and raw
materials in the region, trade flow patterns and the prevalent non-traditional threats. It also
examines the various multilateral security initiatives that have emerged in the region to address
the regional maritime threats. Furthermore, it provides a detailed discussion on China’s strategic
interests in the Indian Ocean region and expansion of its maritime power there followed by the
resultant implications for India. This chapter provides evidence for hypotheses 1 and 2.
Chapter 3 is focused on the evolution of India’s foreign policy and maritime strategy. It traces the
development of India’s foreign policy post-independence up to the present, including recent
government policy announcements regarding the Indian Ocean under the Modi government. It
provides an in-depth analysis of the extant Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2016 and the latest
maritime strategy titled Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, of 2015,
superseding The Freedom to Use the Seas: India's Maritime Military Strategy of 2007. It also
examines the modernisation of the Indian Navy and the resulting transformations in doctrine and
strategy enabled by significant enhancements in capability. This chapter provides evidence for
hypothesis 3.
Chapter 4 discusses the concept of maritime security cooperation. It looks at the various types of
security relationships, including alliances and coalitions, and examines the scope of maritime
security cooperation as an alternative approach to alliance formation in the twenty-first century.
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This chapter also provides an empirical framework, used in the following chapters, for making an
assessment of India’s security ties with various regional states.
Chapter 5 provides an assessment of India’s bilateral security relations with all the Indian Ocean
regional states. It also examines the level of China’s political and economic engagements with the
regional states and compares it to India’s bilateral security relationships to make an overall
assessment of India’s regional influence vis-à-vis China. Chapter 5 offers evidence to substantiate
hypothesis 4.
Chapter 6 explores India’s bilateral maritime security relations with the United States, Russia,
France, the United Kingdom, Japan and Vietnam to analyse the scope and depth of support
provided to India, and the strength of India’s security ties with these powers. It also examines the
scope for alliance formation under the ongoing maritime security cooperation initiatives with the
United States and Japan. Chapter 6 provides evidence for hypothesis 5.
Chapter 7 studies the role of India in various regional multilateral fora such as the Indian Ocean
Rim Association (IORA) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). It argues that India’s
insular approach to multilateral security cooperation precludes support from other stakeholders,
including extra-regional states such as China and Japan, as also commercial interests. It
recommends alternate strategic options for India that include a role for all stakeholders in maritime
security in the Indian Ocean. This chapter addresses hypothesis 6.
Chapter 8 outlines a framework for a Pan-Indian Ocean information grid for maritime domain
awareness (MDA), that could be initiated by India under the aegis of IORA and IONS.
Chapter 9, the conclusion, provides an overall assessment of India’s maritime strategy to be the
regional “net security provider,” based upon all the research findings. It surmises that the extant
Indian maritime strategy for the Indian Ocean is unsustainable in the long term as a growing
Chinese involvement in the region would inevitably draw it into regional affairs and “dilute”
India’s status as the primary net security provider. Thus India needs to urgently reassess its strategy
to adopt an alternate option that leverages its geostrategic location in the Indian Ocean to maintain
balance of power with China. India also needs to introduce specific multilateral initiatives to
complement its strategy, such as the Pan-Indian Ocean information grid.

13

Chapter 2
The Twenty-first Century Environment in the Indian Ocean Region

Introduction
For several millennia, the states of the Indian Ocean rim were bound together by trade, religion,
culture and shared traditions, helped by the seasonal monsoon winds.1 India played a central role,
thus giving the ocean its name. The arrival of the European powers heralded by Vasco Da Gama’s
landing at Calicut in South India in 1498 was a seminal event, and the colonial rule epoch that ran
for the next five centuries appears to have fractured the cohesive nature of the region. In the twentyfirst century, the region appears to be re-inventing itself as a distinct geographical identity with
India once again playing a central role.
The present environment in the Indian Ocean region is a complex interplay of several factors:
predominantly, the unique geography of the region with various choke points, an abundance of
strategically important natural resources and the proliferation of non-traditional threats.
Furthermore, these issues are compounded by a lack of adequate maritime capacity amongst the
majority of the regional states to manage their maritime affairs. Against this backdrop, the rise of
China has been the most significant geopolitical development of the twenty-first century. As an
emergent superpower, China is critically dependent upon its maritime trade and economic interests
spread across the Indian Ocean region. Consequently, the last few years have seen a steady
expansion of Chinese maritime power in the Indian Ocean with further enhancements expected in
the near future under China’s ambitious maritime silk road programme. This has far-reaching
implications upon the overall Sino-Indian balance of power. This chapter provides a broad
overview of the Indian Ocean region and examines the various factors that shape the geopolitical
environment and their impact on India’s maritime security.
The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part discusses the geographical attributes of the
Indian Ocean region, followed by an overview of the various strategically important natural
resources present and the resultant trade flow patterns. The third part deals with non-traditional
1

Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, Random House, New York, 2011, pp. 1-3.
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threats prevalent in the region, including natural disasters, the role of navies in humanitarian aid
and disaster relief operations and the various multilateral mechanisms for maritime security in the
region. The final part examines India’s relations with China and Pakistan in the context of the
Indian Ocean to highlight the strategic threats and challenges that confront India in the Indian
Ocean region in the twenty-first century.

Geographical Attributes of the Indian Ocean Region
The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean on Earth, covering 68.56 million square km and
spanning 10,000 km from the southern tip of South Africa to Australia. Indian Maritime
Doctrine defines the Indian Ocean limits as follows:

The Indian Ocean is separated from the Atlantic Ocean by the meridian of 20° East and from the
Pacific by the meridian of 147° East. The northern limit of the Indian Ocean is the Persian Gulf, at
the approximate latitude of 30° North. Extending southwards down to the parallel of latitude 60°
South, it may be seen as a walled ocean bounded on three sides by land. Africa forms the western
wall, while Malaysia, Myanmar, and the insular continuations of Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and
Australia form the eastern wall.2

The geographical position of the Indian Ocean and its strategic waterways provide the shortest and
most economical lines of communication to the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. Although, in the
long term, this could potentially change with the opening up of the Arctic routes which could lead
to re-routing of some shipping between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans bypassing the Indian
Ocean. This would particularly impact shipping traffic to and from China and Japan.
The political map of the Indian Ocean comprises 36 littoral (38 including the British and French
territories in the Indian Ocean) and 20 hinterland states. Details of the Indian Ocean littoral states
are tabulated below:-

2

Government of India, Indian Maritime Doctrine, Naval Strategic Publication 1.1, INBR 8, Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry
of Defence (Navy), New Delhi, February 2016, pp. 55-56.
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Table 2.1: Overview of Indian Ocean Region Rim States3
Country
Australia

Population (Millions)
23.63

Coastline (1000 Km)

EEZ ( 1000 Km2)

36.7

8,505.30

(excluding

Antarctic territory)
Bahrain

1.34

0.14

5.10

158.51

1.32

76.80

Comoros

0.73

0.40

228.40

Djibouti

0.88

0.35

6.20

East Timor

1.15

0.71

770

Egypt

83.39

1.62

173.50

Eritrea

6.53

1.0

75.80

1267.40

9.0

2,014.90

252.81

60.0

5408.60

Iran

78.47

1.84

155.7

Iraq

34.77

0.002

0.70

Israel

7.82

0.23

23.30

Jordan

7.50

0.002

0.70

Kenya

45.55

0.45

118.0

Kuwait

3.48

0.21

12.0

Madagascar

23.57

4.0

1,292.0

Malaysia

30.19

3.43

475.60

Maldives

0.35

0.64

959.10

Mauritius

1.25

0.18

1,183.0

Mozambique

26.47

2.5

562.0

Myanmar

53.71

2.3

509.50

3.92

2.0

561.70

185.13

1.37

318.50

2.27

0.40

24.0

29.37

2.40

186.0

Seychelles

0.93

0.49

729.70

Singapore

5.52

0.30

0.30

Somalia

10.81

3.20

782.80

South Africa

53.14

3.0

1,016.70

Bangladesh

India
Indonesia

Oman
Pakistan
Qatar
Saudi Arabia

Central Intelligence Agency,“World Factbook,” December 2016, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/html.
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Sri Lanka

21.45

1.70

517.40

Sudan

38.76

0.95

91.60

Tanzania

50.76

0.725

223.20

Thailand

67.22

2.96

324.70

9.45

2.42

59.30

24.97

0.17

584.20

0.70

660.20

0.39

2593.2

150.19

31229.70

United

Arab

Emirates
Yemen
British Indian Ocean

No indigenous population.

Territories (BIOT)
French Territories
Total

1.11
2614.3

The combined coastline of all the Indian Ocean littoral states accounts for nearly 40 per cent of
the world’s coastline. Table 2.1 reveals that Indonesia, Australia and India claim the three largest
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the Indian Ocean region.4 The small island states, Mauritius
and Seychelles, together have EEZs almost the size of India’s EEZ. Furthermore, Djibouti, with
an EEZ spanning just 6,200 square kilometres, by virtue of its location at the mouth of the Gulf of
Aden, is emerging as a pivotal state for the maritime security of the Indian Ocean.
As seen from Table 2.1, the Indian Ocean region is inhabited by about 2.6 billion people,
representing 35.7 per cent of the world’s population in 2010,5 living on a quarter of the world’s
landmass and generating about ten per cent of the global gross domestic product (GDP).6 By 2030
this population will likely have added another 689 million people.7
Sub-Regions in the Indian Ocean Region
For the purposes of this study the littoral states of the Indian Ocean have been divided or
categorised into the following sub-regions:

4

David Michel and Russell Sticklor, eds., Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Policy Challenges, Stimson Centre Study
Report, Washington D.C., 2012, p. 11.
5 Ibid.
6 Amit A Pandya, Rupert Herbert-Burns and Junko Kobayashi, Maritime Commerce and Security: The Indian Ocean, Henry L.
Stimson Centre Study Report, Washington D.C., February 2011. p. 7.
7 Michel and Sticklor, eds., Indian Ocean Rising, p. 11.
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•

South Asian states: Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

•

West Asian states: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
UAE and Yemen.

•

East African states: Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eretria, France, Kenya, Madagascar,
Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan and Tanzania.

•

Indian Ocean island countries: Mauritius and Seychelles.

•

Southeast Asia and Australia: Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore,
Thailand and Timor Leste. 8

Choke Points in the Indian Ocean
A unique and distinguishing feature of the Indian Ocean is that it is covered by the Asian continent
over its entire northern extent in the form of a “roof”. This makes it different from the Pacific and
Atlantic oceans, which stretch from north to south without any intervening landmass. Entry to and
exit from the Indian Ocean region is through numerous choke points which make it easy to control
shipping and also makes trade vulnerable. The various choke points in the Indian Ocean are
described in the following paragraphs.
Suez Canal

The Suez Canal is a manmade sea-level waterway cutting across the Isthmus of Suez

in Egypt and connecting the Mediterranean Sea (Port Said) to the Red Sea (Port Suez). The canal
is more than 193 km long and has a maximum depth of 24 metres. Ships with a draught of up to
20 metres are cleared for transit. The width of the canal at a depth of 11 metres varies between
205-225 metres.9 While the Suez Canal can accommodate partially loaded very large crude carriers
(VLCCs) and ultra large crude carriers (ULCCs), the largest ships cleared for transit are termed as
Suezmax (a typical Suezmax ship displaces about 160,000 tons with a beam of 50 metres and
draught of 20 metres). Compared to the Cape of Good Hope, the Suez Canal is the shortest EastWest route. The savings in transit time reduce as one proceeds eastwards of Suez. Thus, the
distance between Rotterdam and Tokyo through the Suez Canal is 23 per cent shorter in
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, “About IONS,” 10 November 2016, available at http://ions.gov.in/about_ions.html.
Suez Canal Authority,”About Suez Canal,” 10 November 2016, available at
http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/About/SuezCanal/Pages/AboutSuezCanal.aspx.html.
8
9
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comparison to the Cape of Good Hope route, while the distance from Rotterdam to Port Said is
shorter by 86 per cent compared to the Cape route. A total number of 16,833 ships transited
through the Suez Canal in 2016, an average of about 46 ships daily.10 The graph below depicts the
number of ships and tons transported via the Suez Canal between 1975 and 2013. A sharp drop in
numbers in evident from 2008 until 2011 attributable to the global financial crisis and the rise of
piracy in the Gulf of Aden, which resulted in many ships following the longer Cape of Good Hope
route.
Figure 2.1: Suez Canal Transits - Numbers and Net Ton Evolution11

Strait of Babel-Mandeb

The Strait of Bab el-Mandeb (meaning “gate of grief” in Arabic) lies

between the Saudi peninsula and Northwest Africa, flanked by Yemen on the Saudi side and
Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia on the African side. The strait is approximately 41 km wide but
divided into two channels by the Island of Perim (Yemen). The channel to the East is known as
Bab Iskender or Alexander's Strait. This channel is about 3.7 km wide and 30 metres deep while

Suez Canal Authority, “Navigation Statistics,” August 2017, available at
http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/Navigation/Pages/NavigationStatistics.aspx.html.
11 Ibid.
10
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the western channel, Dact-el-Mayun is about 25 km wide and 310 metres deep. Near the coast of
Djibouti lies a group of smaller islands known as the "Seven Brothers."12 There is a surface current
inwards in the eastern channel, but a strong undercurrent outwards in the western channel. The
north coastline of Somalia forms the funnel leading to the strait. The Bab el-Mandeb thus forms a
strategic link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal. According
to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), trade in crude oil and petroleum products
through the Bab el-Mandeb in recent years has increased steadily, rising from 2.7 million barrels
per day in 2010 to almost 4.7 million barrels per day in 2014.13
Strait of Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz lies within the overlapping territorial waters of Iran and

Oman and connects the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf. The strait is about 39 km wide at the
narrowest point, though shipping traffic passes through a narrow traffic separation scheme (TSS)
which consists of a 4 km- wide channel each for inbound and outbound traffic, separated by a 4
km-wide median.14 The channels are deep and wide enough to handle the world's largest crude oil
tankers, with about two-thirds of oil shipments carried by tankers in excess of 150,000 deadweight
tons (DWT). According to the EIA, about 17 million billion barrels per day (roughly 35 per cent
of all seaborne traded oil) were transported through the straits in 2011, slightly more than the 15.715.9 million barrels per day recorded in 2009-2010. More than 85 per cent of the oil was bound
for Japan, India, South Korea and China.15
Given the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz in the supply of oil globally, jurisdictional
issues over the governance of the Straits and the international regime for navigation under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), involving Iran and the United States
have created strategic complexities and uncertainties in the global oil markets. Neither the United
States nor Iran are party to UNCLOS and both disagree over the application of the treaty in the
Strait of Hormuz. 16 The United States claims the right of transit passage in the strait as prescribed

12

United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, Admiralty Sailing Directions NP64 Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Pilot, London, 2015, pp.
87-108.
13 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Oil trade off Yemen coast grew by 20% to 4.7 million barrels per day in 2014,” 23
April 2015, available at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=20932.html.
14 United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, Admiralty Sailing Directions NP63 Persian Gulf Pilot, London, 2015, pp. 45-63.
15 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most important oil transit chokepoint,” 4 January
2012, available at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4430.html.
16 James Kraska, “Legal Vortex in the Strait of Hormuz,” Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 54, Issue 2, Spring 2014, p.
323.
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under UNCLOS and being reflective of customary international law.17 Transit passage permits an
unrestricted right to travel on the surface, under the water, or in over flight through international
straits. Iran counters this claim by insisting that the provisions of UNCLOS may only be applicable
to states that are party to it.18 The dispute is complicated by Iran’s own claim to twelve mile
territorial seas, a key provision under UNCLOS. Iran argues that the twelve mile territorial seas
are now part of customary law. Consequently, over the years, as tensions between Iran and the
United States have escalated and diffused, so have the global oil prices “waxed and waned.”
Since 2008, when the commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard announced that Iran would seal
the Strait of Hormuz, in retaliation to attacks from the United States or Israel, several high-ranking
officials reiterated this threat. In 2012, the Iranian naval commander, Admiral Habibillah Sayari,
is reported to have stated to a television channel that closing the Strait of Hormuz was as easy as
“drinking a glass of water.”19 The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps or the IRGC – widely
regarded as the masters of unconventional maritime warfare – have carried out several exercises
to practice blocking the Strait of Hormuz.20 In recent years Iran’s maritime capability has increased
and it can be easily assumed that it has adequate and multiple capacities to block the Strait of
Hormuz at will. However, just as the Iranians have conducted several exercises aimed at blocking
the straits, the U.S. Navy has also held various minesweeping exercises and practiced scenarios
involving simulated blockings of the Strait of Hormuz.
It is widely believed that while Iran could block the strait, it is unlikely to do so. In 2010 Admiral
Mike Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked about Iranian threats to close
the strait.21 He stated, “The analysis that I have seen certainly indicates that they have capabilities
which could certainly hazard the Strait of Hormuz.” But, he added, “I believe that the ability to
sustain that is not there”. Further, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff in January 2012, said, “[Iran] has invested in capabilities that could, in fact, for a period of
time block the Strait of Hormuz.” 22 He also added, “We’ve invested in capabilities to ensure that
if that happens, we can defeat that.” It may therefore be safe to assume that while Iran has the
Kraska, “Legal Vortex in the Strait of Hormuz,” p. 323.
Ibid.
19 Maj Gen (Retd) RK Arora, “ Will Iran Block the Life Line,” Indian Military Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, February 2012, p. 4.
20 Jeremy Binnie, “Gulf Guerrillas,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 6 February 2014, p. 34.
21 William Komiss and LaVar Huntzinger, ” The Economic Implications of Disruptions to Maritime Oil Chokepoints,” Centre for
Naval Analysis Study Report, Washington D.C., March 2011, p. 15.
22 “Iran Able to Block Strait of Hormuz – General Dempsey tells” Bloomberg, 1 August 2012.
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capacity to block the straits it is unlikely to do so in the near future mainly because blocking the
strait is assessed to be unsustainable beyond a few days while the retaliation that such an act would
invite from U.S. forces and the resultant debilitating impact it would have on the Iranian economy
would be long term. In any case, the successful conclusion of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear
issue between Iran and the P5 + 1 (The United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, France
and Germany) in Vienna in July 201523 and the subsequent lifting of several western sanctions is
expected to pave the way for peace and stability in the region, thus negating any further risks.
As a result of the threat mongering by Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have invested in several
pipelines which have significantly reduced the impact of a potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz
and provided alternate routes for transporting oil. These pipelines are currently capable of
supplying approximately 40 per cent of the total oil carried through the Strait of Hormuz, as
tabulated below.
Table 2.2: Pipeline Routes Bypassing the Strait of Hormuz24
Pipeline

Capacity (million barrels per day)

Abqaiq-Yanbu Pipeline

0.29

East-West Pipeline

2.5 (generally operating at 50% capacity)

Tapline

0.50

Iraq Petroleum Saudi Arabia (IPSA)

1.65

Total Capacity

4.94

According to EIA, in 2013, India was the world’s fourth largest consumer of oil after the United
States, China and Japan, and also the fourth largest importer of crude and petroleum products.
Nearly 80 per cent of India’s domestic oil demand is met by imports and in 2012-13 India imported
182.5 million tonnes of crude, including 13.3 million tonnes from Iran.25 In recent years, India’s
dependence on Iranian crude has reduced – as a result of international sanctions – and Iran has
slipped three places to become India’s sixth largest supplier after Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Venezuela,
United Nations,” UN applauds 'historic' deal on Iranian nuclear programme,” 14 July 2015, available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51409.html.
24 Komiss and Huntzinger,“The Economic Implications of Disruptions to Maritime Oil Chokepoints,” p. 18.
25 “Indian Oil to cut Iranian oil imports by 23%: Veerappa Moily,” The Mint, 6 August 2013.
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Kuwait and UAE. However, for India, any disruption in the Strait of Hormuz poses significant
challenges as it could also hamper India’s oil imports from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and UAE, which
pass through the straits.
Straits of Malacca and Singapore

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are a narrow, 805 km-

long waterway linking the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and the
Pacific Ocean, thereby connecting the economies of India, China, Japan and South Korea. At its
narrowest point in the Phillip Channel off Singapore, the strait is about three km wide. An average
of more than 80,000 ships carrying one quarter of the entire world’s traded goods and oil transit
the straits each year making it the world’s busiest shipping channel. 26 According to the EIA, over
15 million barrels per day or one-third of all seaborne oil was transported through the strait daily
in 2011, mostly headed for China and Japan, but also bound for South Korea and Taiwan. Nearly
80 per cent of China’s energy imports and 90 per cent of Japan’s oil imports transit the straits.27
Around 26 tankers including three fully laden tankers pass through the straits daily. However,
given the shallow depths of 23 metres prevalent in the region, ships up to 200,000 DWT only are
allowed to navigate through the straits. The only alternate pipeline route to the Straits are two
parallel oil and gas pipelines between Kyaukphyu, Myanmar, and Yunan Province in China
recently commissioned by China.28 This oil pipeline is capable of carrying 440,000 barrels per
day.29
Historically, the straits have been a hub for maritime piracy and armed attacks on ships. This may
be largely attributed to the geography of the coastline along the narrow strait which lends itself
suitable for sneak attacks on passing ships. Thus, the pirates can launch surprise attacks on
opportune targets and disappear into the cover of numerous small islands, creeks and coves. In the
early fifteenth century, many of the local pirate groups were used by the local Sultan of Malacca
to maintain control over various islands. During the eighteenth century, piracy in the region had
increased; spurred by the arrival of colonial powers engaged in spice and opium trade between

“Malacca and S'pore Straits traffic hits new high in 2016, VLCCs fastest growing segment,” Seatrade Maritime News, 13
February 2017, available at http://www.seatrade-maritime.com/news/asia/malacca-and-s-pore-strait-traffic-hits-new-high-in2016-vlccs-fastest-growing-segment.html.
27 Chen Shaofeng,” China’s Self-Extrication from the “Malacca Dilemma” and Implications,” International Journal of China
Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 2010, pp. 1-24.
28 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Natural Gas Pipeline System - Southeast Region,” June 2015, available at
www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/southeast.html.
29 Ibid.
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British India and China. Subsequently, in 1830, the British and Dutch naval forces joined hands to
combat piracy in the region. By 1870, piracy in the straits had almost disappeared. Piracy reemerged in the region towards the end of the twentieth century when the Asian financial crisis of
1997 resulted in widespread unemployment, poverty and slow economic growth.30 By 2004, the
number of armed attacks on ships in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore had reached a record
high of 157 recorded incidents.31 Piracy has since been brought under control due to the joint
efforts of the littoral states including Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. However,
concerns of maritime safety and security remain, thus requiring the constant surveillance efforts
of all the littoral navies.
Lombok Strait

The Lombok Strait lies between the islands of Lombok and Bali in Indonesia

connecting the Java Sea to the Indian Ocean. This strait is much wider with a minimum width of
19 km and deep, with depths greater than 150 metres. It is also less congested than the Strait of
Malacca.32 It is therefore the preferred route for fully laden tankers displacing more than 230,000
DWT. The strait is about 60 km long and lies entirely within the Indonesian archipelago.
Makassar Strait

The Makassar Strait is about 966 km long and 18 km wide and lies between the

Indonesian islands of Borneo and Sulawesi. It connects the Celebes Sea to the north and the Java
Sea to the south. Both the Lombok and Makassar Strait are used by deep draught ships not cleared
to navigate through the Strait of Malacca.33
Sunda Strait

The Sunda Strait lies between the Indonesian islands of Java and Sumatra

connecting the Java Sea to the Indian Ocean along a northeast – southwest axis. It is 81 km long
and its narrowest width is 24 km. While the strait is deep at the western end, the depths fall to
about 20 metres at the eastern end. Ships with draughts in excess of 18 metres (corresponding to
approximately 100,000 DWT) do not transit the strait. The strait is also known to be difficult to
navigate due to sand banks, strong tidal currents and manmade obstructions.34

Jennifer C. Bulkeley,”Regional Cooperation On Maritime Piracy: A Prelude To Greater Multilateralism In Asia?” Journal of
Public and International Affairs, Vol. 14, Spring 2003, p. 58.
31 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships for the Period 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015,
2016, London, p. 7.
32 United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, Admiralty Sailing Directions NP36 Indonesia Pilot Vol 1, London, 2017, p. 187.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
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Cape of Good Hope

Traditionally, the route via Cape of Good Hope was used by ships that were

larger than the Suezmax. However, in recent years this shipping route has gained prominence due
to the resurgence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and an increase in toll charges levied by the Suez
Canal authority. While the Cape of Good Hope is not a choke point in the conventional sense as it
is not restricted by availability of navigable waters, unfavourable currents require the ships to
transit close to land.35
Six Degree and Nine Degree Channels

The Six Degree Channel, also known as the Great Channel,

is the channel south of Indira Point on Great Nicobar Island (India’s southernmost territory) and
north of Aceh in Indonesia. The Great Channel is wide and easy to navigate and used by ships
entering or leaving the Strait of Malacca. The Nine Degree Channel is the channel between the
Lakshadweep Islands of Kalpeni and Suheli Par, and Maliku Atoll. It forms the most direct route
for ships sailing from the Persian Gulf to East Asia. In 2010, at the height of Somali piracy, ships
had faced attacks from bands of Somali pirates operating in the region, which has since been under
constant surveillance by both the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard. Both the Six Degree and the
Nine Degree channels lie largely within Indian waters and provide India with a unique geographic
advantage in monitoring the majority of the shipping traffic transiting the Indian Ocean.

Strategic Resources in the Indian Ocean Region and Trade Flow Patterns
The Indian Ocean region has significant deposits of strategic materials that are vital to the world’s
economy. Critical resources include bauxite, chromite, coal, copper, diamonds, gold, iron ore,
natural gas, nickel, oil, phosphates, tin, titanium, tungsten, uranium and zinc.36 The countries in
the region are also the largest producers of rubber, spices, tea and jute.37 Details of major sources
of various raw materials and commodities are as follows:

Government of India, Freedom to use the Seas; India’s Maritime Military Strategy, Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of
Defence (Navy), New Delhi, 2007, p. 28.
36 Pandya, Herbert-Burns and Kobayashi, Maritime Commerce and Security: The Indian Ocean, pp. 10-16.
37 Freedom to use the Seas, p. 41.
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Table 2.3: Sources of Raw Materials and Commodities in the Indian Ocean Region38
Country

Resources

Australia

Iron ore, coal, bauxite, alumina, grain, uranium, refined petroleum products,
LNG.

Bahrain

Refined petroleum products.

Djibouti

Refined petroleum products.

Egypt

Crude oil, phosphates.

India

Iron ore, coal, bauxite, alumina, refined petroleum products.

Indonesia

Coal, crude oil, refined petroleum products, LNG.

Iran

Iron ore, crude oil, refined petroleum products.

Iraq

Crude oil.

Jordan

Phosphates.

Kuwait

Crude oil, refined petroleum products.

Madagascar

Bauxite, alumina, wood.

Malaysia

Bauxite, alumina, palm oil, crude oil, refined petroleum products, LNG.

Oman

Crude oil, LNG.

Pakistan

Refined petroleum products.

Qatar

Crude oil, LNG, refined petroleum products.

Saudi Arabia

Crude oil, refined petroleum products.

Singapore

Refined petroleum products.

Sri Lanka,

Phosphates.

South Africa

Iron ore, coal, grain, phosphates, refined petroleum products.

Tanzania

Refined petroleum products.

UAE

LNG, crude oil, refined petroleum products.

Yemen

LNG, crude oil

A unique feature of the Indian Ocean regional trade is the fact that trade between Indian Ocean
littoral states constitutes only 20 per cent of the total volume, while the remaining 80 per cent is
transported outside the region.39 This explains the strategic interests of extra-regional states in the
region and the presence of their navies in the Indian Ocean. The above trade pattern is reversed in
the Pacific and the Atlantic where extra-regional naval presence is uncommon. However,

38

Pandya, Herbert-Burns and Kobayashi, Maritime Commerce and Security, pp. 10-16.
Government of India, Indian Maritime Doctrine, Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence (Navy), New Delhi, 2007,
p. 58.
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according to a United National Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report, recent
trends indicate growing intra-region trade.40 According to the report, global maritime trade has
traditionally been dominated by three economic centres: North America, Europe and Asia.
Together these three areas imported 88 per cent of the seven billion tons of cargo transported by
sea in 2005.41 However, the UNCTAD report forecasts that this pattern is expected to change as
Africa emerges as a major source for natural resources and as their consumption levels increase in
tandem with improved income levels. China has already overtaken the United States as Africa’s
largest trading partner. In 2011, U.S.-Africa trade was $123 billion while China-Africa trade stood
at $133 billion.42 Further, according to a Lloyd’s Register study report the maritime trading
patterns by 2030 will change from being Western centric to Sino centric.43
In recent years, there has been much speculation around the feasibility of new trade routes via the
Arctic, primarily including the North Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest Passage (NWP). The
opening up of the new routes could potentially connect Japan and China with the Atlantic region,
transiting outside the Indian Ocean as demonstrated by the voyage of the MV Yong Sheng from
the Chinese shipping company COSCO, in September 2013, from Dalian to Rotterdam. However,
according to a study, the commercial exploitation of these routes is unlikely to be a reality for
some time due to the lack of adequate polar-capable ships and the costs involved.44 Presently, only
765 container ships are classified as ice capable (out a global fleet of 5,502 container ships) with
a total capacity for about 1.2 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs)45, while the remaining
fleet of 4,258 vessels accounts for about 15.9 million TEUs. The report also states that ship
operators are in no hurry to improve their numbers of ice capable ships as only seven out of 479
container vessels currently on order are ice capable. These seven ships are mostly small classes
with none possessing over 1,000 TEU capacity. In addition to the lack of suitable vessels, the
viability of the polar route is also constrained by factors such as lack of adequate ice breakers and
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United National Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport, Geneva, 2013, p. 5.
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42 Ibid, p 9.
43 Lloyd’s Register’s Strategic Research Group, QinetiQ and the University of Strathclyde, Marine Trends 2030, Glasgow, 2013,
pp. 14-17.
44 Gary Li, “Arctic North Sea Route Study,” IHS Maritime, London, 2014.
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safety concerns. Thus, the Indian Ocean shipping lanes will continue to remain the primary trade
routes in the future.

Impact of Geography on Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region
Despite occupying the same geographic region, the Indian Ocean states exhibit vast differences in
levels of economic development and prosperity, with a majority being developing economies. For
instance, the region includes states such as Australia, ranked second according to the UN human
development index (HDI) and Mozambique, ranked 184, fourth from last. According to a 2012
Stimson study report:
Overall, the average HDI value for the IOR was only 0.597 (compared to a world average of 0.682).
Thirteen IOR states exhibit HDI values below 0.522, falling in the UNDP’s Low Human Development
category, while only six states numbered in the Very High Human Development group showing values
of 0.793 and above.46

As a result of the economic disparities and the geographic connectivity provided by the Indian
Ocean, maritime transnational crimes such as illegal human migration and trafficking by sea, and
other illegal activities such as smuggling of narcotics and other contraband are prevalent in various
part of the region. Further, as seen historically, the choke points in the Indian Ocean have had a
major influence on the security of maritime trade. Between the sixteenth and seventeeth centuries,
both Arab and Malay pirates benefited from the strategic locations of the choke points in the Strait
of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca, respectively.47 Political instability at the time also aided the
pirates who found safe havens in various locations along the coast. These very factors have led to
the recrudescence of piracy in the Strait of Malacca towards the end of the twentieth century and
later in the Gulf of Aden in the last decade.48 The non-traditional threats and challenges in the
Indian Ocean region are discussed in the following paragraphs.
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Piracy
Following a period of generally peaceful global maritime trade that lasted well over a century,
piracy (or armed attacks on ships as classified by the IMO) first re-emerged towards the end of the
twentieth century in the Strait of Malacca; manifestly precipitated by the financial crisis in the
region.49 As noted earlier in the chapter, by 2004, the number of attacks on ships transiting the
Strait of Malacca region had peaked, accounting for almost half of the global total of 329. The
Strait of Malacca was declared as the world’s top piracy hotspot by the International Maritime
Bureau (IMB) and placed in the war risk zone by Lloyd’s War Committee, resulting in the levy of
additional insurance surcharge for ships transiting the Straits. This prompted the Southeast Asian
littoral states, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, to launch naval anti-piracy patrols
codenamed Operation Malsindo in 2004 under the Malacca Strait Security initiative (MSSI). These
patrols have continued uninterrupted and have since expanded to include aerial patrols (Eyes in
the Sky), an intelligence sharing mechanism and associated security infrastructure such as a radar
surveillance network. The region has remained below Lloyd’s threshold of high risk areas since
mid-2006, when it was officially declared risk free. This appears to have led to a lackadaisical
attitude creeping into the participating navies, and recent years have once again witnessed a spurt
in the number of incidents, described by the IMB as “low level opportunistic thefts.”50
Nevertheless, it is opined that the regional security mechanism which has worked well for over a
decade should be able to tackle these new challenges.
Just when piracy started declining in the Strait of Malacca region, a new “hotspot” emerged in the
Gulf of Aden region in 2005 when Somali fishermen turned pirates started attacking vessels
transiting the Somali EEZ. In 2006, there were 22 incidents of attacks on ships by Somali pirates.
The numbers of attacks increased rapidly, more than doubling with each passing year, from 51 in
2007 to 111 in 2008 and then climbing to 217 in 2009.51 Between 2009 and 2011, the number of
incidents remained constant at over 200, and the range of attacks by the Somali pirates increased
significantly, bringing the entire western Indian Ocean region under threat from piracy. In mid2009, with the arrival of the Second Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG2) the number of
Catherine Zara Raymond,” Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: A Problem Solved?” Naval War College Review,
Vol. 62, No. 3, 2009, p. 33.
50 “Somali pirate clampdown caused drop in global piracy, IMB reveals,” International Chamber of Commerce, 15 January 2014.
51 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships for the Period 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2011,
2011, London, pp. 5-16.
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warships on anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden had reached a record number of about 23 ships
on patrol.52 However, this did not deter the Somali pirates as during this period piracy had more
than doubled from the previous year.
Since 2012, largely as a result of private security, implementation of best management practices
(BMP 4), continued naval patrolling and counter-piracy efforts on land, Somali piracy had almost
ceased.53 Consequently, ship owners may have scaled down onboard security and started passing
closer to Somali shores, even though a leading private security company cautioned that the threats
to the maritime industry were far from eradicated.54 In a grim reminder of the dangers, suddenly
in March 2017 Somali pirates hijacked two vessels and some others were attacked in the following
weeks.55
Historically, it has been seen that piracy has erupted in the Indian Ocean in areas close to choke
points and regions marked by political instability as in the case of Somalia. Therefore, while piracy
may have declined significantly in some regions it could re-emerge once again elsewhere.
Moreover, as demonstrated by Somali pirates, the proliferation of commercial-off-the-shelf
technologies such as GPS and portable radios, a small boat manned by pirates is capable of
carrying out long-range attacks on unarmed merchant ships. Thus, in the twenty-first century, the
high seas are no longer desolate regions but akin to lonely stretches of highway on land where
highway robbers prowl. This is a significant development that has changed forever the way
mariners now look at the high seas.
Maritime Terrorism
In addition to piracy in the Indian Ocean, the beginning of the twenty-first century also witnessed
some of the most audacious maritime terrorist attacks in the world since the advent of the LTTE
Sea Tigers, including the attacks on USS Cole and the French Tanker Limburg in the Gulf of Aden
in 2000 and 2002, respectively. By 2007, the Indian Ocean had become, in the words of Admiral
Sureesh Mehta (the then Indian Naval Chief), “the de facto home of global terrorism, with many
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regional states covertly or even inadvertently aiding and abetting subversive elements.”56 The most
horrific terrorist attacks conducted in the region were the 26 November 2008 attacks in Mumbai
in which ten armed terrorists belonging to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), an Islamic militant
organisation, infiltrated through the west coast of India, killing over 160 people including several
foreigners, and women and children.
Subsequent terrorist attacks in the region include a failed attack on the Japanese VLCC M.Star
which, on 28 June 2010, suffered hull damage caused due to an external explosion in the Strait of
Hormuz,57 and a brazen attack by a terrorist outfit known as Al Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent
(AQIS, an affiliate of the Al Qa’ida) which successfully penetrated into a Pakistani naval dockyard
in an attempt to seize the frigate, PNS Zulfiqar, in September 2014. AQIS later announced that the
frigate would have been used to target the U.S. aircraft carrier in the Gulf.58
These incidents clearly indicate that the threat of maritime terrorism is prevalent in the Indian
Ocean region even though the U.S.-led global war on terror has left Al Qa’ida, the key perpetrator
behind most of the attacks, substantially weakened. A 2012 report on terrorism by the Royal United
Services Institute (RUSI), highlighted some disturbing trends indicating that Al Qa’ida was
looking at partnerships in the Saharan and Sub-Saharan Africa region to regroup and re-energise
itself. 59 This has since manifested in the rise of Al-Qa’ida affiliates such as Al-Qa'ida in the
Maghreb, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in the region which appear to be emulating the tactics of
Al-Qa’ida.60 These groups could therefore plan maritime terrorist attacks as Al-Qa’ida senior
members are known to have worked alongside Al-Shabaab since its formation in 2006.61 Further
in 2016, it has been predicted that the latest global terrorist group Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) could expand its operations to North Africa and Asia where it is expected to attack soft
targets.62 One could speculate that these terrorist groups may find the maritime sector a weak and
vulnerable target.
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Overall, the above findings do not augur well for the future and as they indicate a heightened threat
of resurgence of maritime terrorism in the region. It is therefore opined that maritime security in
the Indian Ocean region will continue to remain fragile and require unhindered and sustained
regional naval cooperation to maintain good order and stability at sea.
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing
Relative to piracy and terrorism, IUU fishing seems to have received much less attention in the
region. Although IUU fishing is an issue of global concern it is widely prevalent in the Indian
Ocean, adversely impacting the sustainability of fish stocks and thus food security. According to
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, about 50 per cent of marine
fish stocks are fully exploited, 15 to 18 per cent are over exploited, and ten per cent are already
depleted.63 This is a global phenomenon and according to a 2014 Global Ocean Commission
report, From Decline to Recovery: A Rescue Package for the Global Ocean, the high seas are akin
to a “failed State” where “anarchy rules the waves.”64 As noted earlier, illegal fishing off Somalia
led to depleted fish stocks, driving the local fishermen to desperation and eventually to piracy in
the early twenty-first century. Although, piracy has now been brought under control, IUU fishing
is once again on the rise. In 2014, a think tank, One Earth Future, noted that foreign fishing fleets
in Somali waters took three times more fish than Somalis, threatening regional maritime security,
and undermining local economic development.65 Thus a comprehensive approach to maritime
security in the Indian Ocean demands far greater focus on IUU fishing than is currently accorded.
Lower End Threats
Maritime threats in the Indian Ocean region at the lower end of the spectrum include smuggling
of drugs, human trafficking and illegal migration. The Indian Ocean region is notorious for its
illegal drug trade with large shipments known to be masked by aromatic cargo such as tea or
coffee, which are commonly shipped across the region, and which make detection by sniffer dogs
difficult. In December 2015, the Australian warship HMAS Melbourne, captured 118kg of heroin,
valued at over $100 million, from a fishing vessel along the “hash highway” or the shipping lanes
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used by drug barons in the Indian Ocean. This was the warship’s fourth such catch since September
2015.66 Money from the sale of narcotics is also known to be used to fund terrorism, giving rise to
the term “narco-terrorism.”67
Human trafficking and illegal migration, although limited to certain parts of the region, have
emerged as another key challenge with wider ramifications. Illegal migration in the Indian Ocean
region has largely been precipitated by the widespread economic disparity amongst the regional
states coupled with political instability and violence in parts. The geographic proximity between
littoral states and the practical difficulties of surveillance and patrolling along maritime borders
seems to have facilitated illegal migrations by sea. Australia, due to its proximity to Indonesia,
received until recently a large number of illegal migrants each year by sea. According to an
Australian government report, between 2012-13, a total of 18,119 asylum seekers arrived by sea,
including people from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.68 In 2015, over 7000 “boat
people” attempted to flee Myanmar and Bangladesh across the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman
Sea.69 A large number of boats were apprehended trying to land the migrants in Thailand, Malaysia
and Indonesia. These trends indicate that the regional navies and coast guards, hitherto involved
in dealing with security issues or providing humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations
(HADR), now also have to prepare to deal with these new “manmade” crises.70

Naval Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Operations
A worldwide database for natural disasters since 1900 to the present, known as the International
Disaster Database or EM-DAT,71 is maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology
of Disasters (CRED). All disasters which meet the following criteria are recorded in the EM-DAT:
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• Ten or more people reported killed.
• 100 or more people reported affected.
• Declaration of a state of emergency.
• Call for international assistance.
CRED classifies natural disasters as follows:
Table 2.4: Categorisation of Natural Disasters
Disaster

Definition

Disaster Main Types

Events originating from solid earth.

Earthquake, Volcano, Mass

Subgroup
Geophysical

Movement (dry).
Meteorological

Events caused by short-lived/small to meso scale

Storm.

atmospheric processes (in the spectrum from
minutes to days).
Hydrological

Events caused by deviations in the normal water

Flood, Mass Movement

cycle and/or overflow of bodies of water caused by

(wet).

wind set-up.
Climatological

Events caused by long-lived/meso to macro scale

Extreme Temperature,

processes (in the spectrum from intra-seasonal to

Drought, Wildfire.

multi-decadal climate variability).
Biological

Disaster caused by the exposure of living

Epidemic, Insect Infestation,

organisms to germs and toxic substances.

Animal Stampede.

According to the 2014 CRED annual disaster statistical review, during 2014, hydrological
disasters had the largest share in natural disaster occurrence, accounting for 47.2 per cent, followed
by meteorological disasters (36.4 per cent), geophysical disasters (9.9 per cent) and climatological
disasters (6.5 per cent).72 Further, over the last decade, China, the United States, the Philippines,
Indonesia and India together constitute the five countries that are most frequently hit by natural
disasters.

72

Debarati Guha-Sapir, Philippe Hoyois and Regina Below, Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2014: The numbers and trends,
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Brussels, September 2015, pp. 1-2.

34

It is a well-known fact that 75 per cent of the world’s population resides within 200 nautical miles
of the coast. According to a 1994 study on hypsographic demography (distribution of population
by altitude), while an estimated 33.5 per cent of the world’s population, lived within 100 vertical
meters of sea level, 15.6 per cent of all inhabited land lies below 100 metres elevation.73 Thus,
population densities in these coastal areas are high, with resultant, increased vulnerability to
maritime disasters. The study also reveals that Asian coastal areas have the most significant
concentrations of populations close to the coast. The vulnerability of the Indian Ocean region
states to hydrological disasters is well know and a CRED report brings out that between 2004 and
2013, two out of the three global disasters killing over 100,000 people took place in the Indian
Ocean rim, notably the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 and cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008. 74
According to the above CRED report, in 2014, much in line with the observations from 2004 to
2013, Asia was most often hit by natural disasters (44.4 per cent), followed by the Americas (23.5
per cent), Europe (16.7 per cent), Africa (12.0 per cent) and Oceania (3.4 per cent). While there is
no empirical evidence to suggest that Asia is particularly more vulnerable to natural disasters
compared to other regions, it is evident that the loss of lives is greater in Asia due to the high
population density and inadequate economic development in the region, resulting in poor
infrastructure to cope with such calamities.
Natural disasters can strike anywhere and at any time, and early warning and quick response are
the key to reducing damage. It is universally accepted that the armed forces are best suited to
respond to major disasters. In the Indian Ocean region, navies therefore have a crucial role to play
and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations form a key element for regional
maritime cooperation. Some recent disasters in the region where the navies have played a central
role are described in the following paragraphs.
Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004
The tsunami of 24 December 2004 that originated in a magnitude 9.0 earthquake in the Indian
Ocean, hit the shores of 11 littoral states, including Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, Indonesia,
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Kenya, Malaysia, the Maldives, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Thailand, killing over 226,408
people.75 The worst affected states were Indonesia and Sri Lanka, followed by Thailand and
southern parts of India and the Andaman and Nicobar islands. The Indian Navy was one of the
first to react and deployed 19 ships, four aircraft, and 11 helicopters on Day 1, in support of relief
work in the Maldives, Sri Lanka and South India, including the state of Tamil Nadu, and the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India conducted several major rescue, relief and reconstruction
missions in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Maldives. The relief operations continued for many days
with some other navies participating. The U.S. Navy had the largest presence in the region,
supported by Australia, Bangladesh, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Pakistan, albeit on
a smaller scale. The French and Japanese navies also joined in subsequent reconstruction
activities.76
Cyclone Sidr
In November 2007, Cyclone Sidr ravaged Bangladesh killing over 3,400 people and causing
widespread damage rendering several million people homeless.77 This was one of the ten strongest
cyclones to ever hit Bangladesh in over a hundred years and the resultant storm surge caused the
sea levels to rise by as much as five metres.78 The Indian Navy deployed three ships with relief
material and shipped 5,000 tons of rice.79 The U.S. Navy also employed two vessels and several
medical and relief teams for support.
Cyclone Nargis
In May 2008, a severe cyclone struck Myanmar killing 138,366 people.80 A total of 37 townships
were significantly damaged and as many as 2.4 million people were affected.81 The Indian Navy
was the first to respond as western aid and workers were not granted visas by the military regime
in Myanmar. Even the forces of neighbouring Thailand and Singapore faced diplomatic hurdles
75
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in supplying relief material by air. 82 In an operation codenamed Sahayata (a Hindi word meaning
“Assistance”) the Indian Navy deployed two ships for HADR operations. In consideration of the
severity of the crisis the U.S. Navy had reportedly readied two aircraft carrier groups and one
amphibious ready group, however the Myanmar government initially declined their assistance and
after much pressure from international groups accepted limited supplies by U.S. planes.83 The
huge loss of life in this particular case, which did not receive adequate and timely naval support –
mainly due to the stand taken by the military government – highlights the criticality of naval forces
in HADR operations. Clearly many lives could have been saved had the various navies been
allowed to operate unhindered.84
Indonesia Earthquake
On 30 September 2009, a powerful earthquake struck the southern coast of Sumatra, Indonesia,
killing 1,117 people. 85 Around 2.5 million people were affected and more than 135,000 houses
were seriously damaged.86 International aid groups from around 30 nations participated in the
relief efforts in Sumatra with the United States Navy being the largest contributor. The U.S.
military deployment for the humanitarian aid and disaster relief efforts were reportedly the largest
in Indonesia since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.87
The above list in not exhaustive but it clearly highlights the central role played by military forces
in general, and navies, in particular, in managing natural calamities. The role of navies can
similarly be extended to other accidents or manmade disasters as demonstrated in the case of
Malaysian Airlines Flight MH 370 which was lost in the southern Indian Ocean. Naval, air force
and coast guard assets from 12 countries, including the United States, Australia, China, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam,
participated in the massive search and rescue operations that followed the crash88.
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Multilateral Mechanisms for Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region
Over the last two decades, shared perceptions of the prevalent non-traditional maritime threats in
the Indian Ocean region have led to the emergence of several multilateral maritime security
cooperation mechanisms. Given the benign nature of peacetime maritime cooperation activities
the littoral states are more than willing to cooperate with each other to mutually augment their
maritime capacities. The main multilateral mechanisms for maritime security cooperation in the
Indian Ocean are discussed in the following paragraphs.
The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)
In March 1995, the government of Mauritius organised a meeting to discuss ways and means for
enhancement of economic cooperation amongst the countries of the Indian Ocean rim. The initial
discussants included representatives from Australia, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Oman, Singapore
and South Africa. After several rounds of meetings with other regional states participating, the
IOR-ARC (India Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation, later renamed as IORA) was
created in March 1997, comprising the original seven founding members, also known as the M-7:
Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Tanzania, Madagascar and Mozambique.
IORA membership is open to all sovereign states of the Indian Ocean rim willing to subscribe to
the principles and objectives of the Charter, which is firmly committed to the principle of open
regionalism, as encouraged by the World Trade Organization (WTO).89 Over the years membership
has expanded and currently includes 21 member states.90 IORA’s six dialogue partners are China,
Egypt, France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Indian Ocean Research
Group (IORG) and Indian Ocean Tourism Organisation (IOTO) have been granted observer status.
The original IORA Charter adopted in 1997 declared that the primary aim of the organisation was
to “build and expand understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation through a consensusbased, evolutionary and non-intrusive approach.”91 Consequently, in keeping with this spirit, there
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are no laws, binding contracts or rigid institutional structures. Currently IORA is chaired by
Indonesia.
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)
The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) was initiated by the Indian Navy in 2008, as a
maritime security construct for the Indian Ocean region on the lines of the Western Pacific Naval
Symposium (WPNS). The inaugural IONS session was held at New Delhi in February 2008,
followed by a Conclave of Naval Chiefs at Goa where the IONS charter of business was adopted.
The stated aim of IONS is:
To attain mutually beneficial maritime security outcomes within the Indian Ocean. These outcomes
will be achieved through the cooperation of all members in determining remedies relevant to regional
maritime security.92

IONS presently includes 35 member states that “permanently hold territory that abuts or lies within
the Indian Ocean.” China, the United States and the United Kingdom have not been accorded
membership although they are IORA dialogue partners. Since its inception in 2008, the
chairmanship of the IONS has rotated from India to the UAE, followed by South Africa and
Australia. Bangladesh holds the current chairmanship until 2018.93 Over the years, IONS has
conducted numerous workshops and conferences related to maritime security and issues of
common concerns such as humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations, for the navies and other
maritime security forces of the region,
Multinational Combined Naval Exercises
In recent years, a few leading navies of the Indian Ocean, including the Indian Navy, the Royal
Australian Navy (RAN) and the Pakistan Navy, have sought to leverage their naval power through
maritime security cooperation. This has led to the development of various regional multinational
maritime exercises hosted regularly by the major navies to help build regional capacity and to
develop basic interoperability. The prominent multinational exercises conducted by regional navies
within the region are discussed in the following paragraphs.
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Exercise Milan

In 1995 India held its first multinational naval exercise, Milan (get-together) at

Port Blair, hosted exclusively for Southeast Asian navies. The inaugural exercise saw participation
by the navies of Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. One of the main aims of this
exercise was to curb the apprehensions – fueled by India’s rapid naval expansion programmes of
the 1980s – amongst the regional littoral states about India’s aspirations for power. Over the years,
the scale of Milan has expanded and the ninth iteration of the exercise held at Port Blair in March
2014 included 15 ships from 1794 Indian Ocean littoral states.95 Some navies were perhaps
stimulated to participate as a result of the international effort to address piracy and other maritime
security risks in the Indian Ocean; others (such as the Philippines) joining perhaps due to direct,
recent experience of natural disasters. Brunei and Vietnam, which had participated in the previous
three exercises, were not present in 2014.96
Milan 2014 focused on building maritime cooperation in support of HADR tasks, with an emphasis
on interoperability and the sharing of best management practices. The exercise included an
international seminar, a tabletop exercise codenamed Rahat (meaning relief or succour) focused on
combined planning and improving interoperability, and a ceremonial parade with an Indian Air
Force and Navy fly past. It concluded with a passage exercise at sea involving the nine visiting and
six Indian Navy ships, and a number of other activities aimed at fostering one-on-one professional
relationships between attending personnel. Such relationships often prove fruitful for cooperation
as careers develop. Speaking at the seminar, then Indian naval chief, Admiral Joshi, highlighted
the need for developing capacity and cooperative operational procedures between nations, based
on common principles and interests. He also stated that other steps were being taken in the region
to improve coordination and commonality between navies, including an emphasis under IONS on
developing standard operating procedures.97
Exercise Kakadu

A biennial multinational naval exercise, Kakadu, aimed at capacity building

and promoting naval interoperability within the Asia Pacific region, has been hosted by the Royal
Australian Navy for several decades. The 24th iteration of the exercise was conducted in September
94

Indian forces were joined by participants from Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, the Maldives,
Mauritius, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Seychelles, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Thailand
95 Shishir Upadhyaya,” Milan 2014 - Maritime security cooperation and the Indian Ocean regional balance,” IHS Jane’s Navy
International, 13 March 2014.
96 Ibid.
97 “17 Nations 15 Ships Demonstrate a Momentous ‘Milan’: Milan 2014 an Unequivocal Success,” Press Information Bureau, 9
February 2014.

40

201698 and included participation by over 3,000 personnel and 19 warships from 19 Asia-Pacific
and Indian Ocean navies and air forces.99 The Indian Navy had been conspicuous by its absence
until 2014, apparently as it included the Pakistan Navy. However, that seems to have now changed,
possibly, due to willingness on the part of India to rise above bilateral security concerns and place
greater importance to regional cooperation.
Exercise Aman

In what appears to have been a move to ape the Indian Navy, the Pakistan Navy

initiated in 2007 the Aman (Peace) series of multinational exercises aimed at enhancing
interoperability in tackling piracy and maritime terrorism.100 The exercise conducted in 2013
included participation by 13 navies101 and personnel from 20 observer nations.102 The next edition
of the exercise planned in February 2015 was called off at the last minute – most probably as a
result of security concerns raised due to the terrorist attack on PNS Zulfiqar in September 2014 –
and an international maritime conference was held in lieu. The latest edition of Aman 2017 was
held in February 2017 and attended by seven navies from Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan,
Malaysia, Turkey and United Kingdom.103
Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC)
The IRTC, running along the Gulf of Aden, is a key multinational initiative of the region that came
into force around 2006 with the emergence of piracy off Somalia. The Gulf of Aden presently
includes a 30-nation Combined Maritime Force (CMF), an EU taskforce, the NATO Standing
Maritime Group and independent patrols by warships from various states such as China, India, Iran
and Russia. The anti-piracy patrols and information sharing are coordinated collectively by the
mechanism of shared awareness and deconfliction or SHADE.104 The IRTC is the best example of
multilateral cooperation in the Indian Ocean involving a majority of the world navies. The
achievements of the IRTC as an effective multinational initiative are evident from the fact that
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piracy in the region has been effectively brought under control and there were nil ship hijackings
from 2013 to 2016.105
The success of the IRTC could be attributed to the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia (CGPCS) which has emerged as the de facto apex body dealing with piracy. The CGPCS,
a U.S.-led initiative, was formed in January 2009, pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1851
and it reports directly to the UN Security Council.106 The CGPCS comprises nearly 80 members
states and several international organisations.107
As an inclusive forum bringing together representatives from all user states (including most Indian
Ocean region states) and the shipping industry, CGPCS has achieved synergy over international
political, military and industry efforts and thus complete control over all issues related to combating
piracy. For instance, at its plenary meeting of July 2015, several Indian Ocean region states
demanded the removal of the high-risk area due to consequences of higher shipping insurance. The
high-risk area had been extended in 2010 by the insurance companies represented by Lloyd’s from
65 degrees East to 78 degrees East Longitude; however, no attacks have been reported in this region
since 2012.108 Consequently, the CGPCS promulgated a reduced high risk area in December 2015.
The CGPCS thus serves as a useful model of public-private partnership, worthy of emulation by
the Indian Ocean regional organisations dealing with maritime security.

Non-traditional Threats to India’s Maritime Security
India, by virtue of its location at the centre of the Indian Ocean, a 7,516 kilometre coastline and
1,197 islands, is exposed to the entire range of non-traditional threats and challenges prevalent in
the Indian Ocean region. Further, as highlighted in the Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2016, India
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has significant industrial and economic activity located within 200 km of its coastline, including
petroleum refineries and nuclear power stations.109 Moreover, as a large trading nation with
maritime trade constituting over 90 per cent of the total trade by volume and 70 per cent by value,
a sizeable shipping fleet and other assets including 12 major ports and offshore oil and gas
installations, India is critically dependent upon maintenance of “good order” in the Indian Ocean
region. India’s vulnerability to the non-traditional threats in the Indian Ocean region has been
exposed time and again. For instance, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami took the lives of over 10,000
Indians including over 5,500 in the Andaman Islands alone.110 Later in 2008, the Mumbai terrorist
attack from sea kept the city, regarded as India’s business capital, under siege for over two days.
More recently, during the period of Somali piracy, India, as one of the largest manpower providers
to the global shipping industry, was severely impacted with several Indian crew facing the brunt
of attacks. In March 2010, when Somali piracy had reached a peak, out of the 175 crew members
held hostage by Somali pirates, 95 were Indians.111 Based on the above, it is clear that the Indian
Navy needs to prepare itself for combating all the above non-traditional threats in addition to the
other traditional and nuclear threats to national security from its neighbours China and Pakistan.
These issues are discussed in the following section.

India’s Relations with China and the Sino-Pakistan Nexus
The rise of China has probably been the most important geopolitical development of the twentyfirst century so far. While this has had far-reaching implications globally, in the Indian Ocean
region the dynamics of maritime influence exerted by India and China has generated widespread
interest and speculation. It is widely predicted that as both China and India increasingly engage
with the maritime arena in the Indian Ocean, there are chances of clashes of interest, which could
lead to a conflict.112
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Post-independence, initial efforts by India under Prime Minister Nehru to build close relations
with China failed as relations soured over Tibet and unresolved boundary disputes. This
culminated in a brief border war in 1962 that has since left both sides deeply suspicious of each
other. India claims the Chinese occupied Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh, spanning about 38,000
km2, since the mid-1950s. Additionally, India maintains that in 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded to
China 5,180 km2of its territory in the Shaksgam Valley of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).113
Post 1962, China has laid claims to the whole of India’s Northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh
spanning almost 96,000 km2.114 Moreover, China’s stated position is that “reunification” of
Chinese territories is a sacred duty of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).115 Despite several
rounds of boundary talks, there is no resolution in sight for India, even though China, which shares
22,000 km of land border with 14 states, has resolved its border disputes with all except India and
Bhutan. It is pertinent to note that China’s land boundary settled with Myanmar runs along the
same McMahon Line separating India and China, which it refuses to recognise with respect to
India and Bhutan.116 With a view to maintain peace along the disputed land border, India and China
signed the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement in 1993, followed by an agreement on
confidence-building measures in the military field signed in 1996. However, reportedly the PLA
has intruded repeatedly into Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh and have raised objections to Indian
road construction projects in these areas. These periodic border transgressions, including the latest
stand-off at the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction at Doklam, Bhutan ending on 28 August 2017117
have been widely reported and debated in the Indian press and have been discussed at length in
the Indian Parliament as well.118
In addition to keeping India off balance across their land borders, China has made Pakistan the
cornerstone of its strategy and has sought to strengthen Pakistan militarily by providing both
conventional and nuclear weapons119. According to Raja Mohan, “the scale and scope of strategic
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cooperation between China and Pakistan is itself unprecedented in the annals of nuclear
history.”120 This has seriously blunted India’s military edge over a much smaller neighbour and
Pakistan has used its nuclear capability as an “umbrella” to wage cross-border terrorism against
India. India is the only country in the world located between two nuclear weapon states with which
it has fought several wars in recent decades. While India enjoys relative conventional military
superiority with respect to Pakistan, it is highly probable that in the case of a Indo-Pakistan conflict,
China – a vastly superior military power – may support Pakistan militarily and open a second front
with India along the disputed border.121 To deal with such a scenario, according to Arun Prakash,
“India needs to nurture the ‘maritime card’ to checkmate both China and Pakistan.”122 India’s
centrality in the Indian Ocean bestows upon it immense geostrategic heft with respect to China,
and given the relative parity of forces along the Sino-Indian land border, India’s maritime strategy
seeks to leverage its geographic advantage to maintain an overall balance of power with China.

China’s Strategic Interests and Vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean Region
As the world’s second largest economy and export country, China is well aware that its continued
growth is closely linked to its ability to secure its sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for supply
of raw materials such as energy and mineral resources, expand its maritime trade and maintain its
access to new markets globally. In 2013, China’s trade crossed $4 trillion and by late 2015 it had
amassed an annual trade surplus of $46.5 billion, making it the second largest trade surplus
economy in the world.123 China is the world’s largest importer of petroleum products, and over 80
per cent of China’s oil imports transit the Strait of Malacca124, a vulnerable chokepoint,
representing China’s so-called “Malacca Dilemma,” first highlighted in 2003, by the then Chinese
president Hu Jintao. China receives about half of its oil from Africa and the other half from Middle
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East, transiting through the Strait of Hormuz, another exposed chokepoint in the Indian Ocean
region.125
China has sought to mitigate its “Malacca Dilemma” by diversifying its oil import sources and
establishing a network of pipelines via Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia and the Central Asian republics
to bypass the strait, with limited success.126 Further, unlike most large trading nations, including
the United States that have preferred to use the more commercially efficient system of foreign
chartered ships over state-owned ships to carry their trade, China has sought to increase its national
merchant shipping fleet to carry its own cargo.127 According to the 2015 UNCTAD report on
maritime trade, China ranks third after Greece and Japan in the list of top five ship-owning
countries which control more than half of the global shipping tonnage.128 Chinese projections
suggest that by 2030, China would surpass Greece and Japan to have the world’s biggest merchant
fleet by dead weight tonnage (DWT) and account for 15 per cent of the world’s shipping volume.129
By around 2017-18, China will become the world’s largest tanker owner state by owner
nationality.130 This would help China in achieving its goal of ensuring that 85 per cent of its crude
oil imports are carried by Chinese-controlled ships.131
In its quest for new markets and investment destinations, China has also expanded its overseas
footprint in Central Asia, the Indian Ocean, Africa and the Middle East to Europe. In 2014, China’s
foreign investments exceeded $116 billion,132 a manifold increase over the less than $3 billion a
decade ago.133 These investments are now bound to increase as the execution of various projects
under the “maritime silk road” initiative unfolds. In addition to these investments, China has over
five million workers employed overseas, including in several trouble spots such as South Sudan,
Yemen and Pakistan.134 In 2011, when a civil war broke out in Libya, the PLA Navy was employed

Euan Graham, “Maritime Security and Threats to Energy Transportation in Southeast Asia,” RUSI Journal, April/May 2015,
Vol. 160 No. 2, p. 20.
126 Vivan Sharan & Nicole Thiher, Oil Supply Routes in the Asia Pacific: China’s Strategic Calculations, Observer Research
Foundation Occasional Paper No. 24, New Delhi, September 2011, pp. 3-8.
127 James R Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan, Routledge, New York,
2008, p. 15.
128United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2015, p. x.
129 Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (retired), Becoming a Great “Maritime Power”: A Chinese Dream, Centre for Naval
Analyses, Washington D.C., June 2016, p. 10.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 “Strategic Geography 2015,” Strategic Survey, Routledge, London, Vol. 115, No.1, September 2015, p. iv.
133 David Tweed, “ Five Million Reasons Why China Could Go to War,” Bloomberg Business, 16 June 2015.
134 Ibid.
125

46

to evacuate 35,800 Chinese workers and more recently, in April 2015, the PLA Navy evacuated
over 900 people from Yemen, including Chinese nationals and several foreigners.135
As a result of China’s engagement with the Indian Ocean states, it is now susceptible to the entire
range of non-traditional threats prevalent in the region. This has been highlighted in the 2015 white
paper on China’s military strategy, which identifies the following threats to national security:
“international and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, serious natural disasters and epidemics, and
the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of
communication (SLOCs), as well as institutions, personnel and assets abroad.”136
From a strategic perspective, China’s source of economic strength, its burgeoning trade, large
merchant fleet and investments in the Indian Ocean region, are also its greatest vulnerability,
potentially liable for disruption by India and the United States. India’s commanding position atop
China’s SLOCs present a formidable challenge for China, virtually across the entire ocean and
particularly at the various chokepoints. The key focus for China has therefore been to alleviate its
strategic vulnerability by expanding its maritime power in the Indian Ocean region. The following
section examines the various factors that indicate a large scale Chinese expansion in the Indian
Ocean region in the coming years, potentially undermining India’s geostrategic advantages.

Expansion of China’s Maritime Power in the Indian Ocean
National Military Strategy
China’s current white paper, the ninth in a series of such policy documents promulgated since
1998, is the first one to deal explicitly with China’s military strategy. Its salient features are an
increased focus on China’s maritime domain, identified as a “critical security domain," and its
protection by the “preparation for military struggle,” an obvious reference to the ongoing tensions
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in the South China Sea.137 While underscoring the importance of the maritime domain over land,
the white paper advocates development of:
…a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and
development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the
security of strategic SLOCs and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime
cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power. 138

The white paper calls for an assertive posture in China’s near-seas, and discusses the possibility
of greater PLA Navy presence in the distant oceanic spaces, quiet obviously the Indian Ocean. It
calls for PLA Navy actions to supplement “offshore waters defence” with “open seas protection”
through naval presence and patrols in blue waters. It also states that China needs to develop navalrelated systems to support extended reach and presence, along with air capabilities, to support the
“strategic requirement of building air-space capabilities and conducting offensive and defensive
operations”.139 The paper highlights an increased scope for participation by China's armed forces
in international disaster rescue and humanitarian assistance.140
From an Indian perspective the new Chinese military strategy is a cause for concern as it clearly
points towards a more robust military posture in the Indian Ocean region for protection of China’s
strategic sea lines of communications, personnel and overseas assets, and also an increased tempo
of naval diplomatic missions. These pronouncements and recent developments such as the
establishment of a PLA Navy logistics facility in Djibouti lend credence to speculation about
China’s effort to establish a permanent naval base in the Indian Ocean.
Modernisation of the PLA Navy
According to a United States Congressional study report, since the late 1980s to early 1990s, when
China’s naval modernisation appears to have commenced, China has made rapid progress in
phasing out older and obsolescent platforms and replacing them with modern and more capable
platforms.141 This is evidenced in the fact that over fifty ships were laid down, launched or
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commissioned in 2013, and in 2013 and 2014, China launched more naval ships than any other
country.142 The PLA Navy modernisation process has been characterised as a three step process:
the first, laying of a “solid foundation” by 2010, followed by making “major progress” by 2020
and finally being able to win “informationalised wars” by the mid-twenty-first century.143
According to the U.S. Congressional report, salient PLA Navy modernisation programmes include
anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, submarines, aircraft carriers, surface
combatants, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and state-of-the-art command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The
key programmes are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) China has been developing for several years an ASBM known

as the DF-21D, a theatre range ballistic missile with a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) for
targeting ships, particularly aircraft carriers, at sea. The DF-21D, widely acknowledged as a “game
changer” is estimated to have a range of 810 nm144 (1,500 km) and known to have been deployed
by the Second Artillery Force since 2010.145 It had been predicted that China could deploy up to
80 such missiles by 2015.146 China is also reportedly developing a sophisticated C4ISR system
including land based over-the-horizon surface wave backscatter radars that would provide
targeting information for the DF-21D. The U.S. Navy has raised serious concerns about the
employment of the DF-21D, estimated beyond even the capability of its SM-2+ level anti-missile
interceptors.147
Submarines The PLA Navy submarine force of the 1980s has been replaced in recent years by a

modern inventory of submarines capable of regional anti-surface warfare missions near major
SLOCs.148 In the mid1990s China acquired 12 Russian Kilo-class conventional submarines and
has since added four new classes of indigenously built submarines: namely, the Jin-class (SSBN
or ballistic missile capable nuclear submarine), Shang-class (SSN or nuclear attack submarine),
Yuan-class (conventional) and Song-class (conventional). The Jin-class SSBNs are capable of

142

Rourke, China Naval Modernization, p. 71.
United States Navy, The PLAN Navy: Naval Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, Office of Naval Intelligence,
Washington D.C., 2015, p. 15.
144 Rourke, China Naval Modernization, p. 80.
145 “China,” IHS Jane’s World Navies 2014-15, p. 34.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Rourke, China Naval Modernization, p. 8.
143

49

carrying the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic nuclear missile with a range of 7,400 km.149 By
2020, the PLA Navy is predicted to have a force of about 63 diesel and 11 nuclear submarines.150
Aircraft Carriers and Carrier Based Aircraft

In September 2012, Liaoning, the former

uncompleted Ukrainian (Soviet) carrier Varyag was commissioned into the PLA Navy, as a
platform that would help the service transition into a carrier-capable navy. The Liaoning is a
60,000 ton ski-jump conventional carrier, bigger than both carriers operated by the Indian Navy
and those currently under construction in India. The Liaoning is fitted out with a full suite of
weapons and combat systems and is capable of accommodating an air wing of 30 or more aircraft,
including J-15 fighters, and a mix of anti-submarine/airborne early warning/search and rescue
(SAR) helicopters.151 However, it is widely believed that this ship will be the PLA Navy’s “starter”
carrier to train personnel in carrier operations for manning carriers of the future.152 This is part of
plans to introduce a force of several carriers by the 2020s, to enable one to be maintained at sea at
all times. Some reports have suggested China may commission between three to four carriers over
the next fifteen years.153 However, the United States Department of Defence believes that at least
one Liaoning-sized carrier could be commissioned soon.154
Surface Combatants

Since the 1990s, when China first procured four Sovremenny-class

destroyers from Russia, it has inducted ten new classes of indigenously built destroyers and frigates
into service. Overall, the PLA Navy surface fleet has made huge progress in its development of
anti-ship cruise missiles and over-the-horizon targeting systems. By 2020, the PLA Navy is
expected to have nearly 150 major surface combatants.155 These include several large amphibious
ships such as the Type 071 and Type 081.156 It is assessed that in addition to defending and asserting
China’s claim in the South China sea, the amphibious ships could be used for diplomatic missions
including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations and port visits in the
Indian Ocean.

149

Rourke, China Naval Modernization, p. 8.
United States Navy, The PLAN Navy, pp. 18-19.
151 United States Navy, The PLAN Navy, p. 17.
152Ibid, p. 23.
153 Ibid, p. 21.
154 Ibid, p. 19.
155 Rourke, China Naval Modernization, pp. 36-38.
150

156

Ibid.

50

A broad comparison of the inventory of major combatants presently operated by the PLA Navy
and the Indian Navy, and the planned inductions by 2020 are tabulated below:Table 2.5: Comparison on PLA Navy and Indian Navy by 2020157
Aircraft

Destroyers.

Frigates.

Amphibious

SSN/ SSK.

SSBNs.

Total

Carriers.

Active/

Active/

Ships.

Active/

Active/

Nos

Active/

Planned

Planned

Active / Planned

Planned

Planned

2020

1/ 1?

24/ 8

49/ 7

60/ 1

58/ 2

4/ 1

216

1/ 2

8/ 7

13/ 11

10/ 4

15/ 12

1/ 2

86

Planned
PLA
Navy
Indian
Navy

The growth of the Indian Navy had surged since 2010, when about 40 ships and submarines were
on order.158 The majority of inductions of major combatants in the pipeline were completed in
2016, barring a few other platforms including one aircraft carrier likely to be commissioned by
2018. Yet another leap in acquisitions is currently underway with about 41 ships and submarines
under construction, all in Indian shipyards, a testimony to India’s indigenisation efforts to move
from being a “buyer’s navy” to a “builder’s navy.”159
While it would be inaccurate to make a comparison of the Indian Navy and the PLA Navy based
on numbers of platforms alone, one could attempt a broad comparison of force levels, assuming a
similar level of capabilities and technology for each major combatant. Three broad points emerge
from the table above. Firstly, it is evident that by 2020 the Indian Navy would numerically be less
than half of the size of the PLA Navy. However, given the logistical constraints imposed by
geography and considering the inescapable requirement for concurrent deployment of the PLA
Navy in the Western Pacific, the PLA Navy will find it hard to neutralise the extant advantage
enjoyed by the Indian Navy in fielding a higher concentration of forces in the region. However,
this could change with the establishment of a Chinese naval base(s) in the Indian Ocean. Second,
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the PLA Navy submarine capability is vastly superior to that of the Indian Navy and a possible
Chinese submarine basing facility in the Indian Ocean region would serve as a force multiplier
that could potentially tie down Indian naval assets and even dominate chokepoints. Finally, the
PLA Navy has a distinct advantage in terms of numbers of major surface combatants, including
amphibious ships, that it could potentially deploy on diplomatic and constabulary roles, including
HADR missions. This capability could be brought to the fore now that the Chinese facility at
Djibouti is functional.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
In 2013, the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, announced the proposal for a Silk Road Economic Belt
over land connecting western China to Europe across the Eurasian continent and a Maritime Silk
Road (MSR) stretching from the Western Pacific across the Indian Ocean up to the Mediterranean.
Together, the two proposals have now come to be known as the belt and road initiative. The BRI
seeks to build and augment the maritime infrastructure along the sea routes in the Indo-Pacific
region, thus improving maritime trade in the region and boosting regional economies.160 China had
invited India along with other states to participate in the new venture. Although India has objected
to China’s Silk Road proposal, as it passes through Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK), disputed
by India, its external affairs minister, Sushma Swaraj, during her visit to Beijing in 2015, stated
that while India would not give a blanket endorsement to the MSR project, it would support the
project where the synergies of the two countries meet.161
The BRI infrastructure when completed will encompass a population of 4.4 billion people with a
collective GDP of $ 21 trillion (one third of global wealth) and connect every participating country
to three continents, linking the world’s top emerging markets.162 BRI will be funded by the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), another Chinese initiative that has attracted support from
57 countries including India. The AIIB has an authorized capital of US$100 billion, of which China
has pledged half the amount as initial subscribed capital. In November 2014, China further pledged
another US$40 billion to a new Silk Road Fund to develop the infrastructure and resources along
the land and sea trade routes in addition to a US$10 billion China–ASEAN Fund on Investment
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Cooperation, a US$15 billion credit line for infrastructure projects for ASEAN states and another
US$490 million pledged to the China–ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund.163 When the silk route
vision is fulfilled then, as noted by an analyst, “all roads will quite literally lead to Beijing.”164 It
is clear that China, through the BRI seeks to legitimise and strengthen its presence in the Indian
Ocean region by binding the regional states to its economy. Analysts have called the “BRI China’s
version of the Marshall Plan though China has claimed that its intentions are purely economic.165
While the scope of the BRI seems to be limited to commercial activities the lack of a detailed
roadmap and the opacity of China’s plans gives rise to the hypothesis that the proposal could be a
larger Chinese “game” to establish a permanent or long-term presence in the Indian Ocean to build
up China’s diplomatic, economic and strategic influence over the region. China’s earlier attempts
at engaging with the Indian Ocean states through economic assistance by way of large-scale
infrastructure projects, were viewed as a strategy aimed at limiting Indian influence (popularised
by the label of “String of Pearls” by the American defence contractor Booz Allen Hamilton). While
this may have raised concerns amongst the smaller littoral states of being dragged into a power
game involving India and China, the new and benign nomenclature seems to be an attempt to allay
such fears. In any case, it is fair to assume that the execution of various projects under the BRI
would naturally be followed by greater PLA Navy involvement within the Indian Ocean region .
PLA Navy Deployments in the Indian Ocean
The PLA Navy was deployed in the Indian Ocean operationally for the first time in modern history
in early January 2009, when two destroyers and a replenishment ship arrived at the Gulf of Aden
on anti-piracy patrols.166 The PLA Navy has since maintained similar force levels, rotated every
four months, a feat unmatched by the Indian Navy which has generally maintained a single-ship
patrol.167 These deployments have provided the PLA Navy a chance to operate with other navies
of the world and build up operational experience in a multinational environment.
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Since 2009, the PLA Navy ships have been deployed on several other occasions in the Indian
Ocean. In 2010 the PLA Navy deployed its hospital ship Peace Ark on an 88-day humanitarian aid
trip covering Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychelles and Bangladesh.168 This mission was
followed by another deployment to assist with the rehabilitation efforts post Typhoon Haiyan in
the Philippines in early November 2013. In 2011, PLA Navy ships were deployed for the
evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya. Some years later, in 2015, the PLA Navy was once
again deployed, this time to rescue its civilian workers from Yemen. In March 2014, following the
disappearance of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH 370 in the southern Indian Ocean, killing 217
Chinese nationals, the PLA Navy was deployed in the region on a search and rescue operation. In
fact it was a Chinese commercial bulk carrier, the Tai Shun Hai, that was the first ship to reach the
area where the plane was believed to have crashed. Subsequent search efforts by the PLA Navy
expanded to 18 ships at one point in time including two Type 071 LPDs, a Type 052C destroyer,
a Type 903 replenishment ship, and a Type 925 submarine support ship.169 A few months later in
2014, China was once again involved in the multinational efforts to locate Air Asia Flight QZ8501
in the Java Sea.
The most significant deployment of the PLA Navy in recent times was the visit of a Song-class
conventional submarine along with submarine support ship Changxing Dao, which docked at the
Chinese-run Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT) in Sri Lanka in late 2014, en-route
to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy operations.170 It later emerged that the PLA Navy had also
deployed a nuclear submarine in the Indian Ocean on anti-piracy patrols – a rather strange measure
since nuclear submarines are unsuited for such operations – taking due care to inform all relevant
countries including India and the United States in advance.171 The hosting of a Chinese submarine
by Sri Lanka under the Rajapaksha government clearly did not go down well in India. The idea of
China gaining privileged access to Sri Lankan ports as a matter of routine unnerved New Delhi,
and India, supported by the United States, as suggested by some, possibly orchestrated the fall of
the Rajapaksha government in the 2015 national elections.172
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It is opined that the deployment of a Chinese submarine in the Indian Ocean was perhaps an effort
to “test the waters” and could presage the deployment of the PLA Navy carrier Liaoning. In
January 2015, IHS Jane’s reported that a Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesman
signalled the prospects of Beijing sending a broader range of ships to the Indian Ocean, stating:
In the future, the Chinese military will send different kinds of naval ships to take part in the naval
escort mission in accordance with the situation and the requirement to fulfil the task.173

A PLA Navy carrier task force in the Indian Ocean could support a number of tasks, including
functioning as a command platform for HADR missions, supporting maritime security tasks, or
providing trade protection along the SLOCs.174 However, as indicated by the Sri Lankan
government, it is unlikely that China would be welcomed again in Sri Lanka in the near future. 175
China will perhaps consider docking its submarines or ships away from South Asian ports.
Chinese Naval Base(s) in the Indian Ocean Region
It is evident that the availability of new and modern platforms in the PLA Navy has emboldened
the Chinese to undertake distant naval operations. However, such deployments also would have
revealed weaknesses in their logistical support, and China is apparently exploring long-term
arrangements for basing of ships in the Indian Ocean region. The most commonly frequented ports
by the PLA Navy include Port Salalah in Oman, and Djibouti, where PLA naval ships have made
over 20 visits.176 Djibouti currently provides naval basing facilities to the United States, France and
Japan and is known to have adequate ship repair and logistical facilities. Reportedly, China under
a bilateral arrangement with Djibouti has been permitted to station up to 10,000 military personnel
in the upcoming PLA Navy logistics basing facility, currently under construction.177 Port Aden in
Yemen is the second most frequented port by the PLA Navy ship. However, it is expected that
current security imperatives are likely to preclude long-term deployments in Yemen. Other
potential bases for the PLA Navy in the Indian Ocean region include Karachi and Gwadar in
Pakistan, Port Victoria in the Seychelles, Colombo, Hambantota and Trincomalee in Sri Lanka,
Shishir Upadhyaya, “Projecting power ... and politics? Carriers in the Indian Ocean,” IHS Jane’s Navy International, 11
February 2015.
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the Maldives, Chittagong in Bangladesh and Sittwe in Myanmar.178 Media reports from Namibia
reported a Chinese proposal for a base at Namibia, though this was later denied by the PLA
Navy.179
It is opined that the BRI initiative by China for building commercial facilities across various
regional ports in the Indian Ocean could also lead to the development of dual-use facilities in the
region. A commercial facility with basic logistical support capability, is a risk-free way of
establishing maritime presence in a region of interest and is likely to be the preferred option for
China.180 Thus, Bagamayo in Tanzania and Eritrea are prospective Chinese bases. While current
concerns about terrorism in Pakistan are likely to discourage the PLA Navy from basing there,
given China’s “all weather” friendship with Pakistan, there is no doubt that Karachi and Gwadar
will probably emerge as preferred PLA Navy bases when the situation is practicable.
The likelihood of a full-fledged Chinese naval base or facility over the next few years seems
inevitable, given that Japan and the West’s three major naval powers, France, the United Kingdom,
and the United States, are all in the process of increasing their basing presence in the Gulf.181
Admiral Arun Prakash, former Indian naval chief, worryingly predicted some years ago:
As China pursues its vision of great-power status, India must reconcile itself to not just seeing a
nuclear-armed navy in surrounding waters, but also to the establishment of bases in the Indian
Ocean.182

The number of likely Chinese bases or places that could eventuate may perhaps be irrelevant at
this stage as even one suitable location could be a potential “game changer” for China in the Indian
Ocean. After all, at the peak of the Cold War the Soviet Navy was operating out of just an
anchorage off Socotra Island in the Indian Ocean.
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Implications of Growing Chinese Maritime Power in the Indian Ocean for India
Based on the above assessment of China’s maritime activities in the Indian Ocean, it would be fair
to assume that by around 2020, the PLA Navy would have graduated to a permanent presence with
one or more carrier-based groups and/or amphibious groups deployed in the region for SLOC
protection and other missions. The implications of an expanded and permanent PLA Navy
presence in the Indian Ocean for India are enormous, potentially shifting the overall balance of
power in China’s favour.
Hypothetically, a permanent PLA Navy base(s) in the Indian Ocean could greatly offset China’s
vulnerability in the Straits of Malacca and impose a Hormuz “dilemma” upon India, which imports
nearly half of its oil from the Persian Gulf.183 Contrary to the common refrain that the Pakistani
ports are vulnerable and exposed to an Indian offensive, it is opined that the deployment of Chinese
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles within Pakistan could alter the balance of maritime power in
the Arabian Sea in China’s favour. A PLA Navy carrier group and numerous surface action groups
comprising destroyers operating from a base in Pakistan or the western part of the Indian Ocean
could potentially overwhelm any opposition from the Indian Navy, rendering Indian trade
vulnerable. However, such a contingency is highly unlikely in the near future. In any case, India
would need to rely on the support of the United States and other powers to tackle this remote, albeit
plausible conflict scenario in the future.
Pertinently, even a semi-permanent – which could later become permanent – PLA Navy presence
in the Indian Ocean region has major implications for India in peacetime as much as in war. As
discussed, the extant Indian maritime strategy to create a “favourable environment” by playing the
role of net security provider is essentially aimed at deterring war. However, an enhanced Chinese
presence in the region will inevitably lead to greater involvement of the PLA Navy in various
security issues of the region, hitherto largely overseen by the Indian Navy, thus potentially diluting
India’s role as the primary net provider of security for the region.
It is obvious that China is likely to seek to leverage its contributions to the region to dispel any
perceived mistrust and build friendly ties with regional states. Once China has established a base
US Energy Information Administration, “International energy data and analysis - India,” 10 August 2017, available at
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in the region, it is also likely to be prepared to take on greater security responsibilities and provide
support in crisis situations, gradually restricting if not displacing the Indian Navy from its position
as the primary net security provider. As noted by David Brewster:
While China has often been relatively cautious about converting its economic power into the security
dimension, its growing influence will create important constraints on India’s power and its ability to
develop security relationships.184

While it could be argued that India has successfully established a network of security relationships
with most regional states, it is viewed that most of India’s security relations – which can be traced
back to the 1980s and the end of the Cold War era – were established in a period when India was
the sole credible maritime power in the region, tacitly supported by the United States. India’s
relations with certain countries, most notably Mauritius, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, have since
blossomed into robust security partnerships. It is unlikely that these states would choose to side
with China in the future. However, the proclivity of other Indian Ocean states to avoid favouring
either India or China can best be judged to be one of political ambivalence. In addition, Pakistan
is already open to hosting the Chinese. It is those states in which China’s economic influence could
translate into long-term security partnerships, particularly once China has established itself as a
dependable provider of security, that pose potential risks to Indian interests.

Conclusion
The twenty-first century environment in the Indian Ocean is dynamic and presents several
challenges and well as opportunities for India. It is clear that the unique geophysical attributes of
the Indian Ocean coupled with a high volume of maritime trade has implications for regional
security. Further, the vulnerability of the highly populated coastal regions to natural calamities and
other vagaries of nature have been exposed in recent years. These challenges are common and are
also potential change multipliers which could throw up complex challenges in the future, far
beyond the capacity of any single littoral state to tackle. India by virtue of its location is fully
exposed to the entire range of non-traditional maritime threats and challenges. It is clear that
184
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maritime cooperation among the littoral states will be the key to combating these challenges and
India, being a major regional naval power, is well suited to foster maritime cooperation.
India is also faced with serious challenges from its adversarial neighbours, China and Pakistan. As
an emergent superpower, China has critical strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. However,
India’s geostrategic advantage in the region is perceived as a crucial strategic vulnerability by the
Chinese, and thus China has sought to expand its maritime power into the area. The rise of Chinese
maritime power and influence in the region could potentially pose a serious challenge India’s
geostrategic advantage and clearly India can no longer take for granted the strategic benefits of its
location. Thus, India’s maritime strategy for the Indian Ocean holds the key to India’s balance of
power with China.
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Chapter 3
India’s Foreign Policy and Maritime Strategy

Introduction
India is an old country but a young nation.1 On 15 August 1947, when India gained independence
from British rule after about 190 years, it was also the first time in nearly a thousand years that
India found itself free from the rule of foreigners.2 Consequently, India’s foreign policy, and
national defence and maritime strategies are evolving and are probably yet to attain the level of
refinement expected from the world’s largest democracy, with one of the largest and most modern
armed forces. An Indian security analyst writing on the Indian experience of the use of the navy
as an instrument of foreign policy notes:
The political apex of the nascent post-colonial state [India] had a limited understanding of the
application of military power for advancing foreign policy objectives… Even in terms of its primary
role as an instrument of military power, the potential of the Indian Navy was not appreciated until
as late as the early 1970s.3

However, recent developments seem to indicate a perceptible progression in India’s foreign policy
and an improved understanding of the employment of India’s maritime power. This chapter traces
the evolution of India’s foreign policy since independence with references to the policy for
engagements with its neighbours in the sub-continent and the Indian Ocean region and relations
with super powers, to highlight the key milestones in India’s post-independence history. This is
followed by an account of the growth of the Indian Navy since 1947, an overview of the
government’s experience in the employment of maritime power as an instrument of state policy
and the development of India’s maritime strategy in the 21st century.

1
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2 J.N. Dixit, India’s Foreign Policy: 1947-2003, Picus Books, New Delhi, 2003, p. 339.
3 C. Uday Bhaskar, “The Navy as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: The Indian Experience,” in Harsh V. Pant, ed., The Rise of the
Indian Navy: Internal Vulnerabilities, External Challenges, Ashgate, Surrey, 2012, pp. 39-42.

60

India’s Foreign Policy
India was one of the first colonies to gain freedom, based on a non-violent struggle greatly
influenced by Mahatma Gandhi. Indian political leaders of the period thus felt that they had a
moral responsibility to create a just international order. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime
minister, envisioned a role for India where it would take the lead in eliminating colonialism,
economic exploitation and discrimination from international relations.4 Consequently, India’s
initial foreign policy was founded on these idealistic, and lofty, principles, which have now come
to be widely known as the Nehruvian philosophy or doctrine.
The Initial Years: 1947 to 1956
The early years of India’s post-independence period coincided with the emergence of the Cold
War between the Western democracies and the East European Communist states led by the Soviet
Union. Rather than getting involved in the ideological battle, Nehru believed India would be better
off abstaining from Cold War politics and remaining committed to fostering peaceful relations
with all countries alike. This approach evolved into the doctrine of “non-alignment” and
subsequently became the cornerstone for India’s foreign policy.5 This idea also led to the formation
of the Non-Aligned Movement, which gained huge popularity amongst Third World nations. In
1949, after the creation of NATO, there were similar treaties involving the Western powers,
notably CENTO6, SEATO7 and ANZUS.8 The United States initially invited India to join these
alliances.9 India, however, refused the offer in pursuit of its goal of remaining non-aligned, so the
United States invited Pakistan to join instead. In 1954, Pakistan signed a defence cooperation
agreement with the United States and participated in SEATO. Later in 1955, Pakistan also joined
CENTO. Subsequently, Pakistan leveraged its links with the United States and the United
C. Uday Bhaskar, “The Navy as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: The Indian Experience,” in Harsh V. Pant, ed., The Rise of the
Indian Navy: Internal Vulnerabilities, External Challenges, Ashgate, Surrey, 2012, p. 342.
5Dixit, India’s Foreign Policy, p. 19.
6 The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Originally known as the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) it was formed in
1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom through the Baghdad Pact. It was dissolved in 1979.
7 The Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation, or SEATO came into force in September 1954, formed by the United States, France,
Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan, with the primary aim of preventing spread of
communism in Southeast Asia. SEATO was disbanded in 1977.
8 The Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and The United States of America or ANZUS came into force in April 1952
to cooperate in military matters in the Pacific region. In 1985, the United States suspended its security guarantee to New Zealand
under ANZUS over a dispute over U.S. Navy nuclear ship visits.
9 Vice Admiral G.M. Hiranandini, Transition to Triumph: Indian Navy 1965-1975, Director Personnel Services, Integrated
Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence (Navy), New Delhi, 2005, p. 14.
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Kingdom to stake a claim over the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and disrupt India’s relations
with the Western democracies.10 Nehru was totally opposed to signing any security treaty with
foreign powers. According to Thomas Schelling in Arms and Influence,11 Nehru was
condescending to Thailand and Pakistan for joining western treaties, as he believed that in a real
emergency, the Western powers’ commitment to defend India would be “as strong with a treaty as
without it.”12 This thinking dictates India’s foreign policy even today and as described in Chapter
6, India is opposed to formal defence agreements with other states.
During the late 1950s, Pakistan also went on to develop close strategic links with China, which
have continued ever since. The United States also viewed India’s non-alignment policy as
detrimental to its own strategy for restructuring the world order in the post-World War II period.
Consequently, the late 1950s saw India’s defence aid from the United Kingdom and the United
States decline and India turned to the Soviet Union and its East European allies by 1955 to meet
its defence requirements.13
The Shift from Idealism to Realism in International Relations: 1961 to 1977
In 1961, after 14 years of negotiations with the Portuguese over their occupation of Goa failed,
India invaded Goa and freed it from Portuguese rule. Nehru, while referring to the American
Monroe doctrine, justified India’s actions as follows:
…the Portuguese retention of Goa is a continuing interference with the political system established
in India today. I shall go a step further and say that any interference by any other power would also
be an interference with the political system of India today…it may be that we are weak and cannot
prevent that political interference. But the fact is that any interference in any way with India is a
thing that India cannot tolerate, and which, subject to her strength she will oppose. This is the broad
doctrine that I lay down. 14

Later prime ministers, including Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, invoked this doctrine to justify
India’s subsequent diplomatic and military interventions in Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Maldives.
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India’s version of the Monroe doctrine has been criticised by its neighbours who perceive it as an
act of hegemony. In 1988, the Pakistan foreign minister, referring to Indian doctrine, stated that it
was unacceptable to India’s neighbours as it violated the basic principles of the charter of the
United Nations, the non-aligned movement and the doctrine of peaceful co-existence.15
Apparently, the United States has not accepted the Indian version of the Monroe doctrine over
Pakistan, though they has tacitly accepted it elsewhere in South Asia including in Sri Lanka, the
Maldives and Nepal.16
Wars with China and Pakistan

In 1962, after Sino-Indian border talks failed, China invaded

India in 1962, inflicting a humiliating defeat and occupying large parts of its territory. This was a
watershed moment for India and a major setback for Nehru, an idealist and an admirer of China,
which he believed was the “other great Asian civilisation” that together with India would lead the
post-imperial Asian resurgence.17 India’s defeat at the hands of China in the 1962 war took a heavy
toll on Nehru’s health and he passed away soon thereafter in 1964. The 1962 debacle made a deep
impact on Indian foreign policy, shifting it away from idealism towards realism.18
During this period, the strategic environment around India was tense and hostile, with the creation
of Sino-Pakistan strategic ties and antagonistic relations with the United Kingdom and the United
States. Taking advantage of this situation, Pakistan invaded India in 1965 in the Rann of Kutch.
Pakistani forces deployed American military hardware including Paton tanks during the war.19
Pakistan grossly underestimated the Indian military response, however, and ultimately faced a
decisive defeat. The Indian prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, is credited for having displayed
great tact and political acumen in the handling of this war and the signing of the Tashkent
Agreement which ended the conflict. Unfortunately, Shastri passed away within hours of signing
the agreement and the mantle of leadership passed to Indira Gandhi, who directed India’s foreign
policy for the next 15 years.
In the late 1960s, when the Cold War was at its peak, China had become a confirmed nuclear
weapon state, exploding its first nuclear device in 1964. Close Sino–Pakistan relations thus posed
15
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a major threat to India. Indira Gandhi focused upon upgrading India’s defence capacity and
establishing friendly relations with immediate neighbours Nepal, Bhutan, Afghanistan, Myanmar,
Sri Lanka and the Maldives.20 During this period India’s relations with the United States remained
somewhat cold, aggravated by India’s difference of opinion with respect to the nuclear Non
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it perceived as being discriminatory and also because of India’s
opposition to American military actions in Vietnam. Pertinently in the mid-1960s, the United
States had also started using the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, a part of the British
Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), to support their naval operations in the region. According to
former Indian Foreign Secretary, J.N. Dixit, during this period the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
was able to establish a friendly and personal rapport with the then American president, Lyndon
Johnson, which somewhat moderated otherwise antagonistic relations.21
In comparison to the United States, India’s relations with the Soviet Union expanded and IndoSoviet cooperation in the fields of defence and technology developed rapidly from 1966 to 1970.
The Indian Air Force was the first of the three services to commence acquisitions from the Soviet
Union with the signing of an agreement for manufacture of MiG 21 fighters in India. In September
1965, an agreement was signed for acquisition of four Foxtrot-class submarines, a submarine depot
ship, five Petya-class anti-submarine corvettes, two landing ships and five patrol boats for the
Indian Navy.22 During this period, the Soviet Union also helped India in setting up steel plants in
India.23
India's relations with the Southeast Asian countries in the 1960s did not receive the attention they
deserved. Indonesia, which was a member of the non-aligned movement, had turned pro-West
while some of the other states, including the Philippines and Thailand, had become a part of the
U.S.-led military alliance system. During the 1965 war with Pakistan, Indonesia tacitly supported
Pakistan. The Indonesian Naval Chief had undertaken to distract India during the war and it was
reported that an increasing number of unidentified ships and submarines were sighted off the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which compelled the Indian Navy to divert some ships in the
Andaman Sea.24 Consequently, between 1965 and 1967, when the Association of Southeast Asian
Dixit, India’s Foreign Policy, p. 80.
Ibid.
22 Hiranandini, Transition to Triumph, pp. 9-16.
23Ajay Kamalakaran,“5 Russian imports that have enriched India,” Russia and India Report, 31 October 2014.
24 Ibid, p. 17.
20
21

64

Nations (ASEAN) was being created, India turned down an opportunity for full membership on
the basis that India could not be involved with a group that was part of the larger American game.25
According to J.N. Dixit, it took more than 23 years to revive contacts with ASEAN and a become
dialogue partner in 1991-92.26
Fostering close ties with the Islamic countries of the Middle East was an important priority for
India in view of its own large indigenous Muslim population, and also to secure India’s energy
imports from the region. While India had longstanding historical relations with the Arabs, the
creation of a Muslim state, Pakistan, confused major Gulf states, which felt that partition implied
an “automatic” transfer of allegiance to Pakistan.27 By the late 1960s, Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi had ensured a strong relationship with Iran and Afghanistan as well as strong economic
ties with Gulf states. However, subsequent inept attempts by India for membership of the
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)28 were unsuccessful and India was excluded from the
organisation.29
The Indo-Pakistan War of 1971

The 1971 war was a major landmark event in the history of

independent India with far reaching and long-term ramifications for its foreign policy. Political
agitation in East Pakistan, perpetuated due to the authoritarian rule of the West Pakistan-dominated
government under military rule, led to tensions in Indo-Pakistan relations. Pakistan blamed India
for fermenting discontent amongst the people of East Pakistan. The national elections of 1970 in
Pakistan, which led to a major victory for the Awami League under the East Pakistan leader,
Mujibur Rehman, was not accepted by the military-led government under General Yahya Khan.
After negotiations for a political settlement failed, Mujibur Rehman launched a movement for the
“liberation” of East Pakistan. Yahya Khan commenced a military crackdown in East Pakistan,
which led to a huge influx of refugees into India. During this period, India supported the liberation
movement as it considered the two wings of Pakistan, separated by thousands of miles of Indian
territory, a geographical and political incongruity.30 India’s efforts to develop international support
for the liberation of Bangladesh were unsuccessful, with the U.S. government firmly against it.
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The UN General Assembly also passed a resolution against the idea of an independent Bangladesh
in October 1971. Meanwhile, in a move that seems to have further antagonised the United States,
India signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in August
1971.31 Article IX of the Treaty provided for mutual defence cooperation between the parties in
case of threats to their sovereignty, stating:
In the event of either Party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties
shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate
effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries. 32

Eventually, the events on the ground culminated in a war, with Pakistan launching a pre-emptive
strike on Indian Air Force bases along the northwestern border. The war lasted 13 days and ended
with a crushing defeat for Pakistan which surrendered at Dhaka on 16 December 1971. India
captured 93,000 Pakistani troops and large tracts of territory in Punjab and Sindh. The United
States protested against Indian military action and even sponsored resolutions in the UN Security
Council against India. However, these were vetoed by the Soviet Union. In a show of support to
Pakistan, the United States also tried to rattle India by deploying their aircraft carrier, USS
Enterprise, into the Bay of Bengal. Though this caused some anxiety in India, the counter posturing
by the Soviet Union helped to diffuse the tension for India. According to J.N. Dixit, the key lessons
for India from the war of 1971 were firstly, that the United Nations did not support India on the
merits of its case and secondly, the international community responded to the crisis in accordance
with their own perceived interests in the situation.33
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZOP) and Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN)
More than 60 years ago, G.M. Panikkar, widely regarded as one of India’s first and foremost
maritime thinkers, argued that “since India’s future was dependent on the Indian Ocean, then the
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Indian Ocean must therefore remain truly Indian.”34 This appears to have shaped India’s approach
towards the Indian Ocean during the following decades post-independence, by which time India
had acquired significant naval capacity, and in the late 1960s India made a bid for regional
leadership by opposing the presence of extra-regional powers. Around 1967, in the wake of the
withdrawal of the Royal Navy from East of Suez and the entry of Soviet warships into the Indian
Ocean for the first time in 1968, closely followed by the leasing of the island of Diego Garcia by
the British to the United States in 1970 for use as an Indian Ocean naval base, India actively started
opposing the presence of extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean.35
Consequently, in December 1971, India engineered the passage of a United Nations General
Assembly resolution for declaring the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and “halting further
escalation and expansion of military presence in the Indian Ocean.” 36 At roughly the same time,
in November 1971, ASEAN adopted a declaration making Southeast Asia a “Zone of Peace,
Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers.”37
Manifestly, both proposals sought to keep the region clear of superpower rivalry, though some
states such as Australia actually viewed American presence in the region as beneficial.38 The U.N.
General Assembly set up a 44-member ad hoc committee to examine the proposals for declaring
the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and its implementation. China initially supported India’s
position, however, as noted by a leading Chinese journal, by 1989 China grew apprehensive of
India’s strengthening position in the Indian Ocean, which it perceived to be far in excess of its
defence requirements and part of a larger plan to establish India as a “global military power.”39
Considering the opposition to the proposals by the United States, the United Kingdom and France,
the U.N. committee failed to reach any consensus, and the end of the Cold War in 1990 effectively
ended the concept. However, India continues to remain firm on keeping the region free from
foreign powers. During the 2014 Galle Dialogue in Sri Lanka the Indian national security adviser,
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evoking the U.N. General Assembly resolution of 1971 for declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone
of peace, called upon the “great powers not to allow escalation and expansion of military presence
in the Indian Ocean.”40
India’s Relations with Neighbouring States and its Role in the Indian Ocean Region: 1977 to
1990
In May 1974, India successfully conducted its first underground nuclear explosion in Pokhran in
the state of Rajasthan. Subsequently, India rejected the NPT on grounds that it was discriminatory.
The Pokhran nuclear tests invited widespread international criticism, and a series of sanctions were
imposed upon India with an adverse impact on India’s economy and technological development.41
These developments coupled with the imposition of “Emergency” imposed by Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi, from 1975 to 1977, saw India become isolated internationally. Meanwhile, India’s
relations with the neighbouring states of Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka during the late 1970s
turned difficult, with the small South Asian states viewing India as an uncompromising dominant
regional state.42 Against this backdrop, the president of Bangladesh, General Zia-ur-Rehman,
proposed the creation of a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) consisting
of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, the Maldives and Sri Lanka. India reluctantly
joined this regional group in 1985. Subsequently, from 1991, India’s relations with all the SAARC
countries except Pakistan started to improve, albeit marginally, helped by the “Gujral Doctrine”
which was based on unilateral goodwill and generosity with all neighbours.43
From 1980 onwards, India started asserting a broad security role in the Indian Ocean and initiated
close security ties with the littoral states, including Mauritius, Madagascar, the Maldives, Sri
Lanka and the Seychelles.44 In 1982, India attempted to intervene in Mauritius, in support of then
prime minister, Anerood Jugnauth (an Indian-origin British-educated barrister) who was under
threat of a coup by his deputy, Paul Berenger, the finance minister of French descent. Evidently,
the Hindu political leaders feared that Paul Berenger would overthrow the Hindu prime minister
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to establish a dictatorship favouring the Franco-Mauritian minority.45 This raised concerns in New
Delhi about the possibility of Mauritius, with over 70 per cent of its population of Indian origin,
slipping out of India’s sphere of influence. Consequently, in response to a call for support – in case
of an imminent coup – from Jugnauth, the Indian prime minister, Indira Gandhi, ordered the
deployment of an Indian expeditionary force of two army battalions to Mauritius. The Indian Navy,
in an operation codenamed Lal Dora, was standing by for further orders when the planned
intervention was called off, apparently due to operational concerns expressed by the Indian
Army.46 Meanwhile in Mauritius, news of India’s support to Jugnauth had spread and in the fresh
elections that were called in 1983, Jugnauth managed to strengthen his position and win the
elections with tacit support from India, defeating Berenger.
From 1984 onwards, India became increasingly involved in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka
between the indigenous Sinhalese majority population and the minority Indian origin Tamils
represented by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The conflict in Sri Lanka resulted
in a huge influx of Tamil refugees into the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu, drawing a wave of
public sympathy for the Tamil refugees and support from the ethnic Tamil regional parties. During
this period, the Sri Lankan government was also engaged in discussions with the United States,
Pakistan and Israel over a possible military role in Sri Lanka. India’s strategic interests in Sri Lanka
were largely driven by a desire to keep foreign powers out of the region and also seek democratic
rights for the large Tamil minority. Following several months of hectic diplomatic discussions
between New Delhi and Colombo, Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan president
Jayawardene signed the Indo-Sri Lanka peace accord in July 1987. India also insisted that Sri
Lanka make a commitment to prevent any foreign military power from using its ports and facilities.
In return, India provided the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka to oversee a peaceful
referendum for the merger of the northern and eastern provinces in Sri Lanka. However, the IPKF
was largely unsuccessful in its mission and failed to prevent the LTTE and the Sri Lankan forces
from engaging in a bloody war.47 The failure of the IPKF to effectively defeat the Tamil separatist
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group, LTTE, was viewed as a failure of India’s foreign policy and much criticised as an attempt
to impose Indian hegemony in South Asia.48
Later in 1986, India covertly intervened in the Seychelles to prevent a coup against the Seychelles
president, Albert Rene. In June 1986, when news of an impending coup was received in India, an
Indian naval ship was dispatched to enter the Seychelles in a show of force.49 Evidently, the
presence of the Indian naval ship averted the coup.50
Subsequently, India also played an active role in November 1988 when, in a swift and successful
tri-services joint operation codenamed Operation Cactus, overturned a coup by a group of more
than 80 mercenaries from a Sri Lankan Tamil insurgent group, the People’s Liberation
Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), against the Maldivian president, Abdul Gayoom.51
End of the Cold War and Beyond
With the end of the Cold War in 1990, the balance of power shifted dramatically, completely
altering the international environment. India also had to alter its foreign policy along the new
reference points of the post-Cold War era. The immediate challenge for India was to prepare for
the looming drift in economic and defence cooperation with the Soviet Union.52 Under the
leadership of Narasimha Rao, India initiated intense interaction with existing and emerging centres
of influence, the United States, western Europe, Japan and the ASEAN states. These interactions
were in addition to those with Russia and China, with whom India already had well-established
close relations.
Relations with Southeast Asia

India has had deep civilizational linkages with Southeast Asian

states spanning over a millennium. These relations were disrupted only after the arrival of the
Europeans in the region in 1498.53 Following India’s independence, there were attempts by the
Indian government to participate in the decolonisation process in Southeast Asia, starting with
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Indonesia and Myanmar, later Malaysia and Vietnam.54 However, as mentioned earlier in this
chapter, the evolving Cold War dynamics and India’s stand of non-alignment ensured that
relations between India and the Southeast Asian region remained “patchy.”55 Following the end of
the Cold War, India found itself marginalised in both political and economic terms, and on the
verge of financial collapse.56 During this period, the ASEAN states had created an economic
marvel by opening up to each other, to Japan, Taiwan, Korea and China, setting aside historical
baggage, thus leading to an economic transformation in the region.57
In 1992, Prime Minister Rao announced India’s revamped policy for engagement with its Eastern
neighbours as the Look East Policy. Initially, the key drivers for India’s Look East policy were
economics and strategic engagement with ASEAN.58 As immediate neighbours and successful
model economies, it was but natural for India to look towards Southeast Asia for economic
interactions.59 To quote the late J.N. Dixit, who was foreign secretary during the initial phase of
India’s Look East policy, “The economic involvement of important industrialized countries of the
West and Japan with ASEAN countries makes it a catalyst through which India can have access
to investment and technologies.”60 India’s initial experience with ASEAN countries showed that
it was an important and growing area for Indian investment, joint ventures and trade promotion.
The security aspect of India’s relationship with the region gained focus only after India’s nuclear
tests in 1998.61 While the ASEAN states were officially critical of India’s nuclear tests, some of
them drew comfort from the fact that India could potentially balance China, the other Asian nuclear
power.62 Moreover, following India’s announcement of the Look East policy, the Southeast Asian
countries, encouraged by India’s economic reforms, also took note of the vast market potential on
offer. This is evident from their readiness to offer India the status of full dialogue partner with
ASEAN.63 Consequently, India’s relations with the ASEAN states grew manifold since the early
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1990s and by 2002, India was elevated to the status of an ASEAN summit partner, at par with
China, Japan and South Korea.
In 2009, India signed a free trade agreement with ASEAN. This led to an immediate jump in
India’s trade with the region, as indicated by the trade figures below:
Table 3.1 - India-ASEAN Trade Pre- and Post-FTA64
Partners

India-ASEAN

Trade

(billions

of

Trade (billions of dollars,

Trade (billions of dollars,

dollars, 2009)

2010)

2013)

41.8

55.4
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Currently, nearly half of India’s trade transits the Strait of Malacca and the Singapore Strait,65 both
regions vulnerable to armed attacks on ships including potential terrorist attacks. Consequently,
the protection of trade and economic interests is a key driver for India’s maritime cooperation
initiatives with the regional states. Presently, India is regarded as a full-fledged strategic partner
in the region with 26 dialogue mechanisms. India now interacts with the grouping in most of its
activities, including trade and investment, security and defence, countering piracy and armed
robbery against ships, science and technology, environment, education and culture and tourism.66
In 2013, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had made it clear that East and Southeast Asia would
remain India’s top foreign policy priorities.67
The end of the Cold War and the common geopolitical experiences also seem to have engendered
a sense of common identity amongst all the Indian Ocean states. This appears to have “rekindled
an awareness of the centuries-old littoral economic, social and cultural community that exists all
along the shores of the Indian Ocean.”68 Thus the post-Cold War period saw the formation of the
first pan-Indian Ocean organisation known as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional
Cooperation or the IOR-ARC, in March 1997. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
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Recent Developments
In 2014, the BJP-led government under the leadership of Narendra Modi, swept into power with a
clear majority. Prime Minister Modi is the first ever prime minister to be born in independent India
and is widely regarded as a pragmatic leader and a man of action, with economics being central to
his thinking.69 Modi was the first to invite leaders from neighbouring states for his swearing-in
and the first to host a U.S. president (Obama) for the Republic Day parade. A second meeting
between Modi and Obama within a span of four months was unprecedented and a reflection of the
growing importance of India as a strategic partner to the United States. The joint U.S.-India
statement issued following Obama’s visit underscored India’s role as “indispensable” in
maintaining peace and stability across the Indo-Pacific.70 Modi believes that a strategic partnership
with the United Sates is critical for transforming India’s economy and international standing.71
Salient bilateral agreements signed between India and the United States include civil nuclear
cooperation, climate change and defence cooperation. The foremost priority of Modi’s government
has been to re-energise India’s foreign policy by moving from rhetoric to action. For instance, the
Look East policy has now been renamed as the “Act East” policy.
National Vision for Maritime Cooperation
A national vision of India becoming the “net provider of security” in the Indian Ocean region was
initially announced by the Indian prime minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, in 2013, while laying the
foundation stone of India’s National Defence University at Gurgaon, near New Delhi. He stated:
Our defence cooperation has grown and today we have unprecedented access to high technology,
capital and partnerships. We have also sought to assume our responsibility for stability in the Indian
Ocean Region. We are well positioned, therefore, to become a net provider of security in our immediate
region and beyond. 72
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In March 2015, during his three island nations trip to Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka, Modi
announced, for the first time, in Mauritius, a clear Indian maritime strategic vision or direction for
the Indian Ocean region.73 He outlined a five-point policy framework as follows:
•

India will do everything to secure its mainland and island territories and other maritime interests;

and also ensure security, safety and stability across the Indian Ocean for all regional states.
•

India will seek to enhance economic and security cooperation with all friendly littoral states and

its maritime neighbours.
•

India will foster collective action and cooperation to promote peace and security in the region.

•

India will promote overall development of the blue economy thorough greater collaboration in

trade, tourism and investment, infrastructure development, marine science and technology, sustainable
fisheries and protection of the marine environment.
•

India recognises that while the Indian Ocean littoral states have the primary responsibility for

peace, stability and prosperity in the Indian Ocean, it also acknowledges that extra-regional powers
too have interests in the region. India will seek to engage with them through the mechanism of
dialogue, visits, exercises, capacity building and economic partnership. 74

This five-point framework expands on the earlier announcement by former prime minister
Manmohan Singh, by adding an economic dimension to security through the promotion of a blue
economy that seeks to enhance economic cooperation between India and the Indian Ocean regional
states. While reiterating this framework during the International Fleet Review held by the Indian
Navy at Vishakhapatnam in February 2016, Modi stated, “the Indian Ocean Region is one of my
foremost policy priorities. Our approach is evident in our vision of “sagar”, which means ocean
[in Hindi] and stands for – Security and Growth for All in the Region.”75
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This framework could be regarded as the first clear articulation of India’s national objectives to
guide national maritime strategy for the Indian Navy. While the Indian Navy could be credited for
having introduced several bold initiatives to foster maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean
region in recent years, a concerted whole-of-government focus to promote relations with several
Indian Ocean states had been lacking. Evidently, the Indian political leaders of the twentieth
century demonstrated a continentalist mindset, with a lack of understanding of maritime power or
“sea blindness,” a term commonly used to describe this malady. This has been largely attributed
to the fact that the Indian capital and the seat of political power, New Delhi, is located furthest
from sea than any capital city in the world and historically, most foreign invasions into India came
from across the land boundaries in the north. As a result of this anomaly in the Indian polity,
diplomatically, this led to a general neglect of the Indian Ocean region for over 25 years. 76 The
visit of Prime Minister Modi to the three Indian Ocean island states in March 2015 was the first
visit by an Indian prime minister to the Seychelles in 34 years and to Sri Lanka in 28 years.77 This
visit has therefore been hailed by the media as “the beginning of the end of [India’s] self-inflicted
strategic myopia” in the Indian Ocean region.78 The scope for maritime cooperation between India
and other regional states now covers a wide range of opportunities with the role of the Indian Navy
as a net security provider being the overarching aim of this vision. This is discussed in detail later
in this chapter.
The Challenge of Chinese Influence in the Indian Ocean Region

As discussed in the previous

chapter, recent Chinese developments such as the ambitious maritime silk road projects and a new
logistics facility for the PLA Navy in Djibouti portend impending large-scale economic
investments in the Indian Ocean region. Quite clearly, China, with an $11 trillion GDP compared
to India’s $2 trillion GDP in 2015,79 can potentially leverage its economic might to counter India’s
bilateral relations, that have traditionally been based on historical, cultural and, in some cases,
close security relationships. Therefore, the main challenge for India’s foreign policy is to promote
the country’s position in the region in the face of increasing Chinese economic engagements.
Project Mausum is one such Indian initiative launched in June 2014, aimed at re-establishing
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India's ancient maritime routes with its ancient trade partners within the Indian Ocean.80 While the
aim of Project Mausum is to link the historic coastal sites of the region and reinvigorate the historic
and cultural linkages that bound India to the Indian Ocean,81 the five-point framework announced
by Modi seeks to foster close security and economic ties with the Indian Ocean littoral states also
leverage India’s relations with the United States and others, including Japan and Australia, to
maintain a favourable environment, without compromising its strategic autonomy.
In recent years, in line with Modi’s vision for the region, India has also sought to enhance its
economic engagements with key regional states. However, as examined later in Chapter 5, given
the large disparity in the GDPs of India and China, the scale of India’s economic engagements is
woefully short of Chinese investments. Consequently, as noted earlier in the introduction, India
has sought to leverage its maritime power to offset this anomaly and maintain a relative balance
of power with China. This is the basis of India’s maritime strategy which is examined in detail in
the next section of this chapter.
Overall Assessment
As a status quo power, the broad objectives of India’s foreign policy have been to work towards a
stable world order and a peaceful neighbourhood to ensure overall economic development,
territorial integrity, and allow India to retain its strategic autonomy to take decisions without the
pressure of foreign influence.82 These objectives have remained the guiding principles for all
subsequent governments in the post-Cold War period since 1990 with no major changes.
The Modi government has sought to revitalise India’s bilateral relations with the United States,
Japan, Australia and the EU with a view to improve economic prospects for the country and
promote defence cooperation. In the Indian Ocean, specifically, the government is actively seeking
to assert India’s position as the net security provider for the smaller littoral states and consequently,
the Indian Navy is expected to play a crucial role in the success of India’s foreign policy. It may
thus be concluded that India’s foreign policy of the 21st century is no longer guided by the “lofty”
ideology of the past but is now well-grounded in realism.
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Genesis of the Indian Navy
Prior to gaining independence the maritime defence of India was a key responsibility of the Royal
Navy. Accordingly, the British maintained a fleet at Trincomalee in Ceylon, a fleet at Singapore
and a squadron at Bahrain. The Royal Indian Navy (RIN), comprising mainly five sloops and a
few minor vessels based at Bombay, was primarily responsible for the coastal defence of India.83
Table 3.2 below sets out the composition of the RIN in August 1947, at the time of independence.
Table 3.2: Composition of the Royal Indian Navy in 194784
No.

Types

Numbers

1.

Sloops

4

2.

Frigates

2

3.

Corvette

1

4.

Coastal Minesweepers

12

5.

Survey Ship

1

6.

Trawlers

4

7.

Motor Minesweepers

4

8.

Motor Launch

1

9.

Harbour Defence Motor Launches

4

10.

Landing Craft

1

Only a week after independence, India’s Naval Headquarters issued an Outline Plan for the
Reorganization and Development of the Royal Indian Navy.85 Post-independence, the initial outline
plan for the development of the navy approved by the government in 1947 recommended a force
level of two aircraft carriers, eight destroyers, four submarines and other small vessels to be built
or acquired in ten years. The plan envisaged the following roles for the navy: Safeguard Indian
shipping; ensure that supplies could reach and leave by sea in all circumstances; prevent an enemy
landing on India’s shores; and support the Army in seaborne operations.86It was expected that
83
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Britain would assist India in achieving the intended force levels. However, the lack of support
from the Admiralty, except in areas of personnel training, led to a scaling down of requirements.
Subsequently, India’s non-aligned foreign policy and the fact that, in 1956, Pakistan had joined
both SEATO and CENTO, resulted in substantial naval assistance to Pakistan from the United
States. As a result, in order to maintain parity with the Pakistan Navy, the Indian Navy shelved its
plans for submarine acquisition and focused on building up its inventory of ships.87 The navy thus
postponed the decommissioning of its old ships, ordered eight new frigates from Britain and also
purchased the Royal Navy’s aircraft carrier, HMS Hercules (commissioned as INS Vikrant) in
1956. 88
Soviet Assistance
Following the 1962 Chinese attack on India and the resulting debacle, an extensive review of
India’s defence preparedness was carried out. The expansion and modernisation of the armed
forces was accorded priority and the navy was presented with an opportunity to formulate its
requirements anew. The fresh requirements of the three services were included in a five year
“Defence Plan 1964-69” and India sought assistance for its acquisition plans from the United
States, Britain and the Soviet Union. While the Americans and the British did not envisage any
threat to India from the Chinese navy, the Soviets were willing to meet the navy’s requirements.
According to Admiral Chatterji:
… Moscow’s geo-strategic analysis of Southeast Asia welcomed a powerful Indian Navy that would
associate and cooperate with the Soviet Navy to contain China in the region. Whatever may be the
reasons for the Soviet Union’s prompt and positive responses to Indian Naval requirements; it was
certainly very helpful and timely in making up the various deficiencies in the Indian Fleet. 89

By 1965, the navy realised that its requirements for ships and submarines could only be met by
the Soviet Union. Thus, Britain’s inability to support India after the 1962 war with China
effectively turned India to the Soviet Union. However, as a result of India’s non-aligned policy
during the Cold War, India was successful in retaining its naval connections with Britain. In 1964
India, in collaboration with Britain, commenced joint construction of Leander-class frigates in
87
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Mazagon Docks in Bombay.90 During this period, the Indian Navy was also able to benefit from
training assistance provided by the Royal Navy, access allied naval tactical publications and, until
1964, even participate in the annual Joint Exercise at Trincomalee (JET) with the British Far East
Fleet and other Commonwealth navies, including those of Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Ceylon and Malaya.91
The period from 1969 to 1971 saw rapid development of Indo-Soviet naval ties. During this period
the Indian Navy received four Foxtrot-class submarines, a submarine depot ship and eight newly
developed missile boats from the Soviet Union.92 The missile boats were successfully employed
by the Indian Navy in an audacious attack on Karachi during the 1971 war with Pakistan.93 As
mentioned earlier, the United States sponsored a UN resolution against India in the 1971 war and
the Soviet veto action, coupled with support during the war, firmly established Indo-Soviet ties
and paved the way for larger strategic naval acquisitions from the Soviet Union. The period from
1976 to 1983 saw the induction of Soviet guided missile destroyers, antisubmarine corvettes,
minesweepers, maritime reconnaissance/anti-submarine warfare aircraft and anti-submarine
warfare helicopters.94
In addition to the Soviet acquisitions, India continued to induct hardware and technology from the
West. The Indian Navy received its second aircraft carrier, HMS Hermes (commissioned as INS
Viraat) from the Royal Navy in 1987. The period from 1976 to 1990 also saw rapid advancements
in indigenous shipbuilding capacity as well as naval research and development. These
developments led to bold and innovative improvisations of both Soviet and Western origin systems
onboard Indian manufactured hulls. During this period the Indian Navy participated in two
significant naval operations. These included Operation Pawan from 1987 to 1990 to provide
support to the IPKF in Sri Lanka, and Operation Cactus in 1989, successfully thwarting an attempt
to overthrow the Maldivian president, Gayoom. As a result of these developments, the Indian Navy
gained international recognition as an emerging power and, in April 1989, the cover of Time
magazine carried a picture of the indigenously built frigate INS Godavari, captioned “Superpower
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India.”95 Notwithstanding the successes of this period, the naval acquisitions proceeded without a
clear strategy and the Indian Navy of the 1980s was a motley collection of naval platforms,
weapons and sensors from multiple sources. Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd), former Chief of the
Naval Staff, recollects:
In the mid 1980s, I recall reading with great indignation, a statement by the editor of Jane’s Fighting
Ships in one of his yearbooks, which said something to this effect ... the Indian Navy is probably
one of the few major navies which first acquire hardware and then thinks about how to use it. 96

Developments in the Post-Cold War Period
Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Indian Navy
was beset with problems such as supplies of spares and munitions to maintain its large inventory
of Soviet-origin platforms, weapons and sensors. The 1990s were a difficult period as it also
coincided with a downturn in India’s economy. However, by the mid-1990s, following the signing
of both the 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and the Bilateral Defence Cooperation
Agreement with Russia, India was successful in restructuring its defence imports from Russia, as
well as Ukraine, where several critical former Soviet manufacturing industries were located.97 The
key lessons of this period for India were to diversify its procurement from alternate sources and
also focus on building indigenous defence industrial capability.
The end of the Cold War led to a recalibration of India’s foreign policy, followed by the
announcement of the Look East policy. Accordingly, the Indian Navy focused on engagements
with Southeast Asian and other Indian Ocean navies and also commenced bilateral naval exercises
with the U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy, the Royal Australian Navy and the French Navy, in 1991 and
1992. In 1993, India commenced naval exercises with Oman and in 1995 held the first
multinational naval exercise, Milan, at Port Blair, hosted exclusively for Southeast Asian navies.98
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One of the aims of these exercises was to quell the apprehensions about India’s aspirations for
power amongst regional littoral states fueled by the rapid expansion programmes of the 1980s.99
Since the late 1990s to the present, the Indian Navy has expanded considerably, growing over 30
per cent according to some estimates,100 consistent with its rising economic and political profile.101
During this period, the naval share of the defence budget also increased from a meagre 11.5 per
cent in 1991-92 to 19 per cent in 2012-13.102 Presently, under the 2017-18 defence budget the
naval share is 14 per cent.103 Several important acquisitions were made during this period. From
1995 to 2010 important inductions into the Indian Navy included three indigenously built Delhiclass destroyers, three Bhrahmaputra-class frigates, seven Kora/Khukri-class corvettes, four
Magar-class Landing Ships (LSTs) and one Aditya-class tanker. Key acquisitions from Russia
during this period included two additional Kilo-class submarines and three Talwar-class frigates
while one landing ship (LPD), INS Jalahswa (formerly USN Trenton) was acquired from the U.S.
Navy under a hot transfer. 104
As part of India’s nuclear weapon policy to develop a “triad” of land, sea and air-based nuclear
delivery systems, the Indian Navy inducted its first indigenously built nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN), the Arihant, in 2009, commissioned in 2013. It later also inducted on
lease from Russia the Chakra-class nuclear submarine (SSN) in 2012.105 Two additional SSBNs
and six SSNs were approved for acquisition by the government in 2015.106 Table 3.3 in the
following page lists the major inductions in the Indian Navy and planned acquisitions from 2010.
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Table 3.3: Post-2010 Major Inductions and Planned Acquisitions in the Indian Navy107
Platform

Class

Design Origin

Aircraft
Carrier.

1 x Kiev- class aircraft
carrier.
1 x Indigenous aircraft
carrier (Project 71).

Russian origin

1 x Indigenous aircraft
carrier.
3 x Kolkatta-class
destroyers (Project
15A).

Follow-on to Project 71.

Destroyer.

4 x Vishakhapatnamclass destroyers (Project
15 B).
Frigate.

Tanker.
Submarine.

Aircraft.

An indigenously designed and
constructed ship

An indigenously designed and
constructed class of ship, followon to the earlier successful Delhiclass destroyers.
Delhi-class destroyers.

Year of Commission/
Planned Induction
Commissioned in 2014 as
INS Vikramditya.
Under construction at
Kochi Shipyard. Likely
induction in 2017.
Construction likely to
start in 2018.
Commissioned between
2013 to 2014.

3 x Shivalik-class
stealth frigates (Project
17).
7 x Shivalik-class
stealth frigates (Project
17 A).
3 x Talwar-class
frigates.

An indigenously designed and
constructed modern stealth frigate.

First in class likely to be
commissioned in 2018,
and every two years in
succession.108
Commissioned between
2010 to 2012.

Seven follow-on ships approved
for construction in 2009.

Likely to be inducted
over next decade. 109

Constructed in Russia as a followon to the earlier Talwar-class.

2 x Deepak –class Fleet
tankers
6 x Scorpene-class
submarines (Project
75).
8 x Boeing P-8I MR
aircraft

Made in Italy by Fincantieri.

Commissioned between
2012 to 2013 as followon to three earlier ships of
the class.
Commissioned in 2011.

Under production at Mazagon
Docks, India in collaboration with
French DCNS.
United States.

To be inducted over next
five years. 110
Six aircraft delivered so
far. Remaining to be
delivered later this
year.111

Presently, India has 137 ships which includes 48 major combatants (including two aircraft carriers)
and 14 submarines. However, according to the latest Maritime Capability Perspective Plan the
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navy is aiming to become a 200-ship force by 2027 with six nuclear submarines and three carrier
task forces.112
Largest Naval Base in Indian Ocean

In September 2015, the Indian Navy commissioned a new

Indian naval air station, INS Vajrakosh, at Karwar. The air station together with a 2013
commissioned naval establishment INS Kadamba, completes the setting up of the largest naval
base east of Suez, spread over 1,000 acres.113 Karwar will be the home of the Western Fleet,
comprising two aircraft carriers, submarines and major surface combatants. This is a key strategic
development that seems to have escaped the attention of most commentators. The base was
conceived in 1985 to cater for the future growth of the navy and to relocate the fleet outside the
range of Pakistani fighters, a requirement now redundant with the introduction of mid-air refuelers.
While the new base serves to provide the navy with ample room to operate freely, away from the
congested harbour in Mumbai, strategically it makes little difference to support India’s maritime
balance of power vis-a-vis China in the Indian Ocean.

Evolution of India’s Maritime Doctrine and Strategy
According to a leading Indian security analyst, India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru
(1947-64) ”who set the template for the use of the armed forces in the pursuit of national objectives
and the subsequent contour of civil-military relations in free India, exuded the liberal disdain for
the use of force.”114 Evidently, Nehru had “an uneasy relationship with the top military brass and
saw the institution of the fauj (military) in its colonial hue.”115 As a result of this unclear thinking,
compounded with the malaise of sea blindness that afflicted the Indian political leadership of the
twentieth century, when India embarked on a large scale military modernisation programme
following the 1962 war with China, the navy was relegated to a “Cinderella” service status for
several years, with the major chunk of the defence budget being allocated to the army and air force.
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A small part of the blame for a general neglect of India’s maritime status in the 1990s can also be
apportioned to the navy, for during this period, it did little to educate or inform the public and
policy makers about the significance and employment of maritime power. For instance, in 1990,
during the First Gulf War, India evacuated over 176,000 Indian nationals from the region in over
500 flights by India’s national carrier, Air India, an operation that surpassed even the Berlin Airlift
and is remembered by Indians as “the biggest ever air evacuation in history;” and that came shortly
before a severe balance of payments crisis.116 The navy could well have been deployed to conduct
the evacuation as they did many years later in 2006 during the Israel Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon
when ships from the Western Fleet, in an operation codenamed Sukoon, successfully evacuated
almost 2,000 civilians; mostly Indians but also Sri Lankans, Nepalese, Greeks and Lebanese.117
More recently, in April 2015, the Indian Navy evacuated hundreds of India workers and foreigners
from Yemen under an operation codenamed Rahaat.118 Evidently in 1990, the civilian bureaucrats
in the Ministry of Defence were unaware that naval power could be employed for such crises.119
Beginning from 1995, following the success of the first multinational naval exercise Milan
conducted by the Indian Navy at Port Blair, there was a growing realisation of the significance of
sea power amongst Indian policy makers. Subsequent naval operations including Operation
Sagittarius in 2002, in which Indian Navy ships escorted high-value U.S. Navy ships through the
Strait of Malacca following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and Indian naval security patrols off
Mozambique during the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit in 2003, helped drive home
the point that the Indian Navy could play an instrumental role in furthering India’s national
interests in the region. Another significant development in this period was the recapture of the
hijacked Japanese ship, Alondra Rainbow, in a joint operation involving the Indian Navy and Coast
Guard in 1999. This maritime incident alone helped in the resumption of diplomatic relations
between India and Japan, which had reached their lowest ebb in 1998 following India’s Pokhran
II nuclear tests, and thus significantly raised the profile of the navy.120
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Around 2003-4, much needed institutional changes within the navy, such as the setting up of
dedicated directorates for Foreign Cooperation as well as Strategy and Concepts, helped to
promote international naval cooperation and craft a maritime doctrine and strategy for the Indian
Navy.121 In 2004, a formal Indian Naval Doctrine was published, followed by the publication in
2007 of an unclassified version of the Indian naval strategy, The Freedom to Use the Seas: India's
Maritime Military Strategy. A revised and updated version of the Indian Naval Doctrine was
published in August 2009. The main aim of the document, according to then Chief of the Naval
Staff, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, was to provide “greater clarity and understanding on various facets
of maritime military power, to our own people in particular and the world community, at large.”122
The setting up of a maritime think tank, the National Maritime Foundation,123 in New Delhi in 2005
with support from the Indian Navy, was another step forward. The Foundation has since helped
“maritime evangelists” to garner public support for the navy and favourably influence government
policy.
The Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 saw active participation by the Indian Navy in providing
humanitarian aid and support to Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Indonesia within hours of the
calamity. Subsequently, in 2006, as noted earlier, the Indian Navy helped in the evacuation of
about 2,000 people from war-torn Lebanon. These operations and several key initiatives by the
Indian Navy, including the continuing deployment of Indian naval ships on anti-piracy patrols off
Somalia since 2007, bolstered India’s image in the Indian Ocean region as a significant maritime
power capable of ensuring maritime safety and security in the region. In recent years, the Indian
Navy has sought to consolidate its activities under a wide-ranging maritime cooperation
programme with various Indian Ocean littoral states, as well as regular bilateral naval exercises in
the Indian Ocean with Australia, France, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.124 Another recent maritime security cooperation programme initiated by India is the
Trilateral Cooperation on Maritime Security (TCMS) agreement signed between India, Sri Lanka,
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and the Maldives. The agreement has recently been expanded to include Mauritius and the
Seychelles.125
Indian Maritime Doctrine
The first attempt by the Indian Navy to formally promulgate a strategy was made in 1988 when a
document titled “A Maritime Strategy for India,” was published.126 After a period of 16 years with
no further maritime strategic level thinking released into the public domain, the Indian Navy
promulgated the Indian Maritime Doctrine in 2004. This edition served as the apex doctrine of
maritime power for a period of five years. Subsequent transformations within the navy necessitated
a review of the doctrine and a revised edition, incorporating the benefits of hindsight and critique,
was released in 2009.127 The Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2009 served as the Indian Navy’s
capstone document providing the foundation for the navy's operating, planning, organisational and
training philosophies. The doctrine was considered to be syncretic in its approach, incorporating
various strands of traditional or continentalist, British, Soviet and Monrovian schools of thought.128
Broadly, the doctrine defined the employment of the navy under four roles: military, diplomatic,
constabulary and benign, encompassing the entire spectrum of activities that the navy could be
called upon to execute. This clearly was derived from the trinity of naval roles described in the
work of Ken Booth129 and the British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806).130 In 2009, when the maritime
doctrine was released it was labelled by analysts as an “aspirational” doctrine rather than
something that the Indian Navy could seek to achieve within its existing capability. 131 While this
may have been true in 2009, based on the rapid growth of the Indian Navy since then, including
the induction of a new aircraft carrier, a nuclear ballistic missile submarine, state-of-the-art
maritime reconnaissance aircraft and several major combatants, it is evident that the extant force
levels of the Indian Navy now enable it to fulfil the entire spectrum of operations envisaged in the
2009 Indian Maritime Doctrine.
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In February 2016, an updated version of Indian Maritime Doctrine was released, incorporating
minor changes and updates to bring it into line with the latest version of the maritime strategy
document. The Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2016 contains ten chapters.132 The first chapter
explains the conceptual framework for the employment of maritime power. It describes the
linkages between national aims and interests, and national security objectives and policy, which
justify the use of maritime power. The next three chapters are dedicated to defining the spectrum
of conflict, concepts and principles of war from an Indian perspective, including a discussion on
the legal aspects of warfare. The fifth chapter provides an overview of India’s maritime
environment and interests. It also covers the strategic imperatives that shape the employment of
maritime power. It discusses the various factors that shape the geostrategic significance of the
Indian Ocean region, such as location of various choke points that control the entry and exit into
the Indian Ocean, presence of raw materials and resources in the region and resultant trade patterns,
highlighting the importance of India’s geographic position atop the international shipping lanes. It
provides an environmental scan of the Indian Ocean region, underscoring emerging non-traditional
threats and challenges such as terrorism, piracy and transnational crimes. The chapter also lists
India’s various maritime interests, including shipping, ports and offshore exploration and mining
areas, based on which the Indian Ocean region has been categorised as primary and secondary
areas of interest to India. The areas of interest to India are defined as follows:
Primary Areas India’s primary areas of maritime interest comprise the following:

•

Maritime zones of India, covering the territorial waters, contiguous zone and exclusive
economic zone from the national baseline.

•

The Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, encompassing all Indian island territories and
EEZ, and their littoral reaches.

•

The Persian Gulf and its littoral, a major source of oil supplies and gas imports, and
home to an estimated seven million expatriate Indians.

•

The choke points leading to, from and across the Indian Ocean, including the Sixdegree Channel, Eight/Nine-degree Channels, Straits of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb,

132
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Malacca, Singapore, Sunda and Lombok Straits, the Mozambique Channel, and the
Cape of Good Hope, as well as the adjacent littoral regions.
•

The Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and the littoral regions.

•

South-West Indian Ocean, including the island nations therein and the East coast of
Africa littoral regions.

•

Other areas encompassing Indian SLOCs, and vital energy and resource interests.

Secondary Areas

•

India’s secondary areas of maritime interest comprise the following:

South-East Indian Ocean, including sea routes to the Pacific Ocean and littoral
regions in the vicinity.

•

South and East China Seas, western Pacific Ocean, and their littoral regions.

•

Southern Indian Ocean region, including Antarctica.

•

Mediterranean Sea, West coast of Africa, and their littoral regions.

•

Other areas of national interest based on considerations of the Indian diaspora,
overseas investments and political relations.133

In October 2015, the Indian government released India’s new maritime-military strategy, Ensuring
Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy. This document supersedes the 2007 maritime
strategy, Freedom to Use the Seas. Under the revised strategy, the areas of interest notified under
the Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2009 were expanded to include the South-West Indian Ocean and
Red Sea within the primary areas and the western coast of Africa, the Mediterranean Sea and
“other areas of national interest based on considerations of Indian diaspora, overseas investments
and political reasons,” within the secondary area of interest.134
Chapter 6 of the Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2016 is focused on the concepts of maritime power.
It examines the attributes of maritime power, command and control aspects, maritime domain
awareness and a discussion on the entire spectrum of naval operations, covering facets such as
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expeditionary operations, amphibious operations, sea control and sea denial. This leads to the next
chapter titled “Application of Maritime Power,” describing the roles, objectives, mission and tasks
that could be conducted by the navy at various levels: tactical, operational and strategic, discussed
in detail below. The last three chapters of the doctrine provide an overview of the fundamental
components of naval combat power and a discussion on the operational planning thought process,
followed by a conclusion.
The “Application of Maritime Power” chapter provides a comprehensive insight into the various
activities of the navy. Broadly, the employment of the navy has been structured under four
headings: roles, objectives, missions and tasks; encompassing the entire spectrum of activities that
the navy could be called upon to execute. The roles of the navy have been described as military,
diplomatic, constabulary and benign. The various objectives, missions and tasks indicated under
each role are as tabulated below in Table 3.3.

Table 3.4 - Indian Navy: Roles, Objectives, Missions and Tasks135
Military Role
Objectives
• Deterrence against war or
intervention.
• Decisive military victory in case
of war
• Security of India’s territorial
integrity, citizens and offshore
assets from seaborne threat
• Influence affairs on land
• Safeguard India’s mercantile
marine and maritime trade
• Safeguard India’s national
interests and maritime security

135

Missions
• Nuclear second-strike.
• Maritime domain awareness.
• Sea control.
• Sea denial.
• Blockade.
• Power projection.
• Expeditionary operations.
• Compellance.
• Destruction.
• SLOC interdiction.
• SLOC protection.
• Special operations.
• Protection of offshore assets. •
Seaward defence.
• Naval
coordination
and
guidance
to
shipping
operations.

Indian Maritime Doctrine, 2016, pp. 110-120.

Tasks
• Surveillance.
• Maritime strike
• Anti-submarine operations.
• Anti-surface operations.
• Anti-air operations.
• Amphibious operations.
• Information operations.
• Electronic warfare.
• Special operations.
• Mine warfare.
• Visit board search and seizure
operations.
• Harbour defence.
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Diplomatic Role
• Strengthen political relations
and goodwill.
• Strengthen defence relations
with friendly states.
• Portray credible defence posture
and capability.
• Influence affairs on land.
• Strengthen maritime security in
Indian Ocean region.
• Promote regional and global
stability.

• Constructive

maritime
engagement.
• Maritime assistance and
support.
• Presence.
• Peace support operations.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

• Counter terrorism.
• Counter-threats from

•
•
•
•
•

Overseas deployments.
Flag showing/ port visits.
Hosting of warship visits.
Technical and logistics assistance.
Foreign training.
Coordinated patrols.
Bilateral/ multilateral exercises.
Non-combatant evacuation.
Peace enforcement, peace making,
peace keeping and peace building.
• Activities under IONS.

Constabulary Role
• Coastal defence.
• Security of EEZ.
• Good order at sea.
Benign Role
• Promote civil safety and
security.
• Project national soft power.

non-

state Actors.

Counter infiltration.
Patrol.
Anti-piracy.
Anti-poaching.
Anti-trafficking.

• Humanitarian assistance and

• Provision of relief material and

disaster relief (HADR).
• Aid to civil authorities.
• Hydrography.
• Search and rescue (SAR).

• Medical assistance.
• Diving assistance.
• Hydrographic assistance.

supplies.

India’s Maritime Military Strategy
As noted earlier in the chapter, in September 2015, the Indian defence minister released the latest
version of India’s maritime strategy, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy,
superseding the earlier document, The Freedom to Use the Seas: India's Maritime Military
Strategy of 2007. Read in conjunction with the maritime doctrine along with Joint Doctrine –
Indian Armed Forces,136 the maritime strategy provides the framework for employment of the
Indian Navy. A critique of the recent strategic writings by the Indian Navy is undertaken in the
succeeding paragraphs.
The Freedom to Use the Seas: India's Maritime Military Strategy

This document was an

unclassified version of India’s maritime strategy released to the public for “providing greater
clarity and understanding on various facets of maritime military power.” As indicated in the
document a classified version of the maritime strategy exists, for use within the navy.137 The 2007
136
137
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Indian maritime strategy comprised nine chapters. It explained the linkages between doctrine and
strategy followed by salient objectives of the strategy and a description of the key factors shaping
it. It presented the evolution of India’s maritime strategy, along with a critical analysis of the two
major wars between India and Pakistan fought in 1965 and 1971 involving the Indian Navy, as
well as certain key operations conducted by the navy in “less than war” situations, highlighting the
lessons learnt. It highlighted the key deficiencies within the navy during that period in terms of
reach, surveillance, amphibious capability and submarine warfare. The reference to trade warfare
during the 1971 war is noteworthy and suggests a renewed focus on the same in the twenty-first
century. Chapter 3 provided an overview of the Indian Ocean region including the various factors
that shape the geopolitical dynamics of the region, while the following chapter was dedicated to
India’s maritime trade, including oil imports and security of energy. Chapter 5 presented the areas
of interest to India in the region – also indicated in the maritime doctrine – to emphasise the relative
levels or degrees of surveillance required to support maritime domain awareness (MDA) across
the region. It specifically evoked the Portuguese governor, Alfonso Albuquerque, who had opined
that control over Indian Ocean choke points was imperative to prevent an “inimical power from
making an entry into the Indian Ocean.”138 This chapter also provided the likely scenarios that
would require employment of the navy in its military role as outlined in the maritime doctrine.
Strategy for Peacetime

Chapter 6 of the document described the strategy for employment of the

navy in peace, flowing from the various objectives, missions and tasks indicated under the
diplomatic, constabulary and benign roles of the navy described in the maritime doctrine. The most
important task prescribed for the navy in peacetime is to maintain “deterrence” at the strategic,
nuclear and conventional levels. In order to achieve a credible level of deterrence the strategy
required the navy to maintain high combat efficiency, forward presence in areas of interest and
demonstrate reach and sustainability in all areas, and an all-round information capability. The
document went on to list the aims of the navy under each of the four set roles. Under the diplomatic
role the main job of the navy was described as support for India’s foreign policy, to be achieved
by conducting of maritime diplomacy and maritime cooperation, broadly structured under
“strategic defence security cooperation,” “defence industry and technology cooperation” and
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“navy-to-navy cooperation.” The vision and drivers for maritime cooperation envisaged in the
2007 strategy encompassed the following:
• Shaping a favourable maritime environment in the Indian Ocean region for operations in
peace as well as during conflict.
• Preventing incursions by powers inimical to India's national interests by actively engaging
countries along the Indian Ocean region littoral areas, and rendering speedy and quality
assistance in fields of interest to them.
• Engaging extra-regional powers and regional navies in mutually beneficial activities to
ensure the security of India's maritime interests.
• Projecting the Indian Navy as a professional, credible force and the primary tool for
maritime cooperation.
In the constabulary role, the maritime strategy recommended a graded application of maritime
power against state-sponsored or non-state actors undertaking hostile activities. These operations
were broadly divided into low intensity maritime operations and “good order at sea” missions.
Under the benign role, the strategy recommended the navy to be prepared for a wide range of tasks
including hydrographic assistance and other operations – even though they normally fall under the
purview of the coast guard - such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, noncombatant evacuation.
Strategy for Employment in Conflict

Chapter 7 provided the strategy for naval employment in

war, advocating employment of both indirect and direct means by the navy. Indirect means imply
attacks on an enemy’s trade; however, the strategy acknowledged that such action has limited
impact in short duration wars. The direct means aimed at influencing events ashore prescribed
targeting of an adversary's territory, including civil and military assets as well as combatants, from
the sea, by the delivery of ordnance. The strategy highlighted the existence of a multi-dimensional
threat scenario for the navy with inherent complexities of identification and short response time
periods. It called for the navy to remain prepared at all times for all scenarios ranging from lessthan-war situations to all out nuclear war. The employment of exclusion zones to restrict trade and
facilitate targeting was also mentioned.
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The document also identified key areas for national focus and the development of indigenous
capability and infrastructure to meet future challenges. In conclusion, the strategy highlighted the
fact that its various elements were continually evolving and thus required constant review. In the
end, it called for adoption of a high level of training, staff procedures and future acquisitions to
meet the maritime challenges of a dynamic environment.
Overall, the Indian maritime strategy of 2007 advocated a modern, robust and balanced navy,
capable of operating across the entire spectrum of naval operations from peacetime to total war.
However, the main focus was on deterring conflict thorough a high degree of readiness, constant
surveillance in and around the areas of interest and, above all, the maintenance of a favourable
environment in the Indian Ocean region through a wide range of maritime cooperation activities.
Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy

The maritime strategy of 2007 was

revised, evidently to align it with the national vision of the government for India to emerge as the
net security provider for the Indian Ocean region, with the new version released in late 2015.
Although many of the broad enunciations of the 2007 strategy, discussed above, have been retained
in the revised strategy, it has been updated to take account of recent developments in the threat
environment. Its scope has also been widened to include the additional mandate for the Indian
Navy, to provide for coastal and offshore maritime security as a result of the 26/11 attacks in
Mumbai.
The document is divided into eight chapters. The first, “Maritime Security Strategy in
Perspective,” describes the changes that necessitated the revision. It acknowledges that the blurring
of the line between traditional and non-traditional threats demand a “seamless and holistic
approach towards maritime security.” It also explains that the title of the 2007 strategy was revised
because, in order to ensure “freedom of the seas,” it is imperative to first ensure “secure seas.” The
chapter indicates the key determinants of India’s maritime strategy to include the recent
developments in India’s economic and maritime interests in the region and the new challenges
envisaged as consequence of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai.
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According to the document, the aim of India’s maritime strategy is “to safeguard national maritime
interests at all times.”139 The maritime security objectives flowing from that aim are:
•

To deter conflict and coercion against India.

•

To conduct maritime military operations in a manner that enables early termination of
conflict on terms favourable to India.

•

To shape a favourable and positive maritime environment, for enhancing net security
in India’s areas of maritime interest.

•

To protect Indian coastal and offshore assets against attacks and threats emanating
from or at sea.

•

To develop requisite maritime force levels and maintain the capability for meeting
India’s maritime security requirements.140

The 2015 maritime strategy lists five broad constituent strategies to ensure the objectives:
•

Strategy for deterrence.

•

Strategy for conflict.

•

Strategy for shaping positive and favourable maritime environment.

•

Strategy for coastal and offshore security.

•

Strategy for maritime force and capability development.141

The second chapter, “Maritime Security Imperatives and Influences,” describes the key imperatives
of India’s maritime security, including maritime trade, economy, relations with regional states and
diaspora, and the influence of the unique geography of the Indian Ocean region and other nontraditional threats prevalent in the region such as piracy, terrorism and the impact of climate
change. As indicated earlier in the chapter, the strategy for the first time expands the primary and
secondary areas of interest to encompass the western Pacific Ocean, Mediterranean Sea and the
coast of West Africa. It also includes two additional choke points, namely the Mozambique
Channel and the Ombai-Wetar Straits. The next five chapters outline the various measures required
Ensuring Secure Seas, India’s Maritime Military Strategy, p. 10.
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to implement the five strategic objectives listed above. These are broadly described in the
following paragraphs.
Chapter 4, “Strategy for Deterrence,” provides the broad strategy to deter conflict and threats
across the military, diplomatic and constabulary roles. It also includes the various objectives,
mission and tasks for the navy at the conventional and nuclear levels of conflict. The next chapter,
“Strategy for Conflict,” describes the strategy “to conduct maritime military operations in a
manner that enables early termination of conflict on terms favourable to India,” in collaboration
with the other services and relevant agencies. It states that although the strategy for conflict is
largely in the classified domain, it is shaped in relation to the “doctrinal concepts of maritime
power and operational art, viz. operational principles, enablers and actions.”142
Chapter 5 addresses the maritime security objective to shape a maritime environment that would
enhance net security in India’s areas of maritime interest. The term “net security” is defined in the
following manner:
… the state of actual security available in an area, upon balancing prevailing threats, inherent risks
and rising challenges in a maritime environment, against the ability to monitor, contain and counter
all of these.143

By logical extension of that definition, the implication is that, as the intended “net security
provider,” India seeks to augment the maritime capacity of regional states by “filling in” gaps
rather than acting as a regional “policeman.” The key actions envisaged in order to maintain net
maritime security are listed as follows:
•

Presence and rapid response, including presence and surveillance missions,

independently or in coordination with friendly maritime states.
•

Maritime engagement through formal engagements such as port visits, naval

exercises, staff talks and strategic interactions.
•

Capacity building and capability enhancement by providing training, technical and

hydrographic support to friendly regional states.
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•

Develop regional MDA.

•

Maritime security operations through the conduct of EEZ surveillance missions, anti-

piracy patrols, humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR) operations and non-combatant
evacuations operations (NEOs) by the Indian Navy for India and the rest of the region.
•

Strategic communication for net maritime security.144

The use of the term “net security” in India’s strategic writings is new. Traditionally, it can be
argued, this role is “expected out of the great and capable powers that can deploy their surplus
national assets for the safety and stability of other countries.”145 However, India has been quietly
involved as a security provider in the region for a long time, as SD Muni, an Indian expert
observes:India has, in fact, always been a security provider to its willing immediate neighbours like Nepal,
Bhutan, Myanmar (then Burma) and Indonesia, since its own independence in 1947. It continued to
play this role throughout the 1970s and 1980s in relation to Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives. 146

As a fast-growing major economy, India’s ambitions to play the “unstated” role of a security
provider seems to have stemmed from a need for regional security and stability. The United States
were the first to formally acknowledge or view India as a “security provider” in the Indian Ocean.
In May 2009, Robert Gates, the US Secretary of Defense, speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue
stated: “In coming years, we look to India to be a partner and net provider of security in the Indian
Ocean and beyond.”147 Subsequently, as noted earlier in this chapter, in 2013, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh articulated India’s role as a “net security provider” as a national vision.
The description of “net security” in the maritime strategy document, however, is broad and does
not clarify, for instance, what is meant by “actual security”; nor does it qualify the types of security
threats, which could possibly range from non-traditional challenges to the threats of a nuclear
attack. Perhaps, the description has been deliberately kept generic to permit the exercise of various
options in the future. However, it is opined based on the record of India’s military and maritime
144
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interventions in the region as analysed earlier in this chapter, that the security providing role
envisaged in the maritime strategy is more in the nature of security cooperation in close
collaboration with the relevant states than as an external force. For example, as noted earlier, in
recent decades Indian military forces were involved in the civil war in Sri Lanka under a peace
accord, they also helped to restore the government in Maldives under siege from a terrorist outfit
and even provided sizable humanitarian aid and disaster relief during multiple natural calamities
including the last tsunami.
Chapter 6 of the maritime strategy discusses the strategy for the new responsibility of the Indian
Navy for overall maritime security, including coastal security and offshore security of various
assets.148 This added responsibility was entrusted to the Indian Navy in February 2009 following
the 26/11 terrorist attacks and currently the Indian Navy is assisted by the Indian Coast Guard,
State Marine Police, and other agencies for the coastal defence of India. The next chapter presents
the strategy for maritime force and capability development. In order to develop the Indian Navy
as a combat ready, technology driven and networked force, the strategy examines the conceptual,
human and physical elements, primarily focused on the physical attribute that is the force level
and capability. In line with the 2007 strategy the new version also advocates an all-round balanced
naval force with a focus on indigenisation and self-reliance. The final chapter reiterates that the
importance of the seas for India’s national interests will continue to rise, and thus demand greater
focus and attention on the role of the Indian Navy.
Overall, the new strategy Ensuring Secure Seas retains the essence of the earlier strategic
document promulgated in 2007. The broad aim of the Indian Navy remains to “shape a favourable
and positive environment,” while maintaining a robust and all-round capability to deter potential
conflict. The phrase “Secure Seas” implies closer association with security of the littoral and the
objective of “Freedom to Use the Seas” is not compromised in the new document.149 However, the
document provides greater clarity on “what” missions the Indian Navy will undertake and “how”
this will be achieved to ensure India’s maritime security, detailing missions and tasks across the
military, diplomatic and constabulary roles of the navy, an important improvement over the 2007
document. Further, based on updated or contemporary threat scenarios, the 2015 strategy
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acknowledges the blurring of boundaries between traditional and non-traditional threats, and
emphasises the need for a seamless and holistic approach to maritime security. An obvious
implication of this situation is a commensurate blurring of boundaries between the measures
required for tackling traditional and non-traditional threats. Thus by a logical extension of this
position, maritime security cooperation that seeks to tackle the common non-traditional threats in
the region, through activities such as combined surveillance missions, anti-piracy patrols, naval
exercises, ship visits and even training exchanges, could be an inherent part of an agenda for
addressing wider national security concerns. This aspect is discussed in greater detail in the next
chapter of the thesis.

Conclusion
This chapter has traced the evolution of India’s foreign policy and maritime strategy postindependence up until the present period. It is seen that in the last seven decades of India’s
existence as an independent nation state, its foreign policy has undergone subtle changes. While,
it is no longer guided by idealism, the guiding principles from the initial Nehruvian philosophy,
the key tenets of non-alignment and retention of strategic autonomy in the Indian Ocean region,
continue to shape India’s foreign policy. However, in a changing world order and a fast evolving
regional environment, the new government under Prime Minister Modi is faced with the difficult
challenge of retaining strategic autonomy for India or the so called Indian Ocean “Monroe
doctrine”, in the face of growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. As Chinese maritime
power increasingly follows its increasing economic clout across the region, China could potentially
undermine India’s bid for regional leadership.
References to India’s hoary maritime history – that actually gave the Indian Ocean its name – in
the various maritime doctrinal and strategic documents indicates that India is highly conscious of
its rich maritime legacy and therefore keen to re-establish its former status. Evidently, extant
strategic thinking seems to advocate a determined bid for leadership in the Indian Ocean in the
twenty-first century, by taking over complete responsibility for regional security. In this context
achieving a “favourable environment” in the Indian Ocean as enunciated in the maritime strategy
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document tacitly implies ensuring that all regional states accept India’s leadership in the Indian
Ocean. Thus, India’s ambition to be the region’s net security provider is aimed at building trust
and confidence amongst the regional states about maritime security and perhaps even to develop
long-term dependency upon Indian protection. By strengthening its leadership role in the Indian
Ocean, India also seeks to counterbalance a fast growing and increasingly assertive China, which
is dependent on the shipping routes of the Indian Ocean. Thus, India’s relations with the Indian
Ocean states will be a key factor in the tussle for influence in the India Ocean and this is where the
Indian Navy is expected to play an instrumental role. Here, it even has the tacit support of the
United States. Although the United States remains the underwriter of security in the broader IndoPacific region, it sees the vastly expanded Indian Navy as a potential ally in maintaining security
in the Indian Ocean region, more narrowly. In conclusion, it can be stated that Indian maritime
strategy for the twenty-first century will play an instrumental role in shaping India’s destiny in the
Indian Ocean region.
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Chapter 4
Maritime Security Cooperation in the Twenty-first Century – Framework for
Analysis

Introduction
The previous chapter provided an overview of India’s foreign policy since independence leading
to the recent proactive policy announcements under the Modi government. It also outlined the
broad Indian maritime strategy to deter conflict by shaping a favourable maritime environment by
playing the role of a net security provider for the Indian Ocean region. This is indicative of an
alternate approach in maritime strategy, one that leverages maritime cooperation or naval
diplomacy to meet a country’s maritime security challenges. Furthermore, it is also reflective of
the changing maritime security scenarios of the post-Cold War period. This phenomenon is
evidenced from the transformations in naval doctrines and force levels, not just in India but across
the Asia-Pacific region, particularly amongst the Southeast Asian navies which embarked on their
modernisation programmes in the late 1990s. There is clearly an increased focus on multilateral
naval diplomatic and constabulary missions such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
(HADR) operations and anti-piracy operations in the littoral region, and a propensity amongst the
regional navies for participation in maritime cooperation fora such as the Western Pacific Naval
Symposium (WPNS), the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), the U.S.-led Cooperation
Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises and the Indian Navy biennial multination
exercise Milan (get-together). It appears that given the shared perceptions of the prevalent
maritime threats in the region and the evolving consensus amongst states to synergise and
coordinate their naval resources to meet the emerging challenges, regional navies are willing, more
than ever before, to engage in multilateral maritime cooperation.
This chapter examines the concept of leveraging maritime cooperation as a strategy to meet
emerging maritime security threats. It also provides a framework for analysis and assessment of
the various levels of cooperation that is used later in this thesis. The first part discusses general
definitions of terms such as maritime security, maritime cooperation and naval cooperation. The
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second part includes an examination of the broad categorisation of navies based on their maritime
strategies in the post-Cold War period with reference to the Indian Navy and a reflection on the
maritime strategy dilemma faced by India. Subsequently, it explores the novel approach of
leveraging naval power through maritime cooperation to meet maritime security threats. It
examines the various types and levels of maritime cooperation, and the drivers and impediments
in using it as a strategy. The final part presents an overarching framework for assessment of
maritime cooperation, and the conclusion.

Maritime Security Cooperation
Definition
The term “maritime security” is a broad one that encompasses a wide range of issues. Some experts
view it as another “dimension” of security, a concept advocated by Barry Buzan, integrating
various “levels” of security: individual, national and international, with “dimensions of security”
such as military, political, societal, economic and environmental.1 An alternative view of maritime
security from five different approaches has been put forward by Chris Rahman:
•

Security of the sea itself including the marine environment.

•

Ocean governance under the international regime of the Law of the Sea.

•

Maritime border protection with regard to sovereignty of states.

•

Military activities at sea.

•

Security regulation of the maritime transportation system.2

Broadly, maritime security can be understood as covering two aspects: traditional security
concerns that pertain to infringement of state sovereignty as well as power projection by states in
their relationships with other states; and the more recent threats including piracy and armed
robbery, terrorist attacks, illicit trafficking in arms, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
1

Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition,
ECPR Press Classics, Colchester, 2009, pp. 220-308.
2 Chris Rahman, Concepts of Maritime Security, Centre for Strategic Studies Discussion Paper No. 7/9, Wellington, 2009, p.6.

101

drugs and humans, migrant smuggling, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.3 These threats,
clubbed with the challenges posed by climate change, are popularly known as “non-traditional
threats.” In the post-Cold War era, it is the non-traditional aspect of maritime security that has led
to cooperation amongst navies and “maritime security cooperation” is now a widely recognised
and accepted doctrinal principle. The term “maritime security cooperation” used in this thesis
refers to the cooperation between navies and/or coast guards or relevant maritime security agencies
over the entire range of common threats and challenges that exist in the maritime domain.
In September 2005, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations , Admiral Mike Mullen, provided a
catchy slogan to maritime security cooperation when he formally announced the 1,000-ship Navy
concept for all “like-minded states” at the 17th International Seapower Symposium at the U.S.
Naval War College.4 While, the “1,000-ship Navy” concept did not gain global acceptance (the
term has since been renamed as the “Global Maritime Partnership” initiative) as it suggested an
American-led global naval initiative with other navies being subordinate to the effort, it did focus
the attention of navies in the Indian Ocean to maritime security cooperation. Initially, Admiral
Mullen envisaged the concept as a vision for the U.S. Navy in the 21st century.5 This was,
evidently, an outcome of the post-Cold War thinking on the subject and an “urgent” attempt to
address the emerging security challenges, including the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2011
(9/11) and the failed attack by pirates on the American cruise liner Seabourn Spirit off the coast
of Somalia.6 Admiral Mullen referred to the Somali pirate attack as the crossing of a “tipping
point” in global maritime security.7 In hindsight, Admiral Mullen was proved right as this event
was actually followed by a wave of piracy attacks in the Indian Ocean.8
The 1,000-ship Navy, or Global Maritime Partnership initiative, is also seen as part of a deliberate
strategy by the Americans to goad navies into maritime security cooperation.9 For instance, in
2004, U.S. Pacific Command proposed a Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in order

Natalie Klein,” Maritime Security,” in Donald R. Rothwell, et al., eds., The Law of the Sea, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2015, pp.582-585.
4 Admiral Mike Mullen, then U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations, introduced the concept of international naval and maritime
cooperation to an audience at the U.S. Naval War College in August 2005.
5 Chris Rahman, The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications for the Royal Australian Navy, Papers in Australian
Maritime Affairs, Naval Sea Power Centre, Canberra, 2008, p. 3.
6 Ibid, p. 7.
7 Rahman, The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative, p. 5.
8 Shishir Upadhyaya,” Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Naval Challenges,” Maritime Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2010, pp. 133-147.
9 Rahman, The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative, p. 7.
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to promote regional cooperation and improve maritime security in East Asia and the Pacific region,
especially in the straits of Malacca and Singapore. Although Singapore was in favour of the RMSI,
it was opposed by Malaysia and Indonesia as they perceived it as an attempt by the United States
to patrol the Strait of Malacca to protect its own interests.10 However, this spurred Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore to launch a trilateral coordinated patrols initiative, known as Malsindo, to
combat piracy and armed attacks on ships in the Strait of Malacca in July 2004.11
The Straits states were initially criticised for being overly sensitive to sovereignty and many
analysts forecast that the Malsindo patrols would fail. However, the trilateral coordinated patrols
have since expanded to include Thailand and also introduced aerial patrols, dubbed Eyes in the
Sky, and were successful in virtually putting a stop to armed attacks on ships in the region by mid2006.12 The Malsindo patrols continue to this day and have evolved into a model mechanism for
regional maritime security cooperation. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy has helped to augment regional
naval capacities and managed to sustain its presence in the region for long durations through the
conduct of bilateral naval exercises such as the CARAT series. This has also allayed some of the
fears of regional dominance in the minds of the littoral states. Overall, this has been a win-win
situation for the United States as well as the regional states.
In recent years, maritime security cooperation has continued to evolve and improve. One of the
best examples of maritime security cooperation on a global scale as envisaged in the U.S. Global
Maritime Partnership initiative is the ongoing multinational anti-piracy patrols in the north Indian
Ocean. Almost all the major navies of the world have been engaged in anti-piracy operations for
the past several years, operating under an informal or loose coalition, including the U.S. Navy and
others partners operating under the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), the European Union Naval
Force (EU NAVFOR), the Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMG) and several others such as
China’s PLA Navy, the Indian Navy and the Russian Navy operating independently. However,
despite the fact that several navies patrol independently, all ships are provided common
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intelligence inputs by the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) mechanism and ship
patrol areas are mutually coordinated to avoid duplication of effort. 13
Types of Navies: Modern Perspectives
Navies can be broadly categorised in various ways such as size, reach and capability. Eric Grove
has provided a “global naval hierarchy” based on number of naval assets, types and the
sophistication and level of afloat support, which provided the “reach” or the geographical extent
of routine deployments.14 Grove classified world navies into eight levels, as set out in Table 4.1
below.
Table 4.1 - Eric Grove’s Classification of Navies

1.

No.

Classification
Major global force projection- Complete.
Major global force projection- Partial.

2.

Medium global force projection.

3.

Medium regional force projection.

4.

Adjacent force projection navies.

5.

Offshore territorial defence navies.

6.
7.

Inshore territorial defence navies.
Navies capable of only constabulary duties.

8.

Token navies.

Examples
U.S. Navy.
Formerly included the Soviet Navy, but Eric Grove
removed this classification post-1990.
Britain, France and Russia with China and India
now moving to this level.
Japan, Australia, Brazil, Singapore, South Korea,
NATO and most European Navies including Italy,
Spain, Germany, Dutch/ Belgian, Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, and Canada.
Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Chile,
Peru, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, Pakistan,
Thailand, Malaysia, New Zealand, Sri Lanka and
Saudi Arabia.
Bulgaria, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Bahrain,
UAE, Oman, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela,
Mexico, Argentina, Bangladesh and Vietnam.
North Korea, Kuwait and Finland.
Ireland, Brunei, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Caribbean
and South Pacific Islands states, Uruguay,
Philippines and Myanmar.
Libya, Georgia, Belize and Benin.

Geoffrey Till, in Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, has categorised navies as premodern, modern or post-modern based on the level of economic development and the resultant
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“national security perspectives and current view of globalisation” of the state.15 According to Till,
pre-modern states lack economic strength and could be regarded as weak or failing or failed states,
such as those found in the relatively challenged parts of Africa. Till defines modern states are those
which have benefited from industrial mass production and therefore “inherently competitive and
driven by ‘Realist’ expectations that international relations is basically a struggle for who gets
what, when and how, the ‘what’ being a question of resources, territory, influence and power.”16
Some European states fall in this category. On the other hand, the post-modern navies have an
internationalist, collaborative and almost collective world outlook. They see their role as defending
the system of globalisation, directly at sea and indirectly from the sea. The United States is an
obvious example. Till concludes that some navies exhibit mixed characteristics.
An alternate perspective is provided by Richard Hill in Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers.17
Based on a country’s economic and military standing, Hill identifies three basic state types: small,
medium and large. According to Hill small powers are unable themselves “to safeguard their vital
interests, not even their territorial integrity, against a determined predator’s coup de main,” such
as Kuwait or Panama. Large states are those which are “big enough and carry enough clout
economically to ensure that the rest of the world respects their aspirations to betterment” namely
the United States, China and Russia.18 Term “betterment,” according to Hill, is an inherent desire
of all states to flourish, both economically and spiritually. In seeking to define a medium power
(synonymous with middle power), Hill suggests that a medium power lies between the “selfsufficient [large powers] and the insufficient [small powers].”19 Hill states that a medium power
will try to “create and keep under national control enough means of power to initiate and sustain
coercive actions whose outcome will be the preservation of its vital interests.”20 Hill’s definition
of a medium power thus implies that once its national powers have been exhausted or defeated, a
medium power would be compelled to seek assistance under a defence alliance for selfpreservation.

15

Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, Second Edition, Routledge, New York, 2009, pp. 1-3.
Ibid, pp 28-32.
17 Richard Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, Croom Hem, New York, 1986, p. 5.
18 Richard Hill, Medium Power Strategy Revisited, Sea Power Centre Working Paper No. 3, Canberra, March 2000, p. 3.
19 Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, p. 20.
20 Ibid.
16

105

Indian Navy It is clear from the above descriptions that India is a medium power having a modern

cum post-modern outlook, with a “medium global force projection” navy, ranked alongside the
PLA Navy, in accordance with Grove’s naval hierarchy. As a rapidly growing economic power
and the world’s fourth largest importer of petroleum products, India is dependent on its maritime
trade for continued growth and development. Thus, as described by Till, India essentially has the
outlook of a “modern” state. However, as a status quo power, India also seems keen to work
towards a stable world order and a peaceful neighbourhood, as reflected in the broad objectives of
India’s foreign policy. India also does not have any significant maritime dispute with any of its
neighbours (except the Sir Creek dispute with Pakistan) and has contributed significantly to
ensuring security of maritime trade in the Indian Ocean by participating in the global anti-piracy
efforts in the Gulf of Aden. Therefore, in addition to a “modern” posture India also exhibits a
“post-modern” outlook.
As noted earlier, India’s maritime strategy dilemma stems from coping with an overwhelming and
diverse range of threats with the inherent limitations of a developing economy. India faces a threat
to its territorial integrity from a “large” power, China, and also from another “medium” power,
Pakistan. Additionally, emerging maritime non-traditional or non-military threats of the twentyfirst century such as piracy and terrorist attacks pose a serious challenge to India’s maritime
security. According to Hill, a medium power, when faced with the dilemma of dealing with a threat
from a large power has two options: to ally with likeminded small or medium powers in the region
or form a security alliance with another large power.21 However, for India neither option is
considered viable. India’s neighbouring states evidently do not share the same security concerns
with regard to China, and as discussed in Chapter 3, India’s foreign policy does not favour a formal
military alliance with any large power. As noted earlier in Chapter 3, the only instance of a treaty
with a politico-military purpose signed by India with a superpower was the Treaty of Friendship,
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with the erstwhile USSR in 1971.
The above Treaty has since been replaced by the “Declaration on Strategic Partnership between
the Republic of India and the Russian Federation” of October 2000.22 This agreement does not

21

Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, p. 66.
Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs,” Declaration on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of India and the
Russian Federation,” October 2000, available at http://mea.gov.in/Images/pdf/DeclerationStrategicPartnership.pdf.html.
22

106

have any politico–military purpose, though it seeks to deepen military-technical cooperation and
also promote bilateral service-to-service cooperation.
Although India has never signed a formal military treaty, in recent years India has signed similar
bilateral agreements for defence and security cooperation with several Asia-Pacific countries.
These include the United States, Japan and Australia, with whom India’s strategic relations have
intensified under the Modi government. The “India-U.S. Delhi Declaration of Friendship” of
January 2015 underscored the importance of Indo-U.S. defence ties.23 The Indo-U.S. Defense
Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) of 20I1 was another key milestone in the Indo–U.S.
defence partnership aimed at strengthening India’s military-industrial complex.24 This was further
expanded in 2015 into a ten-year defence framework pact which envisages joint development and
manufacture of defence equipment and technology, including jet engines, aircraft carrier design
and construction.25
In 2014, in a joint statement issued during the visit of the Japanese prime minister to India for the
Republic Day celebrations, both sides agreed to enhance and strengthen the defence cooperation
agreement of 2008. India, inter alia, invited Japan to participate in the Indo-U.S. combined naval
exercise Malabar in 2015,26 a significant development since Japan’s earlier participation in 2007
in the Malabar series of exercise was suspended, apparently due to Chinese concerns.27 The latest
and by far the largest edition of the Malabar was conducted in July 2017 involving USS Nimitz,
India’s aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and Japan’s helicopter carrier and its largest warship JS
Izumo.28
In November 2014, India concluded a framework for Security Cooperation with Australia,
expanding on the earlier joint declaration on security cooperation with Australia signed in 2009
and conducted the first bilateral naval exercise, Ausindex-15, with the Royal Australian Navy in
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http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24727/IndiaUS_Delhi_Declaration_of_Friendship.html.
24 “U.S.-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI),” August 2015, available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ic/DTTI.html.
25 “India, U.S. Sign New 10-Year Defence Framework Pact,” NDTV Online, 4 June 2015.
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September 2015.29 In fact the signing of the 2009 agreement with Australia was significant as it
completed the final bilateral agreement with each of the four members of the so-called quadrilateral
security dialogue that was proposed by Japan in 2007 and then quickly abandoned.30
All these developments have given rise to the possibility of a multilateral security relationship
involving India, the United States, Japan and Australia slowly taking shape, implicitly aimed at
countering China.

Types and Levels of Maritime Security Cooperation and its Drivers
It is a truism that close defence cooperation is not only a key element of any strategic partnership
but also the bedrock of any formal security alliance between two or more states. Maritime security
cooperation is a form of defence cooperation. It thus follows that the entire gamut of activities
under maritime security cooperation could be important building blocks for a country’s future
security alliance. Maritime security cooperation could be broadly divided into multilateral
cooperation and bilateral/sub-regional cooperation, the latter being a more exclusive type of
cooperation than the former.
Multilateral Cooperation
Multilateral cooperation involving several states, unlike bilateral cooperation, generally does not
demand a deep political compatibility amongst the members or a common or shared worldview.
For instance, Greece and Turkey are mutually hostile states but members of the NATO alliance.
Similarly, the multilateral response to non-traditional maritime security threats in the Indian Ocean
has brought together diverse partners including China, India, Pakistan, the United States and
Russia operating as an international coalition of warships engaged in anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf
of Aden, albeit in disparate groups operating independently. Multilateral cooperation may help to
reduce or share costs, spread risks and pertinently demonstrate legitimacy to the effort.31
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Bilateral/Sub-Regional Cooperation
Bilateral, trilateral or sub-regional cooperation generally involving neighbouring states, calls for
deeper levels of political commitment for a common cause as also a greater degree of
interoperability amongst the forces. The Malsindo coordinated patrols in Southeast Asia involving
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are an example of successful sub-regional
cooperation. The bilateral coordinated patrols by the Indian Navy with the Indonesian, Malaysian,
Thai and Myanmar navies are another example of bilateral cooperation. Bilateral cooperation is
significant as it demonstrates mutual trust between the states and shared security interests. It is
opined that with time successful bilateral cooperation could evolve into security partnerships or
even alliances. For instance, India’s membership in the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting
(ADMM) Plus Eight in 2010, could be attributed to the success of the bilateral coordinated patrols
between India and Indonesia – a key player in the ASEAN grouping – initiated in 2009.
Levels of Maritime Security Cooperation
Maritime security cooperation covers a wide range of activities starting from navy-to-navy
interaction at one end of the spectrum to formal alliances or treaties at the other. The levels or
degree of maritime security cooperation depends upon the type of relationships which could be a
long-term formal alliance or a temporary coalition or an informal collaboration. These are
discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.
Alliance or Treaty

Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse define an alliance as follows:

… a coalition of states that coordinate their actions to accomplish some end. Most alliances are
formalised in written treaties, concern a common threat and related issues of international security,
and endure across a range of issues and a period of time. 32

An alliance or a treaty is the highest level of cooperation between two or more states and can span
the entire range of maritime operations. According to the balance of power theory, in anarchy,
states form alliances to protect themselves.33 By conjoining their military capabilities, states may
leverage their national power and achieve greater bargaining capacity with other states. Alliances
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can also be fluid and shift as national interests shift. Thus, alliances are not marriages of love, but
marriages of convenience.34 According to one study,35 there are four stages in the process of
alliance formation. The first stage, when the external threat is low, is “hedging,” which entails a
low level of commitment towards another state that is neither entirely friendly nor foe. Thus
“hedging” works as an insurance and allows a state to keep its options open.36 The second stage in
“tethering,” wherein a state tries to manage its relations with its adversary by coming closer via an
agreement of mutual restraint or even confidence building measures (CBMs). By “tethering,”
states seek to increase the chance for cooperation and reduce hostility. The third stage is known as
“balancing.” This occurs at high threat levels wherein states seek to secure themselves by forming
alliances to counter states that threaten them.37 The final stage is “bandwagoning,” at the highest
level of threat, when a state’s survival is at risk, it will seek to ally with the most threatening state.38
It is viewed that the effectiveness of an alliance or treaty – particularly one that has not been tested
– may perhaps decline with age. Thus alliance cohesion is dependent upon the level of internal
threat or the threat perceived by members from each other versus the external threat.39 If the
internal threat is high then, once the external threats have declined, the alliance cohesion also
declines but if the level of internal threat is low, then even if the external threat is diminished, the
alliance may endure. This theory explains why the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) of
1949, which brings together 28 states including almost all North American and European states,40
has endured post-Cold War; while on the other hand the Allied powers broke up after World War
II. Even though the missions of NATO in the post-Cold War era remain uncertain, it has not only
expanded but also evolved to meet the emerging threats and challenges of the twenty-first century.
The role of NATO forces in the U.S.-led 21st century “global war on terror” following the
invocation of Article 5 (based on the principle of collective defence) of the Treaty, is evidence of
such a transformation. NATO forces fought the Taliban and others related groups in Afghanistan
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for over 12 years, the longest ever mission conducted by NATO in its existence. 41 As a result,
NATO forces have now achieved a high degree of operational efficiency and interoperability. In
the words of US Air Force General Philip Breedlove, the new Supreme Allied Commander for
Europe (SACEUR):
Alliance forces are at a pinnacle of interoperability due to more than 12 years of sustained combat
operations together in Afghanistan. Our tactics, techniques and procedures have never been better
aligned. NATO’s forces operate today as a team that is ready, capable and interoperable. The challenge
will be to sustain that level of interoperability and to prepare for the full range of potential missions.
Doing so will require a dual approach. We need to continue to build the capabilities and capacities to
be a credible and effective Alliance and we need to sustain our interoperability through rigorous and
sustained training, education, and exercises. 42

Clearly, the focus is now on maintaining the level of effectiveness, not only for land-based
operations but also in the maritime arena.43 The NATO Maritime Command is currently working
on a threefold plan to develop the alliance's standing naval forces, affiliate national task groups
such as the U.K. Response Force Task Group and the U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Groups with the
planned Combined Joint Expeditionary Force to support maritime contingency requirements, and
enhance collective training, focusing particularly on affiliations of national task groups across
NATO’s regions of interest.44 Thus, a high level of commitment in terms of regular military drills
and exercises, investment in defence technology and participation in operational missions by all
stakeholders are essential requirements to sustain a military alliance. In addition to maintaining
military coordination it is imperative to sustain political and public support. In the words of
General Breedlove:
U.S. forces in Europe contribute to preserving the strategic partnership with Europe both in our
bilateral relationships and by assuring our Allies of our continued commitment to NATO. Europe’s
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willingness to support U.S. military operations, whether by providing strategic access or contributing
forces, depends on the continued trust of its population and political leaders in the United States. 45

The U.S.-Japan alliance is another example of an enduring treaty that has evolved with time. In
recent years, the rise of China and its growing assertiveness in the East China Sea over territorial
disputes with Japan seem to have tested the sanctity of the alliance,46 necessitating the
promulgation of revised guidelines for defence cooperation between Japan and the United States
in April 2015. 47 These new guidelines may now have put to rest any apprehensions in Japan about
China’s muscular approach in the region. The guidelines underscore America’s commitment to
Japan as clearly spelt out in the document:
The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities,
including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready
forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.48

It is also viewed that while alliances may evolve in keeping with changes in the threat environment,
they may also be reviewed from time to time to determine their validity. For instance, the
rationality of Australia’s security alliance with the United States under the ANZUS Treaty has
been questioned publicly. A study report submitted to the Australian government as an input to the
latest Defence White Paper, noted that Australia’s security alliance with the United States “has led
Australia into needless wars, compromises Australia’s independence and should be
critically scrutinized.”49 The report argues that as a result of the security alliance, since World
War II Australia has unnecessarily been involved in wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq,
none of which posed any realistic threat to Australia. A similar sentiment was expressed by the
late former Australian prime minister, Malcom Fraser, in his book Dangerous Allies, where he
argued that Australia should adopt a greater strategic autonomy rather than merely follow other
nations into wars of no direct interest to Australia or Australia's security. Most significantly, Fraser,
cautioned that a potential conflict between China and Japan over the disputed
45
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Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which he felt legitimately belong to China, could see Australia dragged
into conflict with China.50
Coalitions

A coalition, unlike a treaty or alliance, is generally a short-term arrangement and

sometimes assembled to address a narrow or specific immediate threat.51 For instance, the
multinational task force engaged in anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden is a naval coalition.
Coalitions could be a formal or informal partnership between two or more states to address specific
issues such as an immediate common threat. Coalitions are generally more limited in scope than
treaties and thus do not demand the same levels of mutual commitment and shared world views,
as in a treaty.52 As noted by Hoyt in the context of United States’ partners, “a maritime coalition
is not necessarily the same as a wartime alliance,” and states that collaborate in peace may not
chose to follow in war.53 Since coalitions are generally formed to meet emergent crises, time is of
the essence and therefore a certain minimum level of a priori interoperability between the forces
is crucial. Thus, one of the drivers for maritime security cooperation is a need to develop a basic
level of interoperability with other navies.
Key Attributes of Alliances and Coalitions
Based on the above, the key attributes of an alliance or a coalition are explained in the succeeding
paragraphs.
Political Compatibility Since alliances or coalitions are an advanced form of military cooperation,

political compatibility between participating states is essential. This could stem from a larger
common security threat or perception that compels states to rise above their bilateral disputes as
in the case of NATO or even a willingness on the part of a state to freely subordinate itself to a
larger power in order to ensure its security, as in the case of the ANZUS Treaty involving Australia
and the United States.
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Operational Interoperability The success of military operations conducted under an alliance or a

coalition are dependent on seamless interoperability at all levels: tactical, operational and strategic.
This implies interoperability in terms of command, control and communications, logistics,
equipment compatibility, common training, drills and procedures, etc.
Constant Commitment

An alliance or a coalition also demands constant commitment from all

participants such as pooling of military resources, combined training of troops and a reaffirmation
of political support. Such commitment may be displayed through various measures such as regular
combined exercises, collaborative military programmes and the promulgation of common
doctrine. The Bersama Lima annual exercise conducted with regularity in the South China Sea
region, involving forces from Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom exercising with
Singapore and Malaysia, under the aegis of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) is an
example of such continuing cooperation, particularly by Britain, which is furthest away from the
region and needs to deploy its forces each year sometimes all the way from Europe, to briefly
participate in the annual exercises. For instance, in 2011 the Royal Air Force flew its Typhoon
multi-role aircraft over 11,000 kilometres to participate in the 40th anniversary of Bersama Lima
in Malaysia.54
Military- Civilian Relations

Implicit to the first point on high level of political compatibility,

healthy military-civilian relations between the participating countries are important, a fact
underscored by General Breedlove in his statement above. A classic example of how poor militarycivilian relations could jeopardise state relations is the infamous Okinawa rape case of 1995
involving U.S. service personnel, who abducted and raped a 12-year-old Japanese girl. The
incident brought 85,000 people on to the streets in protest and forced Tokyo and Washington to
discuss way to reduce the U.S. military presence on the island. 55 In a repeat of this incident in
Okinawa, in May 2016, a former U.S. marine was arrested and charged with the murder of a young
Japanese woman. This killing once again sparked an outrage amongst the Okinawans and forced
the U.S. government to withdraw protected legal status provided for American civilians working
on military bases in Japan.56 Similarly, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Subic Bay naval
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base in the Philippines was precipitated by popular public demand who viewed the presence of
U.S. troops as a vestige of colonialism and an affront to Philippine sovereignty. In hindsight, one
could speculate that better public relations on part of both sides could perhaps have avoided such

an outcome.
Collaborations
Although a formal written treaty or alliance is one of the strongest commitments between two or
more parties to come to each other’s assistance in any contingency, a lack of any such formal
commitment certainly does not imply that a country may not obtain assistance from another.
According to Thomas Schelling “commitments (as in Alliances) can exist even when denied.”57
As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, Schelling provides the example of Nehru being contemptuous
of Thailand and Pakistan for signing treaties with the United States, which he believed were
unnecessary. Thus, some commitments are explicit and others implicit, and perhaps given the
changed global environment of the 21st century, it is these unwritten or informal arrangements
between states that seem to be gaining salience under the garb of defence cooperation or maritime
security cooperation. From a naval-strategic perspective, this translates into building
interoperability with potential partners for combined operations in various contingencies.
Considering the multiplicity of types of maritime engagements, it is perhaps easier to club all such
efforts, barring formal treaties or alliances and coalitions, under the term “collaboration.”
Maritime collaborations may thus include navy-to-navy staff talks, multinational exercises, ship
visits and exchanges of visits by senior officials. Both IONS and the WPNS are examples of
collaborative efforts at the operational level by various regional navies to come together to discuss
common threats and challenges. Navies also collaborate with each other at the operational level
for conducting patrols. As noted earlier, the bilateral coordinated patrols along the EEZ boundary
lines by the Indian Navy with the Indonesian, Malaysian, Thai and Myanmar navies are examples
of such collaborative efforts. It would be incorrect to classify these coordinated patrols as
coalitions because they do not serve to address any threat per se.
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Security Pluralism
Considering the plethora of formal and informal defence engagements amongst states in the postCold War period, the new security order seems to indicate a gradual moving away from exclusive
alliance treaties towards security pluralism. According to Amitav Acharya, security pluralism is
not a purely balance of power system as it relies on other mechanisms.58 This, according to
Acharya characterises the new security order in Asia:
Security pluralism drives 'mutual accommodation among unequal and culturally diverse states that
preserves the relative autonomy of each and prevents the hegemony of any or a few… [and] respects
political and cultural diversity, but fosters accommodation among the great powers and their restraint
towards the weaker actors, such as ASEAN members. 59

Thus, given the multiple maritime security engagements initiated by India, security pluralism best
characterises India’s national defence strategy.
Drivers for Maritime Security Cooperation
According to Chris Rahman, maritime security cooperation may develop as a result of a mutual
need for confidence building measures (CBMs), improving standardisation or interoperability
between navies to facilitate basic naval operations, and as a means to undertake complex combined
maritime operations so as to develop a certain level of interoperability that could lead to coalition
operations.60 Additionally, training or capacity building, benchmarking of operational standards,
trade promotion of defence exports by showcasing military hardware and coalition building are
other important motivations for navy-to-navy interactions. These are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
Confidence Building Measures

According to a memorandum on CBMs at sea issued by the

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), CBMs at the functional level such
as search and rescue (SAR) operations or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR)
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operations, help to build trust to move on to more complex operational and political CBMs. 61
While this may seem plausible theoretically, in practice there are few examples of cooperation
evolving through CBMs alone. For instance, although Vietnam and China have formally agreed to
cooperate over SAR in the South China Sea since 2008,62 they have failed to develop higher levels
of cooperation and China continues to harass Vietnamese fishermen in the region.
While bilateral CBMs may not always foster close maritime security cooperation, regional fora
such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
(IONS) have helped to promote close working relationships between regional navies by providing
CBMs such as the promulgation of the WPNS Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), to
limit naval interference and streamline communications during unscheduled encounters at sea.63
Training or Capacity Building

Small or medium navies are generally keen to emulate and learn

from the more advanced navies through personnel interaction and formal training. For example,
during the CARAT series of bilateral exercises conducted by the U.S. Navy each year with various
South and Southeast Asian states, several regional navies including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Brunei
and the Philippines, with limited naval capacity, regularly depute personnel (as ship riders or
observers) to participate in the exercise. The format of CARAT itself, including cooperative
training events and subject matter exchanges, is designed to provide training to developing navies.
Similarly, the Kakadu series of biennial exercises hosted by the Royal Australian Navy is another
example of such an initiative to build regional naval capacity and also develop certain common
practices and drills. The 23rd edition of the Kakadu exercise was conducted in September 2014,
attended by over 1,200 personnel, eight warships and 26 aircraft from 15 coalition forces making
it the largest maritime warfare exercise for the Royal Australian Navy. 64 By participating in such
exercises, in addition to improving basic skills, the smaller navies get an opportunity to learn the
nuances of standard naval operations, basic safety drills and procedures, which could be useful in
subsequent combined operations. Costs are another major factor and smaller navies seek to benefit
from U.S. funding towards promoting maritime security cooperation.
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Benchmarking of Operational Standards

In addition to training value, emerging navies

sometimes engage in exercises with more advanced navies, simply to benchmark their own
operational standards, compare equipment performance or emulate best management practices.
The bilateral naval exercises between the Indian Navy and the Russian Navy, codenamed Indra,
the Indo-French naval exercises, codenamed Varuna, and the Indo-British naval exercise,
codenamed Konkan, could be considered to fall under this category of naval cooperation.
Building Familiarity

Whatever might be the motivation for maritime security cooperation,

familiarity between partners is a key step in the process of building cooperation. When viewed in
the context of maritime security cooperation “building familiarity” would include familiarity with
certain key personnel such as flag rank officers, familiarity with drills and procedures and
confidence in the skills and expertise of a navy to engage in bilateral exercises. For example, in
the early 1990s, when the U.S. Navy first exercised with Indian Navy ships, the exercise was
deliberately kept at a low level as the Americans were unsure of the seamanship skills of Indian
naval officers. Over the years, after several rounds of simple exercises, a comfortable level of
familiarity seems to have been established as both sides have progressed to more complex
evolutions at sea, including cross deck flying between ships and weapon firings at sea.65
Coalition Building

In order to progress naval cooperation to the next level, towards coalition

building, it is essential to establish a high level of interoperability across operational, technical and
administrative or logistical spheres. Firstly, it is important to establish a high degree of operational
compatibility at the tactical level. This could include creating a common set of tactical doctrines
and publications such as the Multinational Tactical Publications (MTP) in use by NATO and nonNATO states, for fleet operations and exercising in accordance with it for a long period.66
Secondly, it could involve a high degree of technical cooperation in terms of sharing of military
technology, common equipment and platforms that could enable seamless combined operations.
Finally, it is crucial to establish close logistics compatibility to support operations such as sharing
of refueling facilities, provision of temporary or permanent basing facilities, and maintenance of
critical spares and ammunition. India’s growing naval cooperation with the United States, Japan
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and Australia is indicative of an embryonic coalition taking shape. The scope and depth of India’s
maritime security cooperation with these states is examined in detail in Chapter 6.

Impediments to Maritime Security Cooperation
Notwithstanding a genuine desire by most navies to cooperate with other naval forces to combat
common security challenges at sea, maritime security cooperation is often restricted by several
barriers. These are discussed in the following paragraphs.
State Relations
Mutual suspicion and mistrust between states is the biggest obstacle to cooperation. Often this
leads to states being overly sensitive to their sovereignty, thus preventing maritime neighbours
from seeking each other’s assistance. While navies (or the military) are a key element of national
power, they are bound by constraints imposed by the overall political context and policy
framework. It has been seen that even in its ultimate form – in war or less than war situations military (or naval) power may at best dominate but never replace (atleast in most democratic states)
other elements of state power namely diplomatic, economic or informational. Thus, in peacetime,
the influence that navies may exert upon the rest of the state machinery is even more limited. As a
result, maritime security cooperation engagements are never entirely decided by the navy. For
instance, while the Indian Navy had been allowed to depute officers to observe the Australian
Kakadu exercise series, participation by naval ships and aircraft is probably restricted because
Australia does not desist from inviting the Pakistan Navy. The Malsindo coordinated patrols
provide another example of how sovereignty concerns have led the Strait navies to oppose any
operational assistance from extra-regional states and key stakeholders in the security of the
straits.67 Similarly, in 2008, when Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, the paranoid national
government (backed by the military) initially refused permission to foreign armed forces and aid
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workers, except the Indian Navy and Air Force, to land in Myanmar with relief supplies.68 Clearly,
much human suffering could have been avoided by immediate rescue and assistance efforts.
Disparities in Force Levels and Technological Gaps
For any meaningful maritime security cooperation between two or more states, a comfortable level
of compatibility in force structures is essential. While small navies of the region may keenly
engage with larger navies in their neighbourhood, the mismatch in levels of training and expertise
may sometimes limit the actual benefits that may accrue to either navy. However, this need not be
a limiting factor for larger navies, as local knowledge, trust and support that comes with
cooperation may exceed other tangible benefits of cooperating with a less capable force.
Language and Culture
Notwithstanding the giant leaps in communication technology and other areas, language and
cultural barriers can effectively hamper the progression of security cooperation between navies
from basic to advanced levels. Given that English is the lingua franca of almost all navies in the
Indian Ocean region, it would be fair to state that India has a distinct advantage over China in this
regard. The Indian Navy, which essentially uses English as an official language, has leveraged this
advantage to further security ties with almost all regional states centred around naval training.
China is seriously restricted in attaining the same level of maritime cooperation since no Indian
Ocean navy works in Chinese and the PLA Navy can’t operate effectively in English. Clearly,
there is a limit to what can be achieved in terms of combined operations at sea based upon
interpreters or even liaison officers.
Costs
The costs involved in the conduct of maritime cooperation are a key factor that limit the scope for
various activities. With the smaller navies being severely restricted in funding, the cost burden
needs to be shouldered almost entirely by the larger partner. The United States is the biggest
spender on maritime security cooperation and few if any combined exercises can match the scope
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and scale of U.S.-led initiatives such as CARAT and RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercise, the
world’s largest combined naval exercise, biennially hosted by the U.S. Navy.

Framework for Analysis
An overarching framework for analysis of maritime security cooperation used later in the thesis is
described in this section. This is based upon the trinity of naval roles, military, diplomatic and
policing (or constabulary), propounded by Ken Booth in his seminal book, Navies and Foreign
Policy, published during the Cold War era.69 Booth’s trinity has been adapted into the doctrine of
a number of navies and therefore continues to remain relevant even in the twenty-first century.
Where does maritime security cooperation fit in this trinity of roles? Maritime security cooperation
can be viewed as a continuum spanning all three naval roles. Thus, as navies go about doing their
business under each role, so they seek to cooperate with other navies. The level or degree of
cooperation is dictated by the security environment, which could be sub-divided into Levels 1 to
3, broadly corresponding to normal conditions, crisis and long-term strategic partnership/war,
respectively. Normal conditions imply peacetime situations wherein naval forces invest in training
and building good relations with friendly states. A crisis spans all types of contingencies in a lessthan-war situation. A crisis would thus include a HADR mission or a SAR mission or a low
intensity conflict or a developing military or armed conflict. Long-term strategic partnership,
including war, covers all facets of an armed conflict ranging from brief localised war to a total
nuclear war. The framework for analysis is depicted in the Figure 1 below.
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Figure 4.1: The Ken Booth Triangle and Maritime Security Cooperation

Figure 4.1 depicts the trinity of naval roles and the three levels of maritime security cooperation.
As examined in Chapter 3, the defined roles of the Indian Navy which are based on Ken Booth’s
trinity of naval roles are laid down in the Indian Maritime Doctrine which lists four roles for the
navy: military, diplomatic, constabulary and benign. Under each of the roles, the maritime doctrine
lists specific objectives, missions and tasks. However, for the purpose of this analysis, the benign
role and associated missions and tasks are incorporated in the diplomatic role. The various types
of engagements that could take place under each level of security are set out in Table 4.1.
Table 4.2: Maritime Cooperation under Normal, Crisis and Long-Term Strategic/War Conditions
Role
Diplomatic

Level 1
• Ship visits.
• Staff talks.
• Exchange of visits by
personnel.

Level 2
• Agreements for operational
turnaround of ships (OTR).
• Combined naval exercises.
• Sharing of expertise.
• Training exchanges.

Level 3
•
•
•

Diplomatic support at
international fora.
Advanced training.
Enforcement of
sanctions.
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Constabulary

Military

• Multilateral cooperation
initiatives, e.g., IONS,
conferences, etc.
• CBMs such as INCSEA
agreements and CUES.
• Combined coast guard
exercises.
• Coast guard functions such as
joint regulation of fishing
activities, anti-smuggling
operations.
• SAR missions.
• Defence and security
agreements.
• Logistics agreements/
arrangements.
• Repair and refits services.
• Covert activities including
setting up of “listening posts.”
• Sale of military hardware.

• Support for foreign policy
or “gunboat diplomacy.”
• Joint HADR missions.

•

Gifting of military
equipment.

• Classified information /
intelligence sharing.
• Joint/coordinated patrols
including anti-piracy, antitrafficking, anti-poaching
patrols.

•

Sharing of intelligence
related to enemy
shipping, etc.

• Classified information /
intelligence sharing.
• Advanced level joint
exercises.
• Development of SOPs and
doctrines, e.g.,
Multinational Tactical
Publications series.
• Intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (ISR)
operations.
• Transfer of military
technology.
• Transfer of military
hardware.

•

Entire spectrum of
military operations
under a security treaty
or alliance.
Basing of ships,
submarines and aircraft.
Transfer of critical
military technology.
Transfer of strategic
military platforms.
Sharing of crucial
intelligence.
Nuclear cover.

•
•
•
•
•

Diplomatic Cooperation
Level 1

Under normal conditions, navies invest in building relations that could be leveraged in

times of crisis and war. Ship visits, meetings between personnel and conferences are opportunities
for navies to interact and learn from each other, and also lay the groundwork for further
collaboration. Indian naval ships routinely visit ports in the Indian Ocean region as well as outside
the region. For visiting ships, the level of reception accorded to ships and personnel by the host
navy is also a clear indication of the level of trust and confidence imposed upon them. For example,
visits to naval bases, frontline ships or submarines in the host country would indicate a close level
of trust and confidence with possible scope for further enhancement of relations. The absence of
such basic level cooperation or a “cold” reception for visiting ships and personnel would clearly
preclude any scope for further partnerships. For instance, in April 2014, the Captain of the Indian
Navy’s newest stealth frigate, INS Shivalik, calling at Qingdao, China’s North Sea Fleet base city,
refused permission to the PLA Navy Chief, Admiral Wu Shengli, on a brief courtesy call on the
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ship, for an impromptu tour of the ship’s operations room.70 One could speculate that a similar
request from the U.S. naval chief would almost certainly have been granted. Thus, the importance
of navy-to-navy interactions cannot be over-emphasised and successful ship visits often find
mention on the newspaper front page.
Level 2

In times of crisis, such as HADR and counter-piracy operations, navies may extend

operational support to partners. In recent years, India has signed formal agreements with various
littoral states for provision of operational turnaround of ships at their ports whilst on operational
deployments. Indian naval ships, deployed on anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden routinely top
up fuel, water and other provisions at various ports in the region, including Oman, the Seychelles
and Abu Dhabi. Indian naval ships on deployments in the South China Sea or Andaman Sea also
call at Singapore for operational turnaround.71 The multinational search operations for the
wreckage of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH 370 in March 2014 involving 25 states is another
example of cooperation at this level.72 Gunboat diplomacy, or the non-belligerent and political use
of naval force in support of a country’s foreign policy, could be another facet of diplomatic
cooperation in crisis situations.73 Gunboat diplomacy has been used effectively as a tool of foreign
policy, on several occasions. For instance, following the sinking of the South Korean corvette
Cheonan in 2011, the U.S. Navy deployed its aircraft carrier USS George Washington and four
other warships to the Yellow Sea on a combined military exercise with South Korean forces aimed
at preventing the North Korean regime from further military actions.74 The Malabar combined
naval exercise of June 2016 involving the United States, Japan and India in the western Pacific
region, is an example of how maritime security cooperation could be used to send a subtle message
to China over its “muscular” stance in the region.75
Level 3

In times of war, states may either take a neutral stance or provide overt or covert

assistance as an ally or even join the belligerent side, in which case all cooperation breaks down.
Overt support includes diplomatic support at international fora such as the United Nations General
Assembly, while covert support would include sharing crucial intelligence. Further, gifting of
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military hardware, including weapons, sensors and platforms such as ships and aircraft, would
come under this category. For instance, the gifting by India of ships and helicopters to the
Maldives, Sri Lanka, Mauritius and the Seychelles indicates this level of maritime security
cooperation.
Cooperation under Constabulary or Policing Roles
Level 1

This level would include combined coast guard exercises and cooperation in various

coast guard functions such as control of fishing operations along maritime boundary lines or antismuggling, anti-human trafficking operations. For example, the memorandum of Understanding
between the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (MSA) signed in
2006 for exchange of information on maritime boundary violations by fishermen, intra-agency
coordination on maritime search and rescue and marine environment pollution, is an example of
this level of maritime cooperation.76 Collaboration for SAR operations is another facet of Level 1
constabulary cooperation.
Level 2

Cooperation under this category is indicative of a close or comfortable level of trust

between member states. Operations such as combined or coordinated patrols to combat piracy,
conduct HADR and SAR missions, and sharing of classified information not revealed to others,
are examples. The Ind-Indo and Indo-Thai coordinated patrols by the Indian Navy with the navies
of Indonesia and Thailand respectively, are examples of such cooperation. Sharing of information
or intelligence regarding movements of shipping is another. The recently concluded trilateral
maritime security cooperation agreement between India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives is an Indian
Ocean example involving India.77 Under this agreement, the member states have agreed to the
following steps:
•

Improve their maritime domain awareness (MDA) through sharing of ships’ automatic
identification system (AIS) data.

Indian Coast Guard, “Message No. 11 from DG ICG,” 1 February 2006, available at:
http://indiancoastguard.nic.in/indiancoastguard/dgcg/message2.html.
77 Government of India, “NSA Level Meeting on Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation between India, Sri Lanka and
Maldives,” Ministry of External Affairs, 6 March 2014, available at http://mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/23037/NSA+level+meeting+on+trilateral+Maritime+Security+Cooperation+between+India+Sri+Lanka+and+M
aldives.html.
76

125

•

Conduct training and capacity building initiatives in the areas of MDA, SAR, and oil
pollution response.

•

Carry out joint activities including trilateral exercises, maintaining channels of
communication to prevent illegal maritime activities, formulation of marine oil pollution
response contingency plans and cooperation in legal and policy issues related to piracy.78

This information-sharing initiative has been expanded to include Mauritius and Seychelles.79
However, maritime security cooperation of this nature between partner states is generally limited
to bilateral or trilateral arrangements or small exclusive groupings. The ongoing Malsindo
coordinated patrols are a case in point, wherein littoral states are engaged in combating armed
attacks on ships and transnational crimes in the Strait of Malacca. The member states also share
information through the regional Joint Coordination Centres.
Level 3

As previously mentioned, in times of war, states may offer overt and covert support to

partner navies. Thus, sharing of information regarding enemy shipping movements or electronic
intelligence (ELINT) about the enemy could be classified under this category of cooperation.
Cooperation under Military Roles
Level 1

This is the highest level of cooperation between partner navies and can be achieved only

after the lower levels of cooperation have been established. Under normal conditions, partner
navies may enter various defence and security agreements, including logistics arrangements such
as the recently concluded logistics exchange memorandum of agreement (LEMOA) signed
between India and the United States in August 2016.80 Such cooperation also includes the sale of
modern military equipment and technology, training and industrial collaboration. Further, states
engaged in such a level of cooperation may also allow partners to establish intelligence stations or
listening posts on their territory.
Level 2

In times of crisis, close security cooperation could lead to formation of coalitions focused

on addressing immediate threats and challenges such as Malsindo, noted above. It may also be
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characterised by conduct of advanced naval exercises involving anti-submarine, air, and surface
operations. Exchange of classified intelligence is another aspect of these relationships. Transfer of
military hardware, including modern ships, aircraft, submarines and missiles, and crucial
technology, is yet another manifestation of such levels of cooperation. For instance, the sale of the
Yuan-class submarines,81 and transfer of nuclear technology, by China to Pakistan would come
under this category.
Level 3

In conditions of war, partner states may enter into a formal treaty or alliance and thus

join hands in war. In such circumstances, cooperation between forces would be virtually seamless
across various facets of maritime operations. The United States-led coalition force, a “coalition of
the willing,” in the Middle East, conducting operations on land, air and sea, and the NATO
operations in Afghanistan, are examples of such cooperation.
The framework described above is a broad categorisation of various types of cooperative
engagements between partner states based on Booth’s trinity of roles, adapted for the purposes of
the thesis. The framework serves as a useful reference to measure the degree of maritime security
cooperation between states. The degree of cooperation can thus be measured on a scale ranging
from diplomatic cooperation in a normal, or peacetime, environment at the most basic level, to
military cooperation in a period of war indicating the highest level of strategic cooperation. For
example, states that have agreed to share intelligence have a closer or higher level of cooperation
than those that have not graduated beyond ship visits.

Conclusion
The employment of navies in war is a well-established aspect of naval operations. However, their
employment in peace has expanded rapidly in the post-Cold War era. There is no single navy in
the world that could possibly prepare to address the entire spectrum of threats present in the
prevailing environment. Thus, maritime security cooperation with likeminded partners is a key
element of the maritime strategies increasingly adopted by navies globally. Moreover, the wide
Gurpreet Khurana, “China’s Yuan-class Submarine Visits Karachi: An Assessment,” National Maritime Foundation
Commentary, 24 July 2015.
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range of crises for which naval power could be innovatively applied in peacetime, provides ample
opportunities to leverage naval power to address larger maritime security challenges.
Navies cooperate with each other across a wide range of maritime operations and are thus busier
than ever before. The only major impediment to maritime cooperation is perhaps the lack of
political compatibility between nations. There are other considerations, such as levels of
interoperability, which could limit maritime cooperation, but are relatively easier to address.
Armed forces are inherently suspicious of each other and thus a certain level of trust and
confidence is imperative to develop and promote maritime security cooperation. Maritime security
cooperation ranges from navy-to-navy interactions at the most elementary level to a formal treaty
or alliance at the apex. The various types of activities undertaken by navies under the rubric of
maritime security cooperation are building blocks or steps towards building a formal defence
alliance. India, as a medium power, under threat from an emergent superpower, China, does not
yet have a formal security alliance with any other partner(s). However, the Indian Navy is presently
engaged in multiple cooperative initiatives to build a favourable strategic environment in the
Indian Ocean region. The overarching framework for analysis of levels of cooperation, described
in this chapter, is used in the succeeding chapters to determine the extent of cooperation achieved
by the Indian Navy.
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Chapter 5
India’s Contemporary Bilateral Maritime Security Cooperation in the
Indian Ocean Region

Introduction
From independence in 1947 up until 1964, India’s naval exchanges were largely limited to friendly
overseas visits by Indian naval ships and the navy’s participation in the annual joint exercise (JET)
at Trincomalee with the British Far East Fleet and other Commonwealth navies, including those
of Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Ceylon and Malaya.1 Subsequently, as discussed in Chapter
3, following the relegation of the Indian Navy to a “Cinderella” status that reduced it to an offshore
territorial defence navy (as defined by Eric Grove)2 from the mid-1960s to until around 1990 when
the Cold War ended, the navy had limited cooperative engagements with other Indian Ocean
navies. The post-Cold War period, which led to a recalibration of India’s foreign policy and the
announcement of the Look East policy in 1992, saw the attention of the Indian Navy being drawn
to engagements with Southeast Asian and other small Indian Ocean navies. During this period, the
navy also commenced bilateral exercises with the U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy, the Royal Australian
Navy and the French Navy in 1991-92. Further, as noted earlier, in 1993, India commenced naval
exercises with Oman and in 1995 held the first multinational naval exercise Milan at Port Blair,
hosted exclusively for Southeast Asian navies.3 As a result of the success of these cooperative
engagements by the Indian Navy, and aided by other developments including institutional changes
within the navy, discussed in Chapter 3, India formally promulgated its strategy of maritime
cooperation through the first Indian naval doctrine of 2004 and the Indian naval strategy, The
Freedom to Use the Seas: India's Maritime Military Strategy, released in 2007.

1

Vice Admiral GM Hiranandini, Transition to Guardianship: Indian Navy 1991-2000, Lancer Publications, New Delhi, 2009, p.
xix.
2 Eric Grove, “The Ranking of Smaller Navies Revisited,” in Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders and Ian Speller, eds., Small
Navies: Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace, Ashgate, Farnham, 2014, pp. 15- 20.
3 Ibid, p. 31.
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India’s maritime engagements have grown manifold in the last two decades, presently spanning
the entire Indian Ocean region and including most major world powers. The national vision
announced by the Modi government for India to become a net a provider of security has provided
the framework for the Indian Navy’s bilateral engagements with the other regional navies and has
brought focus to India’s maritime strategy.
This chapter examines India’s bilateral relations with various Indian Ocean navies, falling within
the primary areas of India’s maritime interests as defined in the Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2016.
Based on the objective framework described in the last chapter, it analyses the strength of India’s
bilateral maritime ties with the Indian Ocean states and the challenges posed by China’s expanding
influence in the region. It concludes with an overall assessment of the Indian maritime strategy for
fostering bilateral relations with all the Indian Ocean states and addressing Chinese influence in
the region, presenting an alternative strategic approach that leverages India’s geostrategic
advantage rather than bilateral relations.
The chapter is divided into four parts covering India’s bilateral relations with each of the states by
sub-region as set out below.
• South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
• West Asia: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and
Yemen.
• East African Region: Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eriteria, France, Kenya, Madagascar,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan and Tanzania.

• Southeast Asia and Australasia: Australia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Singapore, Thailand and Timor Leste.4

4

Although Vietnam is integral to Southeast Asia, it has been covered in the next chapter along with other extra-regional and western
Pacific navies.
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South Asia
According to Barry Buzan, South Asia is a classic example of a “regional security complex”; that
is, a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their
national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another. 5
India, as the largest state in South Asia, with relative economic might and historical and cultural
linkages, enjoys significant influence across the region. Clearly, India’s relations with its
neighbours are a crucial factor for security and stability in South Asia. However, the India-Pakistan
animosity which has dominated the regional security scenario has resulted in South Asia being the
least economically integrated region in the world, and a potential hotspot for nuclear war. Under
the Modi government India’s relations with its immediate neighbours have received greater focus
than ever before, while bilateral relations with Pakistan continue to remain troubled and aggravated
by its close nexus with China. In fact, India’s desire to reinvigorate its relations with its neighbours
has been manifestly influenced by a growing Chinese influence in the neighbourhood and an
urgent need to wean the neighbouring states away from China. Prime Minister Modi signaled his
government’s resolve to strengthen relations with neighbours by inviting all South Asian leaders
to his swearing-in ceremony on 27 May 2014.6 It is expected that improved relations between India
and its South Asia neighbours will lead to closer defence and maritime cooperation. The present
level of India’s maritime engagements with each of the South Asian states is discussed in the
succeeding paragraphs along with an overview of China’s influence in each state.
Pakistan
India’s political and security relations with Pakistan, even in peacetime, could be characterised as
hostile, tenuously maintained by a series of conventional and nuclear CBMs. Consequently, the
Indian Navy has had no cooperative engagements with the Pakistan Navy since the last British-led
JET of 1964. In 2008, when the Indian Navy hosted the inaugural session of IONS at New Delhi,
attended by over 26 representatives from regional states, the Pakistan Navy did not formally
participate in the event. More recently, the Pakistan Navy chose not to participate in the
International Fleet Review at Vishakhapatnam hosted by the Indian Navy in February 2016, a large

5

Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1998,
pp. 10–11.
6 “In a first, Modi invites SAARC leaders for his swearing-in,” The Hindi, 21 May 2014.
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scale event attended by over 70 nations including China, the United States and Japan.7 Further,
one of the reasons for India not joining the anti-piracy efforts by the multinational CTF 151 under
the Combined Maritime Forces or actively participating in the Royal Australian Navy’s
multinational exercise Kakadu , could also be attributed to the participation of the Pakistan Navy
in those activities.
Notwithstanding the lack of formal defence relations, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
signed in 2006 between the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (MSA)
for exchange of information on maritime boundary violations by fishermen, intra-agency
coordination on maritime search and rescue and marine environment pollution, serves as a
significant link between India and Pakistan.8 Under the MoU, the heads of the Indian Coast Guard
and Pakistan MSA meet annually and also have established a hotline link for regular exchange of
information on non-military maritime issues.9
China-Pakistan Relations

Pakistan and China are unnatural allies but have a de facto alliance

proclaimed by none other than the then Chinese president, Hu Jintao, in November 2006, during a
visit to Pakistan, as “higher than the Himalayas, deeper than the Indian Ocean and sweeter than
honey.”10 The close relations between China and Pakistan are largely framed in the context of their
mutual hostility with India. Further, for Pakistan, China is also a reliable alternative to the United
States in providing military assistance and support for its nuclear program. Pakistan has also been
referred to as “China’s Israel” – that is, no matter what Pakistan chooses to do, China will back
it.11 In April 2015, the Chinese president Xi Jinping announced a $46 billion investment package
aimed at augmenting the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This plan far exceeds not
only total U.S. aid to Pakistan since 2002 but also Pakistan’s paltry foreign direct investment
figures.12 CPEC is a key element of China’s ambitious “one belt one road” project and seeks to
develop the Chinese-constructed Port Gwadar as an alternate energy supply route via pipelines all
the way to China, bypassing vulnerable choke points in the Indian Ocean. It also includes
“Pakistan Navy not invited for International Fleet Review in Vizag,” The Hindu, 23 July 2015.
Indian Coast Guard, ”Message No. 11 from DG ICG,” 1 February 2006, available at:
http://indiancoastguard.nic.in/indiancoastguard/dgcg/message2.html.
9 “DG Pakistan Maritime Security Agency arrives for annual dialog with DG Indian Coast Guard,” SP’s Naval Forces, 18 December
2014.
10 Mohan Malik, China and India: Great Power Rivals, First Forum Press, Boulder, 2011, p. 165.
11 Geoffrey Kemp, Asia: East Moves West, HH Sheikh Naseer al-Mohammad al-Sabah Research Working Paper, No. 6, Durham,
February 2013, p. 9.
12 Louis Ritzinger,” The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” National Bureau of Asian Research Commentary, 5 August 2015.
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upgrading of the Karakoram Highway linking China with Pakistan. Gwadar is a potential Chinese
naval base – in the popularly known “string of pearls” – though the local insurgency in the Pakistan
province of Baluchistan has hampered progress in this area. Baluchistan separatists have attacked
Chinese workers in the past and it is reported that Pakistan has raised a 12,000 strong force to
protect Chinese workers.13
China is also the largest supplier of arms to Pakistan. Chinese-supplied arms include jet fighters,
tanks, missiles, ships and submarines. The Pakistan Navy plans to procure the Chinese modified
Jiangkai frigates and continues to build the Azmat-class missile fast attack craft using Chinese
technology. Further, the Pakistan government has recently approved purchase of eight Chinese
Yuan-class diesel submarines with air independent propulsion (AIP).14 A rapid “Sinicization” of
the Pakistan Navy, including its undersea strategy, is evident from these procurements and the fact
that the Pakistan Navy is taking active interest in adopting PLA Navy underwater operational
concepts.15 For instance, the latest Sino-Pakistan naval exercise included anti-submarine
operations for the first time.16 The growing Sino-Pakistan nexus is likely to pose the greatest threat
to India with the emergence of a Chinese naval presence in Gwadar a possibility in the near future.
Bangladesh
Decades after India militarily intervened in Bangladesh and secured its liberation from Pakistan in
1971, its relationship has not been easy and “frequently strained by Islamic politics.” 17
Consequently, India has had limited navy-to-navy interaction with Bangladesh. However, in recent
times India has taken rapid steps to normalise its relations with Bangladesh. A significant
milestone was achieved in 2014, with the resolution of a long outstanding maritime boundary
dispute between the two countries. This was followed with another landmark agreement between
Delhi and Dhaka to implement the pending Land Boundary Agreement signed in 1974, involving
the merger of 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh in a land swap deal in June 2015.18 Evidently,
Indian prime minister Modi overrode nationalist political opposition, including within his own

Louis Ritzinger,” The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” National Bureau of Asian Research Commentary, 5 August 2015.
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15 Koh Swee Lean Collin, “China and Pakistan Join Forces Under the Sea,” The National Interest, 7 January 2016.
16 Ibid.
17 David Brewster, India’s Ocean: The story of India’s bid for regional leadership, Routledge, London, 2014, p. 45.
18 “Celebrations in Bangladesh over enclave exchange with India,” The Hindustan Times, 3 August 2015.
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party, insisting that a resolution was in the national interest.19 Subsequently, during his visit to
Bangladesh in June 2015, Modi and his counterpart, Sheikh Hasina, in a joint statement “agreed
to work closely on the development of ocean-based blue economy and maritime cooperation in the
Bay of Bengal and chart out ways for future cooperation.”20 India has also agreed to assist
Bangladesh in developing its maritime research capabilities through an agreement for
collaboration between the National Institute of Oceanography in Goa and the University of
Dhaka.21
The joint statement, however, made no mention of defence cooperation between the two countries,
indicative of the initial stages of improved ties. Given the importance accorded by the Modi
government to improving Indo-Bangladesh ties, it is quite likely that defence or maritime security
cooperation would follow in the near future. Presently the maritime cooperative engagements are
limited to regular training exchanges, staff talks, naval ships visits and senior level interactions
between the two coast guards. Bangladesh took over the Chairmanship of IONS in early 2016 and
is a participant in exercise Milan. In what is seen as a significant development, the Bangladesh
Chief of Navy, Admiral Habib, visited New Delhi in November 2015 for discussions on maritime
cooperation. At a press conference he announced “Since the delimitation of maritime border
problem has been solved, we are now trying to cooperate.”22 Evidently, India will need to quickly
follow up on the goodwill generated by the resolution of the maritime border dispute and high
level political interactions with substantial maritime engagements in order to dissuade Bangladesh
from furthering its strategic engagements with China as discussed below.
China-Bangladesh Relations

During the period of strained relations with India, Bangladesh had

leaned towards China and, over time, China emerged as a strategic partner for Bangladesh,
providing strong political cooperation, economic assistance and military partnership. In a pact
signed with China, Bangladesh has undertaken not to allow its territory to be used by India in war
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or peacetime.23 Consequently, Bangladesh has refused to cooperate with India over railroad links
and gas pipelines that could be seen as strengthening its logistics position in the vulnerable
northeastern states facing China.24 For several years, China has been involved in many key
infrastructure projects in Bangladesh, including the Chittagong port. In 2005, Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao offered Bangladesh nuclear reactor technology in return for access to Chittagong
Port.25 Furthermore, China has also been the largest provider of arms to Bangladesh. Chinese
defence transfers include fighter planes, helicopters, ships, tanks, missiles and artillery systems. In
fact, with the sole exception of the eight MiG-29 fighter planes acquired by the Bangladesh Air
Force in 1999 from Russia, Chinese military hardware remains the backbone of the Bangladeshi
defence forces.26 Presently, Bangladesh is in the process of modernising its armed forces under a
national programme, “Forces Goal 2030,” and the Bangladesh Navy is in the midst of a
transformation from a coastal defence force into a modern “three-dimensional” navy.27 This
includes fast-track procurement of two each new corvettes and Ming-class submarines from China,
with several other ships in the pipeline.28
Furthermore, in what seems to be a counter to India by China, following the successful visit of the
Indian prime minister to Bangladesh in June 2015, it was reported that within days of Bangladesh
and India signing a deal on blue economy and maritime cooperation in the Bay of Bengal, China
sent a similar draft deal for Bangladesh’s consideration. Apparently, Dhaka had approached
Beijing a long time ago for a deal on maritime cooperation to facilitate capacity building, training,
joint research and study, but it had not received any response from China.29
Maldives
India has close and wide-ranging relations with the Maldives, including strong defence and
security ties, which were strengthened following the military intervention by India in 1988 to
overturn an attempted coup and restore the government under President Gayoom. As a small
country, the Maldives is almost entirely dependent upon India for maritime security in its vast EEZ
23
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and for its defence requirements. India’s defence cooperation with the Maldives was formalised in
August 2009 with the signing of a comprehensive defence and security cooperation agreement. It
has been reported that following the defence agreement, India has been granted privileged access
to the Gan Atoll in the southern Maldives, a former British naval and air base during World War
II and later.30 India’s defence engagements currently include regular exchanges of visits by senior
military officers and chiefs of the three services, military training, regular exercises between the
two coast guards, naval surveillance in the Maldivian EEZ and hydrographic assistance. The
Maldives is a member of IONS and regularly participates in the Milan series of multinational naval
exercises hosted by India.
In October 2014, the Indian Coast Guard conducted the twelfth edition of the combined exercise,
codenamed Dosti, in the Maldives with the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) along with
the Sri Lankan Coast Guard.31 Indian naval ships and aircraft conduct regular monthly EEZ
surveillance missions in the Maldivian EEZ in collaboration with the MNDF and also provide
assistance whenever required. In 2014, for example, when the Maldives was overwhelmed by a
water crisis following a major fire in the country’s desalination plant, it reached out to India, China,
the United States and Sri Lanka for assistance. India was the first to respond, pressing into service
five air force planes and two naval ships.32
Since January 2014, one advanced light helicopter (ALH) gifted by India has been based at
Hanimadhoo, in the northern group of the Maldives islands.33 This is in addition to an earlier ALH
gifted to the Maldivian Coast Guard and based on the southern island of Addu to conduct SAR
and medical evacuation roles.34 Both helicopters were initially manned and maintained by an allIndian crew. Subsequently, in February 2014, India gifted a small amphibious vessel to the
Maldives.35 Earlier, in October 2011, India signed a trilateral agreement with the Maldives and Sri
Lanka for maritime security cooperation.36 Under the agreement the three countries agreed, inter
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alia, to share information on the movement of shipping through the region under a common
software platform developed by India, the Merchant Ship Information System (MSIS). India has
also built a system of 26 coastal surveillance radars across the Maldivian archipelago which are
networked with the Indian coastal radar system and integrated with India’s National Command
Control Communication Intelligence Network (N3CIN) at Gurgaon, near New Delhi. 37 Maldives
defence personnel regularly attend military training courses in India. Furthermore, India is engaged
in the construction of a composite training centre for the Maldives National Defence Force,
amounting to financial assistance of $9.08 million.38
China-Maldives Relations In recent years, China has sought to develop its economic and strategic

ties with the Maldives. Chinese economic engagements currently include tourism and several
infrastructure projects, including upgrades to the main airport and the building of a bridge
connecting Male to Hulhule, the island where Male International Airport is located. It was reported
that in 2013, over 330,000 Chinese tourists visited the Maldives.39 During the water crisis in the
Maldives, as noted above, within days of India’s assistance, China was also able to deliver over
1,000 tons of fresh water using civilian aircraft and a PLA Navy auxiliary ship. 40 In a significant
development, in September 2014, Chinese president Xi Jinping visited the Maldives, the first ever
Chinese leader to visit the country. Maldivian support for “one belt one road” and the passage of
a crucial land reform bill in the parliament that now allows foreign entities to procure land in the
Maldives,41 has given rise to speculation of the possibility for a future Chinese military facility.
The land reform bill allows foreigners to buy land provided they invest more than $1 billion and
provided that 70 per cent of any land is reclaimed from the Indian Ocean. It is highly likely that
Chinese companies – given their expertise in similar projects in the South China Sea – would be
engaged in the Maldives. While this development raised concerns in New Delhi, the Maldivian
president Yameen wrote to Prime Minister Modi specifically clarifying that his government would
not permit any foreign military presence on the Maldives.42
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As flat, low-lying coral atolls, the Maldives are highly vulnerable to the impact of climate change
and rising sea levels, and are thus faced with a future that is considerably gloomier than almost all
other regional states. It is obvious that the Maldives desperately needs international support to deal
with the wide range of maritime challenges facing them, such as the fresh water crisis mentioned
above. India, as the aspiring net security provider for the region, is clearly not in a position to bear
complete responsibility for the security of the Maldives, and hence not in any justifiable position
to dissuade the Maldivians, should desperate measures demand, from reaching out to China for
any support, including assistance from the PLA Navy.
Sri Lanka
India’s defence relations with Sri Lanka go back to the early 1980s when India was involved in
the civil war between the Sinhalese majority population and the Tamil separatist group, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Following the destruction of the LTTE in 2009, even
though Sri Lanka no longer requires India’s military support, India has maintained a high level of
defence and security interactions. The end of the two-decade old conflict in Sri Lanka has also
helped to develop India’s engagements in other economic sectors such as housing, infrastructure,
education, health, agriculture, fisheries and industry. India’s relations with Sri Lanka in recent
times have also been marked by high-level political visits. Then Sri Lankan president, Mr Mahinda
Rajapaksa, visited India in May 2014 to attend the swearing-in ceremony of Prime Minister Modi
followed by Modi’s reciprocal visit to Sri Lanka in March 2015. In addition to high-level political
meetings, there have been regular meetings between the defence ministers and service chiefs of
each country.
India’s naval engagements with Sri Lanka virtually span the entire range of maritime cooperation
activities, including training, ship visits, staff talks, information exchange, supply of military
hardware such as ships and aircraft, hydrographic assistance and exercises involving the Indian
Navy and Coast Guard. Sri Lanka is also a member of the October 2011 trilateral agreement with
Indian and the Maldives for maritime security cooperation. Under the agreement, as noted above,
the three countries have agreed, inter alia, to share information on the movement of shipping
through the region under a common software platform. Sri Lanka is also a member of IONS and a
participant in the Milan exercise series.
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The Indian Navy has conducted an exclusive bilateral exercise Slinex with Sri Lanka since 2005
while the Indian Coast Guard conducts an annual joint exercise codenamed Dosti with the
Maldives National Defence Force along with the Sri Lankan Coast Guard.43 Both the Indian Navy
and Coast Guard also participate in an annual trilateral international maritime boundary line
meeting with the Sri Lankan Navy.44 In addition to operational engagements, the Indian Navy
regularly conducts training for officers and ratings from the Sri Lankan Navy. Pertinently,
personnel from the Sri Lankan navy form the largest group of foreigners trained by the Indian
Navy. For instance, in 2005, out of a total of 409 foreign personnel trained, 300 were from Sri
Lanka.45 This trend continues even today. Sri Lanka has also been the largest recipient of Indian
military aid and exports.46 The largest ship in the Sri Lankan Navy, SLNS Sayura, is an offshore
patrol vessel (OPV) gifted by India in 2000. Presently, the Sri Lanka Navy has two Barracudaclass OPVs on order from India.47 Further, in 2014, India signed a contract for the sale sale of two
indigenously constructed advanced offshore patrol vessels to the Sri Lankan Navy; one of the two
vessels was supplied in 2017 while the other is expected to be delivered in 2018.48
China-Sri Lanka Relations

Given Sri Lanka’s strategic location overlooking Indian Ocean

SLOCs, China has been keen to expand its influence there mainly by promoting economic
engagement. Since 2010, Beijing has dramatically increased financial assistance to Sri Lanka to
the tune of $4 to 5 billion.49 Most of this funding is in the form of loans aimed at large scale
infrastructure development projects such as the Hambantota port and airport, and the Colombo
port city and highways. According to certain analysts, Chinese investments in Sri Lanka have
largely been “poorly-planned and frivolous” and have failed to stimulate the economy or generate
any benefits for the citizens.50 While Chinese investments in Sri Lanka, particularly the
development of Hambantota Port, were viewed with suspicion in India, they were generally
acknowledged as part of Sri Lanka’s post-war reconstruction efforts. However, in late 2014, under
the Rajapaksha government, the visit of a PLA Navy Song-class conventional submarine and a
Type 925 submarine support ship, Changxing Dao, , which docked at the Chinese-run Colombo
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International Container Terminal (CICT) en route to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy operations,
raised alarm in New Delhi. The employment of a submarine for anti-piracy patrols by itself was
considered an unreasonable or bizarre excuse by the PLA Navy and clearly seen as an attempt by
China to “test the waters” in India’s neighborhood, maybe to ascertain how far Colombo could go
to support a key investor. The idea of China gaining privileged access to Sri Lankan ports as a
matter of routine unnerved New Delhi, and India, supported by the United States, is suspected by
some to have orchestrated the fall of the Rajapaksha government in the following elections. 51 The
new government in Sri Lanka has made it clear that Chinese submarines are no longer welcome.
The Sri Lankan foreign minister is reported to have stated, while addressing a press conference:
I really don't know under what sort of circumstances the submarines came to Colombo on the same
day when Japanese Prime Minister (Shinzo Abe) visited Sri Lanka but we will ensure such incidents
from which ever quarter do not happen during our tenure. 52

It is unlikely that the PLA Navy, particularly submarines, would be welcomed again in Sri Lanka
in the near future. However, after suspending Chinese investments for over the year, the new
government under President Sirisena, faced with falling foreign reserves, a possible balance of
payments crisis and few, if any, alternative investors, is reportedly turning back to Beijing. In
February 2016, a government spokesperson stated that “the stance on China has completely
changed … Who else is going to bring us money, given tight conditions in the West?”53
So far, it appears that the extent and depth of India’s ties with Sri Lanka far exceed those of China.
India’s economic assistance to Sri Lanka, though smaller than China’s, is reported to have
generated far greater benefits to Sri Lankans than the large-scale infrastructure projects by Chinese
companies. India has invested a total of $1 billion since 2003 and in 2013 committed $2 billion
over five years in vital sectors including transportation, telecommunications, health care, energy,
banking, and tourism.54 Moreover, as highlighted above, India has a wide ranging and exclusive
security relationship with Sri Lanka, an area where China has had limited engagements.
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Overall Assessment of India’s Maritime Cooperation in South Asia
An overall picture of India’s maritime cooperation with its South Asian neighbours is expressed
in Table 5.1 below. This is based on the template for maritime security cooperation discussed in
Chapter 4 and thus the various interactions have been classified under levels 1 to 3 corresponding
to normal conditions, crisis and long-term strategic/war.
Table 5.1: Levels of Bilateral Maritime Cooperation between India and other South Asian Littoral States55
Country

Pakistan

Level 1

• Inter-service joint working group

Level 2

Level 3

• Nil.

•

• Ships visits.

• Defence exports.

• Nil.

• Staff talks.

• Naval training.

Nil.

meetings to review CBMs.
Bangladesh

• Reciprocal visits by senior officials.
• Multilateral joint exercise: Milan.
• Combined exercise between Coast
Guards.
• Agreement to enhance naval
cooperation.
Maldives

• Ships visits.
• Staff talks.

• Hydrographic survey
cooperation.

• Reciprocal visits by senior officials.

• Training.

• Defence cooperation agreement.

• Defence exports.

• Trilateral tabletop exercise for Coast

• Bilateral naval

Guards.

•

Indian Navy.
•

Basing of naval
aircraft at Gan.

•

Transfer of naval
platforms.

exercises: Dosti.
•

• Multilateral exercise: Milan.

EEZ patrols by

• Trilateral agreement for maritime

Defence
infrastructure
projects.

security cooperation and information
sharing.
Sri Lanka

• Ships visits.

• Training.

• Staff talks.

• Defence exports.

• Reciprocal visits by senior officials.

• Bilateral joint

• Defence cooperation agreement.

55

exercises: Slinex.

Various Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Defence Annual Reports.

•

Transfer of naval
platforms.
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• Trilateral tabletop exercise for Coast
Guards.

• CADEX. Combined
exercise involving

• Multilateral joint exercise: Milan.

Indian Navy, Indian

•

Trilateral agreement for maritime

Coast Guard and Sri

security cooperation and information

Lankan Navy.

sharing.

It is evident that India has focused its economic and naval resources in fostering close security
relations within South Asia, matching even Chinese investments in Sri Lanka and Maldives. Based
on Table 5.1 above, it is clear that India has achieved a high level of maritime cooperation with
the Maldives and Sri Lanka fostered by close political compatibility and regular naval cooperation,
reflected by “level 3” maritime cooperation. It is unlikely that Chinese economic commitments in
these countries would replace India’s wide-ranging security relations in the near term. Presently,
India’s defence ties with Bangladesh are yet to evolve, though given recent developments it is
expected that defence cooperation could soon expand. Finally, the growing Sino-Pakistan nexus
remains the greatest challenge to India’s security in South Asia.

West Asia
India enjoys close historical and cultural ties with most West Asian countries. The West Asia
region has immense strategic importance for India for two main reasons. Firstly, nearly two-thirds
of India’s burgeoning energy requirements are sourced from this region (currently Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, Kuwait and the UAE are the top five oil suppliers) and, secondly, because the region is home
to more than seven million Indians who contribute around $40 billion in remittances annually. 56
In 2013-14, India’s bilateral trade with the whole region amounted to $185.6 billion, making West
Asia the largest trading block in the Indian Ocean region for India.57 Consequently, India is an
important stakeholder in the security of the region and hence takes keen interest in security
developments such as the surge of the terror group, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al Qaeda
activities and the post-Arab Spring environment. The trouble spots in West Asia and Middle-East
56
57
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regions include Syria, Libya, Israel, Palestine and Lebanon where the Indian Navy has been
repeatedly involved in the evacuation of Indian workers from the region. In 1990, during the First
Gulf War, India evacuated over 176,000 Indian nationals from the region. Later in 2006, during
the Israel–Hezbollah conflict, in an operation codenamed Sukoon, the navy successfully evacuated
almost 2,000 civilians,58 and in April 2015, it evacuated 4,640 Indian workers from Yemen under
an operation codenamed Rahaat.59 In addition to naval evacuations, India has also evacuated its
workers form the region several times using commercial airlines. Following the events of the Arab
Spring in 2011, Indians were evacuated from Libya and Egypt and in 2014 from Libya and Iraq.60
India’s maritime engagements with each of the littoral states in West Asia are discussed in this
section.
Bahrain
India’s relations with the Kingdom of Bahrain have been cordial but exchanges have been sparse
and limited to ministerial-level visits. Defence cooperation between India and Bahrain is yet to be
formalised. In February 2015, during the first India-Bahrain High Joint Commission meeting at
New Delhi, both sides decided to expand defence cooperation and start negotiations on a
Memorandum of Understanding .61 India’s naval engagements with Bahrain are limited to
occasional ship visits and devoid of formal staff talks, training exchanges or naval exercises.
Bahrain’s naval and coast guard forces have traditionally trained with the UK Royal Navy and the
German Bundesmarine while U.S. personnel provide specialist training.62 Bahrain has been a close
American ally since the 1970s. Post 9/11, Bahrain was elevated to “major non-NATO ally” status,
making it the first Gulf country state to join this exclusive 15-member group.63 Manama, Bahrain,
is the headquarters for the U.S. Fifth Fleet, whose area of responsibility spans the Persian Gulf,
Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and part of the Indian Ocean. Manama also served as an important base for
the U.S. joint operations during the 1991 Gulf War, the 2001 war in Afghanistan, and the 2003
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war in Iraq. Presently, as the U.S. military conducts operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the
Fifth Fleet continues to play a crucial role in America’s strategic posture in the West Asian region.
In 2013, the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) reportedly spent $500 million to
modernise the naval infrastructure at Bahrain, including training facilities.64
It is evident that the large presence and support of the U.S. Navy in Bahrain has precluded the
scope and interest for defence cooperation with India. However, it is expected that with the signing
of a defence cooperation agreement, there could be some progress on maritime cooperation.
Iran
From a strategic perspective, Iran is perhaps the most important country in the Persian Gulf for
India. In recent years, bilateral ties between India and Iran have expanded, marked by frequent
interactions at the highest levels, including a meeting between Prime Minister Modi and the
President of Iran in Ufa, Russia, on 9 July 2015 on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO) Summit. Presently, India is engaged in two ambitious infrastructure projects
in Iran: the International North South Transit Corridor (INSTC) for multi-modal transportation
and the development of the port of Chahbahar. The INSTC is envisaged to connect Afghanistan
with Iran and Central Asia. It has been reported that the road connecting the port of Chahbahar to
four cities in Afghanistan, Herat, Kandahar, Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, was made operational in
2016.65 This project appeared to have the tacit support of the United States, keen to promote an
alternative route to Afghanistan bypassing Pakistan.66
It is obvious that an Indian presence at the port of Chahbahar has immense security implications
in the Persian Gulf. Pakistan has expressed grave concerns about any Indian presence in
Afghanistan, which it claims is being exploited by Indian intelligence agencies to provide tacit
support to insurgents in Baluchistan in West Pakistan (where the Chinese built Gwadar port is
located).67 While India’s involvement in the region so far has been commercial, it could be
speculated upon that a naval involvement might be possible in the future. Following the successful
Daniel Wagner and Giorgio Cafiero, “The U.S. and Bahrain’s Increasingly Tense Alliance,” Gulf State Analytics Monthly
Monitor, September 2014, p. 2.
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conclusion of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue between Iran and the P5 + 1 68 in 2015 and
the recent lifting of western trade and financial sanctions, it is likely that the development of the
port could see increased funding and support.
A strategic partnership vision document signed between India and Iran in January 2003 mentioned
defence cooperation in certain “agreed areas, including training and exchange of visits.”69 India’s
naval cooperation with Iran is generally limited to exchanges of visits by senior officials and ship
visits with few, if any, training exchanges. The Indian Navy is also known to have provided
technical assistance related to replacement of submarine batteries to help resolve problems
encountered by the Iranian Navy while operating in the hot Gulf conditions, with respect to the
Russian Kilo-class submarines which are also operated by the Indian Navy. 70 Indian naval ships
have visited Iranian ports occasionally and even conducted a PASSEX or “passing exercise” in
2009.71 While Indian naval ships have always been accorded extraordinary hospitality at Iranian
ports,72 such visits have been relatively sparse and have had a low profile, limited to cadet ship
rather that fleet ship visits.
Iraq
Iraq is currently India’s second largest supplier of oil after Saudi Arabia. The rise of ISIS and the
subsequent devolving security scenario in Iraq has precluded any formal defence or naval
cooperation. However, uniquely in the region, India’s defence ties with Iraq date back to the 1960s
when India provided defence training, with an army team deputed to that country’s national
defence college in Baghdad and Indian Air Force pilots providing flight training at all the major
Iraqi bases.73 Later in 1975, it is reported that the Indian Navy helped establish a naval training
academy at Basra.74 A sizeable Indian Air Force team continued in Iraq until 1989, almost until
Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.75 Since the 1970s, the Iraqi government has awarded several
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contracts to Indian companies for various infrastructure projects and, consequently, a large Indian
workforce has been present in Iraq for the past several decades.
Following the spillover of the Syrian conflict to Iraq, and the capture of several cities in northern
and western Iraq by ISIS in June 2014, the Indian government was faced with the problem of the
safety and security of a large Indian worker population. Consequently, in June 2014, Indian naval
ships were kept on standby in the Persian Gulf for evacuation of Indian civilians stranded in Iraq.76
Given the present security situation in Iraq, it is unlikely that defence cooperation between the two
countries will progress significantly in the near future.
Israel
India enjoys friendly political relations with Israel, with agriculture and defence forming two main
pillars supporting bilateral ties. Bilateral trade between the two countries stood at $6 billion in
2014, largely in favour of Israel and mostly comprising the diamond trade.77 As a global leader in
defence technology, Israel is a key strategic partner for India and in 2016-17, emerged as the largest
arms supplier to India signing contracts valued over $2 billion for supply of advanced anti-aircraft
and anti-missile defence systems to the army and navy.78 However, a lack of operational
engagement in the form of naval exercises or training assistance or staff talks by the Indian Navy
appears to indicate a deliberate strategy for limiting defence engagements with Israel solely to
defence technology transfers and military hardware sales. Presently, Defence Research and
Development Organisation (DRDO), India’s premier defence laboratory, has several joint
development programmes with leading Israeli manufacturers, including Israel Aerospace
Industries (IAI) and Elisra, for certain key weapon systems including the state-of-the-art missile,
electronic warfare and radar systems. Defence cooperation is overseen by a joint working group
at the level of the defence secretary. The 11th meeting of the Israel- India Joint Working Group
(JWG) was held in Tel Aviv in June 2014. Additionally, defence ties have always been marked by
high-level visits such as a visit by the Indian Army Chief in March 2014 and more recently four
Indian naval ships called at Port Haifa in May 2017 to mark 25 years of Indo-Israel diplomatic
ties.79 However, Indo-Israel relations now seem to have moved to the next level with the first ever
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visit by Indian prime minister Modi to Jerusalem in July 2017.80 In his speech at Tel Aviv, Prime
Minister Modi stressed on mutual cooperate in in areas of “science, technology, innovation, and
higher technical education.” It is expected that Indo-Israel defence relations will strengthen further
with Israel remaining a key supplier of crucial defence technology to India, although operational
maritime interactions would probably remain limited.81
Kuwait
Kuwait, like Iraq, is another key supplier of oil to India and a favoured destination for Indian
workers. While India’s ties with Kuwait are dominated by trade in the energy sector and
investments, under strategic cooperation, Kuwait has extended operational turnaround (OTR)
facilities for Indian naval ships at select ports in Kuwait.82 During the ongoing security crisis in
West Asia perpetuated by ISIS, an Indian naval ship visited Kuwait three times in 2015 to evacuate
Indian nationals stranded in Iraq.83 In 2013, an annual security dialogue between the Indian
National Security Advisor and his counterpart was initiated to promote mutual understanding of
threat perceptions and security concerns and strengthen sharing of information, intelligence and
assessments.84
The Kuwaiti Navy, as part of the Combined Task Force (CTF) 152, has gained the experience of
working with other navies in the conduct of maritime security operations in Gulf waters. It also
participated in combined exercises in the Gulf with NATO naval forces, to develop capabilities in
areas such as mine countermeasures.85 Given the security scenario in the region and the nonparticipation by India in the multinational coalition, defence cooperation between India and
Kuwait continues to be rudimentary.
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Oman
Oman is a key maritime neighbour of India and once the extended continental shelf claim for both
countries is legally accepted and brought into force, Oman will officially become India’s eighth
maritime neighbour. India has strong political and economic relations with Oman, with bilateral
trade in the region of $4.5 billion and joint investments across 13 sectors in excess of $7.3 billion.86
Oman is also home to about 550,000 Indian workers and families. 87 In December 2005, India
signed a defence cooperation agreement with Oman, under which an annual Joint Military
Cooperation Committee (JMCC) meeting led by the two defence ministers is conducted regularly.
Oman is also a major destination for Indian defence exports.88
India’s defence relations with Oman has been marked by regular exchanges of visits by senior
defence officials/delegations and regular ships visits. The Indian chief of naval staff visited Oman
in April 2013. Subsequently in October 2014, three ships from the Indian Navy’s training squadron
visited Oman followed by a delegation of senior defence officers from the Indian National Defence
College in January 2015.89 In addition to regular visits by Indian Navy’s training ships to Oman,
major fleet ship visits have also been conducted; most notably a rare visit by the navy’s aircraft
carrier, INS Viraat, accompanied by two other Western Fleet ships in June 2012. India’s naval
exchanges also include navy-to-navy staff talks, training exchanges and bilateral exercises. Oman
is one of the few West Asian countries with whom India conducts a biennial naval exercise,
codenamed Naseem-Al-Bahar, commenced in 1993 with the aim of promoting interoperability
between forces.90 The tenth edition of the exercise was conducted in January 2016.91 Besides the
biennial naval exercise, the Indian Air Force also conducts a joint exercise codenamed Eastern
Bridge with the Royal Oman Air Force and holds regular staff talks.
Qatar
The multi-faceted relations between India and Qatar have intensified in recent years. The Emir
(Head) of Qatar recently visited India in March 2015. Previous visits by the Emir were in 1999,
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2005 and 2012. India’s bilateral trade with Qatar reached nearly $17 billion in 2013-14, with
India's exports amounting to nearly $1 billion, registering a growth of 45 per cent over the export
figure ($687 million) in 2012-13. 92 Qatar is also the largest supplier of LNG to India.93
Qatar has maintained close security relations with the United States and provides the forward
headquarters for U.S. CENTCOM at Doha. The Qatar Navy also regularly exercises with U.S.
naval forces in the Persian Gulf.94 In addition to close ties with the United States, Qatar has also
sought to maintain handy defence and security relations with India.95 The defence cooperation
between India and Qatar has been described as being the most far-reaching that India has signed
with any country and “just short of stationing troops.”96 It has also been reported that India would
“go to the rescue of Qatar, if Qatar requires it.”97 According to a senior Indian analyst, although
Qatar was keen to see India develop a semi-permanent naval presence, India was cautious about
taking action that might upset others in the region.98 Following the recent breakdown of diplomatic
relations with Saudi Arabia and other gulf states, the Indian government has maintained a neutral
stance stating that:
…all parties should resolve their differences through a process of constructive dialogue and peaceful
negotiations based on well-established international principles of mutual respect, sovereignty and
non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.99

A defence cooperation agreement, initially signed in November 2008 and extended for a further
period of five years in 2013, is implemented through the joint defence cooperation committee
(JDCC) led by a two-star officer from the tri-services. India’s defence cooperation with Qatar
includes training, exchanges of visits by senior officials and visits by ships of Indian Navy and
Coast Guard. Two ships of the Western Fleet visited Qatar in September 2013 and two Coast
Guard ships visited in February 2013 and December 2014. The Indian Navy was earlier studying
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the feasibility of deputing or stationing a naval training team at Qatar,100 though following the
recent developments as noted above, this proposal may have been shelved.
Saudi Arabia
India has diverse economic and socio-cultural ties with Saudi Arabia. As a major economic and
military power in West Asia, Saudi Arabia wields huge influence in the region and is thus an
important country for India. However, Saudi Arabia’s greatest strategic partner in the region is
Pakistan. Saudi Arabia also maintains a close security relationship with the United States. In 2014,
Saudi Arabia overtook India as the largest importer of defence equipment worldwide, with the
United States being its largest supplier.101
The Pakistan armed forces had a large presence in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, though presently this
is reportedly limited to a training presence in Saudi Arabia.102 However, of greater concern to India
is the de facto role of Pakistan as a provider of the nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, suspected of
funding Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme from the 1980s,103 culminating in Pakistan
becoming a declared nuclear weapons state in 1998. Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear programme
was exposed by two British journalists in their widely-acclaimed book, Deception: Pakistan, the
United States and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, which brought out that as a quid pro quo,
Pakistan may provide a nuclear umbrella for Saudi Arabia or even transfer nuclear weapon
technology or nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia in the event that Iran acquires nuclear weapons.104
In recent years, Pakistan’s “dysfunctional polity” seems to have reduced its influence in Saudi
Arabia,105 and signs of a strengthening of the relationship between India and Saudi Arabia can be
seen. In February 2014, an MoU for defence and security cooperation was signed during the visit
to New Delhi by the crown price, deputy prime minister and defence minister of Saudi Arabia.106
100

Government of India, Annual Report 2014-15, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, 2015, p. 131.
“Saudi Arabia replaces India as largest defence market for US,” IHS Jane’s, 8 March 2015.
102 Brewster, India’s Ocean, p. 107.
103 Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons,
Walker Publishing Company, New York, 2007, pp. 99-102.
101

104

Ibid.

Brewster, India’s Ocean, p. 107.
106 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Document signed during the Official Visit of Crown Prince, Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to India,” 26 February 2014, available at
http://www.mea.gov.in/incoming-visitinfo.htm?1/679/Official+Visit+of+His+Royal+Highness+Prince+Salman+bin+Abdulaziz+Al+Saud+Crown+Prince+Deputy+Pri
me+Minister+and+Defence+Minister+of+the+Kingdom+of+Saudi+Arabia+to+India+February+2628+2014.html.
105

150

The MoU sought to promote cooperation in defence industry, science, technology and transfer of
technology. Subsequently, when Indian prime minister Modi visited Saudi Arabi in April 2016, in
a joint statement the two sides agreed to:
intensify bilateral defence cooperation, through exchange of visits by military personnel and experts, conduct
of joint military exercises, exchange of visits of ships and aircrafts and supply of arms and ammunition and
their joint development…[and] to enhance cooperation to strengthen maritime security in the Gulf and the
Indian Ocean regions.107

Based on the above developments it is likely that India’s maritime engagements with Saudi
Arabia, currently limited to ships visits, could improve further in the coming years.
United Arab Emirates (UAE)
India is UAE’s second largest trading partner while UAE is the third largest trade partner for India
and the most preferred destination for Indian professionals seeking to work in the Gulf region.
Over two million Indians live and work there, sending home about $12 billion annually and
forming the largest expatriate population, estimated at nearly 30 per cent of the Emirate’s total
population.108 The economic and strategic importance of UAE for India is apparent from the visit
of Prime Minister Modi in August 2015, the first ever visit by an Indian prime minister in 34 years
and Modi’s first visit to the region.109
An MoU on defence cooperation was signed between India and UAE in 2003 and implemented
through a joint defence cooperation committee. The seventh meeting of the JDCC was held at Abu
Dhabi in December 2014, led by a one star defence officer from each side. India’s security
cooperation with UAE includes intelligence sharing on terrorism and related activities, exchanges
of visits between senior officials, regular ship visits, staff talks and training. The Indian Navy is
currently engaged in providing naval training assistance in terms of manpower and equipment to
the UAE Navy.110 Furthermore, the UAE is also the recipient of several Indian defence exports.
In May 2014, a 21-member delegation of Joint Command and Staff College of the UAE Armed
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Forces visited India, and later in October that year, three Indian naval training ships visited Dubai.
Indian naval ships deployed on anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden routinely enter Abu Dhabi
for OTR.111 Recently, in May 2016, three ships from the Western Fleet deployed in the Gulf region
visited Dubai.112 The UAE is an active member of IONS and took over the chairmanship after
India’s term in 2010. The second IONS symposium was conducted in Abu Dhabi in May 2010.
Yemen
India has had close historical ties with Yemen. A sizeable population of Yemeni migrants live in
South India and a small number of Indian workers and business people are based in Yemen.
However, contemporary relations have been hampered by the ongoing civil war in Yemen,
precipitated due to serious differences between the Zaidi Shia group of Houthis from northern
Yemen and the federal government led by President Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi.113 The security
situation worsened by September 2014, leading to a military intervention led by Saudi Arabia to
quell the Houthi rebellion in early 2015. The Indian Navy undertook Operation Raahat, involving
three naval ships, to evacuate 4,741 Indians and nearly 2,000 foreign nationals from 48 countries
as a consequence.114
India’s extant maritime cooperation with Yemen is restricted mainly due to the extant security
situation in Yemen and the country’s proximity to Pakistan. It is unlikely that India-Yemen
maritime cooperation could improve in the near term.
Overall Assessment of India’s Maritime Cooperation in West Asia
An overall picture of India’s maritime cooperation with West Asian states can be seen in the
following Table 5.2:
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Table 5.2: Levels of Bilateral Maritime Cooperation Between India and West Asian Littoral
States115
Country

Bahrain
Iran

Iraq

Israel

Kuwait

Oman

Qatar

Saudi
Arabia
UAE

Level 1

•
•
•
•
•
•

115

Level 3

• Nil.

•

• Training.
• Defence exports.

• Strategic
partnership in port
of Chahbahar.

• Training.

•

Nil

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Ship visits.
Exchanges of visits by senior officials.
Defence Cooperation Agreement.
Ships visits.
Staff talks.
Exchanges of visits by senior officials.
PASSEX.
Ships visits.
Staff talks.
Exchanges of visits by senior officials.
Defence cooperation agreement.
Multilateral joint exercise: Milan.

• Defence imports.

•

Joint development
programmes with
DRDO.

• Training.
• Defence exports.

•

Nil.

•

Basing of Indian
naval training
team.

•
•
•
•

Ships visits.
Staff talks.
Exchanges of visits by senior officials.
Defence, security and maritime
cooperation agreements/ MoUs.
PASSEX.
Ship visits.
Defence Cooperation agreement.
Ships visits.
Staff talks.
Exchanges of visits by senior officials.
Agreement on defence and security
cooperation.
Multilateral joint exercise: Milan.
PASSEX

• Training.
• Bilateral joint
exercises: NaseemAl-Bahar.
• Defence exports.
• Operational turnaround for Indian
naval ships.
• Training assistance.
• Defence exports.

•

Basing of Indian
naval training
team.

• Nil.

•

Nil.

• Training assistance.
• Defence exports.
• Combined naval
exercise Sadakah.

•

• Nil

•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Yemen

Level 2

Ship visits.
Defence cooperation agreement.
Ships visits.
Exchanges of visits by senior officials.
Multilateral joint exercise: Milan.
Passing Exercises between navies
(PASSEX).
• Defence cooperation agreement.
• Ships visits.
• Exchanges of visits by senior officials.

• Ship visits.

Various Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Defence Annual Reports.

Nil.

Equipment and
manpower
provided for
United Arab
Emirates Naval
Training Centre at
Taweelah.
Nil.
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It is clear from Table 5.2 above that India has nurtured close strategic ties with Iran and a working
relationship with most Gulf states, particularly UAE, Oman and Qatar, despite significant Pakistani
influence in the region. Given India’s rising economic and military power, the Gulf countries
presently view India as an important player and stakeholder in the region, and a key maritime
power. The Indian Navy is also acknowledged as a leading navy internationally and most Gulf
navies are keen to engage with India in a security partnership. It is also apparent that India is keen
to enhance its maritime cooperation with the West Asian states given the strategic importance of
the region for India’s energy security and the presence of a large worker population. However, the
extant security situation in the region, political instability in several countries and the large military
presence of the United States in West Asia seems to have restricted the scope for India’s role in
the region.
The Role of China in West Asia
Compared to India which has had historical and cultural ties with the West Asian region, China is
largely viewed as an “outsider” in West Asia.116 However, as one of the largest oil importers from
the region, China has deepening relations with most West Asian countries. Until the 1980s, China
was a key arms supplier to Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.117 In recent years, China has sought to
leverage diplomatic and economic interactions with the region, though its influence is presently
limited. For instance, in 2010, China, offered, although unsuccessfully, to mediate in a longrunning island dispute between the United Arab Emirates and Iran over the sovereignty of the
Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa islands located in the Persian Gulf.118 China’s naval
engagements with the region have been limited to ships visits as part of the ongoing deployment
of the PLA Navy on anti-piracy missions. Oman, followed by Yemen, appear to have become the
preferred destinations for PLA Navy ships on anti-piracy missions; PLA Navy ships have visited
Port Salalah more than 20 times and Aden more than ten times in recent years.119 China has shown
no intention to further naval cooperation with the regional states, beyond operational naval
interactions and ship visits. Perhaps, it is comfortable with the American presence in the region as
a guarantor of security and does not wish to be deeply involved in regional geopolitics. However,
116
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in the long term, it is likely that the ambitious Chinese “one belt one road” project will lead to
greater Chinese engagements in the region and could potentially help China in securing a local
foothold.

The East African Region and Indian Ocean Island States
India has deep historical, cultural and political bonds with Africa with a sizeable Indian diaspora
settled in the region. While the Indian diaspora has faced hostility in many countries in the past
causing political tensions, in recent years India has developed robust strategic relations with
several East African countries and has been closely involved in the maritime security of the region,
particularly since the resurgence of piracy off Somalia beginning from 2005. Presently, India in
its intended role as net security provider in the Indian Ocean is keen to expand its maritime
engagement with the region. In September 2014, in a significant display of India’s Africa
diplomacy, four Indian naval ships proceeded on a two-month-long overseas deployment to East
Africa and the Southern Indian Ocean. The ships called at Antisiranana (Madagascar), Mombasa
(Kenya), Dar-e-Salaam (Tanzania), St Denis (Reunion Island, France), Port Louis (Mauritius),
Port Victoria (Seychelles), Nacala (Mozambique) and Simon’s Town (South Africa).120
The East African states acknowledge the Indian Navy’s rising profile and reach in the Indian Ocean
and seem to be keen to encourage maritime security cooperation with India. In fact maritime
security cooperation and trade were the top two agenda points at the India-Africa summit in New
Delhi in October 2015, which saw the largest ever gathering of African heads of states in India.121
Indian trade with Africa has grown twenty fold since 2000, from $3 billion to $70 billion in 2014,
though considerably smaller compared to China’s Africa trade, which surpassed $200 billion in
2014.122 Over the last several decades, China, in an effort to diversify its energy sources and make
inroads into new markets has deepened its engagements with the African states. This has earned
China considerable political, diplomatic and economic influence in Africa, though presently it has
limited security presence in the region south of Djibouti. It is likely that China’s growing influence
Abhijit Singh, “IBSA trilateralism and Southern oceans’ security – evaluating India's strategic responses,” Journal of the Indian
Ocean Region, Vol. 11, Issue No. 2, 2015, p. 206.
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in Africa could hamper India’s efforts to foster defence and security cooperation. India’s present
maritime engagements with various East African states are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.
The Comoros and Madagascar
The Comoros islands are located at the northern entrance of the Mozambique Channel between
mainland Africa and Mozambique. Since independence from France in 1975, the country has
experienced several coups and continues to remain largely underdeveloped. An Indian consulate
is located in Moroni and the Indian Ambassador to Madagascar is accredited to the Comoros.123
So far, India has not had any maritime engagement with the Comoros, though some government
aid has been forwarded in the past. However, India has achieved a significant level of engagement
with its neighbour, Madagascar.
India’s interactions with Madagascar for the past few years have been centred on capacity-building
missions. Around 2007, there were rumours about India establishing a “listening post” on
Madagascar. However, this seems to have been largely unfounded, though the nonexistence of the
“listening post” was later attributed to Chinese efforts at thwarting the Indian proposal.124 In 2007,
an Indian Coast Guard ship visited Madagascar.125 Subsequently, in an effort to initiate maritime
engagements, for the first time in history, four Indian naval ships visited the port of Antisiranana
in October 2014, whilst on a multination visit to Africa.126 The Indian naval personnel undertook
humanitarian activities and imparted basic professional training, including anti-piracy training, to
Malagasy naval personnel. Madagascar’s strategic vulnerability was first exposed between 2007
and 2008, when Somali pirates started attacking ships in the Mozambique Channel. The
Madagascar Navy comprises only a few small boats and has largely been supported by the French.
However, considering the suspension of French military assistance to Madagascar in 2009-2011
and again commencing in mid-2013, it seems unlikely this relationship will provide any short-term
support.127 With its existing naval resources Madagascar is ill-equipped to protect its large EEZ or
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face the emerging threats to its maritime security. This offers huge potential for the development
of maritime cooperation with India in the coming years.
Djibouti
Since 2009, with the coming into force of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, Djibouti has emerged as
a strategic pivot in the fight against Somali piracy, and terrorism, in the region, actively supported
by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the European Union and others. India has
cultivated close relations with Djibouti and Indian naval ships deployed on anti-piracy missions
frequently enter Djibouti for operational turnaround. Additionally, there have been a few visits by
training ships in the past. Djibouti has adequate ship repair and logistical facilities and also
provides naval basing facilities to the United States, France and Japan. 128 In fact the presence of
multinational forces on anti-piracy missions in Djibouti have made it the most secure port in the
Horn of Africa. PLA Navy ships on anti-piracy efforts frequently visit Djibouti port and as noted
in Chapter 2, China has a bilateral agreement with Djibouti for a naval logistics facility and
stationing of troops at Djibouti.
Such developments are indicative of preparations by China for promoting maritime cooperation
with regional states, similar to the approach adopted by India in fostering security ties. Thus, the
establishment of a PLA Navy basing facility at Djibouti has several implications for India. This
aspect is discussed in detail later in this chapter. India presently has no formal defence cooperation
agreement with Djibouti and the small size of their naval force has precluded any meaningful
maritime cooperation. Moreover, the large presence of several multinational forces in the region
has effectively reduced the scope for exclusive bilateral maritime cooperation between India and
Djibouti. The establishment of a permanent or semi-permanent Chinese naval presence at Djibouti
does not augur well for further maritime cooperation with India.
Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan
As Red Sea littoral states, Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea were listed as states in a secondary area of
interest in the Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2009. However, India has endeavoured to maintain
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close economic and defence ties with Egypt and key linkages with Eritrea and Sudan backed by
political support and economic ties.
India’s relations with Egypt continue to remain cordial despite the political turmoil of recent years.
Trade and investment have remained the core of India’s relationship with Egypt. Between 2009
and 2014, India’s trade with Egypt had increased by 60 per cent from $3.1billion in 2009-10 to
$4.95 billion in 2013-14, with India’s exports to Egypt touching $2.56 billion and imports at $2.39
billion, making India the second largest destination for Egyptian exports.129 In 2014-15 a total of
five delegations from India, including one led by the Head of DRDO, visited Egypt. Similarly,
five delegations from Egypt visited various military establishments in India.130 India signed a
defence cooperation agreement with Egypt in 2006, under a JDCC led by a senior official from
the Ministry of Defence. India’s maritime cooperation with Egypt includes ship visits, training,
exchanges of visits by senior officials and cooperation in defence research and development.
India has wide-ranging trade and investment ties with Sudan. Until 2011, India maintained an
Army contingent under the UN Mission to Sudan. Following the division of Sudan, this group was
later moved to the newly created South Sudan in 2011. Bilateral trade between India and Sudan
recorded about a 46 per cent increase during 2013-14, growing from $888 million to $1.3 billion.
Indian private sector investments in Sudan include iron ore, gold mining, steel manufacturing and
pharmaceutical sectors.131 In September 2013, the Sudanese Secretary General, Ministry of
Defence, visited New Delhi to discuss the scope for defence cooperation and even toured the Indian
Defence Services Staff College.132 However, progress in Indo-Sudan defence ties is yet to be seen,
but the recent lifting of Western trade sanction on Sudan could pave the way for Indian
defence/naval training assistance .133
India has historical linkages with Eritrea going back to the 17th century when Indians traded at the
Eritrean port of Massawa. Eritrea, by way of its strategic location in the Horn of Africa adjacent
to Djibouti, is an important country for India. Over the years India has offered capacity-building
129
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assistance in several fields ranging from legislative drafting, technical scholarships (agriculture,
education, health), and also food aid. In 2009, the Indian government extended a line of credit of
$20 million to the Eritrean government. India is a destination for Eritreans for higher studies.134 In
recent years Chinese interest in Eritrea has been growing. China cancelled an outstanding debt
from Eritrea in 2001 and has further committed several multi-million dollar development projects
there, most notably a large hospital at the capital city of Asmara completed in 2006 and
communication infrastructure projects.135 Significantly, the current president of Eritrea, Isaias
Afewerki received his military training in China.136
Kenya
India’s relations have expanded considerably in recent times marked by several senior level visits.
India is also a favoured destination for Kenyan students seeking higher education. Presently, India
is Kenya’s largest trading partner with bilateral trade having crossed $4 billion in 2014.137 India’s
trade with Kenya has been facilitated by a sizeable presence of Indian-origin merchants, who wield
considerable economic clout but have also been subjected to mistreatment. Notably, in 2008, the
Indian community was attacked in the city of Kisumu, leading to several fleeing the country.138
Apparently, the Indian Navy was kept on standby for a possible evacuation, though such an
eventuality did not arise. 139
Due to a formal defence cooperation agreement between the two countries, India and Kenya have
close naval cooperation including exchanges of visits by senior officials, ship visits, hydrographic
assistance, naval training and defence exports. The Kenyan Navy, though a small force, is regarded
as the best equipped navy in East Africa.140 It participated in the multinational exercise Milan
hosted by the Indian Navy at Port Blair in February 2014 and is a member of IONS. Indian Navy
interactions in recent years include a study tour visit by an Indian National Defence College (NDC)
delegation in May 2014 followed by the visit of the Indian Chief of Naval Staff in November 2014,
during which time he reviewed bilateral cooperation and the anti-piracy cooperation programme
134
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with his counterpart. Earlier in 2012, Indian naval ships called at Mombasa on a goodwill visit and
an Indian naval hydrographic ship was deployed off Kenya in October 2014 for a joint
hydrographic survey with the Kenyan Navy.
Mauritius
India’s relations with Mauritius can be described as time-tested, privileged and multi-faceted,
firmly anchored in a shared history and culture. Over 70 per cent of the population is of Indian
descent and, not surprisingly, Mauritius has been described as “little India.”141 The “special status”
accorded to Mauritius by India is evident from the fact that the Mauritius prime minister, Dr.
Navinchandra Ramgoolam, was the only non-SAARC representative to be invited for Prime
Minister Modi’s swearing-in ceremony in May 2014. India remains the largest trading partner for
Mauritius, with trade exceeding $1 billion in 2014.
Presently, India has a comprehensive defence and maritime engagement policy for Mauritius and
the range and depth of India’s defence cooperation programmes with Mauritius surpass those with
other Indian Ocean states. The fact that the Indian prime minister chose to announce India’s
national maritime strategy for the Indian Ocean region, contained in the five-point policy
framework statement, in Mauritius in March 2015, indicates the strategic importance of India’s
relations with Mauritius.
In 1974, India helped Mauritius to set up a maritime security force by donating a patrol boat,
christened as MNS Amar.142 By 1987, this service grew into the Mauritius National Coast Guard,
a specialised wing of the Mauritius Police Force, based at Port Louis and commanded by a
seconded Indian naval officer. Presently, India’s maritime cooperation with Mauritius includes the
entire spectrum of cooperation activities including staff talks, ships visits, training, reciprocal visits
by senior officials, defence exports, information exchange and a permanent presence of defence
personnel on Mauritius on active duty. The Indian Navy also provides hydrographic assistance to
Mauritius and conducts surveillance in its vast EEZ spanning 2.2 million square kilometres; equal
to the size of the Indian EEZ.
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Over the years, India has transferred several naval assets such as small boats, ships and aircraft to
Mauritius. The latest being a 1,300 tonnes offshore patrol vessel, Barracuda, which was handed
over in the presence of Prime Minister Modi in Mauritius in March 2015.143 The Barracuda-class
ship, built at a cost of $50 million on the lines of the Indian Navy’s indigenous Kora-class corvettes
, is capable of helicopter operations and suited for all routine naval constabulary functions such
as EEZ surveillance, search and rescue operations and anti-piracy operations.144 With more such
vessels planned for the smaller Indian Ocean littoral states, it is possible that India’s offshore patrol
vessel programme could evolve along the lines of the Australia’s Pacific Patrol Boat Program
(PPBP) to support the Pacific island states protect their marine resources. The Pacific Patrol Boat,
a much smaller 31 metre, 165 tonnes boat, compared to the 1,300 tonnes Barracuda-class,145 has
been running for over 25 years and has been successfully put to use by the island states in varied
roles rather than just fisheries protection duties, to include other tasks such as search and rescue,
humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations.146 In 2014 the Australian government
announced a $1.88 billion programme to replace the current fleet of patrol boats for 13 Pacific
Island states with over 20, slightly bigger (about 40 metre) all-purpose patrol vessels.147
In addition to the patrol boats Mauritius has received from India critical defence equipment such
as communications sets, radars and surveillance equipment. India has also installed a radar coastal
surveillance system throughout the Mauritian island chain, including five stations on the islands
of Mauritius, and one each on Rodrigues, Saint Brandon and the Agalega islands. 148 Mauritius,
along with the Seychelles, joined the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives maritime domain awareness
project in 2014 for information sharing and tracking movements of merchant ships in the region.149
In addition to materiel assistance, the Indian Navy has deputed several teams led by serving
officers to Mauritius on a permanent basis to provide training, hydrographic assistance and
technical support and manning of ships. As noted above, the Mauritius Coast Guard continues to
be headed by an Indian naval officer and, in addition to some other naval personnel based in
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Mauritius, the security advisor to the Mauritius prime minister is reportedly a senior Research and
Analysis Wing (RAW)150 official.151
In 2006, there were reports that Mauritius has willingly subordinated itself to India and had agreed
to hand over to India its twin Agalega islands, located 1,000 km north of Mauritius, en-route to the
Seychelles.152 While such reports seem to be unsubstantiated, given the unique nature of India’s
political and security ties with Mauritius, a permanent Indian base in Mauritius might be
considered a distinct possibility in the future.
Mozambique
India’s relations with Mozambique in recent years have been marked by interactions at the highest
political levels. Most recently, the president of Mozambique, Filipe Nyusi, an alumnus of a leading
management institute in India, visited New Delhi in August 2015 for bilateral discussions on a
wide range of issues. As a resource rich state with an abundance of natural gas, coal and other
minerals, located close to the hub of maritime piracy, Mozambique is an important partner for
India for trade as well as maritime security. Mozambique is keen to collaborate with India to
develop its energy infrastructure and receive assistance in the agriculture, healthcare and education
sectors. The importance accorded to Mozambique is evident from the fact that a quarter of India’s
investments in Africa flow to Mozambique alone and India’s bilateral trade grew five times in five
years; from about $400 million in 2009 to over $2 billion dollars in 2014.153 In 2010, the Indian
prime minister, Manmohan Singh, identified defence and security cooperation as one of the “four
pillars” in the partnership between India and Mozambique.154
The Indian Navy has played a key role in providing maritime security for Mozambique. In 2003,
at the invitation of the Mozambique government, the Indian Navy deployed ships off Maputo to
help provide maritime security for the African Union summit, repeating the operation in 2004

150

Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) is the external intelligence agency of India.
Brewster, India’s Ocean, p. 74.
152 “U.S. Saw Indian ‘Hidden Agenda’ in Mauritius,” The Hindu, 6 June 2013.
153 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Transcript of Media Briefing by Secretary (West) on the State visit of
President
of
Mozambique
to
India,”
6
August
2015,
available
at
http://mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/25653/Transcript+of+Media+Briefing+by+Secretary+West+on+the+State+visit+of+President+of+Mozambiq
ue+to+India+August+05+2015.html.
154 “India offers $500m credit line to Mozambique,” The Hindu, 1 October 2010.
151

162

when Maputo hosted the World Economic Forum.155 In 2006, India singed an MoU on defence
cooperation with Mozambique, implemented by a JDCC.156 The MoU includes technical
cooperation, logistics support and training. It also covers combined maritime patrols and the repair
of naval ships, as well as the rehabilitation of military infrastructure. 157 However, since 2006 the
JDCC has met only twice and during the visit of President Nyusi it was decided that JDCC would
meet more often.158
In 2011, Mozambique signed a maritime security agreement with India. 159 While specific details
were not released to the public it is likely that the agreement provides privileged access for Indian
naval ships on deployments to receive logistics support in Mozambique. India’s maritime
cooperation with Mozambique includes ship visits, training, hydrographic assistance and defence
exports. In November 2014, an Indian naval ship visited Mozambique on a goodwill visit.160 With
the reactivation of the 2006 MoU on defence cooperation, it is expected that maritime cooperation
between India and Mozambique will develop further.
The Seychelles
By virtue of its strategic location in the Indian Ocean and sizeable Indian diaspora (roughly eight
per cent of the total population), the Seychelles is an important country in India’s strategic calculus.
With a large EEZ covering 1.3 million square kilometres and inadequate capacity for maritime
surveillance, the Seychelles has been unable to deter attacks by Somali pirates in its waters. In
recent years, India’s relations with the Seychelles have been largely dominated by maritime
security cooperation. Prime Minister Modi started his three nation Indian Ocean tour in March
2015 with a visit to the Seychelles, where he reiterated India’s support to the Seychelles to develop
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its security capabilities.161 Capacity building for the Seychelles Peoples’s Defence Forces (SPDF)
has always been high on the agenda for India.
India’s naval cooperation with the Seychelles includes staff talks, ship visits, a bilateral exercise
codenamed Lamitye, hydrographic assistance, training, technical support and defence exports.
Indian naval ships routinely visit the Seychelles to carry out EEZ surveillance. Over the years,
India has donated warships, aircraft, military vehicles and surveillance equipment to the SPDF. In
2015, the Indian prime minister donated a Dornier-228 maritime reconnaissance aircraft. A similar
aircraft had been gifted earlier in 2013. In November 2014, the Chief of Naval Staff of the Indian
Navy visited the Seychelles to formally hand over a patrol boat to the Seychelles Coast Guard.162
Later, in February 2016, the head of the Indian Coast Guard visited the Seychelles to hand over a
patrol craft.163 These gifts are in addition to a ship donated earlier in 2006. In addition to military
hardware, India provides training at various levels to senior officers and personnel from the
SPDF.164 Many of the senior officers trained in India have gone on to occupy key positions in the
military establishment of their country. India has recently set up a coastal radar network in the
Seychelles and, as noted above, the Seychelles also has joined the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives
maritime domain awareness project. The Indian Navy has deputed a team of officers on a
permanent basis for training and technical support. Further, Indian defence officers serve as the
Military Adviser, Maritime Security Adviser, Medical Adviser and Naval Adviser (Technical) to
the SPDF.165
Most significantly, days after China announced its decision to establish a basing facility at
Djibouti, in December 2015, the Seychelles president, James Michel, announced that India would
be leased a plot of land on Assumption Island, one of the 115 islands that constitute the Seychelles,
to develop a naval base. He stated:
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This is a joint project between India and Seychelles involving our two Defence Forces in enhancing
our mutual security along our western seaboard. Seychelles is absolutely committed to the project. 166

While little is known about the upcoming Indian naval base it would be fair to assume that the base
would initially be developed as a logistics outpost similar to the Chinese planned facility in
Djibouti, with the potential to emerge as an Indian naval strategic outpost in the Indian Ocean in
the years to come.
China-Seychelles Relations

Chinese economic engagements with the Seychelles have grown

significantly in the last decade. In 2006, the president of the Seychelles visited Beijing and secured
a $4.5 million grant from the Chinese government.167 Subsequently, in 2007, the Chinese
president, Hu Jintao, visited the Seychelles at end of his eight African nation tour, the first ever
Chinese leader to visit the Seychelles.168 China has since invested in several multi-million dollar
projects including the construction of the National Assembly and the Supreme Court buildings. In
2011, following the visit of China’s defence minister, General Liang Guanglie, China announced
plans to set up a base in the Seychelles to support its anti-piracy operations in the region.169 While
this announcement raised concerns in India, no noteworthy PLA Navy activity was observed in
the Seychelles, although China gifted to Seychelles a patrol craft and two Y-12 aircraft for
maritime surveillance in 2014.170 In any case, the announcement by President Michel of an Indian
naval base in Seychelles, has effectively put an end to speculation that the Seychelles is moving
closer to China.
Somalia
India has played a key role in the rehabilitation of Somalia, which has had the longest history as a
failed state since the outbreak of civil war in 1991. An Indian Army contingent of 4,600 personnel,
supported by the Indian Navy, participated in the UN mission in Somalia from 1993-94. This has

“Seychelles Committed to Indian Naval Base,” The Hindu, 23 December 2015.
Kamlesh Agnihottri, “Chinese Quest for a Naval Base in the Indian Ocean – Possible Options for China,” National Maritime
Foundation Commentary, February 2010.
168 “Seychelles Welcomes Chinese President,” The Seychelles Weekly, 9 February 2007.
169 “China to Open Military Base in Seychelles,” The Times of India, 12 December 2011.
170 “Seychelles Receives Patrol Vessel Donated from India,” Defence Web, 5 February 2016.
166
167

165

been the only UN mission to date which has seen the active participation of the Indian Navy. Later,
in 2011, India also contributed to the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM).171
Subsequent developments in Somalia, which sparked off the piracy problem in the region
beginning from 2005, led to unprecedented efforts by the global community aimed at combating
the threat. India had reluctantly joined in the effort in 2008, though it has maintained at least one
ship on patrol continuously. The deployment of the Indian Navy was precipitated by strong protests
by the families of Indian seafarers held hostage by Somali pirates. India provides over seven per
cent of the manpower in the shipping industry and hence India seafarers formed a majority group
of the sailors held hostage.172 India also has a leadership role in the UN Contact Group on Piracy
off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), the apex forum dealing with Somali piracy. India’s
engagements with the Somali government were mostly related to securing the release of Indian
sailors held hostage; presently, there are no Indian hostages held in Somalia.173
The situation on land in Somalia appears to have improved and Somalia seems to be moving
towards a new phase of rehabilitation, largely assisted by the EU and various international
organisations. But piracy off Somalia which had been effectively reduced from 2012 onwards,
helped in a large measure by private onboard security employed by merchant ships, is back once
again with Somali pirates hijacking two vessels in March 2017.174 Reportedly, the situation once
again has been brought under control175 but it is viewed that full-fledged piracy could erupt anytime
if the security measures in place were to be reduced. Moreover, the threat of terrorism from groups
such as Al Shabab and other affiliates of Al Qaeda, is a real and present danger in the region. It is
therefore likely that the international focus on piracy off Somali will continue unabated in the near
term.
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South Africa
India’s contemporary relations with South Africa have been structured under the framework of the
India-Brazil-South Africa grouping or IBSA. Since its inception in 2003, IBSA has proved to be
a key forum of dialogue and cooperation between its constituent members. However, in recent
times this grouping appears to have been subsumed by the Chinese-led multilateral initiative, the
Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) group of states.176 Recent engagements between
India and South Africa seem to suggest a growing bilateral relationship centred around common
interests, particularly cooperation in defence and naval exercises, which were discussed during a
2015 meeting between the Indian prime minister and South African president, Jacob Zuma.177
The South African Navy is the best equipped naval force in Africa, though lack of government
spending in recent years has resulted in degradation in capability. 178 South Africa held the
chairmanship of IONS in 2012-13. Indian naval engagement with South Africa include staff talks,
ship visits, training, exchanges of visits by senior officials, a dedicated trilateral exercise also
involving Brazil codenamed Ibsamar, defence exports and joint defence research and development
on certain projects. The Indian Navy also has a small training team based in South Africa on a
permanent basis. Since 2008, five editions of Ibsamar have been conducted; the first four were off
the South African coast, while in February 2016 it was held off Goa.179 A 17-member delegation
from the Indian National Defence College visited South Africa in May 2014.
Considering that South Africa is located at the fringes of India’s area of primary interest in the
Indian Ocean and in an area where India is expected to have limited security concerns, it appears
odd that the Indian Navy has established such wide-ranging and deep relations with the South
African Navy. Perhaps India views South Africa, as with Australia at the other end of the region,
as an important strategic partner that could accord greater legitimacy to its intended role as the net
provider of security for the whole Indian Ocean.
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Tanzania
India enjoys friendly relations with Tanzania, home to a sizeable Indian population and a major
trading partner. In 2014, India’s bilateral trade with Tanzania surpassed $3 billion, including $2.3
million of Indian exports.180 India is thus Tanzania’s largest source of imported goods.
The Tanzanian Navy comprises a mix of old and new patrol boats, including a few donated by
China, grossly inadequate to meet the maritime threats and challenges of the region. In December
2010, two piracy attacks were reported in the Mozambique Channel, highlighting the lack of naval
patrolling in the area.181
India’s defence cooperation with Tanzania includes ship visits, training, exchanges of visits by
senior officials, defence exports and hydrographic assistance. Tanzania is a member of IONS and
a participant in the biennial multilateral exercise Milan. Indian naval ships visited Tanzania in
November 2014 while an Indian hydrographic vessel carried out a joint operational survey with
Tanzanian personnel in the Dar–es–Salaam harbour from 26 December 2013 to 25 January
2014.182
Relations with China

Tanzania maintains close strategic relations with China, and in 2014 signed

an agreement with China to build a new mega port and economic zone at Bagamoyo, expected to
cost at least $10 billion. Further, Tanzania has also awarded to a Chinese consortium a contract to
build new railway lines stretching 2,561 kilometres, connecting the port of Dar–es–Salaam to
landlocked neighbours. Moreover, China is also financing a $1.2 billion, 532 km natural gas
pipeline in Tanzania.183 In October 2014, Tanzanian and Chinese navies conducted a joint exercise
“Broaden 2014,” which included exercises at sea and on land.184
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Overall Assessment of India’s Maritime Cooperation with East African and Indian Ocean
Island States
An overall picture of India’s maritime cooperation with the East African region is set out in Table
5.3 below using the analytical framework established in the previous chapter.
Table 5.3 - Levels of Maritime Cooperation Between India and East African and Indian Ocean
Island States185
Country

Level 1

Level 2

Level 3

Comoros

• Ship visits.

• Nil.

•

Madagascar

• Ship visits.

• Training.

• Nil.

Nil.

• Exchanges of visits by
senior officials.
Djibouti

• Ship visits.

• Nil.

•

Nil

Egypt

• Ship visits.

• Training.

•

Joint defence R&D.

• Exchanges of visits by

• Defence exports.

senior officials.
Eritrea

• Nil.

• Nil

•

Nil.

Sudan

• Exchanges of visits by

• Nil

•

Nil.

• Ship visits.

• Training.

•

Nil.

• Staff talks.

• Hydrographic

senior officials.
Kenya

• Exchanges of visits by
senior officials.

assistance.
• Defence exports.

• Defence cooperation
agreement.
• Multilateral joint exercise:
Milan.

185

Various Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Defence, Annual Reports.
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Mauritius

• Ship visits.

• Training.

• Staff talks.

• Defence exports.

• Exchanges of visits by
senior officials.

•

on permanent basis.
•

EEZ patrols.

•

Information sharing.

• Defence Cooperation

Radar stations installed.
•

agreement.
•

Posting of naval personnel

Likely basing of naval
units.

Multilateral joint exercise:
•

Milan.

Gifting of ships, aircraft
and other equipment.

Mozambique

• Ship visits.

• Training.

• Exchange of visits by

• Defence exports.

senior officials.
• Defence Cooperation

•

EEZ patrols.

•

Posting of naval personnel

• Hydrographic
assistance.

agreement.
Seychelles

• Ship visits.

• Training.

• Staff talks.

• Defence exports.

• Exchanges of visits by
senior officials.
• Defence Cooperation
agreement.
•

on permanent basis.
•

EEZ patrols.

•

Information sharing.

•

Radar network.

•

Likely basing of Indian

Multilateral joint exercise:

naval units.
•

Milan.

Gifting of ships, aircraft
and other equipment.

Somalia

• Nil.

• Nil.

•

Nil.

South Africa

• Ship visits.

• Trilateral exercise,

•

Joint defence R&D.

•

Nil.

• Staff talks.
• Exchanges of visits by
senior officials.

Ibsamar with Brazil.
• Training.
• Defence exports.

• Defence Cooperation
agreement.
• Multilateral joint exercise:
Milan.
Tanzania

• Ship visits.

• Training assistance.

• Exchange of visits by

• Hydrographic

senior officials.

assistance.
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The recrudescence of maritime piracy and terrorism in the African region in the last decade has
exposed the lack of naval capacity amongst the East African states. Increasingly, navies in the East
African region are attempting to achieve greater cooperation through the sharing of limited
resources and targeting their activities through the African Standby Force (ASF). In January 2009,
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Yemen
signed a memorandum of understanding putting into place a new regional mechanism to fight
maritime piracy. The Djibouti accord provided for the setting up of three information centres in
Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, and Sanaa, and the opening of a regional training centre in Djibouti.186
The East African navies are keen to engage with the Indian Navy to augment their capacities. The
recent focused efforts by India to emerge as the net provider of security for the Indian Ocean region
and enhance its naval engagements with the East African states have therefore been welcomed.
Based on the application of the thesis analytical framework for maritime security cooperation in
Table 3 and the preceding sections of this chapter, it appears that India has achieved considerable
success in forging close bilateral security relations with most states except Eritrea, Tanzania, and
Djibouti, which seems to be closer to China than India.
The Role of China in Africa
China’s engagements with Africa go back long before the announcement of the “belt and road”
initiative. Presently, China has become Africa’s largest trade partner and Africa is China’s second
largest overseas construction project contract market and the fourth largest investment
destination.187 So far, China has completed 1,046 projects in Africa and built 2,233 kilometres of
railways and 3,530 kilometres of roads, helping intra-Africa trade and integrating it with the global
economy.188 Contrary to the common perception that Chinese engagements with Africa are
tantamount to neo-colonialism, the response of the African states has largely been positive.189 In
December 2015, speaking at the China Africa forum in South Africa, the Chinese president, Xi
Jinping, announced a $60 billion package for development in Africa covering several areas
including infrastructure projects, health care, aid for drought-stricken countries and thousands of
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scholarships for African students. 190 The Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe, praised the
Chinese president and stated:
Here is a man representing a country once called poor, a country which was never our coloniser. He is
doing to us what we expected those who colonised us yesterday to do … We will say he is a God-sent
person.191

The continued acceptance of Chinese investments by African states over the past five decades is a
sign that Chinese presence in Africa is seen “as that of a partner in economic development rather
than an aspiring hegemon.”192 Clearly, China’s influence in the region surpasses all others and is
expected to intensify further commensurate with the coming wave of investments under the “belt
and road” initiative. Under this framework, China plans to develop deep water ports in coastal
cities such as Bizerte, Tunisia; Dakar, Senegal; Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania; Djibouti, Djibouti;
Libreville, Gabon; Maputo, Mozambique; and Tema, Ghana. These ports will be key sites of the
transcontinental exchange of manufactured goods and commodities between Asian and African
economies along the Maritime Silk Road.193 It is obvious that the growing Chinese investments
and presence of a rising worker population will invariably lead to greater Chinese influence in the
region and also call for greater naval presence. As noted above, the establishment of a PLA Navy
logistics centre at Djibouti, could potentially facilitate a greater role by the PLA Navy in Africa.
As the intended net security provider for the entire Indian Ocean region, India has been engaged
in capacity building for the smaller regional navies, though, essentially, India’s own security
interest in the East African region have been largely centred around the security of shipping,
mainly along the northeast African coast leading to the western Indian Ocean region, the
Seychelles and beyond. Consequently, while India’s contribution to the ongoing anti-piracy efforts
in this part seems to have grown, its maritime presence in East Africa and particularly the Southern
African region has remained relatively low-key. It is clear that India’s trade and economic
engagements with Africa are insignificant compared to those of China and it is therefore likely
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that India’s diplomatic and security relationships with the African states would accordingly be
overshadowed by China in the coming years.

Southeast Asia and Australia
India has had longstanding historical and cultural ties with its Southeast Asian neighbours, though
its relations with the region have bloomed only in the last ten to 12 years, particularly in the field
of defence cooperation. India’s membership in the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus
(ADMM+) in 2010 was an explicit acknowledgement by Southeast Asian states of the rising
importance of India as a strategic partner in the new regional security architecture. India's “Look
East” policy of the early 1990s, having received bipartisan support from successive Indian
governments, has evolved from bilateral and multilateral, economic and diplomatic engagements
with Southeast Asia to broader security and defence ties across the whole Asia-Pacific, including
with Australia, Japan and Vietnam. The “Look East” policy was renamed as the “Act East” policy
by Prime Minister Modi during the India-ASEAN Summit in Myanmar in November 2014. In
addition, Modi has also advocated a “Look East, Link West Policy” pointing to a broader IndoPacific conceptualisation of India’s region.194
Like India, China too has ancient historical and cultural ties with the Southeast Asian region. China
is a key stakeholder in the region with deep economic and strategic engagements with each
regional state. Firstly, the region is an important source of raw materials and capital for China as
well as a rapidly growing export market.195 Secondly, Southeast Asia is also a source of oil and
gas supplies for China and most importantly, it is through the Southeast Asian chokepoints, the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore that China’s primary energy supply routes from the Middle East
and Africa pass.196 However, China’s “muscular” approach with respect to the territorial disputes
with several Southeast Asian states, has led the regional states to view India as a potential balancer
to China. Meanwhile, as noted in Chapter 3, India’s own engagement with the region have grown
significantly and presently half of India’s trade passes through the Straits of Malacca and
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Singapore, both areas vulnerable to piracy and armed attacks on ships. Consequently, the
protection of trade and economic interests is a key driver for India’s security relations with regional
states. The current naval engagements between India and various Southeast Asian states and
Australia are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.
Indonesia
As close maritime neighbours, both India and Indonesia have taken keen interest in recent years
to expand their long-term strategic partnership. India’s bilateral ties with Indonesia were elevated
to the level of “strategic partnership” in 2005 following the visit of Indonesia’s President
Yudhoyono to New Delhi, and currently include defence and security cooperation, comprehensive
economic partnership, culture and people-to-people links, and cooperation in responding to
common challenges.197 In addition to the official bilateral engagements there are several track two
initiatives in force such as the India-Australia-Indonesia Trilateral Dialogue on the Indian Ocean
under the Delhi Dialogue and the India-Indonesia Dialogue under the aegis of the Annual Asian
Relations Conference organised by the Ministry of External Affairs sponsored think tank, Indian
Council of World Affairs.198
India and Indonesia signed a defence cooperation agreement in 2001, implemented under a JDCC
led by the two defence ministers. This is in addition to separate staff level talks between the army,
navy and air force.199 India’s defence engagements with Indonesia have been largely led by the
Indian Navy and include regular visits by naval and coast guard ships, training, reciprocal visits
by senior officials, coordinated patrols and bilateral as well as multilateral exercises, intelligence
sharing and defence exports. Indonesia participated in the multilateral exercise Milan in February
2014 while the Indian Navy participated in the multilateral HADR exercise, Komodo, conducted
by the Indonesian Navy in March-April 2014 at Batam, Indonesia.200 Besides such multilateral
naval engagements, the two navies have also been conducting an exclusive bilateral coordinated
naval patrol codenamed Ind-Indo Corpat along the shared EEZ boundary line since 2009. These
Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Media Briefing by Secretary (East) in Jakarta on Prime Minister’s
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patrols are conducted every year in March-April and September-October; the 29th cycle of these
patrols was conducted in May 2017201. Broadly, the aim of the patrols is to enhance mutual
understanding and interoperability between the navies and prosecute vessels engaged in unlawful
activities by undertaking coordinated patrolling. The Indian Navy has responded on several
occasions to natural calamities in the region and provided assistance to Indonesia, most notably
during the 2005 tsunami.
According to industry reports, India has offered to support Indonesia’s defence modernisation
programmes and industrial base through funding and technology transfers. This is most likely to
be implemented under the extant commercial agreements between Indonesian ship buider PT PAL
and the Indian ship building company Pipavav Defence for naval systems, and PT Diregantara
Indonesia and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) for aerospace programmes.202
The Indonesian government led by President Joko Widodo has accorded maritime issues high
priority by announcing a new doctrine, the “global maritime axis” (poros maritim dunia) that seeks
to refocus national policy on a maritime agenda. The administration has also established a
Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs. Indonesia has also been wooed by Pakistan in the past
based on the “Islam” card with lucrative offers for naval training and technological support. The
Indonesian naval chief was conferred with Nishan-e-Imtiaz (Military) during a visit to Pakistan;
one of Pakistan’s highest military awards, apparently for his contributions to improving naval
cooperation between the two countries.203 Notwithstanding the overtures made by Pakistan, the
present level of naval engagement between Indonesia and Pakistan is fairly limited.
China-Indonesia Relations

China’s relations with Indonesia were elevated to the level of

comprehensive strategic partnership in 2013 and have further strengthened under the Jokowi
government with Indonesia joining the China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in
2015.204 For China, Indonesia could be a key player in their ambitious “one belt one road”
programme and hence Beijing has sought to promote strategic cooperation with Jakarta. However,
Indonesia has been wary of growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea where the
Chinese nine-dotted line claim overlaps with the EEZ of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands. China seems
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to have tried to downplay the issue of maritime EEZ boundary line and, reportedly in November
2015, in a rare announcement, a Chinese official stated that the “Indonesian side has no territorial
claim to China’s [Spratly Islands],” and that “the Chinese side has no objection to Indonesia’s
sovereignty over the Natuna Islands.”205 Yet, in a recent development in July 2017, when Indonesia
renamed the northern reaches of its EEZ in the South China Sea as the North Natuna Sea, a Chinese
government spokesperson responded by stating that the name South China Sea had broad
international recognition and clear geographic limits and “Certain countries so-called renaming
[of the South China Sea] is totally meaningless.”206On the whole, China-Indonesia relations are
tinged with mutual suspicion and have the potential to flare-up in the future.
Malaysia
India has close historical and cultural ties with Malaysia. Nearly eight percent of Malaysia’s
population comprises people of Indian origin. Significantly, the grandson of the Sultan of Johore,
Captain Tunku Ismail Ibrahim, chose to train at the Indian Military Academy in 2003 over the
British Sandhurst academy and was later commissioned into the Indian Army.207 Though India
signed an MoU on defence cooperation with Malaysia in February 1993, 208 India’s relations with
Malaysia were elevated to the level of strategic partnership only by 2010, following the visit of
the Malaysian prime minister, Najib Tun Rajak, to India. Presently bilateral relations cover a wide
range of issues with defence cooperation between the two countries figuring prominently, and
includes an annual Malaysia-India Defence Cooperation Committee (MIDCOM) meeting led by
the two defence ministers, staff talks between each of the three services, ship visits by the navy
and coast guards, joint patrols, training, reciprocal visits by senior officials, defence exports and
information sharing.
In 2008, Indian Air Force pilots commenced training with their counterparts in the Royal
Malaysian Air Force on the Russian manufactured Su-30 fighter planes. According to media
reports, India may even offer maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) facilities for Malaysian Su30 fighters.209 In 2013 the Indian Navy and the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) instituted
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coordinated patrols on the lines of the Ind-Indo Corpat with Indonesia. In 2014, the RMN
participated in exercise Milan, followed by the second cycle of the coordinated patrols off the
Andaman and Nicobar islands. Indian naval ships regularly visit Malaysia and even participate in
the international defence exhibition at Langkawi each year.
Malaysia, like Indonesia, has also been wooed by Pakistan through lucrative deals. In 2014, the
Malaysian naval chief, Admiral Jaafar, was also awarded with Pakistan’s highest military award,
Nishan-e-Imtiaz (Military), for his contributions to enhancing bilateral cooperation.210 While
Malaysia’s relations with Pakistan may be closely watched by India, there has been limited naval
interactions between the two states.
China-Malaysia Relations

China has accorded priority to building up its relations with

Malaysia, a key member of ASEAN and a claimant to some of the Spratly islands in the South
China Sea. In recent years China-Malaysia relations seem to have acquired greater momentum,
fueled by large-scale Chinese investments and over $56 billion in annual trade in 2015.211
Reportedly, in 2015, Chinese president, Xi Jinping, told the Malaysian prime minister, Najib
Rajak: “China and Malaysia are good neighbors and friends that trust and respect each other,”
pointing to the development of China’s Maritime Silk Road as an opportunity to deepen relations
between the two countries.212 Since that time China has become the largest foreign investor in
Malaysia moving ahead of the United States and Japan. Chinese investments in Malaysia include
a US$2.3 billion bail-out of the Malaysian state-owned investment firm 1Malaysia Development
Berhad (1MDB), mired in large outstanding debts and a political scandal involving Najib Rajak.213
This is a significant development and it is widely believed that it could potentially undermine
Malaysia’s independence and Najib’s ability to act tough with Beijing with respect to the South
China Sea dispute.214 China has announced its plans for financing and building a 620 kilometre
East coast rail link to Kuala Lumpur, a US$13 billion project that will connect four states.215 This
is in addition to contracts awarded to Chinese firms for US$3.7 billion for port development in
Malacca in 2016.216 Both these projects are part of the Chinese Maritime Silk Road and are
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expected to significantly deepen China-Malaysia relations. A strategic shift in Malaysia’s foreign
policy towards China is evident from the fact that, in November 2016, during his third visit to
China since 2009, Prime Minister Najib signed 14 agreements with China, including one for the
joint development of at least four Chinese-designed littoral combat ships.217 This deal is
Malaysia’s first major defence acquisition from China and a clear sign of advancement in ChinaMalaysia relations.
Thailand
India-Thailand relations are based on shared historical, religious and cultural ties, though progress
in defence cooperation has been relatively slow, hampered by enduring political instability in
Thailand. An MoU on defence cooperation between the two countries was signed in January 2012.
Broadly, India’s defence interactions with Thailand are structured on the lines of defence
cooperation with Malaysia and Indonesia, albeit on a reduced scale, limited by Thailand’s smaller
naval capacity, and includes an annual dialogue between the defence ministers, navy and air force
staff talks, ship visits, training, coordinated patrols, hydrographic assistance, defence exports and
information sharing. The Royal Thai Navy participated in exercise Milan in early 2014 at Port
Blair and Indian naval and coast guard ships visited Thailand in June 2015. The 23rd cycle of the
Indo-Thai Corpat, which commenced in 2006,218 was conducted in November 2016.219 The Indian
naval chief also visited Thailand in July 2015 to progress various issues related to naval
cooperation.220
Singapore
Singapore has been a staunch supporter of India in the Southeast Asia region. A Ministry of
External Affairs statement issued during a New Delhi visit by the Singaporean president, Tony
Tan, in 2015 noted: India’s relations with Singapore “encompasses strong political understanding,
close defence and security cooperation, growing complementaries in economic engagement,
civilisational and cultural linkages and shared interests in bilateral and multilateral fora.”221
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Despite its small size, the Singapore armed forces and particularly the Republic of Singapore Navy
(RSN) can be regarded the most developed and sophisticated in the region. India signed a defence
cooperation agreement with Singapore in 2003 and presently has a wide range of interactions with
all three services, easily surpassing the level of strategic defence engagements with other regional
states. India’s defence cooperation with Singapore is essentially led by the navy and includes an
annual dialogue between the defence ministers, an annual defence policy dialogue (DPD) between
the defence secretaries, staff talks between the three services, bilateral exercises between the three
services, defence exports and joint research and development on specific projects, regular naval
and coast guard ship visits, training, information sharing and reciprocal visits by senior officials.
Under the defence agreement, Singapore is allowed to use Indian airspace to train Republic of
Singapore Air Force pilots and probably has even based a few war reserve aircraft in India. The
Republic of Singapore Navy participates in the multilateral Indian naval exercise Milan and also
conducts an annual bilateral exercise, Simbex, held in March-April each year, alternately in the
Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea.222 The fourteenth edition of the exercise was held in India
in May 2014.223 The Indian Navy has also stationed a training team at Singapore on a permanent
basis.224
Myanmar
Myanmar is the only Southeast Asian state that shares both land and maritime boundaries with
India and is often referred to as India’s “gateway” to ASEAN. Given its strategic location as a
buffer state between India and China, it has been vied over by both states as a strategic “prize.”225
Barry Buzan has also described Myanmar as an “insulator state,” “insulating” South Asia from
both Southeast Asia and China.226 India has invested in several strategic infrastructure projects in
Myanmar, most notably upgrades to Sittwe port in western Myanmar, the Kaladan multimodal
transit transport corridor which seeks to connect Sittwe port with Indian ports on the eastern
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seaboard through a riverine transport corridor, and by road leading to Mizoram in northeast India,
and the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway.227
While India has always maintained close political relations with Myanmar, except for a brief
period of few years in the late 1980s until the early 1990s, when in a coup the military junta
abolished state institutions and established the state law and order restoration council (SLORC).
In the early 1990s, after India realised that its policy of isolating Myanmar was pushing it towards
China, relations began to normalise.228 By the late 1990s, India resumed regular diplomatic and
military ties, though bilateral assistance, particularly in the area of defence, was kept low key for
the next several years.229 In 2007, when India transferred two BN-2 “Defender” Islander maritime
surveillance aircraft to Myanmar, it came under criticism from Britain, which had originally
supplied the aircraft to the Indian Navy, for supporting the military junta regime in Myanmar. 230
India had earlier gifted Myanmar T-55 tanks, artillery guns, radar, assault rifles, light machine
guns and ordnance.231 However, following the handing over of power from the military junta to a
quasi-civilian government, India seems to have become more proactive in its defence cooperation.
In early 2013, a frigate and a corvette from the Myanmar Navy visited the Indian Navy’s eastern
naval command base at Vishakhapatnam for naval exercises, marking the first-ever visit of naval
vessels from Myanmar to mainland India.232 Subsequently, in July 2013, the chief of the Myanmar
Navy visited New Delhi to discuss future bilateral cooperation, including for operations, training,
and material support. In July 2015, in a meeting between the respective foreign ministers, India
indicated its commitment to assist in the modernisation of the Myanmar armed forces and
reiterated its commitment to cooperate in “building a professional and capable Myanmar Navy to
safeguard and ensure its maritime security.”233
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India’s defence cooperation with Myanmar currently includes training for all three services, staff
talks between the two navies, ship visits, reciprocal visits by senior defence officials, bilateral
coordinated patrols on similar lines to those with Thailand and Indonesia, defence exports and
intelligence sharing. India has recently supplied Myanmar with naval equipment such as
indigenously manufactured sonars, radars and war gaming software. The Myanmar Navy
participated in multinational exercise Milan in 2014 and the maiden IN-MN coordinated patrols
were conducted from March 2013 off the Great Coco Islands, Myanmar.234
In recent years, defence and security cooperation between the two countries has grown rapidly
with a deepening of trust. This is evident from the military operations conducted by the Indian
Army in June 2015, when in a reprisal attack against the killing of 18 Indian Army soldiers by an
insurgent group operating from the jungles in Myanmar, the Indian Army Special Forces carried
out surgical strikes inside Myanmar to annihilate two insurgent camps.235
China-Myanmar Relations

In the late 1980s, after the SLORC took control, Myanmar faced

isolation from all Western powers and India. During this period, China developed strong political
ties with Myanmar marked by economic, military and infrastructure development. China was the
largest supplier for military hardware and training to the rapidly expanding armed forces under the
military regime. Chinese sales to Myanmar included various items such as fighter jets, missiles,
guns, artillery, tanks and various types of ships.236 China was also involved in upgrading Myanmar
naval bases. In recent years, in a bid to bypass the Strait of Malacca, China has also sought to
establish an alternate route via Myanmar and established pipelines connecting Sittwe port to the
Yunnan province in western China. In late 2006, it was reported that Beijing was helping Myanmar
to modernise its naval bases by building radar, refit, and refueling facilities capable eventually of
supporting Chinese submarine operations in the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean region.
During this period, it was also rumoured that the Myanmar naval base at Great Coco Island
developed in 2003 with Chinese assistance through the construction of a large landing jetty to
replace an existing small pier, was the site of a Chinese surveillance installation. This had raised
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concerns in India of the possibility of a facility to monitor Indian missile test firings from the
eastern Orissa coast, in the Bay of Bengal.237 However, the rumours later proved unfounded.
Cambodia
India has historical, cultural and religious ties with Cambodia which has been a large recipient of
Indian aid. While a formal defence cooperation agreement does not exist between the two states,
in the last few years, there has been a steady enhancement of defence cooperation between the two
countries notably, training for Cambodian defence personnel in demining and peace keeping
operations by the Indian Army, exchange of visits of defence officials, goodwill visits by Indian
naval ships, gifts of medical equipment and other stores. The Cambodian Navy participated in the
multilateral exercise Milan in 2014 and, in June 2015, two Indian naval ships visited the port of
Sihanoukville, Cambodia, whilst on a long deployment to Southeast Asia.238
Australia
Over the last decade, Australia has pursued its strategic relations with India as a matter of national
priority. This led to several visits by Australian prime ministers to India and high-level dialogues
which culminated in a series of bilateral agreements for cooperation in defence and security
matters. India too, under the Modi government, has reciprocated enthusiastically and the first state
visit hosted by the new government was that of the prime minister of Australia in September 2014.
Later in November 2014, Prime Minister Modi paid a return visit to Australia, the first prime
minister to visit Australia for 28 years. The highlight of the visit was a landmark agreement for
civil nuclear energy cooperation, underscoring Australia’s support for strengthening India’s
energy security by supplying uranium for India’s safeguarded nuclear reactors, and the signing of
a joint declaration on security cooperation to establish a framework for further cooperation in
security issues. The latest security declaration expands on the earlier joint declaration on security
cooperation with Australia signed in 2009, and provides an action plan for an annual meeting by
the two prime ministers and regular interactions between foreign ministers and between defence
ministers. It also includes, inter alia, a broad agenda for cooperation in the fields of defence and
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maritime security, including information sharing, civil nuclear cooperation, and cooperation in
regional and multilateral fora.239
Australia is only the third country after the United States and Japan with whom India has signed a
similar framework agreement. India-Australia defence cooperation currently includes a wide range
of activities such as an annual defence policy talks between the two defence ministers, an annual
Track 1.5 defence strategic dialogue, service-to-service engagements involving regular high-level
visits, annual staff talks, combined training, and an annual bilateral naval exercise, Ausindex.
Additionally, both sides have also agreed to explore defence research and development
cooperation and promote joint industry links.240 For the first time, the Indian and Australian navies
participated in exclusive bilateral exercise Ausindex, conducted in the Bay of Bengal in September
2015. Australian naval assets for the exercise included a AP-3C Orion (anti-submarine
reconnaissance aircraft), a Collins-class submarine, a tanker and frigates. The Indian Navy
deployed its latest Boeing P-8 long-range anti-submarine aircraft and an indigenously
manufactured corvette. The exercise had both sea and shore phases and included table-top
exercises, scenario planning, and at sea, surface and anti-submarine warfare elements.241
Timor Leste
India’s relations with Timor Leste are relatively fledgling and limited to capacity building through
various Indian aid programmes. There has been no defence engagement to date and evidently
Timor Leste receives most of its military aid from Australia.
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Table 5.4: Levels of Maritime Cooperation Between India and Southeast Asian States and Australia 242
Country

Level 1

Level 2

Level 3

Indonesia

• Ship visits.
• Staff talks.
• Reciprocal visits by
senior officials.
• Defence cooperation
agreement.
• Ships visits.
• Staff talks.
• Reciprocal visits by
senior officials.
• Defence cooperation
agreement.
• Ships visits.
• Staff talks.
• Reciprocal visits by
senior officials.
• Defence cooperation
agreement.
• Ships visits.
• Staff talks.
• Reciprocal visits by
senior officials.
• Defence cooperation
agreement.
• Ships visits.
• Reciprocal visits by
senior officials.
• Defence cooperation
agreement.
• Exchanges of visits by
senior officials.
• Ships visits.
• Staff talks.
• Exchanges of visits by
senior officials.
• Framework for defence
cooperation.
• Multilateral joint
exercise: Milan.
• Foreign aid.

• Training.
• Defence exports.
• Coordinated patrols.

• Defence industrial
technology transfers.

• Training.
• Defence exports.
• Coordinated patrols.

• Technical support.

• Defence exports.
• Training.
• Coordinated patrols.

• Nil.

• Training.
• Bilateral exercise
Simbex.

• Joint defence R&D.

• Defence exports.
• Training.
• Coordinated patrols.

• Nil

• Gifting of military
hardware.
• Cross border military
operations.
• Technical support.
• Nil.

• Training.

• Nil.

• Nil.

• Nil.

Malaysia

Thailand

Singapore

Myanmar

Cambodia
Australia

Timor Leste
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India’s Geographical Link with Southeast Asia: Significance of the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands
Geographically, India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands are co-located with the Southeast Asian
littoral states, astride the western entrance to the Strait of Malacca. These islands provide India
with immense strategic advantage in the Indo-Pacific region and have been regarded as India’s
potential “springboard” into the Pacific or the reason for China’s so-called “Malacca dilemma.”
The Andaman and Nicobar group, comprising over 556 islands extending between Myanmar to
Indonesia are situated 1,200 km from the Indian mainland, lying just 160 km from Indonesia to
the south and only 45 km from Myanmar’s Coco Islands to the north.
In the late 1980s and 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the announcement of India’s
Look East policy, Indian military presence on the islands was expanded beyond the existing
rudimentary presence. As noted earlier in Chapters 2 and 4, during this period the Indian Navy, in
line with the Look East policy, focused on engagements with Southeast Asia and 1995 hosted the
first multinational naval exercise Milan at Port Blair.243 In 2001, India created its ﬁrst joint
operational theatre command, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), in Port Blair, with
bare minimum assets pooled from the three services. This can be viewed as an experiment in
“jointness” for the Indian military. This development also appears to have been spurred by
concerns of Chinese dual-use maritime infrastructure projects in Sittwe, Myanmar and a potential
Kra Isthmus canal in Thailand.244 However, the scale of military assets based at Port Blair
continues to remain fairly modest, limited to one army infantry brigade, a few air force transport
aircraft, some coast guard patrol boats and minor naval vessels, including patrol boats and
amphibious vessels. A new naval air station was commissioned in 2012 at Campbell Bay near the
southern tip of the islands.245 The base was originally built with a 3,500 feet long runway but
reportedly this was extended to 6,000 feet in 2016 to support Boeing P8I operations.246 There are
plans to further extend the runway to 10,000 feet.247
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Overall Assessment of India’s Relations with Southeast Asia and Australia
India’s relations with all Southeast Asian states have expanded significantly since the 1980s.
Although India’s ties with Southeast Asian states are largely dominated by trade and commerce,
maritime security cooperation is also on an upward trajectory. China’s growing assertiveness in
the South China Sea over territorial disputes with several Southeast Asian states, seems to have
pushed regional states closer to India, even as China is seeking to leverage economic ties with
them also.248 This is evidenced from the deepening of India-ASEAN relations that now includes
membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus
(ADMM +), and the fact that Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and Laos have
entered bilateral defence cooperation agreements with India.
India’s Act East policy has also received support from the United States as it complements their
strategic “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region, as highlighted in the U.S. Asia Pacific Maritime
Security Strategy of August 2015:
In South Asia, the Department sees a strategic convergence between India’s “Act East” policy and the
U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, and we are seeking to reinforce India’s maritime capabilities
as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean region and beyond. 249

Support from the United States has also been a major factor in improving relations with Australia,
another key stakeholder in Southeast Asia. Thus, India’s relations with the regional states, as well
as other U.S. allies in Asia-Pacific region such as Japan and South Korea, appears to be shaping
up in conformity with the overall strategic interests of the United States in the Asia-Pacific.
Evidently, Beijing is uncomfortable with India’s growing engagement with the region which it
views as its own maritime sphere of influence.250 The Indian Navy’s deployments into China’s
“maritime sphere” during routine ship visits to the region or naval exercises with the Southeast
Asian states have thus become a source of Chinese concern that the Americans are propping up
India as a counterweight to China.251
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Connecting the Dots in India’s Maritime Strategy: A Coherent Strategy
An analysis of India’s bilateral naval engagements with Indian Ocean states based on a qualitative
assessment and the empirical evidence as per the framework discussed in Chapter 4 to determine
the extent of maritime security cooperation, clearly reveals a coherent national strategy at work.
Firstly, three distinct levels of priority accorded to regional states can be identified as follows:
Tier 1 States: Australia, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritius, Maldives, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand and UAE.
Tier 2 States: Bangladesh, Bahrain, Cambodia, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Madagascar, Saudi
Arabia and Tanzania.
Tier 3 States: Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia, Timor Leste and Yemen.
The above categorisation is based on relative importance or priorities accorded by the Indian
government particularly the ministries of defence and external affairs and do not reflect qualitative
similarity. For instance, India’s relations with Australia, Iran, Mauritius and Mozambique,
although ranked as top priority differ significantly in scope and “texture.” Thus, while India’s
relations with Iran are based on historic and cultural ties, its relations with Australia are very recent,
but both are accorded high levels of importance; Iran, due to its strategic location in the Persian
Gulf region and other factors such as oil and Australia due to its potential role in an emerging
“quadrilateral” with India, United States and Japan.
Secondly, a clear pattern of naval cooperation aimed at capacity building, centred on supply of
military hardware, hydrographic assistance and naval training is evident. The Indian Navy
provides high quality training in several areas at various levels for officers and ratings. The
medium of instruction is English, an area in which the Chinese could never hope to compete.
Third, it is clear that India has sought to maintain the highest level of cooperation with its South
Asian neighbours (except Pakistan), particularly with Sri Lanka and the Maldives, with
considerable success. While China has sought to make inroads in the region, other than with
Pakistan, with whom China has a de facto alliance, it has met with limited success and its influence
is considerably limited. India’s defence relations with Bangladesh, however, are yet to mature.
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Fourth, even though China has much closer economic integration and political influence in
Southeast Asia relative to India, its muscular approach in the South China Sea seems to have
pushed some states closer to India. This is evidenced from the fact that India’s is now closely
integrated with all regional institutions under the ASEAN framework, and the Indian Navy has
participated in several combined naval exercises under the aegis of the ADMM+ forum.
Furthermore, the Indian Navy conducts regular coordinated patrols with key ASEAN states:
Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar and Thailand. Also, India’s Act East policy appears to strengthen
India’s position in the region.
Fifth, it is evident that India is seeking to enhance its relations with West Asian navies. However,
the presence of the U.S. Navy and Pakistani influence in the Arab states has precluded close
defence ties with the region. It also appears that India has preferred to cultivate close ties with Iran
even though this is viewed suspiciously in the Arab states. Evidently, this seems to be driven by
India’s strategic interest in the port of Chahbahar which could potentially allow India to counter a
Chinse presence at Gwadar. Further, India’s limited maritime engagements in West Asia indicate
a strategy for depending upon the United States for its influence in West Asia while prioritising its
relations with South and Southeast Asian states.
Finally, India’s ties with the East African states have been relatively curtailed, ostensibly by
budgetary limitations, except in the cases of Manutius, the Seychelles and South Africa. The lower
of levels of maritime engagement with East African states could also be attributed to a lack of
regional naval capacity, which may demand greater contributions by India. Overall, it is
appreciated that China has greater influence over the African states relative to India.
Risks and Uncertainties in India’s Maritime Strategy
From the above it is clear that the Indian maritime strategy for the Indian Ocean region to be the
region’s “net security provider” is centred around building a network of bilateral security relations
with the various littoral states to create a favourable environment that could counter growing
Chinese economic influence, coupled with a tacit security partnership with the United States, as a
hedging strategy. However, such a strategy has inherent risks.
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Firstly, an attempt to establish a network of exclusive security relations with all the littoral states
could be expensive and difficult to sustain in the long term. A long-term strategic engagement with
the region would entail involvement in various complicated sub-regional security dynamics, going
far beyond the routine ship deployments and training assistance programmes. The long-term trends
in maritime security in the Indian Ocean region, as discussed in Chapter 2, are clearly worrisome
and a sensitive issue with most littoral states, which are increasingly finding themselves vulnerable
to various forms of threats, such as climate change, transnational crimes, illegal fishing and the
spread of radical Islamic terrorism. As a net security provider for the region, those states would
expect India to increasingly meet their maritime security requirements, including surveillance,
hydrographic assistance, counterterrorism and supply of defence hardware. A similar strategy
followed by Australia with respect to the Pacific island countries (PICs) involving supply of the
Pacific Patrol Boats and regular maritime surveillance missions has proven expensive and difficult
to sustain. Evidently, over time, Australian Defence Force commitments in the Middle East and
other areas around Australia led to a decline in the reliability of Australia’s contribution to the
Pacific island states’ maritime security requirements.252 Australia’s operational limitations were
viewed as indifference on their part to augmenting regional maritime security. 253 Thus the Indian
strategy to be the net security provider could face similar challenges in the future and possibly
backfire on India in the long term. This could even provide China a chance to step in as a more
dependable security partner.
Secondly, implicit to the above point is that the term “net security provider” raises concerns about
security from whom, and what? Clearly, the more India gets involved in security issues pertaining
to a particular country, the more likely it is antagonise its neighbours or other stakeholders. As
Anit Mukherjee warns:
If security denotes security of the global commons against environmental threats or security
operations against terrorists or pirates then India, like other countries which have the capacity to,
will willingly join in ... However, if security is perceived as protecting the interests of one country
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in a bilateral dispute with another then the Indian response would be more nuanced and context
dependent.254

Thirdly, the success of the current strategy is largely dependent upon intangible or notional support
from regional states, with unforeseeable implications, rather than something more substantial and
enduring. After all, any national strategy is about leveraging a nation’s own resources and inherent
strengths to meet national objectives rather than relying on support from others. The Australian
experience of providing similar support in the South Pacific does not seem to have earned them
unconditional support or goodwill, with some recipient states critical of their commitment and
suspicious of their intent.255 Thus, there is no guarantee that strong security ties would ensure
continued political support in the long term, even with the closest of partners. Furthermore, with
regard to the role of island states in the Indian Ocean, as Raja Mohan cautions:
Not only is the security dilemma real and rooted in the rivalry between New Delhi and Beijing, but
it also opens up opportunities for small nations to gain by playing one against the other in the
economic realm. 256

The involvement of the Sri Lankan government in hosting a Chinese submarine visit to
Hambantota proves this point, notwithstanding the subsequent actions of the new government to
reassure India by curtailing naval engagement with China. The subsequent volte-face by the
Sirisena government to turn back to Chinese funding for infrastructure projects is indicative of the
strength of China’s financial clout exercised over smaller nations. With regard to Sino-Sri Lankan
relations, Shivshankar Menon, former Indian foreign secretary, noted:
For Sri Lanka, as for India’s other smaller neighbours, using China to get India to pay attention and
invest in the relationship and using India to get Chinses investment and support is a productive
strategy, empirically proven in the past. For India not to recognize and deal with fact of international
life would be foolish.257
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Fourthly, a withdrawal of the United States from the Indian Ocean, already being advocated by
certain leading American thinkers as an “offshore balancing” strategy,258 hastened by a declining
defence budget or changing political priorities, could result in fresh alignments between the littoral
states and China. Finally, a future Sino-U.S. rapprochement,259 however remote it may appear at
the moment, could be potentially dangerous for India.

Expansion of Chinese Maritime Power in the Indian Ocean Region
In comparison to India, China presently has limited defence and security engagements with the
Indian Ocean states. However, as analysed in Chapter 2, it is expected that in the coming years,
China will find itself increasingly involved in the region’s security affairs, and thus establish
exclusive security relationships with certain states. Furthermore, as notedearlier, Djibouti has
already emerged as a base for the PLA Navy while Gwadar, Pakistan, Bagamayo, Tanzania and
Eritrea are prospective Chinese bases. Clearly, these naval facilities or bases could enable China
to play an even larger role in the Indian Ocean region and facilitate a long-term naval presence.
For instance, basing of just a few of the over 60 PLA Navy amphibious ships, including many
Landing Platform Docks (LPDs), at Djibouti or its Type 920 Anwei-class hospital ship,
Daishandao, also known as the Peace Ark, could help China to provide assistance to regional states
in the form of HADR operations, prevention of illegal fishing or stepping up anti-piracy patrols.
Pertinently, China is one of the few countries in the world with the ability to provide advanced
medical care and emergency rescue capabilities on the high seas, a capability conspicuously
lacking with the Indian Navy.
All these developments point to an inevitable expansion of Chinese maritime power in the Indian
Ocean, with a resultant impact on India’s ambitions to be the primary net security provider in the
Indian Ocean region. What then are the options for India? This is discussed in the following
section.
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Alternate Strategic Option for India; Strengthening the Andamans
It is clear that a Chinese naval base or logistics facility in the Indian Ocean could facilitate a larger
role for China and significantly diminish India’s geostrategic advantages. Thus, considering the
strategic risks and uncertainties in India’s maritime strategy, highlighted above, an alternative
approach for India could be to focus on strengthening the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India’s
geographical trump card. Upgrading the Andaman and Nicobar Command, which has so far
remained the “weak link” in India’s maritime strategy, is perhaps the only viable strategic solution
for India to counter growing Chinese maritime power in the Indian Ocean. A review of the extant
status of the Andaman and Nicobar group of islands and a rapid build-up of strategic military
infrastructure should therefore be accorded greater priority over the extant strategy of forging
security relations with the entire Indian Ocean region.
The Andaman and Nicobar group of islands have largely remained neglected by New Delhi and
their long-term strategic utility has been the subject of debate in the strategic community. In the
past, the prevailing view was that the islands could be regarded as India’s security perimeter or an
“outpost” providing defence-in-depth that could potentially “serve to forewarn and even ward off
a possible extra-regional intervention in the East.”260 It was also argued that stationing assets in the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands on a permanent basis could be unnecessary and expensive as they
could be deployed from the mainland whenever required, using the islands as a “springboard” to
stage through various operations. In this context, in 2005, Subramanyam, a prominent security
analyst is known to have stated "Nobody will place their strategic assets in a remote place like the
Andamans as they would become an easy target."261 Consequently, years later, even after the
islands were upgraded to a joint operational theatre command in 2001, in the absence of strategic
platforms and permanent assets, the Andaman and Nicobar Command is viewed as a vulnerable
far flung naval outpost rather than a modern operational theatre command. Consequently, years
later, even after the islands were upgraded to a joint operational theatre command in 2001, in the
absence of strategic platforms and permanent assets, the Andaman and Nicobar Command is
viewed as a vulnerable far flung naval outpost rather than a modern operational theatre command.
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It is opined that even considering the islands as a “security perimeter” is grossly under estimating
their strategic importance; further, it is clear that it makes better sense tactically, to limit staging
through operations to sudden exigencies rather than routine operations. The location of the islands
at a distance of over 700 nautical miles from the mainland poses several challenges, particularly
with regard to regular routine surveillance tasks. For instance, the Andaman and Nicobar
Command (ANC) reported an alarming rise in the number of PLA ships and submarines operating
close to Indian territorial waters.262 Evidently, the PLA units managed to sneak into the region
repeatedly, avoiding early detection. Clearly such transgressions can only be countered by a high
level of sustained patrolling which are difficult to coordinate from the mainland. Foreign naval
officers visiting the Andaman and Nicobar Command are taken aback by the rudimentary military
infrastructure in place.263 One may speculate that the extant condition of the command could be
attributed to the inter-service rivalry that has hampered India’s higher defence organisation,264 as
once remarked by Admiral Arun Prakash:
…the navy was on the verge of receiving approval for a “Far Eastern Naval Command” (FENC) in
Port Blair when the 2000 Group of Ministers was convened. In a rare gesture of magnanimity, the
navy offered FENC as proving ground for India’s first Joint formation. In the bargain, the navy also
handed over all assets (land, buildings, transport, airfield) to ANC. The other two services REFUSED
to hand over any assets, and dragged their heels over most issues relating to reinforcing/consolidating
the fledgling ANC.265

The other reason, going beyond the inter-service turf battles, could perhaps also be the fact that
the Indian political leadership, long accused of a continentalist mindset, have only recently turned
their gaze to the maritime sphere, but not for long enough to view the distant Andamans in the
same form as mainland India. This strategic short-sightedness is evident in the recent setting up of
the largest Indian naval base east of Suez, for basing the Western Fleet, at Karwar. As noted earlier
in Chapter 3, this decision to relocate the Western Fleet from Mumbai to Karwar seems to have
been premised on tactical or operational considerations of the time, based on the range of
Pakistan’s F-16 fighters, rather than long-term strategic imperatives. Perhaps, India’s geostrategic

Abhijit Singh, “Strategic Power-Play in the Indian Ocean,” 28 October 2015 available at
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/strategic-power-play-indian-ocean-abhijit-singh/.html.
263 Based on the author’s own experience of having served in the Andaman and Nicobar islands.
264 Bratton, “The Creation of India Integrated Commands,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 36, Issue. 3, May 2012, pp. 441-448.
265 Anit Mukherjee, “The Andaman and Nicobar Command,” in Anit Mukherjee and Raja Mohan (eds.), India’s Naval Strategy
and Asian Security, Routledge, London and New York, 2016, p. 97.
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location in the Indian Ocean overlooking the shipping lanes was regarded as adequate strategic
advantage over China by Indian planners. However, as argued in this thesis the situation is about
to change, with the expansion of China’s maritime power potentially seriously challenging or even
neutralising India’s geographic advantage.
Another key factor that seems to have influenced Indian strategic thinking are misplaced concerns
that building up a more robust presence in the Southeast Asian region could create an unfavourable
environment for India. However, as discussed earlier in the thesis, the rapid growth in relations
between India and the ASEAN states since the early 1990s suggests that such concerns have been
greatly unfounded. Furthermore, as examined earlier in the chapter, the extent and scope of India’s
maritime security cooperation with most Southeast Asian states, is a clear indication that any
concerns regarding India’s aspirations for maritime power amongst ASEAN states have been
misplaced.
The timing thus appears to be ripe for India to upgrade the Andaman and Nicobar Command from
a naval outpost to the level of other naval commands in terms of support facilities and other related
infrastructure to allow for basing of submarines, major naval combatants, including aircraft
carriers and amphibious ships, air force fighters and even ballistic missile defences. Perhaps the
functions of an Indian naval outpost could someday be shifted to the Seychelles or Mauritius.
Strengthening of the military infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar islands could forever alter
the nature of China’s “Malacca dilemma” from being a notional threat to a real one in the Chinese
calculus, something that India’s approach of “fabricating” defence and security ties alone may not
achieve. Moreover, a large naval presence at the eastern entrance to the Indian Ocean would not
only add more force to India’s diplomatic efforts in the region and enhance India’s status as the
net provider of security but also provide India a crucial strategic lever for dealing with China,
particularly in times of incursions across the Himalayan border in northeast India. Considering that
it took over 35 years to complete India’s newest and largest naval base at Karwar, south of
Mumbai, it is already rather late to develop the Andaman and Nicobar Command, and therefore
there is clearly a need to start work as soon as possible.
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Conclusion
It is clear that India, as the largest resident maritime power in the Indian Ocean, has made rapid
progress in establishing its position to be the net security provider in the region. India’s maritime
strategy seeks to build regional maritime capacity and provide security assistance to littoral states
as and when required. In return, India expects regional states to refrain from supporting Chinese
efforts to establish a military presence in the region. The fall of the Rajapaskshe government in Sri
Lanka, responsible for allowing access to Chinese submarines, with likely tacit support to the
opposition party by India and the United States, seems to serve as a quiet warning for potential
“rogue” behaviour. Manifestly, such a strategy requires constant investment and commitment and
could prove to be unsustainable in the long term. Therefore, strengthening of the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands could be a viable long term strategy that needs to be accorded priority over
building security relations with various Indian Ocean states.

195

Chapter 6
India’s Bilateral Maritime Security Cooperation with Extra-Regional Powers

Introduction
The importance of the Indian Ocean is evident from the fact that several extra-regional powers
have crucial strategic interests in the region and consequently many foreign navies are present in
the Indian Ocean. India, being the largest regional maritime power, is viewed as a key partner for
extra-regional powers such as the United States, Japan, Britain and France; a fact acknowledged
by Prime Minister Modi in his five-point policy framework of March 2015:
India recognises that while the Indian Ocean littorals have the primary responsibility for peace,
stability and prosperity in the Indian Ocean, it also acknowledges that extra- regional powers too
have interests in the region. India will seek to engage with them through the mechanism of dialogue,
visits, exercises, capacity building and economic partnership. 1

While India’s core interests lie in the Indian Ocean, as clearly defined in its maritime strategy, in
what appears to be an act of “strategic balancing” as a result of the recent expansion of Chinese
maritime power, India is also seen as taking keen interest in engaging with those extra-regional
powers that have a stake in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, as described by Mohan Malik, “the IndoPacific expanse has acquired a strategic connotation and is seen as the region of the new Great
Game with great power rivalry among the United States, China, Japan and India in the cards.”2
This chapter provides a detailed examination of India’s bilateral maritime engagements with key
extra-regional states.

Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Prime Minister's Remarks at the Commissioning of Offshore Patrol Vessel
(OPV)
Barracuda
in
Mauritius,”
March
2015,
available
at
http://mea.gov.in/outoging-visitdetail.htm?24912/Prime+Ministers+Remarks+at+the+Commissioning+of+Offshore+Patrol+Vessel+OPV+Barracuda+in+Mauriti
us+March+12+2015.html.
2 Mohan Malik, ”The Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain,” in Mohan Malik, ed., Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives
from China, Indian, United States, Rowman and Littlefield, New York, 2014, p. 5.
1

196

The United States
Regional Strategic Interests and Presence
Ensuring free flow of commerce has always been at the core of the U.S. maritime strategy,
underscored in the United States Quadrennial Defence Review of 2014:
Our economic strength is closely tied to a stable international order, underwritten by the U.S. military’s
role and that of our allies and partners in ensuring freedom of access and the free flow of commerce
globally.3

The Indian Ocean, which has replaced the North Atlantic as the “central artery” of global
commerce, thus figures prominently in the U.S. strategic calculus.4 As the global superpower, the
United States continues to remain the underwriter of security in the region, particularly since the
events of 9/11 and the start of the U.S.-led global war on terror.
U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean include the Fifth Fleet based at Manama, Bahrain, under
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and a naval base at Diego Garcia. Additionally, ships from
the U.S. Seventh Fleet at Yokosuka, Japan, under U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), are regularly
moved on cross ocean deployments to the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca.5 Currently
U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean include three task forces including the U.S.-led Combined
Maritime Force (CMF) of 30 member nations, engaged in anti-piracy patrols in the north Arabian
Sea. Other combined task forces (CTFs) comprise CTF 150 on a maritime security and counterterrorism mission, CTF 151 on a counter piracy mission under the CMF, and CTF 152 for Arabian
Gulf security and cooperation.
The U.S. Navy has maintained at least one, and sometimes two, aircraft carriers on station in the
Arabian Sea almost throughout the preceding decade. In addition to naval forces, U.S. land forces
are currently engaged actively in Afghanistan, albeit in the process of withdrawal. However, a

3

The United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, Washington D.C., 2014, p. 9.
“Introduction-American Strategy in the Indian Ocean, ”Andrew C. Winner and Peter Dombrowski, in Andrew C. Winner and
Peter Dombrowski, eds., The Indian Ocean and U.S. Grand Strategy, Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C., 2014, p. 1.
5 Mohan Malik,”The Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain,” in Mohan Malik, ed., Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives
from China, Indian, United States, Rowman and Littlefield, New York, 2014, p. 7.
4

197

return of U.S. troops to Iraq or a deployment in Syria to fight the Islamic State terrorists, could be
a possibility.6
In 2012, recognising the strategic linkages between the Indian Ocean region and the western
Pacific and East Asia regions, and the rise of China as a regional power, the U.S. government
issued fresh directives in a January 2012 defence strategic guidance document, Sustaining US
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, for a strategic rebalance – popularly
known as the pivot strategy – toward the Asia-Pacific region.7 This was further stated in the 2014
QDR as follows:
Supporting the broader U.S. rebalance to the region, the United States will maintain a robust
footprint in Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Oceania, Southeast Asia, and the Indian
Ocean.

The 2014 QDR indicated that by 2020 the United States would station 60 per cent of its naval
assets in the Pacific, including an enhanced presence at Japan. The assets include up to four Littoral
Combat Ships (LCS) stationed at Singapore in addition to basing several more destroyers,
amphibious ships and the latest Joint High Speed Ships with Pacific Command. Additional naval
and air forces, and Marines are also being stationed at Guam and a 2,500 strong Marine force will
annually rotate through Darwin, Australia.8 Further, in addition to positioning of extra forces, the
United States will increase routine and persistent rotational presence in Southeast Asia for training
with regional partners through the bilateral Force Posture Agreement (FPA) with Australia and the
Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines.9
If the “pivot” to the Asia Pacific strategy announced in 2012 by the U.S. government raised
questions about their commitments to the Indian Ocean region, they were put to rest by the March
2015 document, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which indicated that the U.S.
Navy would concurrently focus on Africa and also increase the number of ships postured in the
Middle East from 30 to about 40 by 2020.10 The Cooperative Strategy also seeks to cultivate U.S.

“Ashton Carter: U.S. to Begin 'Direct Action on the Ground' in Iraq, Syria,” NBC News, 27 October 2015.
U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, Washington
D.C., p. 2.
8 Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, p. 34.
9 U.S. Department of Defense, The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, Washington D.C., 2015, p. 23.
10 U.S. Department of Defense, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Washington D.C., March 2015, p. 7.
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partnerships with states such as Bangladesh, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Micronesia,
Pakistan, Singapore, and Vietnam.11
In recent years, faced with defence budget sequestrations, in what is described as the new “age of
austerity,”12 American foreign policy thinkers have advocated that the United States adopt
alternative strategic options with respect to the Indian Ocean region. One option, labelled an
“offshore strategy,” calls for the United States to adopt a “hands off” strategy by cultivating a
network of alliances and partnerships with major Indian Ocean littoral states, including Australia,
Indonesia, India and South Africa, as regional strategic partners which are capable of ensuring
regional stability and security, without direct U.S. participation.13 The proposed strategy also calls
for maintaining a reduced presence at existing bases in the region, so as to ensure continued access
for U.S. forces in times of crisis. While the long-term impact of a declining U.S. defence budget,
and Washington’s reducing dependence on oil imports from the Persian Gulf,14 upon their Indian
Ocean strategy is difficult to forecast, it would be fair to assume a continued involvement by the
United States, even if reduced, in the Indian Ocean region in the future. In any case, the geopolitical
realties point to continued U.S. engagement with India.
Bilateral Relations with India
As the world’s oldest and largest democracies, India and the United States share several democratic
values and have a broad convergence of global strategic interests. The framework agreement for
India-U.S. defence relationship of June 2005 and the bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement
of October 2008 were major landmark events in the bilateral relationship. The agreement for full
civilian nuclear energy cooperation was widely regarded as representing the most direct
recognition to date, of India’s status as a nuclear weapons state, and thus a reversal of more than
three decades of U.S. non-proliferation policy. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh attributed the re-
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13 Ibid.
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energising of U.S.-India ties to three factors: the end of the Cold War, the accelerating pace of
globalisation, and the increasing influence of nearly two million Indian-Americans.15
The visit of the Dr. Singh to Washington in 2009 and President Obama’s visit to India the following
year, imparted further momentum to bilateral cooperation and helped establish a long-term
framework for an India-U.S. global strategic partnership.16 President Obama characterised the
India-U.S. relationship as one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century,17 and stated: “India
and the United States are not just natural partners … America can be India’s best partner.”18 Since
2014, under the Modi government, the pace of India-U.S. cooperation has clearly gathered speed,
evidenced from the spate of high-level political exchanges, counting three meetings between Prime
Minister Modi and President Obama within a span of six months, including the first ever visit by
a U.S. president to India’s Republic Day parade. Bilateral trade between India and the United
States has quintupled in the last fifteen years to $100 billion and India’s U.S. investments have
grown to $11 billion, while American companies have invested $24 billion in India.19 These
developments indicate a major shift in India’s perception of the United States, for long viewed
through the prism of the Cold War and its relations with Pakistan.
In line with the strategic pronouncements made from Washington D.C., India’s relations with the
United States have blossomed into a “global strategic partnership” with nearly 40 bilateral dialogue
mechanisms between the two governments.20 The broad architecture of dialogue is built around
five pillars of mutual interest, notably: strategic cooperation, energy and climate change, education
and development, economy, trade and agriculture, science and technology, and health and
innovation.21 These areas of interest are addressed at ministerial-level by bilateral dialogues such
as: home (Homeland Security Dialogue), finance (Financial and Economic Partnership),
commerce (Trade Policy Forum), HRD (Higher Education Dialogue), science and technology
(Joint Commission Meeting on S&T) and energy (Energy Dialogue).22

Cited in K. Alan Kronstadt, “U.S.-India Bilateral Agreements in 2005,” CRS Report for Congress, 8 September 2005, p. 3.
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17 Ibid.
18 “More than just an idea,” The Hindu, 25 February 2015.
19 “China and Indo-U.S. Relations: An Emerging Triangle?” NBR Commentary, 26 June 2015.
20 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “India – U.S. Relations,” Media Brief, September 2013.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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Maritime Security Cooperation
The framework for Indo-U.S. military-to-military ties was originally laid down in the 1991
Kicklighter Proposals, named after Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command Admiral Claude
Kicklighter.23 This led to the initiation of a series of small-scale combined exercises between 1992
and 1996. In 1992, the two navies held the first combined exercise Malabar, while U.S. marines
participated in a short training course at the Indian Paratrooper Training School (PTS) in Agra. In
1995, the two countries established a Defence Policy Group (DPG) to oversee future military-tomilitary activities. Exercise Malabar II was held in 1995 and in 1996 Malabar III was the last
Indo-US military exercise before military ties were suspended following India's nuclear tests in
1998. Following the events of 9/11, there was a flurry of high-level political and military
exchanges, leading to the reactivation of the DPG and an expansion in the scope and number of
combined exercises,24 eventually leading to the signing of the framework agreement for the IndiaU.S. defence relationship in June 2005, which paved the way for deeper Indo-U.S. defence
cooperation.
The January 2012 defence strategic guidance document Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defence, highlighted that the United States would be investing in a longterm strategic partnership with India “to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor
and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.”25 This was further emphasised in the
2014 QDR:
The United States supports India’s rise as an increasingly capable actor in the region, and we are
deepening our strategic partnership, including through the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative. 26

The Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) – also known as the “Carter Initiative” –
was created in 2012, primarily to strengthen defence cooperation between India and the United
States by elevating defence cooperation to the most senior levels of government. The aims of the
DTTI are as follows:

“Indo-U.S. Strategic Ties on the Upswing,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 10 January 2003.
Ibid.
25 U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington D.C., January
2012, p. 2.
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•

Transform the bilateral defence relationship into one that is limited only by
independent strategic decisions, rather than bureaucratic obstacles or inefficient
procedures.

•

Strengthen India’s defense industrial base by moving away from the traditional “buyerseller” dynamic toward a more collaborative approach.

•

Explore new areas of technological collaboration from science and technology
cooperation through co-development and co-production.

•

Expand U.S.-Indian business ties.27

The DTTI currently includes four pathfinder projects and two working groups on aircraft carrier
cooperation and jet engine technology.28 Other specialist working groups established to progress
India-U.S. cooperation include: Defence Policy Group (DPG), Defence Joint Working Group
(DJWG), Defence Procurement and Production Group (DPPG), Senior Technology Security
Group (STSG), Joint Technical Group (JTG), Military Cooperation Group (MCG), and Serviceto-Service Executive Steering Groups (ESGs). It is also reported that the United States has
identified 17 defence technologies that it aims to co-develop and co-produce with India under the
DTTI to boost its military-industrial base and augment its military capacity in the region. Further
it is believed that the U.S. government has established a six-man India Rapid Reaction Cell
(IRCC), headed by a senior Pentagon official, only to monitor all defence-related issues with
Delhi.29
In 2015, the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy issued by the U.S. government identified a
strategic convergence between India’s Act East policy and the U.S. rebalance and sought to
“reinforce India’s maritime capabilities as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean region
and beyond.”30 The document lays down a three-pronged approach to maritime security
cooperation with India, as follows:

“U.S.-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI),” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ic/DTTI.html.
28 “More than Just an Idea,” The Hindu, 25 February 2015.
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30 U.S. Department of Defence, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, p. 28.
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… maintaining a shared vision on maritime security issues; upgrading the bilateral maritime security
partnership; and collaborating to both build regional partner capacity and improve regional maritime
domain awareness.31

The shared vision for maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region was also reflected in the U.S.India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions signed in January
2015.32 Under the agreement, both sides agreed as follows:
Regional prosperity depends on security. We affirm the importance of safeguarding maritime
security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the
South China Sea. We call on all parties to avoid the threat or use of force and pursue resolution of
territorial and maritime disputes through all peaceful means, in accordance with universally
recognized principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea. 33

Notwithstanding the mention of the South China Sea in the above statement, India is yet to
demonstrate active participation in the region, perhaps indicative of the limits of Indo-U.S. shared
interests or India’s core interest in the Indian Ocean region.34
A recent development under the joint strategic vision was the conduct of the first maritime security
dialogue in May 2016, involving officials from both defence and external affairs ministries.35
Reportedly the issues discussed included Asia-Pacific maritime challenges, naval cooperation, and
multilateral engagement. It is expected that the maritime dialogue will provide the framework to
decide the scope of future maritime security cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral level.36
India and the United States are in the process of enhancing their bilateral exchanges through
participations in combined exercises such as the U.S.-hosted Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)
exercise and the flagship naval exercise hosted by the Indian Navy, Malabar. Hosted since 1971,
RIMPAC is the largest international military exercise in the world, symbolic of the U.S. Navy as
the most powerful navy in the world. The 2014 edition of RIMPAC was the largest ever on record
31
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with participation from 22 nations (including China), involving 49 surface ships, six submarines,
more than 200 aircraft, and 25,000 personnel in and around the Hawaiian Islands and southern
California.37
The nineteenth iteration of the Malabar annual combined naval exercise was held in October 2015
and included participation by Japan, for the second time since 2007. The Malabar exercise held in
2007 included participation by

Singapore,

Japan and Australia along with the U.S. and India, and

featured a total of three aircraft carriers, 28 surface vessels, 150 aircraft and over 20,000 personnel,
making it one of the largest multilateral naval exercises ever held in the Bay of Bengal. This led
to protests by China, prompting Beijing to issue démarches to all five participating countries.38
While India justified the participation of other states as measures to save costs and economise
efforts (as India was already conducting bilateral exercises with Singapore), it subsequently
discontinued participation by Japan, Singapore and Australia in the Malabar series. Presently,
India conducts separate bilateral exercises with Singapore (Slinex) and Australia (Ausindex). The
significance of Malabar 2015, involving India, the United States and Japan, has obviously not
been lost on the Chinese, and an article about the naval exercise in China Daily, a government
mouth-piece, stated:
The U.S. concept of Asia Pivot revolves around isolating China and creating a block of Regional
and Extra Regional second tier powers to strategically suffocate China in the 21st century. These
second tier powers include India, Australia and Japan.39

India has consistently maintained that its engagements with the United States are not aimed any
country nor a move towards alliance building. Therefore, in what appears to be an effort to placate
the Chinese, the Indian Army participated in a combined exercise, Hand-in-Hand 2015, with the
People’s Liberation Army in Kunming, China, a few days prior to the commencement of the
Malabar exercise.40
Malabar 2015 was regarded as an advanced combined exercise, involving a U.S. Navy aircraft
carrier and a nuclear submarine, and a Kilo-class submarine and a Boeing P-8I long-range maritime
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reconnaissance aircraft from the Indian Navy.41 However, as noted earlier in Chapter 4, Malabar
2017 which concluded in July 2017 went a step further with three carriers notably USS Nimitz,
INS Vikramaditya and JS Izumo, Japan’s helicopter carrier.42 Malabar 2017 qualifies as the most
advanced level combined naval exercise ever undertaken by the Indian Navy.
The Malabar series, unlike any other bilateral exercise held by the Indian Navy, includes use of
common tactical drills and procedures outlined in the NATO Multinational Tactical Publications
series (MTP) and a dedicated communication system Centrixs (Combined Enterprise Regional
Information Exchange System), a secure information and intelligence exchange communications
system specifically designed for use between the U.S. Navy and its coalition partners. The extant
level of naval engagement encompasses a wide range of naval operations, except combined
amphibious operations, which would generally fall under “offensive operations.” It is highly likely
that in the future, the U.S. Navy, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Indian Navy may
graduate to combined amphibious operations involving U.S. Marines, probably under the garb of
HADR exercises. This could be regarded as the strongest indication of intent to form an alliance,43
and serve as a tough strategic signal to China of a de facto military alliance between India and the
United States.
China has been closely following India’s naval engagement with the United States and a 2016
proposal by the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, inviting India, Japan and Australia to form
an informal strategic coalition for “joint” patrols in the Pacific region, was strongly criticised by
China.44 A leading Chinese analyst, Shen Dingli, commented that India would not join such a
network for fear of Chinese retaliation, stating:
China actually has many ways to hurt India … China could send an aircraft carrier to the Gwadar port in
Pakistan. China had turned down the Pakistan offer to have military stationed in the country. If India forces
China to do that, of course we can put a navy at your doorstep. 45
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Although, the Indian defence minister categorically rejected the idea of “joint” patrols with the
U.S. Navy,46 the above exchange of words conveys a sense of the direction of India’s strategic
engagement with the United States and future outcomes.
Sale of Military Hardware
The Indian armed forces are currently under a process of modernisation, with nearly $150-200
billion in acquisitions planned over the next 12 years.47 India is keen to diversify its arms supplies
away from Russia and also develop indigenous capabilities, thus the DTTI offered by the United
States fits in well with India’s plans. The growth in India-U.S. ties has been accompanied by an
increase in defence sales from America to India from 2005, with sales touching $9 billion by 2014,
and the United States, for the first time, surpassed Russia as India’s major arms supplier.48
A common grievance expressed by Indian defence experts about defence support from the United
States, was that the Americans, unlike the Russians, were unwilling to sell their latest and best
technologies to India. Over the years, India’s ties with Russia have evolved from a buyer-seller
relationship to a collaborative partnership, and the Indian government was keen to adopt a similar
model for defence cooperation with the United States. Apparently, the U.S. government appears
to have taken cognisance of Indian defence requirements, and has offered under the DTTI 17 stateof-the-art technologies to India for co-development and co-production. Of these, four “pathfinder”
technologies are presently under way in India, including one for hand-launched unmanned aerial
vehicles, another to develop protective clothing for soldiers, two for roll-on/roll-off intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance modules for the Indian Air Force.49 The most significant area of
technology transfer from the United States is the Electro Magnetic Aircraft Launch System
(EMALS), developed by General Atomics. This is currently being overseen by a joint working
group established under the DTTI. India is evaluating EMALS for its 65,000-tonne Indigenous
Aircraft Carrier-II (IAC-II) planned to be constructed at the Kochi Shipyard.50 Furthermore,
according to media reports, Lockheed Martin and Boeing have made proposals to the Indian
“Question of Joint Patrolling with the U.S. Does Not Arise, Need to Cut the Flab from the Military: Parrikar,” Indian Express, 5
March 2016.
47 “China’s Strength Draws U.S. and India Together,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 5 May 2015.
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government to build production facilities in India for manufacture of the F-16 Fighting Falcon and
the F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets.51 Reportedly, Lockheed Martin proposes to move its entire
F-16 assembly line from Texas to India, making India the sole producer of the single-engine
combat aircraft.
Recent defence sales from the United States to India include eight Boeing P-8I Neptune long-range
maritime surveillance aircraft, ten Boeing C-17 Globemaster III, 12 Lockheed Martin C-130J-30
Super Hercules military transport aircraft,52 and a U.S. amphibious ship, the USS Trenton,
marking the first sale to the navy under a “hot transfer” in 2007.53 The ship was re-commissioned
into the Indian Navy as INS Jalashwa in June 2007. Additional planned acquisitions from the
United States include four additional P-8Is, six C-17s, and supplementary C-130J-30s.54 Further
announcements indicate that the Indian government has cleared purchase of 15 Boeing CH47F Chinook heavy lift and 22 Boeing AH-64E Apache attack helicopters for the Indian Air Force,
valued at $2.5 billion.55
Challenges
While Indo-U.S. bilateral defence relations seem to have moved significantly in recent years, some
areas of incompatibility continue to retard its progress. These are mainly centred around certain
key agreements insisted on by the United States as a prerequisite for transfer of high-end defence
technology, such as: the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement
(CISMOA) for sharing of sensitive technology, the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) that could
potentially allow basing/refueling facilities for U.S. platforms in India, and the Basic Exchange
and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence to facilitate classified intelligence
sharing.56 New Delhi has shied away from signing formal agreements, indicating a lack of
propensity for any binding military commitment. A former Indian foreign secretary, while
justifying India’s stand on these agreements, stated that the “form” of India’s relationship with the
United States should not be confused for “substance,” highlighting that both sides had received
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logistics support from one another, even in the absence of formal agreements.57 Indeed, Indian
naval ships have received fuel from U.S. Navy tankers in the past and India provided refueling to
U.S. Air Force planes during the first Gulf War.
Notwithstanding the above hurdles, after protracted negotiations over the LSA, a much-watered
down version of the agreement called the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement
(LEMOA) was signed by India in August 2016. Broadly, LEMOA provides a framework to govern
and facilitate the provision of logistical support, supplies, and services between the two militaries
on a reimbursable basis.58 This agreement is significant as it is indicative of a strong desire on both
sides for mutual accommodation to invest and preserve the ongoing strategic partnership.
Overall Assessment of Indo-U.S. Relations
India’s aspirations to be a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region finds common ground
with the United States, and therefore fits into the American grand strategy for the larger IndoPacific region. Both sides have converging strategic interests in combating terrorism, piracy and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), reflected in the joint strategic vision
statement of January 2015.59 However, the key factor that appears to drive bilateral relations is the
rise of China and the expansion of China’s maritime power in the Indian Ocean, which could
potentially tip the Sino-Indian balance of power in favour of China.
India’s defence cooperation with the United States is unprecedented in scope and depth, a clear
reflection of India’s hedging strategy in the face of growing Chinese maritime power in the Indian
Ocean. India is also keen to collaborate with the United States in the modernisation of its armed
forces in order to “leapfrog” in defence technology and develop its own military industrial
complex. Having replaced Russia as the primary defence supplier to India, the United States is
expected to play a major role in India’s ongoing defence modernisation programme.
Notwithstanding the progress in India-U.S. relations, New Delhi is wary of openly antagonising
China. Perhaps the possibility of a Sino-U.S. conflict, however remote it may appear, seems to
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shape Indian strategic thinking. While a lack of formal commitments by New Delhi may have
earlier unnerved the Americans, this time, as noted by an Indian analyst, “the United States is
demonstrating patience and a strategic empathy that had eluded the bilateral relationship earlier”
and thus India-U.S. maritime security cooperation continues to move forward.60

Russia
India has longstanding relations with Russia and enhanced levels of cooperation in multiple areas
including defence, civil nuclear energy, space, science and technology, hydrocarbons and trade
and investment. During the 2010 visit of then Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin to New Delhi,
Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, stated:
Relations with Russia are a key pillar of our foreign policy, and we regard Russia as a trusted and
reliable strategic partner. Ours is a relationship that not only stands independent of any other, but
whose significance has grown over time.61

Following the signing of “Declaration on the India-Russia Strategic Partnership” in October 2000,
Indo-Russian ties appear to have been upgraded to the level of a “Special and Privileged Strategic
Partnership,” with several institutionalised dialogue mechanisms operating at both political and
official levels to ensure regular interaction and follow up on cooperation activities.62 An annual
summit meeting between the Prime Minister of India and the President of the Russian Federation
is the highest dialogue mechanism under the Strategic Partnership between India and the Russian
Federation.63 Additionally, there are regular annual interactions under two inter-governmental
commissions, one on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation
(IRIGC-TEC), co-chaired by the Indian external affairs minister and the Russian deputy prime
minister and the other on Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC) co-chaired by Russian
and Indian defence ministers.64 Bilateral trade between India and Russia in 2014 exceeded $9.5
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billion and during the 15th Annual Summit of 2014, the two leaders set a target of $30 billion
bilateral trade by 2025. Russian imports are led by defence and nuclear power equipment.65
In May 2015, the Indian president, Pranab Mukherjee, attended the Russian commemoration of
the 70th anniversary of victory in World War II in Moscow, joined by the Chinese president, Xi
Jinping, but largely unattended by most Western leaders. An Indian contingent also participated in
the military parade in Moscow on 9 May 2015.66
Defence Cooperation
About 70 per cent of India’s defence equipment is of Russian or Soviet origin dating back to the
1960s. 67 It is estimated that since the early 1960s, India has acquired more than $40 billion worth
of defence hardware from Moscow.68 Over the last twenty years, India’s defence imports from
Russia have been varied and extensive and included: a Kiev-class aircraft carrier (ex Admiral
Gorshkov), destroyers such as the Rajput-class, stealth frigates including the Talwar-class,
corvettes, missiles boats, conventional submarines including the Foxtrot-class and the Kilo-class,
nuclear submarines on lease (Akula-class), maritime reconnaissance aircraft such as the IL-36 and
Tu-142M, naval helicopters such as the Ka-35, air force fighters such as the MiG-29, MiG-29
SMT, Su-30K, Su-30MKI, helicopters including the Mi-17 and Mi-18, transport aircraft including
the An-32, air defence systems, and army main battle tanks such as the T-72 and the T-90.69
China was the number one arms importer from Russia for a long time, however, it was overtaken
by India as Russia’s largest arms buyer in 2007. This trend continued until recently, when the
United States emerged as India’s largest defence supplier. During the early years, India’s defence
cooperation with Russia was characterised as “a simple buyer-seller” relationship. However, over
the years, the framework for defence cooperation now has evolved to one involving joint research,
development and production of advanced defence technologies and systems.70 Some successful
projects include the BrahMos anti-ship cruise missile system, joint development of the fifth
generation fighter aircraft and the multi-transport aircraft, as well as the licensed production in
Government of India, “India-Russia Relations,” Media Brief, 7 July 2015, p. 2.
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India of the SU-30 fighter aircraft and T-90 tanks.71 Most recently, India has ordered the S-400
Triumf surface-to-air anti-ballistic missile defence system, in a deal valued at about $10 billion,
making it the largest ever single defence deal with Russia.72 It is also reported that a second leased
Russian Akula-class submarine is possible.73 Further, Russia has agreed to manufacture over 200
Kamov 226T helicopters in India in collaboration with a private Indian company, Reliance.74 These
developments could once again make Russia India’s largest arms supplier.75
In addition to defence purchases, India conducts a range of combined exercises involving the three
services, including a bilateral naval exercise codenamed Indra first initiated in 2003.76 Unlike the
other bilateral exercise conducted by the Indian Navy, the scale of the Indra series is much
restricted and generally superficial. The ninth naval exercise took place in the Bay of Bengal in
December 2016.77
Notwithstanding the success of Indo-Russian defence cooperation, there have been problems
related to the declining quality of Russian equipment, high costs and poor after-sales service from
Russian companies.78 Indo-Russian defence cooperation was seriously marred by the ex-Gorshkov
deal, during which renegotiations that dragged on for three years until early 2010, the Russians
demanded over $1.2 billion more than the original price of $1.5 billion.79 This experience appears
to have driven India to explore alternate sources for defence procurements from the United States,
Israel and Europe. Consequently, in 2011, in what appears to have been a retaliatory move by the
Russians to dissuade India from seeking alternate suppliers, the Russian Navy abruptly cancelled
exercise Indra.80 Russia also transgressed a decades-old informal understanding with India by
agreeing to supply Pakistan with Mi-35 helicopters.81
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Overall Assessment of India-Russia Relations
India is keen to maintain its time-tested relationship with Russia despite improved relations with
Washington. India shares Russia’s vision of a multipolar world and, within South Asia, Russia has
always supported India over the Kashmir issue and opposed its internationalisation.82 Further, the
issue of terrorism is another area of strategic convergence of interests.83
It is evident that defence ties with Russia constitute the core of Indo-Russian relations. Given that
nearly 70 per cent of Indian military equipment is of Russian/Soviet origin, it is clear that India
will continue to depend on Russia in the long-term for spares, maintenance and upgrades. Further,
notwithstanding recent progress in India-U.S. defence cooperation, Russia remains India’s major
supplier for strategic platforms and systems including the aircraft carrier, conventional and nuclear
submarines and fighter aircraft, and the latest ballistic missile defence system. However, in many
other cases, there appears to be trend of replacing aging Russian origin equipment with the latest
American equipment. This may also be seen as a move by India to gradually balance between
Russian origin and Western origin hardware and to try and get the best of both.
Over the years, India has mastered the task of operating and maintaining Russian platforms,
equipment and systems, in Indian conditions. This has helped India to provide support to other
users of Russian arms in the Indian Ocean region and thus to develop its own security ties. For
instance, in 2008 the Indian Navy transferred over 5,000 spare parts for the old Soviet origin
Petya–class patrol ships to Vietnam and also repaired their aging MiG-21 fighters and T-55
tanks.84 The Indian Air Force (the largest Su-30 fighter operator in the world ) also conducted
training for the Malaysian Air Force on the Su-30MKI fighters for over two years.85 And during
the visit of Prime Minister Modi to Malaysia in 2015, India and Malaysia signed an agreement to
establish a Su-30 forum for cooperation in training, maintenance, and technical support of the
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Russian fighter jets.86 The decision by Indonesia to acquire the Su-30 also appears to have been
influenced by the fact that these planes could be repaired and overhauled in India.87

France
Regional Strategic Interests and Presence
France has major strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region. The French island territories in the
Indian Ocean, including La Reunion and Mayotte, provide it with an EEZ covering 2.6 million
km2, more than a quarter of the total French EEZ of 11 million km2 (France has the second largest
EEZ in the world). Altogether, the French island territories account for over one million citizens.88
Significantly, over 25 per cent of the population of La Reunion is of Indian origin.89 The French
speaking sub-region of the Indian Ocean, which includes Mauritius, Madagascar (a former French
colony), the Seychelles and Comoros plus the two French territories, are brought together under
the Indian Ocean Commission operating under a rotating presidency, currently held by Comoros.90
Crucially, the French island of Mayotte is claimed by Comoros. According to a recent study report,
France provides considerable resources to this sub-region to support the Indian Ocean
Commission:
It [Paris] also goes a long way towards ensuring that territorial claim by Madagascar and Mauritius,
as well as Comorian irredentist claims over Mayotte - the residents of which have repeatedly, and
by increasing margins, voted for closer integration with France - can be put to one side without
compromising the COI[Indian Ocean Commission].91

Notwithstanding the internal disputes between COI member states, they find French membership
advantageous as an influential world power that understands their challenges. For France,
membership of the COI provides it with legitimacy and influence in the Indian Ocean. 92
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In order to safeguard its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, France maintains an active defence
presence, with troops and some ships mainly based on the island of La Reunion and Mayotte.93
Additionally, French troops continue to remain based at Djibouti, under a bilateral defence
cooperation treaty that actually ended in 2011.94 In 2009 France established a base at Mina Zayed,
Abu Dhabi, its first permanent military complex in the Persian Gulf. This complex includes army
and air force facilities and a naval jetty for various types of ships, except the aircraft carrier,
Charles de Gaulle, which is routinely deployed in the Indian Ocean region.95 Since 2001, France
has committed troops in support of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan and ships on anti-piracy patrols
under Combined Maritime Forces Task Force 151. Further, France has also contributed to antipiracy patrols under the EU NAVFOR Operation Atlanta.96
Bilateral Relations with India
India established a strategic partnership with France in 1998 and has made significant progress in
several areas of bilateral cooperation including defence, counter-terrorism, nuclear energy and
space. In 1998, when India conducted its second nuclear test, France did not condemn the tests
which invited international sanctions. Moreover, following the waiver given by the Nuclear
Suppliers’ Group that allowed India to resume full civil nuclear cooperation with the international
community post-sanctions, France was the first country to enter into an agreement on civil nuclear
cooperation with India.97 In February 2013, French resident, Francois Hollande, chose India as the
first country in Asia for a bilateral visit, highlighting the importance accorded to India by the
French government. Subsequently, the Indian prime minister visited Paris in April 2015 where he
signed a series of MoUs related to cooperation in the fields of defence, civil nuclear energy and
space research. In January 2016, the French president visited New Delhi as the head guest for the
67th Republic Day parade, the fifth time that India extended this honour to France. Significantly, a
contingent from the French Army’s 35th Infantry participated in the parade, marching along with
units from India’s armed forces.98
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As one of the world’s largest exporters of military hardware and a leading manufacturer of stateof-the-art defence equipment and platforms, France is a key supplier to India, and thus defence
cooperation forms the bedrock of the Indo-French strategic partnership. During his 2015 visit to
France, Prime Minister Modi announced a multi-billion dollar order for French Rafale jets for the
Indian Air Force, which were selected over comparable American and Russian competitors. Earlier
major imports from France include the Mirage 2000 multi-role bomber, inducted into the Indian
Air Force in the 1980s and six diesel-electric Scorpene submarines – valued at US$3.5 billion
when the contract was signed in October 2005 – which are currently under construction in India
under a transfer of technology from the French manufacturer DCNS. 99 The Scorpene project was
later marred by leaks of classified technical information about the submarine published in the
Australian media; and reportedly an order for three extra platforms has been put on hold.100
However, on the whole, this does not seem to have irretrievably impacted Indo-French defence
cooperation. India and France have also fostered solid collaboration in space. The Indian space
agency has completed over 50 years of collaboration with the French space agency,101 successfully
launching the first Indo-French satellite in September 2012, followed by a second one in February
2013, aimed at oceanic and climatic research.102
India and France conduct regular combined military exercises between the three services including
Exercise Shakti between the two armies, exercise Garuda for the air forces and a naval exercise,
Varuna, which commenced in 1992. The 14th iteration of the exercise was conducted in April-May
2015 off Goa, and included the Indian aircraft carrier Viraat operating with the French aircraft
carrier Charles de Gaulle and its Rafale fighters.
Overall Assessment of Indo-French Relations
At the grand strategic level, both Indian and French interests are closely aligned around
maintaining stability in the Indian Ocean region. While India regards the presence of former
European colonial powers as illegitimate, it generally views France as an intrinsic Indian Ocean
power in recognition of the level of importance its accords to its territories, which are locally
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administered by an elected government. This concession or recognition has not been extended to
the United Kingdom since the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), including the Chagos
archipelago with the island of Diego Garcia, are currently administered directly from Britain.
Moreover, BIOT does not have any native inhabitants, all of whom were relocated to Mauritius
and the Seychelles in the 1960s and 1970s prior to handing over the island of Diego Garcia to the
United States to establish a naval base.103 Thus, in 2008, while France was accorded full
membership of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), the United Kingdom and the United
States were not.
India’s relations with France have grown significantly in recent years based on a shared world
view and strategic convergences in several areas noted above. India’s defence procurements from
France also seem to have provided it with significant political influence. For instance, in 2011,
under Indian pressure, France halted a major defence sale to Pakistan which was to have included
fighter aircraft, submarines and anti-ship missiles. Evidently, during the Indo-French defence
dialogue in 2011, French Defence Minister Gerard Longuet had assured his Indian counterpart,
A.K. Antony, that France would “put on hold” the supply of “heavy” materiel to Pakistan.104 With
the signing of the largest defence deal for Rafale jets for the Indian Air Force, valued at over $10
billion, it is expected that India’s defence cooperation, and consequent political leverage, with
France will be further enhanced.

Japan
Strategic Interests and Presence in the Indian Ocean Region
Japan is the world’s third largest importer of crude oil and oil products. More than 80 per cent of
its oil imports are sourced from the Indian Ocean region and transit the Strait of Malacca, making
Japan critically dependent upon the Indian Ocean SLOCs.105 Additionally, Japanese exports
destined for Africa and Europe are routed through the region. Japan thus takes a keen interest in
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Indian Ocean maritime security. As an alliance partner of the United States, Japan has been
involved in the U.S.-led security operations in Afghanistan as well as the anti-piracy missions
under the Combined Maritime Forces. Although constitutional and other domestic political
constraints have prevented Japan from engaging in offensive military operations, it has
nevertheless played a key role in the ongoing reconstruction and stabilisation process in
Afghanistan.106 Similarly, in the anti-piracy missions, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
(JMSDF) tankers have provided logistics support to coalition ships on deployment since 2009.107
Japan is also an active participant in the ongoing United Nations Mission in the Republic of South
Sudan (UNMISS). In order to support its military commitments in the Indian Ocean region, the
Japanese government under Prime Minister Abe established a logistics facility at Djibouti in 2013,
the first semi-permanent Japanese overseas military facility since World War II. Abe is also
regarded as leveraging Japan’s military involvement in Africa to further the military normalisation
process, initiated under his government.108
In addition to military commitment, Japan has also made massive infrastructure investments in
various countries of the region. For instance, in Bangladesh, Japan is reported to have invested
$5.7 billion to create an industrial base over five years.109 Similarly, Japanese companies have
invested over $15 billion in India between 2010 to 2013 in various industrial projects.110 A further
investment of over $35 billion has been planned over the following five years in India.111Apart
from South and Southeast Asian states, Japan is also seeking to enhance its economic engagements
with other countries in the region, including Iran, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. Thus, Japan has
crucial strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region and this is a key driver for India-Japan ties.
Bilateral Relations with India
Despite the large geographical separation between India and Japan, current relations between the
two countries are rooted in ancient religious and cultural ties that can be traced back to 752 AD,
when a Buddhist monk from India visited Japan. During the period of freedom struggle in India
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led by Netaji Subhash, Japanese support and assistance to Netaji and the Indian National Army
during the early 1940s created much goodwill. Subsequently, post-Indian independence, there
were a few high-level exchanges of political visits, including a visit by the Japanese Crown Prince.
However, the bilateral relationship stagnated thereafter, with fewer political or diplomatic
exchanges, although, in 1991, when India was faced with a balance of payment crisis, Japan was
one of the few countries that helped to bail out the Indian economy. This was also followed up
with significant foreign direct investments, which reached a peak of $531.5 million in 1997, with
big names in Japanese industry such as Toyota, Honda, Sony and Mitsubishi, establishing an
Indian presence.112 Just when India-Japan relations started improving, the second Indian nuclear
tests of 1998 resulted, according to S. Jaishankar,113 in an “exceptionally harsh” response by Japan
which temporarily withdrew its ambassador and swiftly imposed economic sanctions, including
suspension of all financial aid and other punitive measures.114 Relations started to improve
gradually in 1999, helped by the recapture of Japanese merchant vessel Alondra Rainbow by the
Indian Coast Guard and Indian Navy that year. The Indian and Japanese coast guards have since
established strong ties and conduct a bilateral exercise, Shahyog-Kaijin. The 15th edition of the
exercise was conducted in the Bay of Bengal in January 2016.115 Significantly, the Indian Coast
Guard is also an active member of the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting
(HACGAM), initiated by Japan in 2004.
The rise of China in the 21st century and its adoption of a muscular stance with regard to the
dispute with Japan over the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, and over the Spratlys with its
other neighbours in the South China Sea, seems to have compelled Japan to revisit its earlier
polices. In 2006, Indo-Japan relations were elevated to the level of a global and strategic
partnership. The global partnership formed the foundation for the strengthening of ties in diverse
fields, including identifying areas of strategic convergence with the provision of annual Prime
Ministerial Summits. India is the only country with which Japan has such annual summit meetings
alternating between Delhi and Tokyo.116
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In September 2010, when Japan arrested a Chinese fishing boat captain, China blocked the export
of rare earth metals to Japan, threatening “further measures” against Tokyo if the captain was not
immediately released.117 The Chinese fisherman was later released. However, this incident seems
to have been a watershed moment for Japan as it added a sense of urgency to their initiatives to
further their strategic partnership with India. There were also growing concerns in Japan about
America’s ability to abide by its security commitments, and thus Tokyo sought a new strategic
partnership with India. Since 2010, Indo-Japan relations have been marked by high-level political
visits and a spurt in economic and military engagements. In 2013, in a rare gesture, the Japanese
Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko made a week-long visit to India, followed by Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe, who visited New Delhi for the 8th Annual Summit with Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and as the Chief Guest at the Republic Day parade in New Delhi in January
2014. The prime ministers signed a Joint Statement sharing their vision on intensifying the IndiaJapan Strategic and Global Partnership.118 In 2014, Prime Minister Modi visited Japan, signing the
“Tokyo Declaration for India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” The visit resulted
in substantive outcomes: Japan conveyed its intention to invest 3.5 trillion yen ($35 billion) of
public-private funds in India over a five year period as well as to double the number of Japanese
companies operating in India, and defence equipment and technology was identified as a major
new area of cooperation.119 Prime Minister Modi stated that his visit would “write a new chapter”
in relations, while Abe said that India-Japan bilateral ties have the “most potential in the world.”120
In 2014, Japan took a historic shift away from post-War pacifism, allowing for a relaxation of
certain constraints of Article IX of its constitution, which states:
The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force
as means of settling international disputes .... Land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential,
will never be maintained.121
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Under the new interpretation, Japanese forces will now be able to play a more proactive role in
exercising the right of collective self-defence and thus even assist the United States or other allies
if they were attacked, although there would still be limits on the scope of Japanese assistance. 122
Developments in India-Japan defence cooperation include the participation of the Japan Maritime
Self-Defense Force in combined naval exercise Malabar with the U.S. Navy in 2015 for the first
time since 2007. Further, the Indian government has placed an order with Japan for 12 unarmed
utility Seaplane Mark 2 amphibious search and rescue aircraft for the Indian Navy at a cost of
around $1.65 billion.123 While two of these aircraft will be supplied directly from Japan, the
remaining ten are to be manufactured in India under a transfer of technology arrangement. This
deal is the first ever sale of military hardware by Japan, post-World War II. It is also reported that
India has invited Japan to submit a proposal for the sale of their Soryu-class submarines.124
Overall Assessment of Indo-Japan Relations
Japan’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean and shared concerns over the rise of China are the
two main drivers for Japan’s bilateral relations with India. The inclusion of Japan with the United
States in combined naval exercise Malabar hosted by India in 2015 and 2017, is the strongest
indicator of an attempt at alliance forming aimed at countering China. This development appears
to have made a significant impact on the political leadership in Beijing. While in 2007, China had
issued a démarche to Japan to mark its protest against Japanese participation, in 2015 the Chinese
response had been “far more cautious and moderate.”125
Given the process of normalisation initiated by the Abe government and the recent relaxation in
the interpretation of Article IX of the Japanese constitution, it is expected that Japan might pursue
a proactive policy for furthering defence cooperation with India. The muted response from China
following Malabar 2015, also seems to have further emboldened India to pursue closer defence
cooperation with Japan and the United States.
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The United Kingdom
Regional Strategic Interests and Presence
Although the strategic interests and presence of the United Kingdom in the Indian Ocean region
had been steadily declining since the withdrawal of most British forces from the east of Suez in
1967, the past few years have witnessed growing British interest in the region. In 2013, Admiral
Sir Trevor Soar, the Royal Navy’s former Commander-in-Chief Fleet, noted that over 50 per cent
of the Royal Navy’s deployed manpower and assets were then located in the Indian Ocean.126
Presently, the two key areas of strategic interest for the British in the region are trade and
commercial interests, including energy products from the Middle East, and the administration of
the British Indian Ocean Territories (BIOT) comprising the Chagos archipelago. The Chagos
archipelago is a group of seven atolls comprising 55 individual tropical islands, many of them very
small. The archipelago lies about 500 km (300 miles) due south of the Maldives, its nearest
neighbour; 1,600 km (1,000 miles) southwest of India.127 The largest island, Diego Garcia, was
leased to the United States in 1966 for 50 years to house their Indian Ocean naval base. 128
Significantly, Mauritius claims the entire archipelago, a demand tacitly supported by India.
Mauritius maintains that the British violated the “intangibility of colonial borders” by
appropriating Chagos and forcibly relocating all the native people to Mauritius and the Seychelles.
However, the British contend that Chagos was never a part of Mauritius, but only administered by
the British colonial government of Port Louis for administrative convenience.129 The original 50year lease to the United States, which expired in 2016,130 has now been extended by another 20
years and reportedly the British government has ruled against the return of over 3,000 displaced
islanders to Chagos.131
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In addition, Britain is closely involved in the ongoing anti-piracy and anti-terrorism security
operations in the region. The United Kingdom also maintains a naval presence in Bahrain which
hosts the United Kingdom Maritime Component Command (UKMCC) headquarters. 132 The
United Kingdom is also a principal supplier of military hardware to Gulf states such as Saudi
Arabia and the UAE, which closed multi-billion dollar deals for the procurement of the Eurofighter
Typhoon.133 Further, Britain continues to maintain its defence links, albeit tenuous, with Australia,
New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia, through the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)
dating from 1971. The FPDA conducts combined naval and air exercises each year with Royal
Navy ships participating regularly. The Royal Navy has also been conducting a bilateral naval
exercise with the Indian Navy codenamed Konkan since 2004. In recent years, the United Kingdom
has sought to leverage its leadership in the Commonwealth forum, a grouping mostly of former
parts of the British Empire, to play a greater role in fostering defence cooperation, including
several Indian Ocean states. A 2011 report proposal highlights scope for greater strategic
cooperation, including intelligence sharing and cooperation.134 However, given that the
Commonwealth is still a viewed, at least in India, as a “largely ceremonial, British-dominated
organization with an antiquated aura,”135 the idea appears unlikely to be successful.
India-United Kingdom Defence Cooperation and Overall Assessment
After a period of relative decline since the 1970s, India-U.K. defence cooperation was renewed
with the establishment of a Defence Consultative Group (DCG) in 1995.136 The DCG, led by the
two defence secretaries, meets annually, alternating between New Delhi and London. Bilateral
defence cooperation has been marked by high-level visits, training exchanges, combined exercises
and sale of military hardware, notably Jaguar fighters and 66 Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer from
BAE.137
However, India’s bilateral relations with the United Kingdom seem to have been overtaken by
emerging strategic ties with other European powers, including France and Germany. This is
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evidenced from the fact that the United Kingdom was only the 27th country visited by Modi in his
recent tours, despite three visits by the British prime minister to India in the past six years.
Moreover, India chose French Rafale fighters over the Eurofighter Typhoon, partly built by British
defence giant BAE Systems. Evidently, India and the United Kingdom are divided over several
global issues such as Syria, Russia and Afghanistan. Most crucially, “Indian diplomats see the
U.K. as hopelessly naïve on the issue of Pakistan,” with whom the United Kingdom has maintained
strong defence and intelligence ties.138 Thus on balance, India’s ties with the United Kingdom
seem to have lost their “exclusivity” and are gradually waning, replaced by the United States,
Japan and other European powers.

Vietnam
India’s relations with Vietnam have been exceptionally friendly and cordial from the early 1950s,
based on common historical roots in the struggle for freedom from the European colonial
powers.139 It is said that the Indian prime minister, Nehru, had established a deep personal bond of
friendship with the Vietnam president, Ho Chi Minh, and was the one of the first visitors to
Vietnam following Hanoi’s independence in 1954. President Ho Chi Minh also visited India in
1958. Another fact of history that defence officers from both sides never forget to reiterate is that
India and Vietnam are the only two countries to have fought a direct war on land with China in the
last fifty years.140 In recent years, bilateral relations have been elevated to a strategic partnership,
marked by a greater level of political engagement and close defence cooperation. Recent
exchanges include a visit by the Indian president to Vietnam in September 2014, followed by a
return visit by the Vietnamese president the following month. Later, in September 2016, after a 15
years’ gap, Prime Minister Modi visited Vietnam. Bilateral trade and economic linkages have also
grown significantly, with trade volumes surpassing $8 billion in 2014. Both sides have agreed on
a new trade target of $15 billion by 2020.141 In 2011 Vietnam offered two blocks for oil prospecting
to India in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. This led to China issuing a protest to India
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for accepting Vietnam’s offer.142 While India has cited Vietnam’s sovereign claims over the
blocks, actual prospecting is yet to commence. In July 2011, during a routine port visit to Hai
Phong, Vietnam, by an Indian naval ship INS Airavat, the Chinese navy apparently warned the
ship not to enter Chinese waters.143 Although the event was not taken seriously in New Delhi, it
indicates Chinese concerns about growing India-Vietnam cooperation.
India has been closely involved in capacity building for the Vietnamese armed forces, particularly
in the field of naval cooperation. An annual security dialogue at the level of the defence secretary
is held each year and the tenth iteration of the meeting was held in Hanoi in March 2017.144 The
areas of focus have been information sharing, training, repairs and maintenance support, exchanges
between think tanks, study tours and ship visits. Indian naval ships regularly visit ports in
Vietnam.145 Given that the Vietnam People’s Navy inventory includes a wide range of
Soviet/Russian origin equipment also used in India, the Indian Navy has been able to extend
training and maintenance to them. For instance, in 2008 India supplied around 5,000 items of
spares for Vietnam’s Soviet origin, Petya-class boats, in addition to helping Hanoi to overhaul
several Soviet-era platforms such as MiG-21 fighters and T-55 main battle tanks.146 In 2014, India
extended a $100 million credit line to Vietnam for four patrol craft for the Vietnam People’s Navy
under construction in India.147 Later, in September 2016, during his visit to Hanoi, Prime Minister
Modi announced a $500 million credit line for defence procurement for Vietnam.148 Most
significantly, the Indian Navy provided submarine training to 500 Vietnam naval personnel at the
navy’s submarine training school in Vishakhapatnam in 2014, and is considering sale of the
Brahmos anti-ship missile to the Vietnam People’s Navy.149 Moreover, in December 2015, New
Delhi announced the setting up of a satellite tracking station in Ho Chi Minh City at a cost of $23
million.150 The Indian Navy has also stationed a permanent training team at Vietnam for providing
training in English and information technology.151
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Analysis

India’s privileged defence cooperation with Vietnam is a clear indication of an

implicit strategy aimed at countering China’s strategic relationship with Pakistan. The location of
Vietnam in East Asian waters, adjacent to China and overlooking the PLA Navy submarine base
on Hainan Island, provides enormous strategic potential to India. However, the Vietnam armed
forces are technologically inferior to those of India and clearly ill-prepared to play the role of a
potential coalition partner. Thus, Indian defence cooperation with Vietnam is specifically directed
at training and capacity building. Indian actions indicate a long-term commitment with a view to
prepare the Vietnam People’s Navy to absorb modern and advanced technology in order to be able
to play a greater role as a strategic partner in the future.

Conclusion
On balance, an analysis of India’s bilateral relations with extra-regional states indicates the
following salient points. Firstly, it is clear that India has sought to maintain close strategic ties with
all major powers that have strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, particularly the United States,
with whom India’s strategic ties are unsurpassed in scope and scale, arguably at the same level as
ties with the erstwhile USSR during the Cold War. Secondly, while India has maintained strategic
defence cooperation with western Pacific states such as Japan and Vietnam, in what appears to be
a deliberate attempt not to unduly antagonise China it has avoided prolonged or overt presence in
the western Pacific region. As such, the naval exercises with Japan are conducted in the Indian
Ocean region and India’s maritime cooperation with Vietnam has been kept low key. Furthermore,
as noted earlier, New Delhi dismissed a proposal from the commander of U.S. Pacific Command
for coordinated “freedom of the seas” patrols in the western Pacific region or a quadrilateral
security dialogue among India, Japan, Australia and the United States.152
Thirdly, for India self-reliance in defence is an important precondition to strategic autonomy.153
Given the extant gap in India’s own military industrial capabilities, India has sought to leapfrog in
technology and modernise its armed forces through large-scale defence imports. The doctrine of
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non-alignment that has shaped India’s foreign policy has helped India to source military hardware
from all major suppliers. India has thus been able to induct state-of-the-art equipment from the
United States, Russia, Israel, France and the United Kingdom, a crucial advantage over China,
which has virtually no access to state-of-the-art defence technology from the United States or
Europe. This has proved to be a significant advantage, a fact grudgingly acknowledged even by
the PLA Navy leadership who believe that the Indian Navy has had the benefit of amalgamating
the best seamanship practices inherited from the Royal Navy, practical training received from
Soviet experts on their own robust platforms and equipment, and sophisticated American
technology and tactics.154
While the Indian Navy may have successfully integrated varied platforms and technologies from
multiple countries, in recent years indigenisation of defence technology has become a national
priority. Recently the Indian naval chief stated that the blueprint for the future Indian Navy was
“firmly anchored on indigenisation.”155 And with a view to develop its industrial base for the
manufacture of military hardware, the Indian government has sought to attract foreign investment
and technology, encapsulated in the” Make in India” slogan of the present Modi government.
Support from the United States under the DTTI is thus crucial and could help India to emerge as a
major defence manufacturing hub. Already signs of progress in defence manufacturing in India
can be seen in new private sector ventures, such as the proposed $1 billion dollar investment by
the Reliance group (India’s leading private sector company) to set up the Dhirubhai Ambani
Aerospace Park (DAAP) to manufacture helicopters for both commercial and military
applications.156 Reportedly, DAAP is inspired by Aerospace Valley in Toulouse, France, which
comprises a cluster of about 500 aerospace companies and research centres including Airbus,
EADS, Air France Industries and Dassault Aviation.157 Further, the Reliance Group has also
announced an investment of $1.5 billion to develop a naval shipyard at Vishakhapatnam for
submarine construction.158
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Finally, regardless of any formal commitment, India’s growing maritime security cooperation with
the United States and Japan is the clearest indication of an implicit strategy aimed at alliance
forming to counter China. Over the years, the levels of India-U.S. combined exercises have
increased in complexity and scope. The inclusion of Japan in these exercises in 2015 and 2017,
much against earlier Chinese concerns, shows a sense of urgency on the part of India to balance
growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, India’s ties with Japan and Vietnam
also appear to be driven by what appears to be an Indian contingency strategy to cater for scenarios
such as the event of a U.S. withdrawal from the Indian Ocean region or a Sino-U.S. rapprochement.
As noted in Chapter 4, all these engagements are characteristic of the pluralism in the security
order in the Asia-Pacific region.
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Chapter 7
India’s Role in Regional Multilateral Maritime Security Cooperation

Introduction
Based on the examination of India’s maritime strategy in the preceding chapters, it has been
demonstrated that India is seeking to develop a network of bilateral security ties to maintain an
overall favourable environment in the Indian Ocean region. India has also sought to foster
multilateral maritime cooperation to ensure security in the Indian Ocean, with the Indian Navy
filling in the gaps in regional capacity wherever required. As the largest regional maritime power,
India clearly has a central role in promoting maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean. Essentially,
this is in India’s interest as it would enable the entire range of prevalent non-traditional maritime
threats to be addressed comprehensively and also provide support or legitimacy to India’s
aspirations to be the “net security provider” for the whole region. Manifestly, by promoting
bilateral maritime cooperation and playing the role of a “net security provider” for the region, India
seeks to strengthen its regional influence, countering extra-regional, mainly Chinese, influence.
This thinking goes back to the 1970s when India mooted a proposal for making the Indian Ocean
a Zone of Peace tacitly aimed at keeping extra-regional forces out of the region.
This chapter looks at India’s role in the various cooperative mechanisms for multilateral security
cooperation in the Indian Ocean and examines their current status and future prospects. It argues
that a lack of cohesion amongst the various sub-regional institutions, coupled with India’s insular
approach to multilateral maritime security cooperation, which in turn has been driven by security
concerns over expanding Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region, is hampering regional
multilateralism. In the long term this could be counter-productive for India as it could make its
regional leadership untenable and facilitate a greater role for China helped by its naval facility in
Djibouti. In the end, the chapter recommends various strategic options for India to foster closer
collaboration between sub-regional mechanisms in order to strengthen multilateral maritime
cooperation, formally recognise legitimate Chinese interests for maritime security in the Indian
Ocean and enable a participatory role for China in regional security.
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Multilateralisation of Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean
Maritime security is the foremost concern in the Indian Ocean. As noted in Chapter 4, events of
the early twenty-first century such as the maritime terrorist attacks in Aden against the USS Cole
and off Yemen against the French tanker Limburg in 2000 and 2002, respectively, a rise in armed
attacks on ships in the Straits of Malacca and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, fueled maritime
security multilateralisation. India, as the largest maritime power in the region, took the lead in
promoting regional maritime security cooperation, playing an instrumental role in fostering
maritime multilateralism, at considerable costs and even initiated the formation of the Indian Ocean
Naval Symposium (IONS) in 2008. Although IONS has been widely regarded as a successful
initiative, as it helped in corralling regional states under one overarching regional institution in a
relatively short period of time, it now seems to be losing its novelty and could potentially degrade
into a “talk shop” forum. This is evident from the fact that most IONS gatherings have centered
around similar themes with hardly any innovative ideas emerging from the meetings. Some analysts
see this as the result of a “tight control” exercised by India. An Australian analyst has thus noted:
While the IONS is similar in concept to that of the WPNS, its implementation will be very different
… Its continued existence is likely to be entirely dependent on Indian funding and leadership.
Potentially this defeats the purpose of a truly cooperative arrangement because India, as a consequence
of providing most of the funding, will likely want firm control over IONS activities. 1

Another factor that has seemed to have curbed further growth or maturation of IONS is the
fact that its agenda has been limited to non-traditional threats, while other more complex
issues such as interstate tensions and conflict in the maritime domain such as sovereignty
disputes, interpretation of the law of the sea and the possibility of a naval arms race, being
largely outside its purview.2 Consequently, IONS has not been able to evolve into a
comprehensive security regime for the Indian Ocean.
In addition to creating IONS, India took up the additional challenge of reinvigorating the Indian
Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the other regional forum for multilateral cooperation, during its
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Chairmanship in 2011. IORA, as noted in Chapter 2, after an enthusiastic start in 1997, also seems
to have quickly lost momentum and stagnated, failing to achieve any substantial gains, economic
or otherwise. Thus, when India took over the chairmanship of IORA in 2011, it was expected that
as a major maritime power, the founder of IONS and a rapidly growing economic power, India
would re-invigorate the organisation. During its tenure as the chair of IORA from 2011 to 2013,
India worked in collaboration with other member states to expand the scope of the organisation
and attempted to build consensus on themes of contemporary relevance to all members. Six priority
areas were identified to enhance regional cooperation including, inter alia, maritime safety and
security, fisheries and disaster management.3
It was envisaged that individual member states would take leadership roles under each of the
priority areas and come up with specific projects that could be sanctioned under the IORA Special
Fund. However, no significant project has been undertaken so far under this scheme.

Factors Inhibiting Regional Multilateral Cooperation
India’s Insular Approach and the Role of China
Although it may be fair to assert that India has a vested interest in keeping itself in the “driver’s
seat” in all the multilateral cooperative efforts and also in keeping extra-regional powers, mainly
China, out of these regional institutions, it obviously does not want the institutions to languish and
fail. A failure of multilateral cooperation would be highly counter-productive for India and could
pave the way for greater unilateral Chinese involvement. As highlighted in Chapter 2, China has
enormous strategic interests at stake in the Indian Ocean including its maritime trade and shipping,
a sizeable worker population and massive financial investments. Thus, notwithstanding China’s
lack of active participation in the ongoing multilateral initiatives, the PLA Navy has been a major
contributor to the region’s maritime security by engaging in anti-piracy patrols off Somalia since
2009. As discussed in Chapter 5, it is obvious that a semi-permanent Chinese presence in the region
with PLA Navy ships operating from Djibouti could facilitate a greater role for the PLA Navy,
effectively diluting India’s role as the primary “net security provider.” It would therefore be fair to
3

Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “The IOR-ARC,” Media Brief, March 2013.

230

assume that China’s growing presence, but with no formal role in regional institutions, would
weaken maritime multilateralism and potentially divide the region into India and China-led camps.
It thus becomes clear that it would be in India’s interest to strengthen regional multilateral
cooperation and formally involve China as a stakeholder in maritime security in the Indian Ocean.
This is discussed later in the chapter. The other factors that have inhibited the growth of regional
multilateral cooperative initiatives are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Lack of Integration amongst Sub-Regional Institutions
The Indian Ocean region in comparison to East Asia appears relatively less institutionalised.4 East
Asia has numerous institutions dealing with maritime security cooperation including the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East Asia Summit
(EAS), the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting
(ADMM) Plus, while Indian Ocean fora for maritime security cooperation are mainly limited to
IORA and IONS at the regional level. East Asian are also more evolved and range from summit
level inter-governmental organisations to an informal Track II mechanisms for dialogue such as
the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific,5 working in support of official
mechanisms. While it may be argued that IORA and IONS are relatively young and yet to evolve
to the level of East Asian institutions or that India has a vested interest in maintaining its control
over them, clearly there are other challenges that beset the region.
A closer look at the sub-regional level actually reveals that even the Indian Ocean has several
institutions that have worked well within sub-regional limits, but because they have developed
independent of each other, the region as a whole has the appearance of a disjointed collection of
institutions. The various sub-regional organisations and initiatives are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) SAARC is one of the older regional

organisations, formed in 1985, and currently comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,
the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The aim of SAARC was to promote the welfare of
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the people of South Asia through economic, social and cultural development. In over three decades
of existence, although SAARC has made some progress in certain areas such the formation of a
South Asian free trade area (SAFTA), the South Asian University (SAU) and the SAARC
development fund (SDF), it has largely been a “complete failure,” to quote India’s former external
affairs minister, Yashwant Sinha.6 Manifestly, this is due to the SAARC agenda being dominated
by India-Pakistan border tensions, cross-border terrorism, and political mistrust between member
states that have precluded meaningful regional dialogue. In November 2016, following a terrorist
attack on Indian troops in Kashmir, the Indian government pulled out of a SAARC summit
scheduled in Islamabad. Furthermore, based on Prime Minister Modi’s efforts to isolate Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Bhutan also declined to participate and it was later cancelled. Prime
Minister Modi in his SAARC charter day message of December 2016 stated:
Our efforts to build regional cooperation have come under serious threat from the rising number of
terrorist attacks. These undermine peace and security, and disrupt development of the region. It is
incumbent on all like-minded people and nations in the region to come together to combat and defeat
the scourge of terrorism and its support system … only then we will be able to realize the potential
of our region and the aspirations of our people.7

The latest developments raise serious questions about the continued role of SAARC as a regional
organisation. Consequently, it also makes the role of other regional fora more important.
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) This

is a lesser known intergovernmental regional organisation formed in June 1997 comprising the Bay
of Bengal littoral states: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand.
They constitute a contiguous regional unity or a potential economic bloc. BIMSTEC is essentially
a sector-driven cooperative organisation that started with six sectors – trade, technology, energy,
transport, tourism and fisheries – later expanding in 2008 to cover others such as counter-terrorism
and climate change. Since its inception BIMSTEC has produced few if any notable achievements,
mainly due to the “internal political turmoil and violent insurgencies that have kept members such
as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand internally focused.”8 Furthermore, Indian plans
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for development of road infrastructure to connect major manufacturing areas in northeastern India
with Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Thailand through to Vietnam, that could have potentially helped
to transform the region, barely progressed under the Congress led Indian government in the past
several decades.9 Meanwhile, a transport corridor through the four states is already part of China’s
belt and road initiative (BRI) programme. Consequently, according to Raja Mohan, “as India
dithered, China has deepened trans-frontier economic integration with most member states of the
BIMSTEC, especially Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Nepal.”10 Evidently, in order to make
up for lost time, the Modi government has accorded greater priority to several infrastructure
projects in the northeast states. Raja Mohan also notes that although India is wary of the BRI
passing through its northern frontiers to Pakistan, it may be a “wee bit” open to jointly developing
the northeastern part with China.11 Recent developments, such as Modi’s decision to invite
BIMSTEC leaders to the BRICS (Brazil Russia India China South Africa) summit at Goa in
October 2016, seem to indicate a renewed focus to reinvigorate BIMSTEC, perhaps precipitated
by the collapse of the SAARC summit as noted above.
The strategic and economic potential of the Bay of Bengal region seems to be gaining greater
importance. During a recent visit to New Delhi, Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister Wickremesinghe stated
that the Bay of Bengal region could be developed as a dynamic economic zone and even suggested
expanding BIMSTEC to include Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia.12 On balance, given India’s
renewed interest and its close security ties with most of the member states, it is possible that closer
economic collaboration within the sub-region could provide greater impetus to Indian-led maritime
cooperation.
Malacca Strait Security Initiative

As noted in Chapter 2, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia

launched the Malsindo coordinated patrols under the Malacca Strait security initiative in 2004.
There were initial concerns that the patrols would fail for want of adequate regional capacity,
particularly because Malaysia and Indonesia steadfastly refused direct naval assistance from
external powers. However, these concerns have proved unfounded as they did accept materiel
support, training and funding from user states and stakeholders such as Australia, China, India,
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12 “India-Sri Lanka economic Pact by 2016-end, Says Ranil Wickremesinghe,” The Hindu, 26 October 2016.
9
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Japan and the United States, to augment their efforts.13 In addition the Malsindo patrols have been
largely successful, evolving into a comprehensive framework for maritime security at the subregional level. The success of Malsindo is evident from the fact that the region has remained below
the Lloyd’s threshold of high risk areas since mid-2006, when it was officially declared war risk
free. Broadly, the Malacca Strait security initiative now includes the coordinated patrols limited
exclusively to participation by the littoral states and the Cooperative Mechanism for Safety of
Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (Cooperative
Mechanism) framed in collaboration with the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) as a
platform for littoral states, user states, stakeholders and industry dialogue, information exchange
on key straits issues. The success of the Malacca Strait security initiative could be attributed to an
inclusive approach from the initial stages that took into consideration the security requirements of
all stakeholders, including not just the other major states but also the shipping industry. This is an
approach that could be emulated by India to involve not just China but also all other stakeholders
in Indian Ocean maritime security.
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
(ReCAAP)

ReCAAP was initiated in 2004 as a regional organisation, roughly at the same time

as the Malacca Strait security initiative but through a regional government-to-government
agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia. 14 The
ReCAAP agreement came in to force in 2006 and currently includes 20 member states.15 Malaysia
and Indonesia are conspicuously absent, although the two countries have agreed to cooperate with
it. Under ReCAAP an Information Sharing Centre (ISC) was established to facilitate exchange of
information on incidents of piracy and armed robbery, mutual capacity building and cooperative
arrangements.
Southern African Development Community (SADC) The SADC is a lesser known but important

sub-regional organisation formed in 1980 under the leadership of South Africa. It comprises 14

13

Sam Bateman, Catherine Zara Raymond and Joshua Ho, Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: An Agenda
for Action, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Policy Paper, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, May 2006, p.
12.
14 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), available at
http://www.recaap.org/AboutReCAAPISC.aspx.html.
15 20 member states include: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, South Korea,
Laos, Myanmar, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States of America
and Vietnam.
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African states.16 The SADC states have signed a mutual defence pact that includes maritime
security, and which seeks to synergise limited sub-regional naval capacity to tackle piracy and
other maritime contingencies.17
African Union Integrated Maritime Strategy

A major regional maritime initiative is expected to

emerge over the next decades from an announcement by the African Union for an Integrated
Maritime Strategy 2050 (AIM 2050). AIM 2050 outlines a blueprint to address the continent’s
maritime challenges for sustainable development of its blue economy. One of its objectives is to
establish a Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa. Further, maritime domain awareness is
another key objective. AIM 2050 states:
Steps toward promoting inter-agency and transnational cooperation and coordination on maritime
safety and security shall include the development of an inter-agency approach, a Naval Component
capacity within the framework of the African Standby Force (ASF), and the establishment of a
representative continental working group of Chiefs of African Navies and/or Coast Guards
(CHANS) to scrutinize issues of situational awareness and collaborate towards the enhancement of
Africa’s Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), and to uphold cooperative efforts between
Navies/Coast Guards of the AU Member States and international partners. 18

While AIM 2050 encompasses not just the Indian Ocean but equally the Atlantic and the
Mediterranean, it is expected to have far greater engagement with the Indian Ocean given the
region’s close economic, political and security engagements with India and China.
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Another important sub-regional security mechanism is the GCC

comprising six Persian Gulf states.19 Under the GCC, maritime security is dealt under the “joint
GCC defence pact of 2000 and includes regular combined naval and air exercises. Since 2009, the
GCC navies have also coordinated their efforts with the multinational forces in the region, mainly
around the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf, to prevent attacks on their oil production and
transportation infrastructure.20

16

Member states include: Angola, Botswana, Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, The Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, The
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
17 South African Development Community, SADC Mutual Defence Pact, Gaborone, June 1996.
18 African Union, 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy, Version 1.0, Addis Abbaba, 2012, p. 16.
19 Gulf Cooperation Council member include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
20 Kamlesh K. Agnihotri, “Leveraging Maritime Capacities in the Indian Ocean towards Wholesome Cooperation: A Prescription
for Win-Win Outcomes,” Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, January-March 2016, p. 78.
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Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime (IOFMC)

The United Nations Office on Drugs and

Crime (UNODC) has also expanded its focus area beyond counter-piracy into other forms of
maritime crimes, as well as looking into new geographical areas such as the Indian Ocean. A part
of these efforts has led to the formation of the IOFMC with the aim of providing a regional network
between states in order to coordinate their responses to maritime crime concerns at the diplomatic,
strategic and capacity-building levels.21 The IOFMC seeks to improve understanding of maritime
threats, enhance cooperation and promote access to capacity-building initiatives. Its initial focus
has been on heroin trafficking, trafficking in persons/smuggling of migrants, and wildlife and forest
crime, although its charter could expand to cover other crimes in the future. It is also envisaged to
collaborate with regional and international organizations with a common interest in combating
maritime crime and enhancing regional coordination such as IORA and the Combined Maritime
Forces (CMF).22 A recent development, it is yet to take the form and shape of a key intergovernmental organisation. However, given the backing by the United Nations it could potentially
emerge as the apex body at the technical, and political and strategic levels to deal with maritime
crime. Furthermore, its planned linkages with regional organisations such as IORA could in turn
help raise IORA’s international profile and credibility, thereby fostering greater regional support.
Galle Dialogue

An emerging Track II forum is the Galle dialogue, an initiative of Sri Lanka’s

Ministry of Defence and navy. The inaugural event was held in 2010 with 11 participating
countries. However, within a short span of years the event has emerged as a credible forum for
discussion of maritime security: the 2015 Dialogue was attended by senior government officials
from 35 countries, flag officers from several navies, representatives from inter-governmental
organisations such as the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHCR), UNODC,
ReCAAP and the European Union, and maritime experts form think tanks.23 It is expected that this
event could help to foster closer cooperation within the region and further policy development on
similar lines as the Shangri-La Dialogue hosted annually by the London-based International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in Singapore.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “UNODC’s Contribution to the 2015 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General
on Oceans and the Law of the Sea,” Vienna, 30 January 2015, p. 1.
22 Ibid.
23 Galle Dialogue 2015, “Secure Seas Through Greater Maritime Cooperation Challenges and Way Forward,” 12 December 2016,
available at http://galledialogue.lk/index.php?id=1.html.
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A few other sub-regional institutions discussed earlier in the thesis include multinational

Others

combined naval exercises aimed at capacity building, notably the Milan, Aman and Kakadu series,
the Djibouti Code of Conduct and the Commission de L’ocean Indien – or the Indian Ocean
Commission (IOC). The internationally recognised transit corridor (IRTC) is yet another regional
mechanism, although it includes several extra-regional states it is essentially a sub-regional
construct.
Thus, it can be seen that while the Indian Ocean region may not have the “alphabet soup” of
multilateral institutions as is the case in East Asia, it does have many sub-regional institutions that
have “sprouted” in response to specific maritime threats of the area. These institutions have
generally remained insulated from each other precluding development of a regional regime for
maritime security.
The reason for the lack of integration can be attributed to the intra-regional fault lines that lie within
the Indian Ocean region, which is fractured into various sub-groups such as Southwest Asia, South
Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa. As noted by an Indian scholar:
Peculiar characteristics, issues and nature of internal dynamics of these [Indian Ocean] sub-groups,
which are at great variance with each other, tend to dilute any holistic attempt at formulation of a
unified maritime agenda. Furthermore, some states within the above-mentioned sub-groups, for
example, India and its immediate western neighbour, which are consigned to a tenuous long-term
relationship, render most of the cooperative concepts as non-starters. Strained Arab-Israel relations
on one hand, and the Iran-Saudi Arabia equation on the other, also follow a similar ‘exclusive’
pattern.24

Lack of Synergy Amongst Leading Maritime States of the Indian Ocean Region
One of the main challenges in promoting multilateral maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean
has been the seeming lack of naval capacity of many states. Once again, closer scrutiny indicates
that this is not entirely accurate. While it may have been true perhaps a decade ago, the naval
modernisation process initiated in several states, particularly in Southeast Asia, is now coming to
fruition and thus the overall naval capacity within the region has been significantly enhanced.

24

Agnihotri, “Leveraging Maritime Capacities in the Indian Ocean,” p. 83.
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Table 7.1 in the following page provides an overview of the major naval platforms held and
planned acquisitions by the navies of the Indian Ocean.
Table 7.1: Broad Overview of Major Naval Platforms ((including planned acquisitions) in the Indian
Ocean Region25

No.

Country

Major

Heavy Lift

Large Patrol

Replenishment

Combatants

Amphibious

Craft (incl.

Ships

(incl.

Vessels

corvettes and

Carriers,

offshore patrol

Destroyers

vessels)

Submarines

and Frigates)

Australia

12

8

2

2

14

20

2

-

6

12

2.

Bahrain

1

-

-

-

2

-

-

-

-

-

3.

Bangladesh

6

-

-

-

10

2

2

1

-

2

4.

Comoros

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

5.

Djibouti

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

6.

East Timor

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

7.

Egypt

10

4

-

-

-

-

-

4

4

8.

Eritrea

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

9.

India

25

12

6

4

51

30

4

-

14

14

10.

Indonesia

9

-

5

1

46

7

3

1

2

9

11.

Iran

4

2

-

9

-

1

-

3

-

12.

Iraq

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

13.

Israel

-

3

4

5

1

14.

Jordan

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

15.

Kenya

-

-

-

-

2

-

-

-

-

-

16.

Kuwait

-

-

-

-

8

-

-

-

-

-

25

-

-

IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2014-15.

Projected

acquisitions

Active

Projected

acquisitions

Active

Projected

acquisitions

Active

Projected

acquisitions

Active

Projected

acquisitions

Active

1.
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No.

Country

Major

Heavy Lift

Large Patrol

Replenishment

Combatants

Amphibious

Craft (incl.

Ships

(incl.

Vessels

corvettes and

Carriers,

offshore patrol

Destroyers

vessels)

Submarines

and Frigates)

Madagascar

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

18.

Malaysia

2

-

4

2

12

6

-

-

2

-

19.

Maldives

-

-

-

-

2

-

-

-

-

-

20.

Mauritius

-

1

1

-

-

-

-

21.

Mozambique

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

22.

Myanmar

4

6

-

-

5

-

-

-

-

-

23.

Oman

-

-

-

-

6

-

-

-

-

-

24.

Pakistan

9

4

-

-

2

-

5

1

5

8

25.

Qatar

-

-

-

-

6

6

-

-

-

-

26.

Saudi Arabia

7

-

-

-

13

-

2

-

-

-

27.

Seychelles

-

-

-

-

2

-

-

-

-

-

28.

Singapore

6

-

4

-

17

6

-

-

4

2

29.

Somalia

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

30.

South Africa

4

-

-

-

7

-

1

-

3

-

31.

Sri Lanka

-

-

-

-

8

2

-

-

-

-

32.

Sudan

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

33.

Tanzania

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

34.

Thailand

10

1

1

-

14

3

-

2

1

3

35.

United Arab
Emirates
Yemen

-

-

-

-

23

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

3

-

-

-

-

-

36.

-

Projected

acquisitions

Active

Projected

acquisitions

Active

Projected

acquisitions
Active

Projected

acquisitions
Active

Projected

acquisitions

Active

17.

A ranking of the Indian Ocean navies based upon the nine levels of “global naval hierarchy”
advocated by Eric Grove, noted in Chapter 4, puts regional naval capacity into perspective.
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Table 7.2 - Ranking of Indian Ocean Navies Based on Eric Grove’s Classification of Navies26
No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Classification
Indian Ocean Navy
Major global force projection - Complete. United States Navy with a global reach and key
regional presence.
Major global force projection - Partial.
Formerly included the Soviet Navy, but Grove
removed this classification post-1990.
Medium global force projection.
India.
Medium regional force projection.
Australia and Singapore.
Adjacent force projection navies.
Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Israel,
Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and South Africa.
Offshore territorial defence navies.
Egypt, Iran, Bahrain, UAE, Oman, Qatar and
Bangladesh.
Inshore territorial defence navies.
Iraq and Kuwait.
Navies capable of only constabulary
Kenya. Jordan, Myanmar, Maldives, Mauritius,
duties.
Seychelles and Yemen.
Token navies.
Comoros, Djibouti, East Timor, Eritrea,
Madagascar, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan and
Tanzania.

With one of the largest navies in the world, India clearly stands out in the region. Australia and
Singapore rank next with significant capacity. According to Grove, “Singapore is perhaps the
world’s most powerful small navy.”27 As a result of naval modernisation initiated in the last decade,
many Indian Ocean navies have acquired new capabilities and have moved up in Grove’s
categories. Such navies include those of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Iran and South Africa. It is opined that these navies could potentially substantively contribute to
regional multilateral efforts.
From the Table 7.2 above it is also evident that half of the regional navies belong to the last three
categories, barely capable of operating beyond their own maritime zones, including a quarter with
only a token naval capacity. The states that stand out most for lack of naval capacity in relation to
their maritime zones are the Maldives, the Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar and Comoros. An
Indian writer remarks:
While the ‘capability-requirement deficit’ is unfavourably placed for most states, the situation for
Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar and Comoros is particularly alarming. A

Eric Grove, “The Ranking of Smaller Navies Revisited,” in Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders and Ian Speller, eds., Small
Navies: Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace, Ashgate, Farnham, 2014, pp. 15- 20.
26
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representative ratio of about 2,905 square kilometres (sq km) of sea area to guard for every sq km
of land territory in case of Seychelles, and quite the similar ratio (1:3,078) for Maldives, brings out
the enormity of task at hand. 28

A brief overview of some regional navies now reaching the culmination of modernisation,
commenced a decade ago, follows in the succeeding paragraphs.
Royal Australian Navy (RAN)

Australia has been a keen proponent of multilateral cooperation

in the Asia-Pacific region and has hosted the biennial multinational naval exercise Kakadu for
Asia-Pacific navies for several decades. As noted earlier, the RAN has also been an active
participant in various multinational naval exercises such as Milan and the Five Power Defence
Arrangements (FPDA) exercises with Singapore, Malaysia and the United Kingdom. Moreover, in
its role as a coalition partner of the United States, Australia has participated in naval missions in
Iraq and has been involved in anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden.29 The RAN has been in
transition for over a decade since the launch of “Plan Blue” in 2006 which envisaged significant
modernisation of the surface fleet.30 With the imminent induction of three Hobart-class air warfare
destroyers starting in 2016, two Canberra-class amphibious assault ships (LHDs) with helicopters
(commissioned in 2014 and 2015) and 14 Armidale-class patrols boats (inducted over the past
decade), the RAN is capable of taking on larger roles in the Indian Ocean. 31 As noted by an
Australian analyst, the induction of new LHDs could provide:
… robust capability for improved effects in humanitarian and disaster relief; assistance to friendly
nations; joint military exercise; evacuation operations, presence and preventive diplomacy. 32

The most recent Australian Defence White Paper has sets out the most ambitious plan for the
regeneration of the RAN since World War II. Under the new plan the government expects to
procure nine new anti-submarine warfare frigates, 12 new offshore patrol vessels, and seven
additional P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft.33

“Australia,” IHS Jane’s World Navies 2014- 2015, pp. 37-48.
Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Peter J. Dean, “Australia: Maritime Strategy and Regional Maritime Diplomacy,” in Justin Jones, ed., A Maritime School of
Strategic Thought for Australia: Perspectives, Sea Power Centre, Canberra, 2013, p. 94.
33 Commonwealth of Australia, Defence White Paper 2016, Canberra, February 2016.
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Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN)

Singapore is one of the largest military spenders within the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, with a defence budget of about $10
billion, accounting for nearly a quarter of government expenditure.34 The RSN has made numerous
inductions over the last decade and its present inventory of assets includes six French design
Formidable-class frigates, four Endurance-class amphibious landing platform docks (LPDs), four
submarines and several patrol vessels. The RSN is an active participant in several multinational
and bilateral naval exercises.35 It has also contributed to U.S.-led operations in Iraq and the antipiracy patrols of Combined Task Force 151, which was commanded by an RSN two-star officer
three times.36
Indonesian Navy and Bakamla

Considering the vast geographical expanse of the Indonesian

archipelago, the Indonesian Navy, until a decade ago, was regarded as ill-equipped to address the
maritime challenges of the region with more than half of the navy comprising vintage origin ships.
Reportedly, in 2004, the Indonesian naval chief told the parliament that the navy had 117 ships of
all types and readiness status, but that effective security of the country’s enormous maritime area
required 762 ships.37 The same year the Indonesian Navy in collaboration with the Malaysian Navy
and the RSN commenced the coordinated anti-piracy patrols in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore. Since then, under a plan to induct 30 to 40 fast patrol boats or corvettes over ten to 15
years, it procured four modern Sigma-class corvettes between 2007 and 2009. Additionally, five
multirole LPDs designed for use as hospital ships and rendering humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief (HADR) were acquired between 2003 and 2011.38 Indonesia is thus one of the few
navies in the Indian Ocean region to boast such a capability. In 2011, Indonesia signed a contract
with South Korea for three Chang Bogo-class diesel-electric attack submarines to be delivered by
2020.39 In 2010, a strategic defence plan was formulated aimed at developing a green-water navy
by 2024 with a 274-ship force structure, divided into a Striking Force (110 ships), Patrolling Force
(66 ships), and Supporting Force (98 ships).40 In late 2014, Indonesia's President Joko Widodo
unveiled his “global maritime axis” concept, aimed at projecting Indonesia as a maritime nation

“Singapore,” IHS Jane’s World Navies 2014- 2015, p. 402.
Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 “Indonesia,” IHS Jane’s World Navies 2014- 2015, p. 265.
38 “Indonesia,” IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2014-2015, p. 363.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
34
35
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and a clear signal by his government for according priority to naval expansion. Indonesia is an
active participant in several multinational naval exercises. It also hosts a major multinational
exercise, Komodo, aimed at enhancing cooperation in HADR operations. The latest edition of this
exercise held in April 2016 involved 22 ships from 16 navies. 41 It is thus expected that the
Indonesian Navy could play a greater role in the Indian Ocean in the coming years, possibly
deploying far beyond home waters.
Indonesia’s Maritime Security Board or Bakamla was established in December 2014 primarily to
coordinate maritime issues between multiple national agencies for effective law enforcement in
Indonesian waters, a huge task for which it is presently ill equipped.42 Bakamla is responsible for
synergising maritime security efforts by various institutions in the country's maritime sector,
including the navy, police, customs, immigration authorities, courts, maritime affairs and fisheries
ministry, foreign affairs ministry and the transportation ministry. 43 Bakamla currently operates six
patrol boats,44 although the Indonesian government has recently sanctioned additional funding
which will be used to procure four additional patrol boats,45 an OPV46 and other assets. It is viewed
that the increased funding for Bakamla and the government’s focused efforts to clamp down on
illegal fishing in Indonesian waters could see the agency grow in size and stature as a credible
regional coast guard service over the next few years.47
Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA)

Malaysia is one of the few Southeast Asian states with a modern navy and a coast guard, MMEA.
The RMN in recent years has emerged as a small but modern navy, operating two French
Scorpene-class submarines and six Kedah-class frigates, which form the backbone of the navy. In
2008, three warships were deployed at short notice to the Gulf of Aden in response to the hijacking
of two Malaysian merchant ships by Somali pirates.48 Since then the RMN has maintained, almost
continuously, one or two ships on independent anti-piracy patrols.49 The RMN along with the RSN
“Indonesia to Host Multilateral Naval Exercise to Strengthen Maritime Cooperation,” Antaranews.com, 15 February 2016.
“Bakamla trapped in overlapping agencies,” The Jakarta Post, 3 February 2015.
43 Ibid.
44 “Indonesia,” IHS Jane’s World Navies 2014- 2015.
45 “Bakamla to procure new patrol boats in 2017,” The Jakarta Post, 11 December 2016.
46 “Indo Defence 2016: PT Palindo discloses further details of 110 m vessel on order for BAKAMLA, Jane’s Navy International,
4 November 2016.
47 “Head of Bakamla Beberkan Effective Way to Punish Illegal Fishing Actors,”11 July 2017, available at
http://poskotanews.com/2017/07/11/kepala-bakamla-beberkan-cara-efektif-menghukum-pelaku-illegal-fishing/.html.
48 “Malaysia,” IHS Jane’s World Navies 2014- 2015, p. 208.
49 Ibid.
41
42
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and the Indonesian Navy has vast experience of participation in anti-piracy patrols and several
multinational naval exercises including the Milan series and regular coordinated patrols with the
Indian Navy. The MMEA since its inception in 2005 has emerged as a high-profile service in the
region, reporting directly to the Office of the Prime Minister, bypassing the navy and the Ministry
of Defence.50 The MMEA is responsible for maritime security in the Strait of Malacca, relieving
the RMN of much of its earlier tasks. It is also the head of the Maritime Rescue Coordination
Centre and currently operates a sizeable fleet of patrol craft, fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.
Royal Thai Navy (RTN)

The Royal Thai Navy stands out in the Indian Ocean region as the

only navy, besides the Indian Navy, to operate an aircraft carrier, although it has rarely been
exploited to its full potential. The RTN has also participated in the ongoing anti-piracy patrols
under Combined Task Force 151 in 2010 and 2011. In 2012, the RTN acquired an Endurance-class
LPD from Singapore, evidently for HADR purposes and a Chinese offshore patrol vessel in 2013.51
Furthermore, reportedly it is likely to soon procure three submarines from China.52 As discussed
in Chapter 5, the RTN has significant experience of participation in anti-piracy patrols and several
multinational naval exercises including the Milan series and regular coordinated patrols with the
Indian Navy. Given its capability to field an aircraft carrier and the recent acquisition of an LPD,
both of which could be used as command platforms for HADR operations, the RTN is well suited
to participate in regional crisis situations.
Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) Navy

In the past two decades the IRI Navy acquired a lethal

combination of symmetric and asymmetric weapon systems, primarily aimed at challenging the
dominance of the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf.53 The IRI Navy also participated independently
in the anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. It is expected that the recent lifting of trade and
financial sanctions on Iran through the P5+1 talks could pave the way for a greater role for IRI
Navy in the Indian Ocean. As discussed in Chapter 5, notwithstanding the international isolation
of Iran, India has maintained cordial relations with Tehran and kept alive maritime cooperation
through regular interactions. Thus, India could now play an important role in involving the IRI
Navy in regional affairs by inviting them to participate in multinational events. The participation
“Malaysia,” IHS Jane’s World Navies 2014- 2015, p. 208.
“Thailand,” IHS Jane’s World Navies 2014- 2015, p. 312.
52 Prashanth Parameswaran, “Is Thailand Now Serious about Submarines from China?” The Diplomat, 6 July 2016.
53 Abhijit Singh, “Dark Chill in the Persian Gulf: Iran’s Conventional and Unconventional Naval Forces,” Maritime Affairs, Vol.
6, No. 2, 2010, pp. 108-132.
50
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of the IRI Navy in the recent international fleet review hosted by the Indian Navy at
Vishakhapatnam in February 2016 seems to be a step in that direction.54
Egyptian Navy

The Egyptian Navy has traditionally been a two-sea force. However, in recent

years its focus has shifted from a threat perceived from Israel and Libya in the Mediterranean and
the Gulf of Suez, to a wider role in the Red Sea.55 As the largest navy in Africa, Egypt could play
a key role in areas beyond the periphery of the Red Sea. Further, as brought out in Chapter 5, India
could leverage its cordial relations with Egypt to involve the Egyptian Navy in regional matters.
Pakistan Navy

Although India does not share any defence linkages with Pakistan, the Pakistan

Navy is a regarded as a fairly modern and professional service, having made significant
contribution to the ongoing anti-piracy patrols under CTF 150, which senior Pakistani naval
officers have commanded several times.56 As noted earlier, the Pakistan Navy also hosts the Aman
series of multinational naval exercises aimed at enhancing regional cooperation. This expertise
could be harnessed for promoting cooperative endeavours in the Indian Ocean region.
Saudi Arabian Navy

The Saudi Arabian Navy seems to be on the cusp of transformation towards

a “blue water” force. Traditionally the navy was employed in coastal security, however the threat
of Islamic terrorist and piracy activities and tensions with Iran have led to a reappraisal of the
navy’s role and employment.57 The Saudi Arabian Navy has exercised with the U.S., British and
French forces and conducted anti-piracy patrols with other GCC navies. As noted in Chapter 5, it
has also evinced interest in defence cooperation with India. India could thus persuade Saudi Arabia
to play a larger role in the region and facilitate its participation in multinational cooperative efforts.
South African Navy (SAN)

The SAN can be regarded as the most effective naval force in Sub-

Saharan Africa, although it currently seems to be struggling to support its small inventory of four
Valour-class frigates and three submarines with no current plans for major upgradation of forces.58
However, the SAN has been able to maintain relatively high training standards and demonstrate its
competence in multiple international exercises including, as noted earlier in Chapter 5, Exercise
54

Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence (Navy), International Fleet Review 2016, February 2016, available at
https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/international-fleet-review-2016-1.html.
55 “Egypt,” IHS Jane’s World Navies 2014- 2015, pp. 99-102.
56“Pakistan,” IHS Jane’s World Navies 2014-2015, p. 219.
57“Saudi Arabia,” IHS Jane’s World Navies 2014-2015, p. 289.
58“South Africa,” IHS Jane’s World Navies 2014-2015, pp. 165-168.
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Ibsamar with the navies of Brazil and India. Since 2011, SAN has also conducted anti-piracy
patrols in the Mozambique Channel under an agreement with the Mozambique government.59 As
the largest sub-regional maritime power, South Africa has responsibility for maritime SAR for
large parts of the south Atlantic, Indian, and Southern Oceans. Based on the above it could be stated
that the SAN remains a force to be reckoned with and given the necessary funding there is no
reason why the SAN should not be able to build and operate a sizeable balanced fleet by around
2030.60
On the basis of the above inputs it is clear that many Indian Ocean navies besides the Indian Navy
have significant capacity and expertise. Furthermore, several well-developed sub-regional
institutions flourish in the Indian Ocean. Yet, a lack of cooperation between regional navies and
sub-regional institutions precludes closer multilateral cooperation. This is an area where India
could leverage its bilateral relations with the states addressed in the above discussion and play a
larger role in synergizing naval effort. The strategic options before India for strengthening
multilateral maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean region are as discussed in the
following section.

Strategic Options for India to Promote Multilateral Security Cooperation
It is thus a leading argument of this thesis that regional integration and synergised naval capability
in the Indian Ocean is potentially a way forward for more effective regional maritime security, and
this is an area in which India, as the “driver” of IONS and IORA, could play a major role. The
various strategic options for India are discussed next.
Linking IORA with IONS
A key difference between East Asian multilateral institutions and those of the Indian Ocean region
is the lack of direct higher level political leadership in the latter case. As noted by Sam Bateman,
“IONS lacks the political top cover that notionally is provided for the WPNS through APEC and
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the ASEAN Regional Forum.”61 IONS is a gathering of the heads of navies and coast guards while
IORA is largely a gathering of diplomats. Thus, even though there exists enormous scope and
potential for promoting close multilateral cooperation between IORA and IONS, particularly with
the inclusion of “maritime safety and security” into the IORA agenda – making it a common aim
for both – the two main regional institutions seem to be functioning independently. A close and
institutionalised working arrangement would provide significant impetus to maritime security in
the Indian Ocean region and could lead to greater synergy of naval efforts. Some effort in this
direction seems to have been initiated by IORA, evidenced from the Perth communique issued in
November 2013 which stated:
All IORA Member States have a stake as invited participants in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
(IONS). We consider it important that IORA’s work on maritime security and safety and disaster
management align with and complement possible IONS initiatives in these areas, including in
information sharing and other activities with both civilian and non-civilian dimensions.62

This message has been repeated subsequently in the Padang Communique of 2015, for example,
which stated:
We reaffirm our commitment to develop a seamlessly and comprehensively connect and integrate
Indian Ocean Region toward sustainable and balanced economic growth as articulated in our ‘IORA
Maritime Cooperation Declaration’. 63

Notwithstanding the various declarations, not much seems to have progressed in practice, as
demonstrated by the lack of coordination in the initial stages of the MH 370 plane crash search
mission in 2014.64
It is viewed that a melding of the two institutions or a “handshake” could help to achieve greater
synergy of effort. If a merger of the two proves difficult to implement, then an alternative and
comparatively easier approach could be to upgrade IORA to a summit level forum involving heads
Sam Bateman, “The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium-Will the Navies of the Indian Ocean Region Unite?” S. Rajaratnam School
for International Studies Commentary No.35/2008,17 March 2008 cited in C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry
in the Indo-Pacific, Brookings Institute Press, Washington D.C., 2012, p. 225.
62 Indian Ocean Rim Association Council of Ministers, “13th Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Indian Ocean Rim
Association Perth Communiqué,” 1 November 2013, p. 1.
63 Indian Ocean Rim Association Council of Ministers, “The 15th Indian Ocean Rim Association Meeting of the Council of
Ministers Padang Communique,” 23 October 2015, p. 1.
64 Vijay Sakhuja,” Indian Ocean and the IORA: Search and Rescue Operations,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies,
Commentary No. 4724, 3 November 2014.
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of states, with IONS functioning directly under it. This is in line with the proposal for an “Indian
Ocean Assembly,” bringing together Heads of State from the Indian Ocean region, mooted by Sri
Lanka’s President Wickremesinghe at the Indian Ocean Conference in Singapore on 1 September
2016.65 A summit level regional forum would also provide much needed political “top cover” to
IONS. India, Australia and Indonesia are members of the IORA “Troika” (comprising the chair,
vice chair and the previous chair), which is associated with the Council of Ministers and the
Committee of Senior Officials for dealing with important issues, and thus well suited to “nudge”
IORA and IONS closer together.
Milan as a Regional Forum to Promote Multilateralism
In recent years, Milan, the biennial multinational combined naval exercise hosted by the Indian
Navy, seems to have gained far greater popularity than the Kakadu exercise series hosted by
Australia and exercise Aman by Pakistan. This is evidenced from the fact that the 2013 edition of
Kakadu included just eight navies from the Indian Ocean region (though several western Pacific
navies were present) while Aman 2013 included only four, as compared to 17 navies in Milan. The
rapid expansion of Milan since its inception in 1995 and the enthusiastic response of the
participating navies witnessed in the last iteration of the exercise in 2014, appears to indicate that
Milan has the potential to evolve as a regional forum for Indian Ocean navies at the operational
level. Given that nearly half of the 36 Indian Ocean navies and coast guards have participated in
Milan, the exercise could potentially serve as an incubator or an experimental test bed for common
drills and procedures for regional navies. Already common standard operating procedures for
HADR operations are being discussed at IONS. It may therefore be a viable option to test these
drills during the biennial get-together of regional navies under Milan. Indeed, the IONS Charter
envisages the “planning and conduct of ‘Concept-development’ and associated ‘table-top’ and/or
real-world Exercises, focused on HADR.”66
In order to upgrade or expand the existing Milan biennial exercise series to include a majority of
the region’s navies and coast guards, the main task for India would be to encourage participation
by the West Asian navies, which have been conspicuously absent. This may not be a difficult task
Sri Lanka Prime Minister’s Office, “Global Power Transition and the Indian Ocean: Inaugural Address by Hon. Ranil
Wickremesinghe Prime Minister of Sri Lanka at the Indian Ocean Conference on 1st September 2016 at Shangri La Hotel,
Singapore,” available at http://www.pmoffice.gov.lk/download/press/D00000000050_EN.pdf?p=7.html.
66 Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, Charter of Business - Version 1.1, 28 March 2014, p. 5.
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as the Indian Navy has already conducted bilateral naval exercises with several West Asian navies,
including Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and UAE. Arguably, Pakistan would abstain from joining an
India-led initiative, but then it is unlikely to influence a majority grouping. The other challenge
would be costs, as several regional forces would be unable to afford to participate. Here again,
India could help by diverting even a small part of the funds for supporting bilateral ties into such
multilateral initiatives. Once the Milan series has been sufficiently expanded to include a majority
of Indian Ocean maritime security forces, it might help to build regional consensus and even
facilitate an eventual merger between IONS and Milan. This could be accomplished on the lines
of the Asian Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+) model for cooperative activities.67 A
similar idea was first proposed by Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, then Chief of the Australian Navy
during the fourth IONS meeting in 2014. Griggs suggested that IONS must aim to:
…accelerate maturation process of IONS by using as much as we can from like institutions such as
the WPNS and ADMM+ expert working group (EWG) construct. One way to accelerate that
maturation is that we consider introduction of IONS working groups. This is something we have been
able to see in operation in the context of ADMM+, where in just a couple of short years, [these]
working groups have conducted a series of table-top and even field exercises which are of mutual
benefit.68

In order to promote multilateral cooperation within the ASEAN region, the ADMM+ has created
five expert working groups (EWG) including maritime security. Under the ADMM+ member states
have conducted several table top exercises, conferences and combined naval exercises.69
Although Griggs suggested expanding IONS to include combined naval exercise, considering the
success of the Milan series it would perhaps be easier for India to conjoin the Milan with IONS, as
it already includes participation by most leading navies of the region.
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Developing a Regional Track II Forum
Another area where East Asia scores over the Indian Ocean region in terms of “thought leadership”
is a lively Track II mechanism, which by virtue of being unconstrained by limitations of formal
constructs is able to influence and promote sound policy development. This was also an idea
originally proposed by Admiral Arun Prakash, former Chief of the Indian Navy, during the
inaugural IONS conclave in 2008.70An attempt to create a Track II dialogue has been initiated by
a New Delhi-based think tank, the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) to be established under
IORA. India could explore a similar mechanism for IONS using the New Delhi based National
Maritime Foundation currently supported by the Indian Navy, and gradually network with all
relevant think tanks in the Indian Ocean region to create a caucus that could drive further
multilateral cooperation. Further, the ongoing Galle Dialogue needs to be patronised by India in
order to build credible Track II fora for the Indian Ocean region.
Collaboration with Maritime Industry
A key stakeholder in maritime security is the shipping sector. Yet, both IONS and IORA currently
have no institutionalised interaction with the maritime industry. It is widely known that the
shipping industry is multinational in nature with multiple stakeholders. A lesser known and
startling fact about the shipping world is that the largest ship-owners in the world are the Korea
Development Bank and China’s ICBC Leasing Company, financial institutions with absolutely no
connection with seafaring.71 The actual job of running the ships is outsourced to ship management
companies who provide the crew, many from within the Indian Ocean region. Over the last few
years, mainly as a result of the Somali experience, the shipping industry has come a long way in
terms of security and is no longer as vulnerable as it was in the early years of the twenty-first
century, having conveniently outsourced the business of security – as it does with other functions
– to private security companies. Meanwhile, the private security industry has also evolved with
the mushrooming of several security companies, providing a range of services from barbed wire
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Connectivities, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, 2009, pp. 188–189.
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fencing to armed guards and even armed patrol boats for escorting ships through dangerous
waters.72
However, this raises the question of whether navies and other maritime security agencies in the
Indian Ocean are prepared for, or acting consistently with, these changes in the shipping industry.
Apparently not, as IONS has never initiated any interaction with industry. The CEO of a leading
international private security company has complained about the key challenge faced by private
security, stating that a
… lack of regional cooperation creating a plethora of legal and jurisdictional requirements as well as
the lack of acceptance that public-private partnerships are the key to develop a sustainable force
capable of regulating and policing the maritime flank. 73

In the absence of a formal dialogue between the navies of the Indian Ocean and the maritime
industry, several key issues such as the formulation of uniform rules of engagement for armed
guards and guidelines for floating armouries operating on the high seas, a common reporting
system for incidents at sea and demarcation of high risk areas for insurance purposes, remain a
grey area in maritime security. A lack of coordination is evident from a case in India involving the
U.S. ship, MV Seaman Guard Ohio, arrested by Indian authorities in October 2013 along with six
crew members, whilst operating as a floating armoury. The Indian Coast Guard alleged that they
intercepted the ship as it was sailing illegally in Indian waters, while the ship’s owners, AdvanFort,
claim Indian port authorities allowed the vessel to enter port to refuel and shelter from a cyclone.74
With the fate of the ship undecided, the hapless crew remain in detention in India.75 Such situations
could be easily avoided by closer collaboration between navies and coast guards and the maritime
industry under the aegis of IONS. Notwithstanding the legalities involving floating armouries,
such vessels are indeed a cause for concern, and need to be closely monitored. According to former
Indian naval chief, Admiral Sushil Kumar:
Floating armoury is a matter of very serious concern. This is entirely unregulated ... This has very
serious security implications for us including the infiltration of terrorists ... If there are unregulated
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arms and ammunition on a vessel, the existence of weapons is not known as also where guards are
transferring them and this could lead to such a situation on anybody’s soil.76

Given the security scenario in the Indian Ocean, it would be fair to assume that private security
companies, including maritime security firms, are here to stay. Hence there is a need to establish
a proper mechanism for tracking movements of such vessels and armed guards across the entire
region, under a common arrangement.
A part of the blame for this lack of coordination can be apportioned to industry for being
unenthusiastic to engage with government security agencies, which they perceive to have interests
divergent from their commercial interests. Therefore, in order to involve the various stakeholders
in maritime security in the Indian Ocean region, India, being one of the largest contributors of
manpower to the shipping industry and the foremost regional maritime power, is best suited to
initiate a move to establish a public-private partnership through IONS and IORA.
Information Sharing
Multiple maritime information sharing centres have been set up in the region, each representing
slightly disparate interests such as the RSN’s Information Fusion Centre (IFC), the ReCAAP
Information Sharing Centre (ISC), the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) piracy reporting centre
in Kuala Lumpur and various centres in Africa under the Djibouti Code of Conduct. India has also
developed exclusive arrangements with key partners in order to strengthen its own maritime
security, such as the five-nation maritime domain awareness project for sharing shipping
information involving India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles. Furthermore,
as noted in Chapter 5, India also has exclusive information sharing agreements with other states
for the exchange of shipping information. This could be viewed as an India-centric sub-group
evolving within the region and could lead to a similar grouping being formed by China, possibly
involving East African states, thereby dividing the region into two groups. Thus, in the interest of
promoting multilateralism, development of a pan-Indian Ocean maritime domain information
sharing grid involving all regional states and Indian Ocean stakeholders, could be an important
project. India, by virtue of being involved in many regional information sharing arrangements, is
76
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perhaps best suited to take the lead. A proposed project that could be initiated by India to develop
a pan-Indian Ocean information sharing grid for regional maritime domain awareness (MDA) is
discussed in the following chapter.
Dialogue with China
In addition to the options discussed above, it would be prudent for India to clearly acknowledge
China’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean and signal an intent to China for building an
inclusive cooperative framework. The first step towards dialogue with China seems to have been
initiated by India in the form of the first-ever “Maritime Affairs Dialogue” held in New Delhi in
February 2016. This is a recent but seminal event and although not much has been disclosed
officially, the media statements issued by the two sides indicate that maritime security figured
prominently in the talks. The statement released by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs provides
an overview of the agenda:
The dialogue covered issues of mutual interest, including exchange of perspectives on maritime
security, developments in international regimes such as UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 1982) and (the other) IMO (-related treaties) and prospects for maritime
cooperation.77

The news brief from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:

Both sides introduced their respective maritime development strategies and their respective stance and
views on current maritime security situation, and agreed to enhance policy dialogue and expand
practical cooperation in such areas as marine scientific research, navy exchanges, fishery and
navigation in a joint effort to ensure maritime security and harmony. 78

The above statements clearly indicate the scope for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. An
Indian analyst notes that the meeting was an “icebreaker” and symbolic rather than substantive.79

Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Inaugural India-China Maritime Affairs Dialogue,” Media Statement, New
Delhi, 4 February 2016, available at
http://mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/26317/Inaugural+IndiaChina+Maritime+Affairs+Dialogue.html.
78 People’s Republic of China, “China and India Hold First Round of Dialogue on Maritime Cooperation,” Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Media Statement, 6 February 2016, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1339176.html.
79 Gurpreet Khurana, “First China-India Maritime Dialogue: Beyond Icebreaking,” National Maritime Foundation Commentary,
23 February 2016.
77

253

However, the India-China maritime dialogue could emerge as a key forum that could help promote
multilateral security cooperation in the Indian Ocean region.

Conclusion
Combating twenty-first century maritime threats and challenges in the Indian Ocean are far beyond
the capacity of any one country, hence further multilateralisation would be the way ahead. Several
cooperative fora at both regional and sub-regional levels have thus emerged. As the major Indian
Ocean maritime power, India has played an important role in helping to build IORA and IONS, the
two main key institutions for multilateral maritime cooperation. However, as discussed, India’s
desire to retain “control” over these regional institutions coupled with the lack both of institutional
integration and synergy of regional naval resources, seems to hinder progress in multilateral
maritime cooperation. Thus, while the region has all the ingredients for fostering multilateral
maritime cooperation, a region-wide institution is yet to evolve. Clearly, the onus for progressing
regional cooperation remains with India, as a failure of multilateralism in the region could pave the
way for extra-regional powers, including China, to play a larger role in regional affairs. It is also
likely that the India-China rivalry could divide the Indian Ocean region and eventually weaken
overall multilateral efforts. Therefore, it is clear that India must explore opportunities to connect
regional and sub-regional initiatives, synergise regional naval capacity and engage with China and
other states such as Japan, to play a more constructive role in these regional issues. The promotion
of a pan-Indian Ocean maritime domain information sharing grid, for example, linking various
extant information systems in the region and involving all regional states and stakeholders, could
be a crucial project that could help to strengthen trust and collaboration which in turn will help to
foster multilateralism. Such a strategic project might help to create synergies in the maritime
security efforts and resources of all regional states and stakeholders. Eventually, this could help to
improve maritime security in the Indian Ocean region, maintain an overall “favourable
environment” in the region - a key objective of India’s maritime strategy - and even serve as a
confidence building measure to improve overall relations between India and China. In the long
term, this might even lead to the creation of a truly comprehensive regional framework for maritime
security.
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Chapter 8
Pan-Indian Ocean Information Grid

Introduction
Having examined the political aspects of multilateralism in the Indian Ocean, this chapter examines
the technical modalities of implementing a pan-Indian Ocean project that could potentially link all
the regional states and key stakeholders in a common information grid. As noted in the last chapter,
the emergence of various sub-regional institutions in the Indian Ocean region has led to a
proliferation of information centres, often representing different interest groups or stakeholders,.
The commissioning of a maritime information fusion centre on Madagascar in 2015 marks the
latest addition to the Indian Ocean region’s directory of information sharing centres. Other recently
established facilities for monitoring shipping include centres in Yemen, Kenya and Tanzania.
While the mushrooming of information centres in the region clearly indicates a continued focus on
the maritime domain on the part of littoral states, have these developments led to improved
maritime domain awareness (MDA) within the Indian Ocean region? This thesis argues that they
do not, as MDA is not just limited to monitoring vessel movements, but encompasses a much wider
sphere.
Maritime domain awareness, as defined by the U.S. Navy document titled Navy Maritime Domain
Awareness Concept, is the “effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime
domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment” of a state or region.1 The
Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2016 provides a narrower definition of MDA, as “being cognisant of
the position and intentions of all actors, whether own, hostile or neutral, in the constantly evolving
maritime environment in the areas of interest.”2 Broadly, MDA consist of two components:
“situational awareness,” based on what is “observable and known”; and “threat awareness,” based
on what is “anticipated or suspected.”3 Thus, MDA is a state of comprehensive knowledge of the
1
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maritime domain, in near real time and continually maintained, a goal that states can only aspire to
achieve but never fulfill. States, at best, can strive to maintain a credible level of near-constant
“situational awareness,” and specific “threat warning” in their areas of interest for limited periods
of time. Furthermore, MDA is largely unique to each state and although it may contain parts that
could be common to other states or “shareable,” the rest could be of a classified nature which states
conscientiously guard. For instance, movements of crucial cargo such as oil into one’s own ports,
is of strategic importance to all states. Further, private shipping companies may have commercial
interests in keeping confidential the movements of their ships contracted to load cargo, from their
competitors. Even movements of fishing fleets to new fishing grounds is valuable commercial
information. However, information such as meteorological reports in various parts of the ocean,
tsunami warnings and accidents at sea reports, including ship collisions that could lead to oil spills,
is easily “shareable.”
This chapter posits that the proliferation of new information centres in the Indian Ocean has not
effectively translated into improved region-wide MDA, as each information centre represents only
a small piece of the big MDA “jigsaw.” The aim of this chapter is to propose a framework to link
the various information centres into one information grid – a pan-Indian Ocean Information Grid
– that could provide a common maritime picture and related services accessible to all littoral states.
The chapter highlights the role of India as a key member of various sub-regional institutions and
posits that, realistically, only India could take the lead in developing such a pan-Indian Ocean
information grid. This could perhaps be the first step in a bottom-up approach to integrate various
Indian Ocean region sub-regional institutions leading to greater synergy of regional efforts,
something which institutions such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and the Indian
Ocean Rim Association (IORA) have been seeking to achieve. Moreover, as examined in Chapter
2, given the commonality of maritime threats and the lack of adequate maritime surveillance,
regulatory and enforcement capacity, or infrastructure, of most regional states, particularly the
small island states, information sharing is clearly a cost-effective way to maximize maritime
security effectiveness. Better information sharing will help to synergise available regional
resources and efforts that could be crucial in managing future large-scale disasters. This is further
discussed later in the chapter.
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As highlighted in the last chapter, a key challenge for India in promoting maritime security
multilateralism in the Indian Ocean region is to involve all principal stakeholders with strategic or
commercial interests in the region, including extra-regional powers such as China, in a cooperative
framework. A similar predicament, discussed in Chapter 2, of bringing together multiple interest
groups and stakeholders under one common mechanism was faced by states seeking to improve
maritime safety and security in the straits of Malacca and Singapore, in the early years of the
twenty-first century. Here, the sudden spurt in sea robberies and piracy between 2001 to 2003 had
raised concerns about the capacity of regional states to deal with the crisis and, to the consternation
of some littoral states, led to several other stakeholders hankering to provide assistance. However,
this multiple stakeholder problem was settled by the creation of the “cooperative mechanism on
safety of navigation and environment protection in the straits of Malacca and Singapore,” or
Cooperative Mechanism, that reconciled the disparate interests of various stakeholders including
extra-regional user states such as Australia, China, India and Japan, and major shipping companies.
The Cooperative Mechanism was facilitated by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and
included various projects aimed at promoting navigational safety, ship security and environmental
protection in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.4
This chapter seeks to outline an MDA framework for the entire Indian Ocean region, which could
be built by connecting all the extant layers of “shareable” maritime information networks and
resources at the sub-regional and regional levels to create a pan-Indian Ocean region information
grid for use by all regional states and stakeholders. This could be achieved under the aegis of IORA
or IONS, and steered by India in collaboration with Australia, Indonesia, South Africa and other
key players, on similar lines to the IMO-initiated Cooperative Mechanism in the straits. A
functional example of a maritime information grid which could serve as a model for the Indian
Ocean region is the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) Maritime Support Services (MSS)
Network, created in 2002 by integrating various European maritime agencies. The first part of the
chapter discusses extant facilities in the region. Subsequently, it outlines a framework for a panIndian Ocean MDA information grid, on similar lines to the MSS network. Finally, it examines the
modalities of such a project, including scope for funding and participation by various stakeholders.
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Extant Information Systems
Several information systems exist in the Indian Ocean region, including certain global mechanisms
such as the international system for search and rescue at sea and regional systems that have
developed in response to the prevalent threats and challenges of the region. As these are common
to the entire region, they encompass “shareable” information. The various systems presently in
force are listed in Table 8.1 below and discussed later in this section.
Table 8.1. List of Information Systems in the Indian Ocean Region
No.
Organisation
1.
Search and Rescue Convention.5
2.

3.
4.

5.

5

Membership
109 contracting states, including all Indian Ocean rim
states.6
World-Wide Navigational Warning All members of the International Hydrographic
System.7
Organisation (IHO). Includes all Indian Ocean rim
states.8
International Convention on the
163 contracting states, including all Indian Ocean rim
Safety of Life at Sea.9
states.10
The Intergovernmental
Australia, Bangladesh, British Indian Ocean Territory,
Coordination Group for the Indian Comoros, Djibouti, France – Reunion, India, Indonesia,
Ocean Tsunami Warning and
Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives,
Mitigation System.11
Mauritius, Mozambique, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan,
Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri
Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, United Arab
Emirates and Yemen.
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission.12 Australia, China, Comoros, Eritrea, European Union,
France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of
Iran, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Madagascar,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Sultanate
of Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Sudan,
Tanzania, Thailand, United Kingdom and Yemen.

International Maritime Organisation (IMO), International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, As Amended (SAR
1979), Hamburg, 27 April 1979.
6 International Maritime Organisation, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the International
Maritime Organization or Its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or other Functions, London, 12 June 2017, p. 408.
7 International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO), available at
https://www.iho.int/srv1/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=437&Itemid=395&lang=en.html.
8 IHO, “Member States,” available at
https://www.iho.int/srv1/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=452&lang=en.html.
9 International Maritime Organisation (IMO), International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, As amended (SOLAS
1974), London, 1 November 1974.
10 International Maritime Organisation (IMO), Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments, 1 August 2017, p. 16.
11 Indian Ocean Tsunami Information Centre, “Member States,” 1 August, available at http://iotic.ioc-unesco.org/indian-oceantsunami-warning-system/17/member-states.html.
12 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, “Structure of the Commission,” 1 August 2017, available at http://www.iotc.org/aboutiotc/structure-commission.html.
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6.

Indian Ocean Memorandum of
Understanding on Port State
Control.13

7.

Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC),
International Maritime Bureau
(IMB), Malaysia.14
Regional Cooperation Agreement
on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships in Asia
(ReCAAP) Information Sharing
Centre (ISC), Singapore.15
Information Fusion Centre (IFC),
Republic of Singapore Navy.

8.

9.

10.

11.
12.

Australia, Bangladesh, Comoros, Eritrea, France (La
Reunion), India, Iran, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, South
Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Yemen.
A free service supported by the commercial crime
services of the International Chambers of Commerce.
Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
China, Denmark, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Laos,
Myanmar, Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Kingdom,
United States of America and Vietnam.16
12 Indian Ocean states and 11 others including:
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada,
Chile, China, France, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Peru, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand,
United Kingdom, United States of America and
Vietnam.17
Currently operated by the Indian Navy.

Information Management and
Analysis Centre (IMAC), Gurgaon,
India.
UK Maritime Trade Operations
Voluntary reporting organisation.
Centre.18
Maritime IFC, Madagascar, and
Includes liaison officers from 11 states including France
other Information Sharing Centres and several East African states.19
in Yemen, Kenya and Tanzania.

International System for Search and Rescue at Sea
Until the adoption of the search and rescue (SAR) Convention in 1979, there was no international
system for search and rescue operations at sea. While there were certain areas that were covered
by a well-established organisation for providing assistance, promptly and efficiently, extensive
parts of the world oceans had nothing at all. Following the adoption of the SAR Convention in
Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port States Control, “History,” 1 August 2017, available at
http://www.iomou.org/secmain.html.
14 International Maritime Bureau(IMB),”About IMB,” 1 August, available at https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reportingcentre.html.
15 The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), “About
ReCAAP,” 1 August 2017, available at http://www.recaap.org/.html.
16 The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), “About
ReCAAP,” 1 August 2017, available at http://www.recaap.org/.html.
17 Presentation at the Information Fusion Centre, Changi Naval Base, Singapore, 15 December 2016.
18 United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), “About UK MTO,” 1 August 2017, available at
https://www.ukmto.org/.html.
19 Cdr (Retd.) R. Jean Edmond(French Navy), Maritime Information Fusion Centre of Madagascar Project, presentation at
Information Sharing Centre, Singapore, 26 February 2016.
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April 1979, the International Maritime Organization’s Maritime Safety Committee divided the
world’s oceans into 13 search and rescue areas (SRA). Each SRA was further divided into multiple
search and rescue regions (SRR) with earmarked states being accorded responsibilities for
adjoining SRRs.20 The SRRs for the Indian Ocean were finalised at the SAR conference held at
Fremantle, Australia, in 1998.21
In 1998 the SAR Convention was revised with the aim of emphasising a regional approach to SAR
operations and encourage coordination between maritime and aeronautical SAR operations.
Concurrently with this revision, the IMO and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
jointly promulgated the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR)
Manual.22
In 1999, in line with developments in digital and satellite communications technology, the global
maritime distress and safety system (GMDSS) was developed by IMO in order to streamline the
global radio and satellite communication network, so that, regardless of where a ship was in
distress, help could be dispatched. GMDSS was introduced as an amendment to the SOLAS
Convention, Chapter IV, dealing with Radiocommunications.23 Under GMDSS, all passenger
vessels and cargo ships over 300 gross tonnes, are mandated to carry specified satellite and radio
communication equipment, for sending and receiving distress alerts and maritime safety
information, and for general communications.24 The implementation of the system is regarded as
a key milestone in maritime history and a massive achievement in improving the safety of
seafarers.
As noted earlier, the responsibility for SAR operations in each SRR is entrusted to one state, which
is required to set up national systems and arrangements such as Rescue Co-ordination Centres
(RCC) and Rescue Sub-Centres (RSC), SAR facilities and communications in the area, including

20International

Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), available at
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Maritime-Search-and-Rescue(SAR).aspx.html.
21 Ibid.
22 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), International
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual, London, 2016.
23 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Shipping Emergencies - Search and Rescue and the GMDSS, London, March
1999, p. 7.
24International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, As amended (SOLAS
1974), Chapter IV:Radiotelegraphy and Radiotelephony, Parts A to C, Regulations 1 to 19, London, 1 November 1974.
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detailed plans for conducting SAR operations.25 For instance, India is responsible for search and
rescue operations in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea region, for which the Indian
government has set up an RCC located at Port Blair. Australia is responsible for the largest SRR
in the Indian Ocean, spanning about 52.8 million square kilometres or over one-tenth of the earth’s
surface.26 Indian Ocean SRRs are shown in Illustration 8.1 below.
Illustration 8.1 Indian Ocean Search and Rescue Regions27

It is clear from the map above that coordination between various agencies and regional states is
paramount for successful SAR operations and in this regard the SAR convention emphasises

25International

Maritime Organization (IMO), International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, As Amended
(SAR 1979), Chapter 2-Organisation, Hamburg, 27 April 1979
26Commonwealth of Australia,” Australian Search and Rescue Region,” Australian Maritime Safety Organisation, 1 August
2017, available at https://www.amsa.gov.au/search-and-rescue/sar-in-australia/arrangements-in-australia.html.
27 Australian Maritime Security Authority, ”Search and Rescue Regions,” 22 August 2017, available at
https://www.amsa.gov.au/search-and-rescue/australias-search-and-rescue-system/australia-srr/.html.
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cooperation thus:
… unless otherwise agreed between the States concerned, a Party should authorize, subject to
applicable national laws, rules and regulations, immediate entry into or over its territorial sea or
territory for rescue units of other Parties solely for the purpose of searching for the positon of
maritime causalities and rescuing the survivors of such casualties.28

Successful SAR operations are also dependent on capacity in terms of surveillance assets such as
ships, aircraft, satellites and underwater systems. In the Indian Ocean, a majority of the littoral
states lack surveillance assets and equipment for SAR operations, with just a handful being able to
undertake SAR operations on the high seas.29 Thus, as evident from the size of the SRR in the map
above, a large burden of responsibility in the Indian Ocean region is shouldered by a few states,
most notably Australia, India and South Africa. This gap in regional capacity was exposed in the
SAR operations launched following the loss of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 that
disappeared in the Indian Ocean in March 2014. The mystery surrounding the loss of the plane
remains unresolved to date. Inadequate SAR capacity can complicate issues in times of crises. For
instance, apparent gaps in satellite and radar inputs related to the flight path of the ill-fated plane
provided by Malaysia to the Chinese government gave rise to mutual suspicions and skepticism,
with the Chinese media blaming Malaysian authorities for trying to cover up lapses.30 In the wake
of the MH370 incident, the ASEAN Regional Forum issued a statement which called “for regional
countries to strengthen SAR coordination and cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral
levels, including through dialogue and cooperation in ARF.”31 Furthermore, the need to build
regional SAR capability and improve cooperation and coordination amongst regional states was
also highlighted by IORA in the Perth Communique of October 2014.32
Given the increased focus on development of the blue economy, including tourism and increased
air and shipping traffic in the Indian Ocean region, SAR-related activities are likely to remain a

28

International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, As Amended
(SAR 1979), Chapter 3 - Cooperation, Article 3.1.2, Hamburg, 1979.
29 Vijay Sakhuja, “Indian Ocean and the IORA: Search and Rescue Operations,” Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
Commentary No.4724, 3 November 2014.
30 Lindsay Bremner, “Fluid Ontologies in the Search for MH370,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2015, pp.
10-12.
31Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), “Second Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Harmonisation
of Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR),” New Delhi, India, 8-9 April 2016, p. 2.
32 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), “Final Communiqué 14th Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Indian Ocean
Rim Association Perth Communiqué,” 9 October 2014.
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high priority for all regional states. While a global system for distribution of responsibility and
communications is already in place, regional efforts to promote best practices, share technical and
operational information such as drift modelling prediction and tracking, are areas for regional
cooperation.33 This presents an opportunity for regional cooperation in information sharing that
could be promoted within IONS and also serve as a driver for the development of a pan-Indian
Ocean information grid.
World-Wide Navigational Warning Service (WWNWS)
The World-Wide Navigational Warning Service was established on 1 January 1977 under the aegis
of the International Hydrographic Organisation and the IMO, as an internationally coordinated
broadcast service for promulgation of information on worldwide hazards to navigation for
shipping. Under the WWNWS, the world is divided into 21 NAVAREAS, each under a designated
coordinator responsible for collation and assessment of relevant information from various sources
followed by the drafting and broadcast of navigational warnings. The Indian Ocean is covered by
NAVAREAS VII to XI, under South Africa, India, Pakistan, Australia and Japan, respectively. In
1999, following the implementation of GMDSS, a maritime safety information (MSI) service was
introduced to augment WWNWS.34 MSI is a network system of internationally and nationally
coordinated broadcasts containing information which is necessary for safe navigation. It includes
navigational warnings, meteorological information, SAR reports and other safety information.
Under the MSI service, navigational warning and other messages are transmitted by satellite
(NAVTEX) and radio (SafetyNET).35
Over the years, MSI has improved and evolved as a highly reliable and effective system of
providing information to mariners at sea. However, the weak link in the entire system remains the
collection of up-to-date information. Clearly, for the MSI system to be successful, the NAVAREA
coordinators must receive the latest information pertaining to navigational hazards from multiple
sources covering the entire ocean. However, within the Indian Ocean region, several littoral states
lack surveillance capacity and thus potential hazards to shipping across large areas remain
Jim Young, General Manager (SAR) AMSA, “Regional Cooperation in Search and Rescue (SAR) Operations - An Australian
Perspective,” IORA Dialogue 2015, Perth, 6 September 2015.
34 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Amendments to Resolution A.705(17) – Promulgation of Maritime Safety
Information, Maritime Safety Committee, 9 December 2008, pp. 1-6.
35 Ibid, p. 4.
33

263

unreported. For instance, in 2011, MV Pavit, a Panama-flagged oil tanker carrying over ten tonnes
of fuel oil, drifted from Ras-Al-Madrakah in Oman across hundreds of miles in the Arabian Sea
following engine failure and flooding of its engine room, finally running aground at Mumbai.36
The crew had abandoned the ship and the onboard communication and tracking systems were
probably inoperative. Apparently, the ship owners were under the impression that the ship had been
sunk while the vessel drifted as a derelict across the busy shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean for
several days unobserved!
A pan-Indian Ocean information grid could help to improve surveillance and by linking the
NAVAREA coordinators to the information grid, the existing mechanism for receiving current
information on navigational hazards could be significantly enhanced.
Automatic Identification System (AIS)
The ship automatic identification system (AIS) was brought into force by IMO on 31 December
2004 under SOLAS Convention Chapter V, Regulation 19, dealing with “Carriage requirements
for shipborne navigational systems and equipment.” It was designed as a mechanism primarily
aimed at enhancing safety of life at sea, the safety and efficiency of navigation, and the protection
of the marine environment.37 The implementation of AIS was moved forward by a few years
following the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Its introduction was a major breakthrough in
maritime safety, making available for the first time real-time, openly accessible vessel tracking
information, vital for collision avoidance and vessel traffic management systems. It allows for
remote tracking and unique identification of ships at sea, and also provides other basic information
such as type of cargo and destination. The IMO defines AIS as a ship and shore-based broadcast
system, operating in the very high frequency (VHF) maritime band, designed to be capable of
providing information about the ship to other ships and to coastal authorities automatically. IMO
regulations require that the AIS systems of SOLAS-regulated ships:
•

Provide information –including the ship's identity, type, position, course, speed,
navigational status and other safety-related information – automatically to appropriately
equipped shore stations, other ships and aircraft;

“Another Ship Stuck at Mumbai's Juhu Beach,” NDTV, 31 July 2011.
International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, As amended,
Chapter V, Regulation 19.2 - Carriage requirements for shipborne navigational systems and equipment, London, 1974.
36
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•
•
•

Receive automatically such information from similarly fitted ships;
Monitor and track ships; and
Exchange data with shore-based facilities.38

There are two types of AIS, classes “A” and “B.” Class “A” AIS is mandated for vessels of 300
gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage
and upwards not engaged on international voyages and passenger ships, irrespective of size, which
carry more than 12 passengers.39 Smaller vessels such as pleasure craft and fishing boats, and other
non-SOLAS-regulated ships, may carry AIS Class “B,” but this is dependent upon the rules of the
coastal state or national, sub-national or regional regulatory authority for particular vessels. It is
not required by international regulation.
Considering the range limitations of VHF-based AIS and with a view to enhance ship reporting
systems in the wake of 9/11, IMO introduced a new regulation for long-range identification and
tracking (LRIT) using satellite communication. LRIT was officially implemented on 1 July 2009.40
It is a system requiring vessels to automatically transmit their identity, position and the date and
time of position every six hours via satellite links. This information is made available only to flag
states in respect of their vessels, which can be shared, for a cost, with coastal states only when the
ship passes within 1,000 nautical miles of their coastline. These restrictions were put in place given
the political sensitivities involved in unrestricted sharing of vessel position data.41
However, this restriction is now practically redundant with the availability of satellite-AIS data
commercially. The use of satellite-mounted receivers to capture VHF signals (that have limited
detection ranges from land) has since enabled unrestricted access to vessel data. The United States
has been a key proponent of satellite AIS, prompted by concerns of maritime terrorism, 42 and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Over the years, primarily as a result of trade interests,
AIS has evolved into a versatile and popular tool for tracking ships globally, widely used not only
38

International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, As amended,
Chapter V, Regulation 19: Carriage requirements for shipborne navigational systems and equipment, London, 1974.
39 Commonwealth of Australia, ”Navigation Services,” Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), 1 August 2017, available at
https://www.amsa.gov.au/navigation/services/ais/html.
40 International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, As amended,
Chapter V, Regulation 19-1: Long Range Identification and Tracking of Ships, London, 1974.
41 Chris Rahman, “The International Politics of Combating Piracy in Southeast Asia,” in Peter Lehr, Violence at Sea: Piracy in the
Age of Global Terrorism, Routledge, London, 2007, p. 184.
42 Rahman, “The International Politics of Combating Piracy in Southeast Asia,” p. 184.
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by commercial firms but also by government agencies. Several companies such as IHS, 43 Lloyd’s
List Intelligence,44 and Marine Traffic,45 provide global AIS data obtained from private terrestrial
stations and satellites. IMO has officially condemned public display of such AIS information by
websites such as marinetraffic.com, noting that it could compromise ship security. 46 Furthermore,
IMO guidelines allow ships’ masters to exercise the option of switching off onboard AIS if they
feel that continual operation may compromise the ship’s safety and security. 47 However, the
demand for ship tracking services by ship and port agents, bunkering agents, commodity traders,
port authorities, banks (which finance global trade) and government safety and security agencies
has led to a spurt in companies providing global AIS information services for a price.
The Intergovernmental Coordination Group for the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and
Mitigation System (ICG/IOTWS)
This agency was formed in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004. The IOTWS
was formed under the aegis of the UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
(IOC/UNESCO) and is linked with the Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre (PWTC) and Japan
Meteorological Agency (JMA).48 The IOTWS has 28 members from the Indian Ocean region, with
Australia, India and Indonesia the three primary sources for tsunami advisories. In India, the Indian
National Centre for Ocean Information Services (INCOIS) is the lead agency responsible for
providing tsunami warning.49 Similarly, the lead meteorological agency in each country is
connected to IOTWS. Thus, by connecting all the apex meteorological agencies in the Indian Ocean
region, the IOTWS, besides providing tsunami warnings is also a rich source of a wide range of
meteorological services and climatic information such as cyclone warning and storm surges. The
IOTWS provides tsunami warning bulletins and conducts several training programmes and
exercises for member states. However, there is no indication of any engagement between IOTWS
and IORA or IONS, under which humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) cooperation
is a key priority. It is thus considered that by linking IOTWS to regional maritime security agencies

43

IHS Markit, 10 August 2017, available at https://www.ihs.com/index.html.
Lloyds List Intelligence, 10 August 2017, available at https://nextgen.lloydslistintelligence.com/vessels/.html.
45 Marine Traffic, 10 August 2017, available at http://www.marinetraffic.com/.html.
46 AMSA, “Automatic Identification System,” 1 August 2017, available at https://www.amsa.gov.au/navigation/services/ais/.html.
47 Ibid.
48 Indian Ocean Tsunami Information Centre, available at http://iotic.ioc-unesco.org/indian-ocean-tsunami-warningsystem/16/what-is-iotws.html.
49 Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services, available at http://www.incois.gov.in/portal/activity.
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and navies through IORA and/or IONS, the entire region could be better prepared to deal with
HADR operations.
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC)
The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) is an important, albeit low profile, intergovernmental
organisation responsible for the management, conservation and sustainable development of tuna
and tuna-like species in the Indian Ocean. The IOTC is open for all Indian Ocean regional states
and other states with an interest in fishing in the Indian Ocean. Currently, as indicated in the earlier
table, the IOTC has 31 members including 23 Indian Ocean rim states.50 Broadly, the charter of
IOTC is to ensure conservation and optimum utilisation of the fish stocks in the Indian Ocean for
long term sustainability. The IOTC is thus mandated to monitor illegal, unreported and unregulated
(IUU) fishing activities, including fishing vessels, operating in the region.51
IUU fishing is a major maritime challenge in the Indian Ocean and pertinently, as noted in Chapter
2, the emergence of piracy off Somalia was directly related to IUU fishing in Somali waters. The
unchecked rise in IUU fishing in the Indian Ocean over the past several years has led to several
key fish stocks such as the yellow-fin tuna having declined to below minimum sustainable levels.
This situation indicates that the IOTC has not performed its duties as envisaged. 52 In 2013, a
Greenpeace International mission spent two months in the Indian Ocean documenting and exposing
many loopholes in fisheries management and illegal fishing practices, presenting its findings to the
IOTC. However, reportedly the organisation paid no attention, with Greenpeace condemning them
for failing to prevent a decline in the region’s most vulnerable tuna species and for its inability to
undertake adequate measures to protect sharks.53
Manifestly, IOTC is constrained by capacity to monitor its vast area of competence to keep track
of fishing activities, a formidable task even for coast guards and navies. Furthermore, several
regulatory actions by the IOTC such as boarding and inspecting fishing vessels fall under port state
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, “Commission Contracting Parties (Members),” 22 February 2016, available at
http://www.iotc.org/about-iotc/structure-commission.html.
51 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, “Resolution 15/04 Concerning the IOTC Record of Vessels Authorised to Operate in the IOTC
Area of Competence,” 10 September 2015.
52 Sampan Panjarat, “The Tuna Resource Management in the Indian Ocean: The Challenges for the Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission,” Thailand Department of Fisheries, 2009, p. 3.
53Dianne Mc Alpine, “Indian Ocean Tuna Commission - Where to from Here,” Greenpeace International, 13 May 2013, available
at http://www.greenpeace.org/africa/en/News/Blog/indian-ocean-tuna-commission-where-to-from-he/blog/45111/.html.
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and flag state responsibility, an area where the Indian Ocean states have a poor record.54 This is
discussed in detail later in the chapter. In contrast, the South Pacific Regional Fisheries
Management Organisation (SPRFMO), set up in 2006 by Australia, Chile and New Zealand,55 and
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) established in 2004,56 have
achieved significant success in curbing illegal fishing in the Pacific Ocean. The WCPFC has
successfully implemented an effective vessel monitoring system (VMS) for keeping track of
fishing activities, including maintaining an updated database of annual fish catch for various
species. Under the WCPFC VMS, all fishing vessels are required to install a position transmitter
that enables officials to ensure compliance with area closures and other restrictions.57 The WCPFC
also works in close collaboration with navies and coast guards, which routinely board and inspect
fishing vessels to enforce regulations.
The IOTC is yet to implement a VMS for the Indian Ocean region. It has also been unable to
institutionalise a mechanism for operational level interaction with regional coast guards and navies.
The IOTC could function more effectively by working in close collaboration with IORA and IONS,
which, as argued in this thesis, should have greater overall responsibility for regional maritime
security, of which IUU fishing is a sub-set and an area of common interest among all Indian Ocean
states. By linking the IOTC to both regional institutions, particularly the navies under IONS, via
the pan-Indian Ocean information grid, an Indian Ocean VMS could become a viable option
supported by various regional maritime agencies.
Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (IOMOU)
An idea for regional cooperation within the Indian Ocean rim states to control movements of substandard ships in the region was first mooted by India in 1997. Subsequent efforts by the IMO,
with support from the government of India. India hosted the preparatory meeting and set up a
secretariat for the organisation in Goa), leading to the drafting of the MoU for port state control
(PSC). Port state control is a mechanism for the inspection of ships in ports by state agencies to
Sam Bateman, “Maritime Security and Port State Control in the Indian Ocean Region,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region,
Vol. 8, No. 2, December 2012, pp. 188-201.
55 South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO), available at https://www.sprfmo.int/data/datasubmission/.html.
56 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), available at https://www.wcpfc.int/about-wcpfc.html.
57 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), Commission VMS Standard Operating Procedures, Pohnpei, April
2009, pp. 4-10.
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ensure that sub-standard ships (ships that do not comply with required IMO environmental
regulations and international standards of safety and seamanship) do not operate in the region. Substandard ships are not only vulnerable to piracy and armed attacks but also pose a threat to the
safety of crew and the environment, and are more likely to participate in crimes. 58 The IOMOU
came into force in April 1999 and initial signatories included Australia, Eritrea, India, Sudan, South
Africa and Tanzania.59 Currently, 17 Indian Ocean states60 are parties to the IOMOU while Ethiopia
and Madagascar are observer states.61 Under the Memorandum, each national authority is required
to establish and maintain an effective PSC regime. The mission of the IOMOU is “to promote the
effective implementation of an improved and harmonized system of port State control by uniform
application, of relevant IMO/ILO instruments on ships operating in the region.”62
Currently there are ten such PSC MoUs in force, including the Paris and Tokyo MOUs and the
U.S. Coast Guard, which are regarded as the most efficient and effective regimes. 63 The IOMOU
is much less effective, with certain important shipping countries such as Pakistan, Madagascar,
Myanmar and the Seychelles remaining outside the MoU, while many member states don’t take
their role seriously.64 For instance, in 2010, four states – Bangladesh, Eritrea, Maldives and Oman
– did not report any inspection activity throughout the year; their subsequent record from 2011 to
2015 shows only a slight increase.65 The effectiveness of the Western and Tokyo MoUs has led to
many of sub-standard ships being pushed away from Europe and America towards Indian Ocean
ports, which are generally considered lax, with a few exceptions such as Australia. Thus,
ineffectiveness of the IOMOU is evidently linked to the high rate of maritime crime in the region.
The Indian government has taken several initiatives to improve PSC in the region and the IOMOU
conducts regular training workshops and conferences for member states. The IOMOU also
maintains the Indian Ocean computerised information system (IOCIS), a dynamic database
Bateman, “Maritime Security and Port State Control in the Indian Ocean Region,” p. 189.
Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (IOMOU), “History,” available at
http://www.iomou.org/historymain.html.
60Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (IOMOU), Annual Report 2015, Goa, 2016, p. 6.
61 Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control observer organisations include the Black Sea
Memorandum of Understanding, Riyadh Memorandum of Understanding, Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding, West and
Central Africa Memorandum of Understanding, IMO, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the U.S. Coast Guard and
Equasis.
62 Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (IOMOU), Annual Report 2015, p. 6.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (IOMOU), “Port State Inspections Carried Out by
Authorities (From 1 Jan 2011 to 31 Dec 2015),” available at http://www.iomou.org/iomoureports/php/Reortsindex.php.html.
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containing comprehensive information about the global merchant fleet, various ports of the world,
reports on ship inspections, detentions and arrests.66 IOCIS receives data from multiple sources
from commercial as well as government agencies, and is thus a valuable source of information.
IOCIS information could be used by regional coast guards, ports and customs authorities and even
navies for profiling ships based on their track record of PSC inspections and detentions; a valuable
input for maritime security and, therefore, a vital element of a pan-Indian Ocean information grid.
Regional Information Centres
As highlighted earlier in this chapter, the Indian Ocean region has several sub-regional institutions
with various stakeholders involved. Consequently, numerous information centres, with
overlapping roles, have emerged, each designed to serve a particular interest group. The key
information centres in the Indian Ocean region are described in the following paragraphs.
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC), Malaysia

The International

Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) was established in 1992 as an independent and
non-governmental agency based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It aims “to raise awareness within
the shipping industry of high risk areas with pirate attacks and specific ports/anchorages where
armed robberies on board ships have occurred.”67 The PRC is a commercial venture providing free
information and alerts about global maritime piracy, armed attacks on ships and other fraud and
crime related to the shipping business. The IMB itself is a specialised division of the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), established in 1981 “to act as a focal point in the fight against all
types of maritime crime and malpractice”;68 and thus represents commercial interests.
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
(ReCAAP) Following the growing prominence of the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre it was felt

that its obvious commercial bias tended to exaggerate maritime security risks in the region. This
was greatly resented, especially by the straits states, which had stepped up anti-piracy efforts
leading to improved security. This promoted the idea for an alternate inter-governmental agency to
monitor piracy and armed attacks on ships. Japan, as a key stakeholder in regional maritime
66
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security, seized this opportunity and took the lead in formulating the Regional Cooperation
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). 69 A
proposal for combined patrols in the Strait of Malacca had been earlier mooted by Japan’s Prime
Minister Koizumi in 2001 following the “Tokyo Appeal,” a call for cooperation to combat piracy
and armed robbery at sea, and the Model Action Plan of 2000, both outcomes of high-level
conferences on piracy and sea robbery held in Tokyo. 70 An information sharing centre (ISC) was
set up under ReCAAP in Singapore in 2007. The ISC is jointly manned by Coast Guard officers
from member states and provides regular incident reports and alerts for shipping, and facilitates
exchange of information among ReCAAP member states through a secure web-based information
network system. A notable success of ReCAAP since its inception has been its role in facilitating
the creation of another IFC at Madagascar under the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) of 2009.
According to a ReCAAP report:
The Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the
Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Djibouti Code of Conduct), adopted on 29 January 2009
in Djibouti, with 20 signatory states was inspired by the ReCAAP and emulated it as its model. As a
preceding entity of a kind, ReCAAP has not only been emulated by the DCoC member states but also
done its best in providing assistance in their setup and operations by sharing its experience and
expertise for more than five years under the auspices of the IMO.71

ReCAAP has not only provided training and expertise in setting up the Information Sharing Centres
in Africa, but also shares regular information between the centres.
The primary aim of ReCAAP is to “to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed
robbery in Asia.”72 The ISC reports provide a more nuanced reporting of security incidents, taking
into consideration the violence factor and the economic aspects of various incidents or crimes.73
Republic of Singapore Navy Information Fusion Centre (IFC)

As part of Singapore’s strategy to

foster regional collaboration in ensuring regional security, the Information Fusion Centre (IFC)
69
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was inaugurated in April 2009. It has since evolved to become a multinational maritime security
centre with representatives from 23 countries. The primary aim of the IFC is to achieve early
warning of threats through collective awareness and sense-making, and provide actionable
information for regional responses against maritime security threats. The IFC has institutionalised
linkages for information sharing with over 78 agencies in 38 countries. The information received
is fused into its open and analysed shipping information system (OASIS) database.74 OASIS is also
integrated with the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) Regional Maritime Information
Exchange (ReMIX) and the Malacca Straits Patrols Information System.75
Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC), Gurgaon, India

This is a newly

established Indian Navy information centre, integrating the Indian coastal radar and AIS network.76
As noted in Chapter 5, this network is also connected to AIS stations being set up in Sri Lanka, the
Maldives, the Seychelles and Mauritius.
UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)

The UKMTO office in Dubai administers a voluntary

reporting scheme, under which merchant vessels are encouraged to send regular reports in the
piracy high risk area (HRA) of the Indian Ocean region bounded by the Suez Canal, 78° East and
10° South. The office tracks vessels and shares the information with the Combined Maritime Force
(CMF) and E.U. headquarters.77 The UKMTO also acts as the primary point of contact for merchant
vessels and liaison with military forces in the region. It is thus best suited to pass tactical
information affecting commercial traffic directly to the ships, rather than routing the information
via company offices, thereby improving responsiveness to any incident and saving crucial time.78
Madagascar IFC and Other Information Sharing Centres in Yemen, Kenya and Tanzania

An

Information Fusion Centre was established in 2015 in Antananarivo, Madagascar, under the EU
“Piracy, Maritime Awareness and Risks - Maritime Security” (PMAR-MASE) project. It is aimed
at building capacity for maritime domain awareness in respect of the East and Southern African

Based on the author’s interaction with IFC officials at Changi, Singapore, during fieldwork carried out in August 2016.
Ministry of Defence, Singapore, “Inauguration of the Information Fusion Centre (IFC),” 27 April 2009, available at
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2009/apr/27apr09_nr.html#.VsprIfl96Ul.
76 Government of India, Ministry of Defence, “Coastal Security Network Must Ensure Zero Tolerance to Error: Parrikar,” 23
November 2014.
77 UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), available at http://www.mschoa.org/on-shore/links.html.
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states and western Indian Ocean island countries.79 The European Union has committed €37 million
towards improving maritime security in the region.80 As noted earlier, the new IFC was established
in close collaboration with ReCAAP and thus has many similarities with the ReCAAP ISC. Its area
of interest includes the western Indian ocean region bounded by 20° East, 76.5° East, 26° North
and 37° South. It works in close collaboration with information sharing centres (ISC) in Yemen,
Kenya and Tanzania, and it is manned by a team of international liaison officers from several
countries.81
It is thus quite clear that the Indian Ocean region has a multiplicity of information centres
representing different interest groups, including commercial entities and even extra-regional
powers such as Japan, United States and the European Union. It is also evident that a majority of
the information centres discussed have overlapping geographical areas of interest. This provides
ample scope for integrating their collective output into one grid. It is thus opined that combining
the data from these centres into a common information grid accessible to all regional states and
other key stakeholders, including extra-regional states, could be a useful and challenging project
that could best be done under the aegis of IORA or IONS. As discussed in Chapter 5, and clearly
evident from Table 8.1, India is a member of all sub-regional fora and also has long standing
security ties with a large majority of regional states including recent bilateral information sharing
agreements. Furthermore, in addition to being the largest regional maritime power, India is also a
leader in science and technology. Therefore, India seems best suited to take the lead in creating a
common maritime information grid for the benefit of all.
Future Surveillance Systems
A potential pan-Indian Ocean information grid must also cater to various emerging technologies
and mechanisms such as unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and employment of commercial ships
and aircraft to augment regional surveillance efforts. Unmanned aerial systems involve
technologies that have rapidly gained salience. While the use of unmanned aerial systems for ocean
surveillance by the military has existed for a few years, the wider use of such machines as a tool
79European
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for effective maritime governance is a relatively new development. Reportedly, EMSA has
advocated the use of “emission-sniffing” drones to clamp down on sulphur emissions from ships
to monitor compliance with new IMO guidelines.82 EMSA has also proposed the use of unmanned
aerial surveillance to gather information on small boats and vessels, following the recent influx of
refugees and other migrants from the Middle East and Africa via the Mediterranean. 83 Similarly,
unmanned aerial systems could be deployed in the Indian Ocean region, perhaps under the aegis of
IONS, to monitor movements of small boats at vulnerable choke points and to assist with
compliance and law enforcement functions.
In addition to the use of unmanned platforms, the use of commercial platforms such as ships and
aircraft provided by private security contractors is another mechanism that could be linked to the
information grid. As noted earlier in Chapter 5, Mauritius, the Maldives and the Seychelles are
dependent upon the Indian Navy for surveillance in their waters. It is unlikely that the Indian Navy
can sustain constant surveillance efforts outside Indian waters for the long term. Consequently,
large swathes of the Indian Ocean may continue to have limited surveillance. A durable and longterm solution to this problem could lie in a public-private partnership involving the use of
commercial platforms manned by armed forces personnel from the regional states. Pertinently,
private contractors have been employed successfully by the Royal Navy to conduct ship
surveillance missions in the English Channel and this option is also being considered by the
Australian government for supporting the Pacific island countries.84
Therefore, the integration of unmanned aerial systems and commercial platforms with the other
information systems could improve overall regional maritime surveillance efforts.
Other Sources Furthermore, additional layers of intelligence from satellite imagery, details of

logistics and medical facilities that could be deployed, as examples, could be included into the panIndian Ocean information grid in order to assist SAR and HADR operations.

Gary Peters, “How Drones Are Changing the Maritime Industry,” available at http://www.ship-technology.com, 18 May 2016.
Ibid.
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Advantages of a pan-Indian Ocean Information Grid
Integration of the various information centres into a common grid will help to improve Indian
Ocean MDA, with the various systems complementing each other to fill in any “information gaps.”
Moreover, several Indian Ocean littoral and island states have limited maritime security capacity
and could benefit from cooperative surveillance and monitoring to expand their coverage and
receive up-to-date maritime services not otherwise available. This would help to improve maritime
governance. and, by networking all the sub-regional monitoring facilities, many of which are
integrated with regional maritime agencies, regional maritime coordination could be improved.
A hypothetical scenario involving a collision between two tankers, or even a terrorist attack on a
vessel resulting in a massive spill heading towards land with a storm warning restricting SAR
operations, situations which can’t be regarded as implausible in the Indian Ocean, would clearly
involve multiple maritime agencies and interests. Maritime accidents resulting in oil spills can
have huge environmental and economic impacts, far beyond the capacity of any one state.
Therefore a pan-Indian Ocean information grid could synergise regional efforts and enhance
interagency coordination to streamline future operations. Pertinently, the European Maritime
Safety Agency, discussed below, was established due to the political impetus resulting from two
major maritime disasters: the Erika (1999) and the Prestige (2002) accidents. The oil spills
resulting from these maritime casualties damaged thousands of kilometres of pristine European
Atlantic coastline causing grave harm to the local fishing and tourism industries.85 Finally,
integrating the Indian Ocean states’ maritime interests via an information grid would help to build
mutual confidence and assist in promoting multilateralism: a key challenge facing the region.

Mechanism for Establishing a Pan-Indian Ocean Information Grid
It has thus been established that the various information centres functioning in the region have
been operating almost independently, with limited institutional linkages to each other. Since these
centres originated in response to specific situations or sub-regional requirements, the key challenge
would be to bring together not just the various systems but also involve all the principal
85
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stakeholders in regional security, including relevant extra-regional states and the shipping industry,
with its varied commercial interests.
As highlighted earlier in the chapter, India is a common factor in all the diverse regional
organisations in the Indian Ocean. India has also been at the forefront of both IONS and IORA
and has always been closely involved with various regional groupings. Furthermore, it has
developed significant bilateral security ties with almost all Indian Ocean states. However, as
analysed in Chapters 5 and 7, India’s insular approach to regional security and efforts to emerge
as the sole “net security provider” could be unsustainable and eventually weaken multilateralism,
thereby facilitating a larger role by the PLA Navy. Thus, by taking the lead in initiating a panIndian Ocean information grid as a form of inclusive regional multilateralism, formally involving
relevant stakeholders, including China, India could both promote regional security and strengthen
its own position.
EMSA Maritime Support Services (MSS) Network: A Model Maritime Information Grid?
The European Maritime Safety Agency provides technical and scientific assistance to the
European Commission and all EU member states on matters relating to the implementation of the
Commission’s integrated maritime policy. As an operational agency of the European Union,
“EMSA has in-depth understanding of the maritime situation in and around EU waters.”86 In order
to achieve this level of maritime domain awareness, EMSA hosts multiple maritime information
systems such as vessel traffic reports (LRIT, SafeSeaNet), satellite monitoring (CleanSeaNet), and
Port State Control (Thetis).87 This integrated “information grid” provides relevant services
covering maritime safety and security, fisheries control, defence, customs, maritime law
enforcement and environment protection. The maritime services are available to all EU member
states, non-EU states and maritime institutions through the MSS network maintained by EMSA.
EMSA’s MSS network is a highly integrated and evolved information grid covering all European
ports and maritime areas. Obviously, this is the result of an integrated maritime policy wherein all
EU member states have agreed to share their information systems. In contrast, the Indian Ocean
“Integrating Data for a More Safe, Secure and Clean Maritime Environment,” European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA),
available at http://www.emsa.europa.eu/.html.
87 Ibid.
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region is faced with multiple challenges and regional states don’t have a common maritime policy.
Nevertheless, the MSS network is perhaps the most functional and integrated multinational
maritime information grid globally and thus it provides a useful model for emulation in the Indian
Ocean.
Framework
A broad framework incorporating the various sources of information is diagrammatically depicted
in Figure 8.2 below.
Figure 8.2 - Pan Indian Ocean Information Grid

Emulating the Cooperative Mechanism in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
As noted earlier in the Chapter, in 2004 Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia established a
Cooperative Mechanism for promoting safety of navigation and environmental protection in the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore.88 The Cooperative Mechanism is the main platform for the
straits states, user states, stakeholders and industry to conduct dialogue, exchange information and
share their valuable perspectives on important issues in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. It
was launched in September 2007 following a series of IMO-sponsored meetings on the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore under the IMO’s “Protection of Vital Shipping Lanes” initiative. The
creation of the Cooperative Mechanism was a key event for the international maritime community
88
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as it put into operation, for the first time, “the spirit and intent of Article 43 of the United Nations
Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS).”89 Article 43 encourages user states and states bordering
a strait used for international navigation to cooperate in the establishment and maintenance of
navigational and safety aids and work towards prevention, reduction and control of pollution from
ships.90 The mechanism functions directly under a Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG)
jointly led by the three littoral states and has the following three constituent parts:
•

Cooperation Forum This forum includes user states, the shipping industry and other

stakeholders invited for discussion with the littoral states. It serves to promote general
dialogue and exchange of views on issues of common interest in the straits and is also a
“useful avenue for the littoral states to ascertain feedback from users of the Straits on a
coordinated basis.”91 It is also used to generate new ideas to further enhance safety and
environmental protection.
•

Project Coordination Committee (PCC) This committee comprises the littoral states and

sponsors of projects to oversee the coordination and implementation of various projects.
The PCC allows sponsors to have a role in overall project planning and implementation.
Some of the projects agreed to in principle include removal of wrecks in the traffic
separation scheme area; cooperation and capacity building on hazardous and noxious
substance preparedness and response; a demonstration project for class “B” AIS
transponders on small ships; setting up of a tide, current and wind measurement system for
the straits; and replacement and maintenance of aids to navigation in the straits and
replacement of aids to navigation destroyed or damaged by the tsunami of December
2004.92
•

Aids to Navigation Fund The purpose of the Aids to Navigation Fund is to receive direct

financial contributions from user states and other parties for installation and maintenance

“Establishment of the Cooperative Mechanism,” 1 August 2017, available at http://www.cmsoms.com/index.php?p=td&id=6.html.
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December 1982, Article 43 “Navigational and safety aids and other improvements and the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution.”
91 “Cooperation Forum,” 1 August 2017, available at http://www.cm-soms.com/index.php?p=component-info&id=2.html.
92 “Project Coordination Committee,” 1 August 2017, available at http://www.cm-soms.com/index.php?p=componentinfo&id=8.html.
89

278

of aids to navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Contributions to the Fund are
voluntary and could originate from states, inter-governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations, industry and private benefactors.93
The success of the Cooperative Mechanism lies in the fact that it was the first formal
implementation of UNCLOS Article 43, bringing together various stakeholders onto a common
platform where they could voice their apprehensions or views on various aspects of maritime
safety and security. At the same time, it permitted the littoral states to maintain strategic autonomy
in straits affairs. However, the Cooperative Mechanism has not been without problems and interest
in the institution seems to be declining in terms of contributions to the aids to navigation fund or
participation by various stakeholders.94 This could be attributed to the overall decline in the
maritime sector following the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, this mechanism is worthy of
emulation in the Indian Ocean and a similar initiative led by India in close collaboration with the
maritime agencies of other prominent Indian Ocean states potentially could be considered under
the aegis of IORA. States could be brought together into one Regional Experts Group mimicking
the TTEG to oversee all aspects of information sharing involving extra-regional partners and other
stakeholders. And an Indian Ocean Cooperative Forum comprising all relevant Indian Ocean
maritime security partners, such as the United States, China and Japan, and the shipping industry,
could serve as the platform for discussions on issues of common interest as well as exchange of
information.
Infrastructure
The extant infrastructure for information sharing in the form of information centres which are
already integrated with maritime agencies at the sub-regional level, makes it possible to create a
functional pan-Indian Ocean information grid in a relatively short period, with minor upgrades or
improvements. Further, recent advances in commercial information technologies such as “big data
analytics” and “enterprise resource planning” tools and platforms that have allowed large
organisations to integrate multiple sources of data, bringing together disparate pieces of

“Aids to Navigation Fund,” 1 August 2017, available at http://www.cm-soms.com/index.php?p=ext-page&id=4&ep=1.html.
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information into a unified environment, provide readymade options.95 Such solutions have been
used successfully across multiple sectors such as urban transportation systems, ports and shipping,
disaster planning and healthcare services. Thus, by incorporating commercial technologies, a stateof-the-art pan-Indian Ocean information grid could be developed for use by the entire region.
Moreover, the information could also be shared with the regional Track 2 forum as suggested in
the previous chapter, for comprehensive analysis that could guide policy formulation.
Funding
Upgrades to existing infrastructure, use of private contractors to carry out regular aerial and ship
surveillance missions and the creation and maintenance of a pan-Indian Ocean information grid
will obviously incur significant costs. Once again, instead of creating a new venture, the IORA
Special Fund could be used for this purpose. The Special Fund was created in 2008 and has been
financed by contributions from all member states, dialogue partners and observers. The total fund
corpus is presently limited, totaling around $2 million, with India being the largest donor with a
total contribution of $1,050,000, followed by U.A.E. with a contribution of $500,000 and China
with a total contribution of $200,000.96 Many leading dialogue partners such as France, Japan, the
United States and the United Kingdom have evidently not contributed to the fund. So far, over six
projects have been undertaken utilising about $165,000, covering areas such as tourism, fisheries,
tsunami and science and technology. Clearly, limited funding has precluded planning for largescale projects of major significance to the entire region. By opening the Special Fund to all
stakeholders in the Indian Ocean including the user states, maritime industry and even banks such
as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a larger stakeholder group for undertaking
various projects could be created. The Special Fund could be administered by the Regional Experts
Group with contributor participation as observers.

See, for example, Palantir Inc., United States, “Disaster Response,” 11 August 2017, available at
https://www.palantir.com/solutions/disease-response/.html.
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Conclusion
Connecting the various information systems in the Indian Ocean could help to build comprehensive
maritime domain awareness and promote effective maritime governance in the region. As an
influential member of various regional and sub-regional fora, India can play a central role as a
facilitator for information sharing and help to synergise regional maritime efforts. Although, a
definitive mechanism for constructing a pan-Indian Ocean information grid which takes into
consideration the unique attributes of the region could be an area for further research, the
Cooperative Mechanism approach that has helped to facilitate cooperation by multiple
stakeholders, is an idea worth pursuing. And the EMSA MSS network could serve as a useful
functional model to successfully integrate data from multiple maritime agencies to provide
common services.
Existing regional infrastructure should allow for relatively rapid integration of multiple datasets
from different facilities into a pan-Indian Ocean information grid with funding from littoral states
and other stakeholders. Commercial off-the-shelf technology allows for integration of diverse
information layers onto a common platform. Such a pan-Indian Ocean information grid could serve
as a common thread binding the Indian Ocean region into a cohesive framework upon which a
comprehensive security regime could be built to address the region’s maritime security challenges.
Finally, by formally inviting extra-regional stakeholders, including China, to contribute to
maritime security in the Indian Ocean under a structured mechanism, India could better manage
China’s claims or concerns about maritime security. This might eventually strengthen multilateral
maritime security cooperation while also cementing India’s position as the region’s “net security
provider.”
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
Since the end of the Cold War, India has emerged as an economic and maritime power: seeking to
strengthen its position in the Indian Ocean region it has made a determined bid for leadership as
the region’s “net security provider.” The India of the twenty-first century wishes to regain its
perceived historical status as the pre-eminent maritime power in the Indian Ocean, while China as
a rising global power has similar ambitions in seeking to secure its strategic interests in the region.
The chance of a conflict erupting between the two powers, as predicted by several analysts, is high,
though it could also be avoided or deferred for a long time. Most analysts agree that the SinoIndian rivalry would be played out in significant part in the Indian Ocean and hence India’s
maritime strategy is vital for its success.
This chapter brings together the individual findings of the research to arrive at an overall
assessment of the efficacy of India’s maritime strategy. It also elucidates the various
complementary actions or alternate strategic options, identified throughout the thesis, that India
could adopt in its bid to consolidate its position in the Indian Ocean region. The first part of the
chapter reviews the key hypotheses for the study against the analyses presented in preceding
chapters. Next, it looks at the various research questions and presents the findings of the study.
The final part provides salient recommendations for the Indian Navy and scope for further
research.

Review of the Study
The research was based on six key hypotheses which were tested in chapters 2 to 7. A review of
the study is provided in the following paragraphs.
H1: The twenty-first century security environment in the Indian Ocean region presents
several complex challenges to India.
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The examination of the current environment in the Indian Ocean region in Chapter 2 present ample
evidence to support this hypothesis and confirm that the regional security situation is indeed
complex and fraught with strategic risks and uncertainties. The region faces a wide array of threats
in various parts, ranging from illegal migration, illegal fishing, and transnational crimes and piracy
at the lower end of the threat spectrum to terrorism, natural disasters and the impact of climate
change at the higher end. Thus, as the study demonstrates, by virtue of its vast coastline jutting
into the Indian Ocean and its geographic location at the centre of the region, India is not only
exposed and vulnerable to the entire range of non-traditional maritime threats but also faces serious
challenges from its two adversarial neighbours: both China and Pakistan which pose a long-term
strategic threat. As explained in Chapter 2, the expansion of Chinese maritime power in the Indian
Ocean could potentially change the extant Sino-Indian balance of power in China’s favour and
India can no longer take for granted the geostrategic advantages of its location at the centre of the
Indian Ocean.
H2: India by virtue of its geographic location and extant naval power enjoys relative
superiority over China in the Indian Ocean. India’s relations with China and Pakistan will
remain adversarial in the foreseeable future. China will seek to enhance its influence in the
Indian Ocean in pursuit of its national interests.
The comparative analysis in Chapter 2 indicates that even though the PLA Navy is twice as large
as the Indian Navy in terms of numbers of combatants, logistical constraints imposed by geography
coupled with corresponding Chinese requirements to maintain minimum forces levels in the
western Pacific theatre of operations, currently allow the Indian Navy to dominate in the Indian
Ocean. Further, the review of the current status of the Sino-Indian border dispute and cross-border
tensions between India and Pakistan provides support to the hypothesis that India’s relations with
both neighbours will continue to remain adversarial. Finally, recent developments in China with
regard to its national policy for the Indian Ocean stated in its Defence White Paper, and other
advances such as increased operational deployments of PLA Navy ships and a new logistics
facility in Djibouti prove the hypothesis that China is in the process of enhancing its influence in
the Indian Ocean in order to secure its national interests in the region.
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H3: India with tacit support from the United States is asserting its leadership in the Indian
Ocean region with a national vision to emerge as the region’s “net security provider.”
Indo-U.S. relations were examined in Chapter 6. The analysis brings out the extent and depth of
political and strategic engagements between India and the United States, marked by regular highlevel government-to-government interactions and a robust bilateral defence cooperation
programme, including an advanced combined naval exercise. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 6,
there have been several pronouncements made by the United States government in various fora
and national strategic documents that unambiguously state that the United States is willing to
support India as a security provider in the Indian Ocean.
H4: India has established close bilateral security relations with most Indian Ocean states.
The empirical analysis of India’s bilateral engagement with various Indian Ocean states in Chapter
5 provides sufficient proof to support Hypothesis 4. The evidence also reveals that India has a
coherent national strategy for promoting bilateral maritime security cooperation with most regional
states, with the obvious exception of Pakistan and a few others.
H5: India has adopted a hedging strategy with other extra-regional powers such as the
United States, Japan and Russia in order to balance China.
The examination in Chapter 6, of India’s maritime security cooperation with the United States,
Russia and Japan, clearly point to a hedging strategy aimed at balancing China. Further, recent
steps by India such as the conduct of the combined naval exercise Malabar with Japan and the
United States and a joint declaration on security cooperation with Australia following the signing
of the civil-nuclear energy cooperation agreement, provide evidence of an emerging de facto
security arrangement involving Australia, India, Japan and the United States, aimed at countering
China.
H6: India alone cannot meet all the future maritime security challenges of the Indian Ocean
region and therefore needs to involve China along with other stakeholders, including the
shipping industry, in regional multilateral initiatives to offset costs and augment regional
maritime capabilities, while maintaining close security ties with other strategic partners.
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Based on the examination of China’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean in Chapter 2, it is clear
that China’s interests could eventually lead to its deeper involvement in regional security
dynamics, and China’s growing economic influence could help it to dominate certain key regional
states. Although it is currently difficult to prognosticate which states would choose to align with
China over India, as explained in Chapter 7, this process could lead to a division of the region into
India and China-led groups and weaken the extant regional multilateral cooperation framework.
This would prove to be highly counter-productive for India as it would pave the way for greater
Chinese involvement in the Indian Ocean. Further, as noted in Chapter 2, the PLA Navy has much
greater capacity than the Indian Navy for participation in peacetime missions such as humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief operations. And with the operationalisation of the Chinese facility at
Djibouti, China could potentially challenge India as the primary net security provider for the
region. Finally, as brought out in Chapter 7, the absence of key stakeholders such as the shipping
industry and extra-regional states in key institutions such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
(IONS) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) is a crucial lacuna in the extant multilateral
framework for regional maritime security. Based on all these factors is it evident that India can no
longer promote multilateralism in the region without opening to other stakeholders. India must
therefore, acknowledge the strategic interests of China and other extra-regional states along with
industry, and help to promote a cooperative mechanism for comprehensive maritime security in
the Indian Ocean.

Research Outcomes
The main aim of the thesis was to assess India’s maritime strategy and critically examine its
efficacy and sustainability. In particular, it critiqued India’s ambitions to be the “net security
provider” for the Indian Ocean region to determine if the extant maritime strategy would help India
to maintain its balance of power with respect to China. The thesis recommends that India adopt
complementary actions and alternative strategic options. The argument was broken down and
considered as six key research questions. The findings of the study are expounded in the following
paragraphs.
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The first question was to study the impact of the twenty-first century Indian Ocean security
environment on India’s national security. As brought out in Chapter 2, India’s vulnerability to the
entire range of maritime threats has been exposed repeatedly. Events such as the Indian Ocean
tsunami, the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks of 2008 and capture of numerous Indian sailors by
Somali pirates clearly demonstrate the nature of challenges faced by India. Pertinently, India has
large-scale industrial infrastructure and critical nuclear power plants along its coastline, making it
highly susceptible to attacks from the sea. Furthermore, India’s relations with both China and
Pakistan, strained over long outstanding historic border disputes, are likely to remain so into the
future. India is thus faced with both non-traditional and traditional threats, and as acknowledged
in the Indian maritime strategy of 2015, the boundaries between the two are becoming blurred.
The second question was to examine how India’s foreign policy has shaped its maritime doctrine
and strategy and the basis for India’s ambitions to emerge as the regional “net security provider.”
This has been discussed extensively in Chapter 3 and the study shows that India’s postindependence foreign and maritime policymaking has been greatly influenced by its ancient
maritime heritage, which gave the Indian Ocean its very name. In other words, India sees the Indian
Ocean as “India’s Ocean.” Since the early 1990s, by which time the Cold War had ended and India
had acquired respectable naval capacity, New Delhi has made a bid for regional leadership. In the
beginning the political leadership seemed to be reticent in exercising maritime power, attributed
to its “sea blindness.” However, initial successes and navy efforts to educate the public at large
seem to have won the navy support from the government. An analysis of various strategic
documents promulgated by the Indian Navy reveals that the navy’s approach to regional leadership
has been to promote bilateral ties with various regional states to develop a “favourable
environment.” Initial naval successes of the late 1980s to early 1990s in promoting maritime
security cooperation and participation in regional security operations, the rapid growth of the
Indian Navy and tacit support from the United States in the twenty-first century, seems to have
inspired government confidence to declare a national vision for the Indian Ocean region;
announced by Prime Minister Modi in 2015 as ensuring “Security and Growth for All in the
Region” (SAGAR, or Ocean in Hindi). This concept has been the basis for the Indian Navy’s
maritime strategy to emerge as the region’s “net security provider.”
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The next question sought to explore the role of maritime security cooperation in the post-Cold War
period and how it could be measured by way of an analytical framework. Chapter 4 examined the
various security mechanisms and the evolution of security pluralism as the new security order in
Asia. The research reveals that India, as a medium power with no security treaty or alliance partner,
and faced with a threat to its territorial integrity from an emerging Chinese superpower and
Pakistan, has limited strategic options. Therefore, as demonstrated in the study, India has sought
to strengthen strategic partnerships with extra-regional powers and cultivate close bilateral security
ties with regional states through maritime security cooperation.
In order to measure the level, or depth, of security ties with various countries, an analytical
framework was designed derived from Ken Booth’s trinity of naval roles. Subsequently, an
analysis of India’s maritime security engagements with various states using this framework
revealed a coherent national maritime strategy at work. This led to the next two questions: to assess
the efficacy of India’s bilateral maritime security cooperation initiatives and the context of
relations with extra-regional powers, and recommend complementary actions and strategic options
that could be adopted by India. The research has revealed that, in recent years, India’s policy for
the Indian Ocean region has coalesced into a whole-of- government approach under the leadership
of Prime Minister Modi, and that India has sought to establish a favourable environment by
establishing a network of bilateral security relationships. Further, using the framework to
determine the depth of maritime security cooperation, the research provides strong empirical
evidence that indicates that India’s maritime security cooperation initiatives seem to have gained
traction in the region, and have largely been welcomed by most states.
India’s relations with Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles, in particular, are
assessed to be exclusive and privileged. Further, as noted in Chapter 5, India is reportedly in the
process of setting up a naval facility in the Seychelles. A similar facility could conceivably be
established in Mauritius. The analysis of India’s bilateral maritime security cooperation
arrangements indicates that it has accorded priority to building relations with its neighbours in
South and Southeast Asia and is beginning to step up its maritime cooperation with West Asian
states, with a long-term strategic focus on Iran. In relative terms, India’s maritime cooperation
with the East African states is limited, evidently as the region lies on the fringes of India’s strategic
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interest. Consequently, Chinese economic and political influence overshadows India’s relations
there.
The study indicates that, China, in a tacit acknowledgement of India’s geostrategic advantage and
formidable naval power, is conscious of its vulnerability in the Indian Ocean region. Evidently,
China has also realised the limitations of its economic and political clout in other strategic locations
such as Sri Lanka, Mauritius and the Seychelles, where India has established deep security ties.
However, following China’s huge trade with and investments in the region, the PLA Navy has
since 2009 has rapidly expanded its footprint in the Indian Ocean. China already enjoys significant
political and economic influence in some parts, mainly Pakistan and, to a lesser degree, in
Tanzania, Eritrea and Djibouti, where it has established a naval logistics facility. This is a crucial
development and it is opined that once the Chinese facility at Djibouti is fully set up, China will
be poised to play a larger role in the region as a security provider, potentially eventually displacing
India’s status as the primary net security provider.
An examination of India’s relations with extra-regional powers in Chapter 6 indicates that New
Delhi has also successfully established close and long-term strategic partnerships with the United
States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, in order to acquire state-of-the-art defence
technology and build up its own military industrial complex. It is expected that these partnerships
will greatly enhance India’s military capability and credibility as a net security provider for the
region. India has skillfully leveraged its relations with the United States to foster close ties with
other states, particularly the Southeast and West Asian states, and also rapidly modernise its navy
to make a determined bid to be the net security provider. At the same time India has hedged with
Japan, seen as an “enemy of the enemy” and also put its “foot in the door” in the western Pacific
by promoting strategic relationships with both Japan and Vietnam. India’s growing maritime
security cooperation with the United States, Japan and Australia are a clear attempt at alliance
building to counter China in a balance of power strategy, even though India has taken care not to
overtly antagonise Beijing.
From the analysis in Chapter 5 it is clear that India’s bilateral approach to building a favourable
environment as envisaged under its maritime strategy is unsustainable in the long term, given the
quantum of effort involved and the adverse impact of failing to live up to the expectations of the

288

smaller and more vulnerable regional states as they prepare to grapple with twenty-first century
maritime challenges. Further, any failure on India’s part to fulfil maritime security needs could
push some states closer to China. This could potentially divide the region between India and China,
possibly leading to a confrontation between the two sides. Moreover, forging security ties alone is
no guarantee for support in perpetuity. A change in government in any state could potentially
negate any goodwill achieved with earlier regimes. Most significantly, the Indian maritime
strategy for the Indian Ocean is also dependent on support from the United States – at least in areas
outside South Asia– and thus does not cater for possible withdrawal of the United States from the
region.
The final question concerned India’s role in multilateral maritime security cooperation and
prospects for maritime cooperation between India and China. Given the common nature of
maritime threats prevalent in the Indian Ocean, regional states have preferred to deal with nontraditional threats multilaterally. This has given rise to several institutions at the sub-regional and
regional level. India has taken the lead to foster maritime multilateralism in the Indian Ocean and
sought to keep itself in the “drivers seat” of the various regional fora, in part by keeping out China.
However, as proven by hypothesis 6, the emerging maritime threats and challenges of the Indian
Ocean are beyond the capacity of any single state and require involvement of all stakeholders. The
research advocates greater focus on multilateralism over bilateral security ties, which could pave
the way for sustained collaboration between India and China. This could be achieved by India –
with support from other key regional states such as Australia, Indonesia and South Africa – by
involving China and all other stakeholders in the maritime security of the Indian Ocean region.
Thus, a multilateral approach led by regional states, within a structured framework involving
relevant extra-regional states and other stakeholders such as the shipping industry in a publicprivate partnership, could be the way ahead. This could be modelled on the Cooperative
Mechanism in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. By adopting this approach India could
continue to retain its pre-eminent position in regional fora while at the same time fostering greater
multilateralism. As regards India’s concerns of maintaining a maritime strategic balance of power
with China, strengthening its Andamans force posture would provide the necessary “bulwark”
against any future possibility of confrontation with China in the Indian Ocean and should be
accorded the highest priority by the Indian government.

289

Recommendations
As Chinese maritime power follows its trade and strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region, the
threat of China altering the extant balance of power in its own favour looms large. What are India’s
strategic options? First, India must realise that national strategy is about leveraging one’s own
means rather than dependency on foreign relations which could change over time. The study
reveals that the weakest link in India’s maritime strategy is the Andaman and Nicobar Islands,
whose strategic potential is yet to be fully realised. By failing to develop the Andamans as a fullfledged operational command rather than a far-flung outpost, India has failed to leverage their
geostrategic potential, overlooking the mouth of the Strait of Malacca. India’s decision to develop
a new base South of Mumbai, conceived 35 years ago, is a glaring example of strategic shortsightedness. Looking 35 years ahead, India may have to reconcile to a permanent Chinese presence
in the Indian Ocean that could effectively neutralise its own geographic advantages. Thus, India
must strengthen the Andaman and Nicobar command and upgrade it to the level of other naval
commands. The functions of a strategic outpost in the Indian Ocean could be achieved by new
facilities in the Seychelles and Mauritius. Upgrading the Andaman and Nicobar Command would
serve as an enduring symbol of India’s maritime power in the Indian Ocean and, for China, as
noted earlier, become a “knife at the throat,” rather than a notional “dilemma.”
India should concurrently endeavor to strengthen maritime multilateralism in the Indian Ocean
region and work towards closer integration of extant institutions and maritime capabilities. One of
the key reasons for the failure of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and the Indian Ocean
Rim Association (IORA) to emerge as all-inclusive frameworks could be attributed to India’s
efforts to take complete “ownership” of these fora. This approach could potentially stymie growth
of maritime multilateralism. By being more inclusive it could be possible to facilitate a larger, but
controlled, role for China. India must try to meld both fora into a single framework or an Indian
Ocean Assembly – as mooted by Sri Lanka – involving the regional heads of states, in order to
facilitate greater synergy of effort and maritime capabilities. India should also seek to upgrade the
extant multinational combined exercise Milan into an operational forum for Indian Ocean navies,
on the lines of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM +). Furthermore, India could
help to develop a Track 2 forum to provide guidance and support to regional institutions and drive
policy formulation.
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India must also acknowledge that there are other stakeholders that have genuine interests and
associated security concerns in the Indian Ocean region. Rather than keeping China out of
multilateral fora, India should rather initiate a dialogue with China to involve it in the regional
multilateralism. Further, as a large and wealthy trading nation dependent upon the Indian Ocean,
China should be encouraged to contribute to the costs of protecting maritime security via regional
mechanisms. In fact, the success of China’s Maritime Silk Road programme hinges on maritime
safety and security in the Indian Ocean. Therefore the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank
(AIIB) ought to be a key donor to the regional mechanism proffered by this thesis for maritime
security under an IONS-IORA framework. Similarly, India must facilitate active participation by
other non-state stakeholders such as the shipping industry in a public-private partnership as
advocated in Chapter 8, which could be the key to building a comprehensive maritime security
framework for the Indian Ocean region.
Finally, India should initiate development of a pan-Indian Ocean Information Grid for maritime
domain awareness (MDA) by linking all the available global and regional information systems.
Linking all the information resources in the region could thus be the first step practical, operationallevel step towards achieving a comprehensive framework.
The effectiveness of India’s maritime strategy will ultimately be measured by its success in
combating non-traditional maritime threats and ensuring national security, and contributing to
maintenance of a balance of power with China. By strengthening the Andamans posture, India
could fully exploit its geostrategic advantage over China in the Indian Ocean, and by involving
China in a cooperative role, India could build trust and confidence. Together, these twin strands of
policy could improve regional stability and security for all in the Indian Ocean.

Areas for Further Study
With the implementation of China’s Belt and Road infrastructure, over the coming years, it is
expected that the Chinese presence and influence across the region would assume greater salience
and add another dimension to the study. Manifestly, there are several risks inherent in the
programme and it is difficult to predict the outcome of China’s endeavours or the role of regional
states. This aspect is beyond the scope of this research and therefore merits a separate study. Other
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areas for further research could include a study to determine the scope and technical modalities of
integrating various sub-regional maritime information systems into a common grid to help to
improve regional maritime governance; the strategic interests and role of the United States in the
Indian Ocean under the newly formed government and most importantly a review of the status of
the Andaman and Nicobar group of islands with a view to develop their strategic and military
infrastructure.
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